The Business of War in the Early Modern Baltic Sea Region, 1530–1765

Edited by Jaakko Björklund, Sebastian Schiavone, Steve Murdoch & Anu Lahtinen



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Introduction

The Business of War in History and Historiography

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The business of war, meaning the commercial supply, financing, and organisation of soldiers and materiel for armies and navies, was one of the leading economic sectors in early modern Europe. During this turbulent period, civil unrest and wars were the norm rather than the exception. Changes in the practice of war meant ever more manpower was required, along with expensive new technologies and new forms of administrative competence, and most importantly the timely payment of specialised experts. In response to these challenges—and

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opportunities—many potentates turned to the private market to provide the necessary military resources. While some of these could be acquired locally, the bulk were obtained through transnational networks of merchants and military entrepreneurs, making this a pan-European and even global endeavour.[1]

This anthology explores the role of private agents in supplying war in and from the Baltic Sea region during the early modern period. Although the prevalence and significance of private military entrepreneurs and contractors for military supply and early modern state formation are well recognised in the fields of military, social, and economic history, these topics rarely form the focus of research.[2] Ideals of military service constructed in the 19th century and based on national-patriotic sentiments and modernising narratives of state formation and institutional development tend to consider military entrepreneurship as either an uninteresting historical dead end or a transitory phase in the development of strong nation-states with powerful, centrally administered standing armies.[3]

Only in recent years have these ingrained and teleological assumptions come under revision. The re-emergence of military contractors in the post-Cold War era and a wider trend towards privatisation and specialisation of operations have raised interest in and awareness of past practices. As demonstrated by David Parrott, Rafael Torres Sánchez, and others, outsourcing could be an efficient means of resource mobilisation and interest aggregation, with mutual benefits for both contractor states and entrepreneurial suppliers. Indeed, military entrepreneurship did not disappear with the advent of nation-states but continued in varying forms throughout the early modern period and beyond.[4]

1 Parrott 2012; Torres Sánchez, Brandon, and 't Hart 2018; Carl 2022.

2 Zürcher 2013, 11; Torres Sánchez, Brandon, and 't Hart 2018, 4.

3 For theories of military entrepreneurship forming a transitory phase in the process of state formation, see, for example, Hintze (1906) 1975, 200; Weber (1918) 2007, 77–128; Redlich 1957; Redlich 1965, 103–11; Anderson (1974) 2013; Wallerstein (1974) 2011, 133–34, 139–43; McNeill 1982, 132–43; Mann (1986) 2012, 452–58; Lynn 1990; Tilly (1990) 1992, 29–33; Lynn 1995; Lindegren 2000; Ribot García 2000; Ertman 2003; Ágoston 2010.

4 Harding and Solbes Ferri 2012; Parrott 2012; 't Hart 2014; Brandon 2015; Torres Sánchez 2016; Björklund 2025.

This paradigm shift has led to a reappraisal of public–private interaction in the early modern world, and of the role of private agents in managing and providing the means for emerging states to perform their core functions—the foremost of which was providing security and stability in countering external and internal threats.[5] As Jeff Fynn-Paul, Marjolein 't Hart, and Griet Vermeesch have argued, well-connected military entrepreneurs formed a crucial nexus, connecting the diffuse powerholders of early modern states. Moreover, it was these transnational private agents and their networks that enabled rulers to connect with the broader military market and gain access to crucial fiscal-military resources needed to wage war.[6]

Recent research has also demonstrated that military entrepreneurship could function as an efficient means of interest aggregation, allowing members of the mercantile and social elites to participate in the state's military endeavours.[7] Indeed, with the expanded resources, networks, and social capital provided by these private agents, outsourcing was often a mutually beneficial solution. Private suppliers gained a measure of political agency, social and cultural validation, and social and economic advancement. In return, rulers gained access to otherwise inaccessible resources at lower transaction costs and greater efficiency than in purely state-run enterprises. Furthermore, by using private agents the state could devolve managerial responsibility as well as financial and social risks to these individuals.[8]

This new focus on private suppliers has been most evident in the analytical model of the contractor state. In contrast to past models of the power state and the fiscal-military state, which focused on revenue extraction by the state and its re-allocation through centralised institutions, the contractor state approach emphasises collaboration and negotiation between the state and private suppliers, and shifts the focus of observation from the resource-raising paradigm to the nature and efficacy of how those funds were used. The contractor state, as defined by Harding and Solbes Ferri, sought to exert an indirect influence on

5 Hallenberg 2008, 227; Owens 2010.

6 Fynn-Paul, 't Hart, and Vermeesch 2014, 3–6; Wilson and Klerk 2020; Sutherland 2022, 13–14; Wilson 2024.

7 Parrott 2012; Parrott 2014; Björklund 2025.

8 Harding and Solbes Ferri 2012; Pourchasse 2012; Fynn-Paul, 't Hart, and Vermeesch 2014; Torres Sánchez 2016, 7–9; Sutherland 2022, 13–14; Rogger and Holenstein 2024; Schiavone 2025.

commercial interest groups to obtain the resources needed to meet its military objectives. Prerequisites for the successful functioning of this indirect approach were a developed economy, flexibility, and an effective and active administration which understood and monitored the supply system, as well as working dialogues, collaboration, and trust between the various parties involved. The most successful states, such as Great Britain and the Dutch Republic, managed to 'go further' than their rivals, with more resources and greater efficiency in employing them.[9]

Others have drawn attention to the transnational nature of military supply systems. States needed not only connections to foreign production areas and international markets to obtain the commodities required to maintain their militaries, but also political support and collaboration with foreign powers to access these.[10] Professor Peter Wilson's ongoing project *The European Fiscal-Military System 1530–1870* (University of Oxford) has sought to shift the research focus from national narratives of private military supply to a more holistic and decentralised explanation of the emergence of the European state system as a whole. A central element of this framework is viewing the system as composed of a series of production areas, joined together by crucial fiscal-military hubs (nodes), in which key intermediaries managed the transfer and exchange of these military resource flows.[11]

The Baltic Sea region formed its own ecosystem within this broader fiscal-military system, particularly as more of it came under Swedish dominance as the 17th century progressed. Most of the commodities needed to wage war on both land and sea could be found within the region, allowing local rulers to engage in armed conflict while also creating competition between states over resource control. External powers and private suppliers were also drawn to these resources, while

9 Harding and Solbes Ferri 2012; Torres Sánchez 2016, 5. For the British case, see Bowen 2006; Conway 2006; Bannerman (2008) 2016; Knight and Wilcox 2010; Graham 2014. For the Dutch case, see 't Hart 2014; Brandon 2015. For a discussion on the overlap between fiscal-military states and contractor states, see Brandon 2013, 13–22. For a list of publications and ongoing research following the 'contractor state' approach, see the website of the Contractor State Group, https://www.unav.edu/web/contractor-state-group.

10 De Vries 2010; Trim 2010; Norrhem 2019; Norrhem and Thomson 2020; Sutherland 2022, 6–8.

11 Klerk 2020; Wilson 2020a; Wilson 2020b; Wilson and Klerk 2020.

increasing intra-Baltic Sea area competition drove local powers to look further afield for additional resources. Thus, despite Denmark–Norway's military and maritime supremacy at the dawn of the 17th century, the Oldenburg state was a power in decline, suffering catastrophic military defeats and loss of territory in both 1645 and 1658.[12] The opening of the Danish Sound by force meant that the increasingly Swedish controlled Baltic region became ever more connected with the broader European fiscal-military system and global economy. It did so while Baltic trade routes retained some particular geopolitical and commercial characteristics, including the continued collection of Sound Tolls by the Danish authorities for most Scandinavian cargoes.[13] Indeed, competition over Baltic Sea trade routes and military resources—including but not limited to grain, naval stores, metals, and manpower—is an enduring phenomenon, even if collection of the Sound Toll finally ceased in 1857.

Unlike the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Central European military markets, the business of war and public–private cooperation in the Baltic Sea region has received much less academic attention. The region's distinctive fiscal-military environment has been either ignored or subsumed within more generalising accounts in previous studies. Moreover, what research exists remains scattered.[14] This book seeks to rectify this, having drawn together a team of international scholars, both seasoned researchers and emerging voices in the field, to provide an overview of the latest research regarding the business of war in the North, particularly concerning Sweden, her allies, and those territories resisting or facilitating fiscal-military growth.

The aims of this book are threefold. Firstly, it explores the particular features and realities of the business of war in the Baltic Sea region, where fiscal-military operations were characterised by long distances, difficult terrain, lack of infrastructure, and a low degree of urbanisation. For much of the early modern period, this region also suffered from a paucity of capital and an undeveloped economy. Mercantile groups in the North were far smaller and less affluent than in richer regions of Europe and consequently enjoyed far less autonomy and

12 Lockhart 2007.

13 Jespersen 2017.

14 Frost 2001; Kreem 2001; Glete 2002; Glete 2010; Skoog 2018; Sproule 2019; Björklund and Schiavone 2021; Skoog 2021; Talvitie and Granqvist 2021.

manoeuvrability within the strong centralised Northern states than their counterparts elsewhere. This created an interesting operational environment explored throughout this book, where the resources needed to wage war were often available, but mobilising them effectively required concerted public–private collaboration.

This ties in with the second aim of the book: to broaden the perspective on the types of resources exchanged and provided by private military suppliers. While past studies have often focused on the supply of a few key commodities, such as soldiers or materiel, this represents only a fraction of the diverse goods and services that were delivered by entrepreneurial suppliers and private agents. Besides funds and financial services, private suppliers were instrumental in providing states with crucial intangible resources, such as knowledge, expertise, and social capital. In recognition of this broader categorisation, this book focuses on the exchange of the following commodities, each addressed in their own sections:

- **Materiel**, including overtly military equipment such as arms and armour, as well as more general supplies used for military purposes, such as victuals for soldiers, is examined in Part I.
- **Manpower**, in the form of soldiers, military specialists, and non-fighting labour used to sustain military efforts, is examined in Part II.
- **Financial services**, including providing funds, advancing credit, and guaranteeing loans, as well as enabling monetary transactions, are examined in Part III.
- **Intangible resources**, such as specialised knowledge, ability, and expertise, social contacts, and access to significant military networks, as well as reputation and social standing, are examined throughout all parts of the book.

This last concept of intangible resources is fundamental to the third aim of the book, namely, to feature the private suppliers themselves rather than the system as a whole. By focusing on individuals, rather than institutions, we aim to bring in a fresh perspective which highlights the agency, motivations, and logic of the people and groups involved in a way that macro-level studies cannot do. Finally, our range of examples, connected by the four sections identified above and a single geographic focus, offer a good perspective on charting continuity

and change in the business of war in the Baltic Sea region over three centuries.

The chapters of this book portray the complexity and diversity of the business of war in the early modern Baltic Sea region. There are contributions on the various forms of public–private interaction in organising military supply, the political significance and societal implications of military entrepreneurship, and the intricate relationship between the business of war and state formation. From these elements, the following key themes arise:

I. **Questions of efficiency and utility of private military supply solutions.** Private military supply solutions offered the rulers of the Baltic region access to a broader resource base at potentially lower transaction costs and greater flexibility than if they had attempted to manage everything on their own. All chapters of this book showcase how rulers in the region had to carefully balance this flexibility with reliability, state control mechanisms, negotiations, and institutional developments to maintain control over their armed forces.
II. **The transnational nature of the supply system and the role of private agents in managing resource flows.** The large-scale transnational system of the early modern business of war was strongly represented in the Baltic Sea region. This book showcases how the networks of military contractors developed and how these networks enabled the region's rulers to tap into these international military resources. The key role played by military entrepreneurs as intermediaries in this system of resource transfer highlights the importance of personal networks in enabling the system.
III. **Exploring different forms of military entrepreneurship and their overlapping public and private roles.** Military entrepreneurs are traditionally viewed as self-interested, private, non-state actors. This book shows that during the early modern period this distinction was not so clear cut, with individuals often performing combined roles—both with formal authorisation and informally. This was not generally seen as problematic and was even encouraged, although in some cases these overlapping roles could lead to conflicts of interest. While personal aggrandisement could certainly be a motivating factor, we demonstrate that these individuals were not merely self-interested war profiteers but also

members of broader communities and networks, with social ties and obligations connecting them to the states which they served.

IV. **The political significance of privatised military supply—both for domestic politics and for international diplomatic relations.** The mobilisation of military resources was a major undertaking, requiring state oversight, resource extraction and re-allocation, and negotiation with various interest groups. Besides military power, mobilising resources for warfare created pools of economic, political, social, and informational power. These processes and the concentration of power in the hands of various groups played an important role in the development of state structures and institutions, as well as the formation of the European states system and diplomatic ties between foreign powers. We consider how this power was built, negotiated, and used, and the ways in which rulers sought to maintain control of the emerging fiscal-military structures.

Structure of the Work

Part I of this anthology, 'Materiel', concerns the flow of material resources that were vital for the successful waging of early modern warfare, as well as the public–private relationships connected to its supply.

In Chapter 1, 'Social Capital v the Fiscal-Military State: The Logistics and Supply of the Covenanting Army, 1633–1641', Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch look to the origins of the Covenanting Revolution in Scotland (1639–1641). The innovative aspect of this chapter comes through the revelation that preparations for financing and assembling the rebel Army of the Covenant did not occur in 1638 (as quoted in orthodox histories) but can be easily traced to five years earlier, in 1633. This case study illuminates how the rebels' social capital, built up over several decades in the armies of Sweden, Denmark–Norway, the Dutch Republic, and France, enabled them to supply the rebel army with military materiel, soldiers, and officers from these countries. The chapter thus explains how the Covenanting Revolution could only happen because of a truly international network of political and financial support based not on money but on decades of military service and amassed social capital and networking.

Mika Mickelson discusses the network of the arms manufacturer and entrepreneur Louis De Geer (1587–1652) in Chapter 2, '"Cannons Have Made Him Very Rich": Louis De Geer's Role in the International Arms Trade in the Baltic and North Sea Region in the Early 17th Century'. De Geer's activities offer a valuable perspective on military entrepreneurship and on the gradual emergence of permanent navies and armies as part of state formation process in early modern Europe. Here the focus lies on how De Geer's personal contacts and social network enabled his military entrepreneurship. Through his network, he had connections and access to international capital and expertise that were necessary for the development of the Swedish economy and domestic manufacturing.

Chapter 3, 'Private Enterprise and Commercial-Diplomatic Exchange: British Arms Supply and Sweden, 1654–1660', by Adam Grimshaw, traces the actions of Britain and Sweden's mercantile communities, diplomatic corps, and political elites, demonstrating the many ways in which their cooperation facilitated commerce during the second half of the 17th century. The chapter illustrates how vital goods were sourced when both Britain and Sweden endured periods of conflict, and highlights the efficiency and effectiveness of private enterprise in sourcing and delivering goods. Further, the collaboration between Britain's and Sweden's commercial, diplomatic, and political spheres served to facilitate the procurement of goods. The political significance of privatised military supply is then placed within the context of contemporary diplomatic discussions and relations occurring between Britain and Sweden as both a cause and effect which impacted the nature of their relationship.

Chapter 4, Patrik Winton's 'Global Commodity Chains and Military Supplies during the Russo-Swedish War, 1741–1743', investigates the Swedish state's deployment of private agents to efficiently mobilise resources during the Russo-Swedish War. The chapter examines how the Swedish government's demand for resources led to transnational flows of goods. Likewise, it discusses how the mobilisation of those resources affected merchants involved in the trade in grain and peas from Swedish Pomerania, fish from Norway and Scotland, and tobacco from the Americas. Finally, Winton investigates the relationships between the Swedish state and its main suppliers, as well as the strategies that state officials utilised to limit potential harmful practices

arising from the merchants' strong position, such as overpricing, and how state officials maintained control of the fiscal-military system.

Part II, 'Soldiers', concerns the role of military entrepreneurs, military networks, military migration, and military intelligence in the process of recruiting soldiers and other personnel needed to sustain early modern armies.

In Chapter 5, 'Intelligence, Security, and the Military Market in Sweden, 1538–1547', Martin Neuding Skoog examines the role of the military market in Swedish security considerations during the years from 1538 to 1547, when the country was the target of international intrigue and recurrent plans for invasion. In response, King Gustav Vasa organised extensive intelligence networks in Germany and adjoining areas to monitor military developments. The study demonstrates how the networks operated, what intelligence the agents provided, and how that information affected royal policy. Furthermore, this chapter emphasises the significant role of the military market in decision-making about national security. The interplay between intelligence and the military market is a crucial yet understudied part of the general field of early modern military history. The chapter reveals the struggle for control of the transnational fiscal-military structures and illustrates the entangled nature of private enterprise, intelligence, and national security in 16th-century Europe.

Chapter 6, by Sebastian Schiavone, titled 'The King's Scots: The Swedish Crown's Attempts to Utilise and Control William Cahun's Cavalry Squadron in the Northern Seven Years' War', investigates the relationship between the Scottish cavalry squadron of William Cahun and kings Erik XIV and Johan III of Sweden. In the context of fiscal-military history and the Swedish crown's attempts to use foreign professional soldiers and military entrepreneurs in the development of Sweden's military apparatus, the Northern Seven Years' War (1563–1570) offers an important watershed moment. This war witnessed the first successful large-scale recruitments of Scottish soldiers into Swedish service. Cahun's Scottish squadron presented both monarchs with new challenges: how to ensure officer loyalty, how to use the Scots in military operations, and how to supply and pay the troops in a war that lasted for years. This chapter showcases how the relationship between the Swedish crown and Cahun's squadron developed through the war, ultimately sowing the seeds of what would become the Swedish–Scottish military network.

Chapter 7, 'An Officer and a Businessman: Jacob De la Gardie as Military Entrepreneur during the Ingrian War, 1609–1617', by Jaakko Björklund, follows the development of De la Gardie's lifeguard regiment, which the Swedish entrepreneur recruited, supplied, and financed partly himself and partly through the crown. This dual position as colonel-proprietor of a regiment and commander of Swedish forces saw De la Gardie combining private and public roles. These roles were further blurred as he incorporated other units—both privately owned and those belonging to the king—into his regiment, thereby raising complex and contentious questions about the ownership of these units and the loyalty of their men. Although De la Gardie clearly overstepped some bounds in the management of his regiment, the end result proved to be a mutually beneficial solution, which helped Sweden win the Ingrian War and the Swedish commander to benefit from his entrepreneurial actions, both financially and socially.

Chapter 8, 'Military Entrepreneurship and Migration: Swedish Mercenaries in Venetian Service', by Björn Forsén and Mika Hakkarainen, sheds light on the hitherto largely unrecognised Swedish military entrepreneurs in the service of Venice during the Morean War (1684–1699). Swedish participation in the business of war on the continent goes back to the Thirty Years' War and peaked during the last two decades of the 17th century, creating a bridge from the Baltic Sea to the larger pan-European military market. The chapter offers a survey of the Swedish subjects who joined Venetian service, exploring who they were, what motivated them to leave their own country to fight in Southern Europe, and whether any of them chose to settle down for good in Venice or elsewhere in Italy. The choices made and career trajectories of these military entrepreneurs and officers broaden our understanding not only of mercenarism but also of the interconnectivity between the Baltic and Mediterranean military markets at the height of Swedish absolutism.

Part III of the book, 'Finances', investigates different facets, both public and private, of financing war and of the complex process of transferring funds to where they were needed in the early modern Baltic Sea region.

Chapter 9, Mariusz Balcerek's 'Financing the War in Livonia, 1617–1626', focuses on funding the war between the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden. These years saw some of the most intensive fighting of the wider Polish–Swedish War (1600–1629), which marked

a breakthrough in the struggle for dominance in this region. This chapter presents the first comparative analysis of the costs of this war for both belligerents, analyses the role of private financiers in providing these funds, and provides an assessment of the relative efficiency of the financial systems employed.

Chapter 10, 'Financial Contributions and *Brandskatt* from the Period of the Polish–Swedish War, 1655–1660', by Katarzyna Wagner, in turn examines financial contributions and war taxes imposed on the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth by Sweden during the Polish–Swedish War. Wagner defines the role and agency of private agents in determining and collecting these taxes. She also investigates the position of *brandskatt* (a threatening 'fire tax') in the extraordinary war contribution imposed on the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, comparing it with the financial contributions imposed on Old Warsaw.

In Chapter 11, 'The Financial Infrastructure of Warfare: Merchant Bankers, Bills of Exchange, and the Exchange Bank in 18th-Century Sweden', Peter Ericsson examines the Swedish state's utilisation of merchant bankers in money transfers and methods of payments to sustain Sweden's warfare during the Seven Years' War (1756–63). Stockholm's merchant bankers were an integral part of the networks that constituted international financial markets, with centres in Amsterdam and London, and, for the Baltic area, Hamburg. International payments were conducted by bills of exchange. In a rare instance, a substantial number of the bills of exchange circulated in 1761 have been preserved in the archives of the merchant banker firm of Carlos and Claes Grill, facilitating an investigation of their contacts and transactions. This chapter illustrates how the complex financial interaction between state and market played out in practice, while also presenting an institutional context which has previously eluded research.

The Seven Years' War is also the focus of Chapter 12, 'Swedish Logistics and Finance in the Seven Years' War, 1757–1762', by Oleksandr Turchyn. This chapter examines how the Swedish war procurement system functioned during the country's involvement in the Seven Years' War, fighting against Prussia in Pomerania and Brandenburg. It focuses on the supply activities from the ground level of this war, which are triangulated against Sweden's domestic and foreign trade operations. It also discusses the role played by local entrepreneurs in Germany and Swedish government ministers, managing the strategic resource base and mobilising capital for tactical army manoeuvres.

The chapter supports this anthology's central themes of efficiency and utility of private agents in providing military supply during the 18th century while also expanding on the traditional scholarship about Sweden's participation in the Seven Years' War.

Finally, Cathleen Sarti's Epilogue synthesises the key findings from the book, summarising the conclusions arrived at for each theme covered. The Epilogue highlights the complex interdependencies of the business of war, and the challenges and opportunities of studying the phenomenon in the future.

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PART I

Materiel

CHAPTER 1

Social Capital v The Fiscal-Military State

The Logistics and Supply of the Covenanting Army, 1633–1641

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Abstract

This chapter looks to the origins of the Covenanting Revolution in Scotland (1639–1641). The innovative work reveals that preparations for financing and assembling the rebel Army of the Covenant began in 1633, not 1638 as Orthodox histories have claimed. How does an army with no extant infrastructure finance a revolution which saw the rebels field an army larger, more professional and better equipped than the Royal armies of England, Ireland and Scotland? The answer lies in the social capital built up over several decades in the armies of Sweden, Denmark-Norway, the Dutch Republic and France. Members of the

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governments of three of these states provided and transported soldiers, military materiel, and expertise in the form of skilled officers and engineers. Their governments also facilitated the running of potential blockades both in the Danish Sound and in the North Sea. Businessmen and bankers also became important agents in sourcing capital and goods for the Army of the Covenant. Moreover, the rebels were able to neutralise the closest Stuart allies (Denmark and France) and thus field the first professional army in the British Isles. This case-study shows how one tiny European country's revolution could only happen because of a truly international network of political and financial support based not on money, but decades of military service and amassed social capital and networking.

Introduction

The specifics of how the Scottish Covenanting Army (1638–1641) obtained its weapons have long remained nebulous. In contrast, the succession of events leading to the raising of an army in opposition to the rightful monarch is well understood. In 1633 Charles I held the Scottish Coronation Parliament, introducing new taxes, disempowering the nobility, and threatening the independence of the Scottish Calvinist Church. The following year saw the 'awakening' of the Scottish military diaspora as those serving abroad became aware of developments back home. However, it was the introduction of the Anglican-styled *Book of Common Prayer* in 1637 which generated a 'spontaneous' riot on its first reading.[1] The following year saw the general discontent among the people formalised in the distribution and signing of the National Covenant, binding the Scottish nation to God by adherence to the Kirk (Calvinist Church).[2] A clear split formed between those loyal to the Kirk, known as Covenanters, and those supporting the Stuart monarch, making an armed rebellion inevitable. This in turn necessitated the covert procurement of military supplies. Indeed, it was in 1638 that the first tangible arms shipments arrived in Scotland from overseas.

The 1638–1641 Covenanting Revolution has been closely documented, gaining wider attention within the British and Irish academic

1 *Booke of Common Prayer* 1637.
2 For a copy of the Scottish National Covenant, see Gardiner 1899, 124–34.

milieu by the early 1990s.[3] More recently, scholars have further teased out and more deeply nuanced the political and theological dynamics of the Covenanting movement,[4] producing some detailed analysis of the revolutionary army, particularly in terms of its personnel, and of the leadership on both sides in the ensuing conflict.[5] The diplomatic manoeuvring and more covert attempts to gain allies, rebel Covenanters and staunch followers of Charles I alike, have similarly received attention, particularly with regard to the international networks involved.[6] The focus of this study will lie on the origins of the military and logistical elements, asking how a revolutionary alliance with no extant financial infrastructure could raise an army larger, more professional, and better equipped than the royal armies of England, Ireland, and Scotland which they sought to confront.

In our early works (which predate the digital age) we highlighted evidence for materiel sourced in and supplied from Sweden. Now we can significantly enhance those findings using an array of digital sources previously unavailable to us. These include the Gothenburg Customs Accounts (Göteborg Drätselkammare), the Sound Toll Registers Online (STRO), and the Dundee Ship Arrivals (DSA).[7] We also returned to the physical archives and utilised previously untapped archival sources such as the Stockholm Vågböcker (the 'Stockholm weighbooks' (SWB) at the Swedish National Archives), and the Stockholm Customs Accounts (SCA) in the city's Stadsarkiv.[8] Adam Grimshaw's forensic work on 17th-century Anglo-Swedish trade has revealed the importance of these latter two resources for this type of study.[9]

3 Stevenson (1973) 2003; Stevenson 1981; Lee 1985; Morrill 1990; Macinnes 1991; Russell 1991; Fissel 1994.

4 Stewart 2016; Langley 2020.

5 Furgol 1990; Murdoch and Grosjean 2014, chs. 5 and 6; Robertson 2014.

6 Murdoch 2003, 90–116; Murdoch 2010a.

7 We express our sincere thanks to Dr Christina Dalhede for sharing her photographs of the Drätselkammare in the Göteborg Landsarkiv with us. The STRO is published by Gröningen University, https://www.soundtoll.nl; the Dundee shipping lists are published by the Friends of the Dundee City Archives, 'Ship Arrivals in the Port of Dundee 1612 to 1700', http://www.fdca.org.uk/17th_C_Ship_Arrivals.html.

8 Stockholm Riksarkiv, Kammararkivet, Stockholms vågböcker; Stockholm Stadsarkiv, stadskamrerarens arkiv räkenskaper.

9 Grimshaw 2024.

As is often the case, not all these sources are complete for the period under consideration. The Gothenburg records are missing for the years 1639 and 1640, namely, the height of the Scottish rebellion. Similarly, the SCA begin in 1636, but are incomplete for 1637 and 1638. Further, not only is the corruption of personal names, ports, and cargo listings endemic throughout records, but the STRO, for example, often confuses the home port of a vessel with the place of origin of a cargo.[10] Each collection also takes a different point of focus, whether the merchant, the skipper, the factor, or the recipient of goods. We focused on the Danish Sound toll and two Scottish ports—Aberdeen and Dundee—for which we have complete data over the time period, clarifying who organised the supply of weapons and metal to make them, which merchants shipped them, the names of the vessels, and which merchants received the goods in Scotland. This updated research provides new insights into the 17th-century arms trade, purchasing power, and logistics of these early modern Scottish revolutionaries.

The Military Diaspora Awakens

News of Charles I's high-handedness at the 1633 Scottish Parliament quickly reached members of the Scottish military diaspora deployed in various armies engaged in what later became known as the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). On the eve of the Scottish revolution, this diaspora included three regiments of Scots in Dutch service, roughly 3000 men in French service, and about 10,000 in Swedish service. In early 1634, four Scottish generals—Alexander Leslie, Patrick Ruthven, James King (all in Swedish service), and John Hepburn (of the French army)—were campaigning in close proximity along the Rhine, providing an

10 For example: Robert Low from Anstruther, STRO, ID 876505, 25 June 1638, is listed as departing from Anstruther and passing through the Sound with his cargo of iron and copper, when he was clearly destined for Scotland with this cargo. The same is true of Peter Thomson from Anstruther, STRO, ID 856824, 19 June 1640, who was also carrying iron and copper for Scotland but is listed as departing from Anstruther with this cargo. George Duncan from Dundee is identified as being from Danzig when it is a misreading of his home port. See STRO, ID 862852, 14 November 1639, from Stockholm. The DSA notes his arrival at his home port on 17 March 1640 with his cargo of iron. For personal names we have standardised to Scottish convention.

opportunity to discuss the Scottish situation.[11] Hepburn, who had recently left Swedish service, acted as the intermediary between the Swedish and French forces. Although no records of any meetings have been found, Scottish officers had a demonstrable history of personal networking that often bridged confessional and political divisions.[12] Further, General Alexander Leslie's intentions to return to Scotland, ostensibly to settle some family affairs, were expressly stated in a telling letter of April 1634 from the diplomat Johan Adler Salvius to the Swedish chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna. Salvius significantly added that *religio patria* was a contributing factor in Leslie's decisions.[13] He also mentioned the probable influence of Sir Robert Anstruther, the Stuart ambassador in Hamburg, who left the king's service that year and later became a supporter of the Covenanters.[14] Once in Scotland, Leslie and other officers strengthened intra-kin bonds and also met with future political leaders of the Covenanting Revolution, including John Leslie, the Earl of Rothes (Margaret, daughter of the earl, later married General Leslie's son and namesake[15]).

A year later, in 1635, high-ranking Scottish officers again met as the French and Swedish armies joined forces along the Rhine.[16] Colonels Hepburn, Ruthven, and Leslie, 'and others', gathered before Louis XIII at Compiègne in April, albeit no topic of discussion was recorded.[17] The colonels in question were most probably Colonel John Hepburn, Colonel John Ruthven, and Colonel George Leslie, variously of French, Swedish, and Saxe-Weimar service. The last was Alexander Leslie's

11 Murdoch and Grosjean 2014, 64–65; Murdoch 2022, 72–74.

12 See Murdoch 2006 for a detailed study of early modern Scottish networking. See also Grosjean 2003 for the Scottish–Swedish networking of the first half of the 17th century.

13 Johan Adler Salvius to Axel Oxenstierna, 23 April 1634, in Ottosson and Backhaus 2012, 221.

14 For Anstruther as signatory to the Solemn League and Covenant, see University of St Andrews Special Collections, MS 37242, List of [former] students of St Salvator's College who subscribed the Solemn League and Covenant, 1643–1648.

15 Alexander Leslie junior was married to Margaret Leslie, daughter of John, 5th Earl of Rothes: see Balfour Paul 1908, 5:378.

16 *Recveil des Gazettes, Novvelles, et Relations…*, 1635, Bibliothèque nationale de France (BNF), https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6439110h.image.langFR, 96, 24 February 1635, from Stuttgart, 14 February 1635.

17 *Recveil des Gazettes, Novvelles, et Relations…*, 235, letter from 8 May 1635 referring to a letter dated 22 April 1635.

Table 1.1: Army of the Covenant: leadership (by rank), 1639–1641

Name	Rank	European Service	Notes
Alexander Leslie	Lord General	Sweden	Field Marshal in Sweden
James Livingston	Lieutenant General	Dutch Republic	Colonel in the Scots-Dutch Brigade
David Leslie	Lieutenant General	Sweden	Colonel of Swedish cavalry
Alexander Hamilton	Lieutenant General	Sweden	General of Swedish artillery
Thomas Hamilton	Major General	Sweden	Colonel in Swedish service; brother of Alexander
Robert Monro	Major General	Denmark and Sweden	Major in Danish service; colonel in Swedish service
Robert Moray	Quarter-Master General	France	Colonel in French service

half-brother, though he, like Hepburn, died before the outbreak of the rebellion. Ruthven, who was Alexander Leslie's son-in-law, sat out the later revolution despite holding a titular royalist military rank in 1639.

The nature of covert revolutionary military planning precludes the existence of a paper trail detailing developments. Nevertheless, it is clear from the composition of the military leadership of the Covenanters (Table 1.1) that meetings were held between the Scottish soldiery abroad and the governments for which they worked, seeking to neutralise possible opposition, garner potential allies, and, specifically, to source the weapons required to stage a revolution.[18] The first two parts of this have been explored elsewhere, but the latter has not been considered in detail.

Table 1.1 shows that the military leadership of the Army of the Covenant comprised eight highly experienced officers pulled from Swedish, French, and Dutch service. Some had already led armies in the

18 Grosjean 2000; Grosjean 2003, 175–82; Murdoch 2010a; Murdoch and Grosjean 2014, 103–13.

field; others were elevated to generalships to participate in the revolution. Each had built up significant social capital with the governments they served before returning to Scotland, and all did so with the active support of those governments. Several of these commanders began planning their return to confront Charles I as early as 1634 and had committed to do so as early as 1636. When they sourced, or how they started to ship, the guns, munitions, swords, pikes, powder, and armour needed into Scotland to consolidate their negotiating position remains to be clarified.

Arms Shipments and the First Bishops' War

The STRO reveals little concrete evidence to indicate the shipment of arms and munitions to Scotland before 1638. An early record is dated 29 May 1638, when a ship left Stockholm destined for the Scottish port of Dysart in Fife. While ostensibly carrying a cargo of tar and pitch, the master also declared 10 ship-pounds of iron and 10 ship-pounds of 'kugler'—in other words, metal shot, usually for cannon.[19] The Marquis of Hamilton noted in late June that the Covenanters were 'still sending for more armes and amunitioun not onlie from Hollen bot lykuys from Hamburg, Breme, Lubick, Dansick and Sued, that if one part should faill they may be suppleud from ane other'.[20] We can see larger munitions shipments innocuously leaving Stockholm, Norrköping, and Danzig to destinations in Hamburg, Bremen, or the Dutch Republic, but with very little overt evidence to link them to the Scottish revolutionaries. For example, on 29 May 1639, a heavily laden arms shipment left Norrköping destined for Oostzaan in the Dutch Republic. On board were, among other things, large quantities of iron bars (over 7000), in addition to 190 sets of what appears to be cavalry armour and 100 sets of soldiers' armour.[21] The cargo was charged

19 Couberdt Sibet from Dysart, STRO, ID 876348, 29 May 1638, from Stockholm. The values of ship-pounds and lasts varied between countries and according to goods involved. Grimshaw 2024, xvi, uses this measure for ship pounds: '1 SSP = 136 kg'; and for lasts: '12 barrels for tar and pitch … Other amounts were used for different commodities'.

20 Gardiner 1880, 17.

21 Douwe Beeckenseen of Oostzaan, STRO, ID 857181, 29 May 1639, from Norrköping.

a minimum fee, being described as *Svensk gods* (Swedish cargo), and thus escaped close inspection by the Danish authorities.

On 9 July 1638, Scottish merchants were certainly ordering consignments of muskets, powder, and pikes from Baltic ports.[22] Intriguingly, Alexander Leslie happened to be in Stockholm that month, giving pause for thought regarding cargoes leaving the Swedish capital around that time. On 26 July 1638, the *Johne*, bound for Dundee, passed the Danish Sound (henceforth the Sound) with large consignments of iron and copper.[23] The correlation between the dates, the cargo, and Leslie negotiating with the Swedish government are unlikely to be coincidental. When James Hay of the ship *Johne* declared his goods at the Sound on 26 July, the weight was given as 819 ship-pounds; however, on unloading in Dundee, only 699 pounds were declared, leaving a mysterious 120 ship-pounds weight of cargo missing (assuming the same unit of ship-pounds was being used).

The Swedish government naturally did not want to be seen to be supportive of Leslie's request for cannons, muskets, and other weapons from the Swedish crown, but they noted the urgency of the request, sending it over for Axel Oxenstierna's consideration on 28 July 1638.[24] A *Riksråd* (Swedish State Council) discussion lasting two weeks followed, with the most intensive debates on 9 and 10 August, concerning the release of Leslie from Swedish service. Oxenstierna had agreed not only to Leslie's request to be released from Swedish service but more importantly to his request for artillery. The chancellor advised that the

22 National Records of Scotland, GD 297/123 Misc. Papers, Commission by William Dick of Braid to Robert Porteous bound for Danzig for muskets, bandoliers, staves, powder, and pikes, 9 July 1638 and Lord Lothian to Porteous, 4 October 1638. In the latter letter, Lothian asks for 550 of the muskets to be set aside for his use, suggesting they had arrived. As yet, Porteous's voyage has not been traced in STRO.

23 James Hay from Dundee, STRO, ID 876618, 26 July 1638, from Stockholm. Hay arrived in Dundee by 13 August on his vessel *Johne*. Four separate recipients of the iron were noted—William Duncan, Robert Davidson, David Wemyss the younger, and James Cochrane—the total being 699 ship-pounds. See DSA, *Johne*, James Hay (master), 13 August 1638. The same month another vessel passed the Sound, this time destined for Aberdeen. See George Stewart from Aberdeen, STRO, ID 817026, 19 July 1638, from Danzig. Stewart's arrival in Aberdeen is recorded in Taylor 1972, 224.

24 Stockholm Riksarkiv, Oxenstiernska samlingen, E 772, Swedish government to Axel Oxenstierna, Stockholm, 28 July 1638.

artillery should follow Leslie as though it were an advance on his salary, as Sweden could not overtly undermine Charles I's authority.[25] Definitive weapons supplies for the revolutionaries were, nevertheless, organised in Sweden thereafter.

Sending military supplies on the quiet was not an issue, thanks to the well-established Scottish merchant communities based in Sweden.[26] James Maclean is a recurring name in such discussions, but the activities of Robert Rhind, William Petrie, George Gardner, and the Feiff brothers are equally prominent.[27] The artillery supplies that Leslie requested would be provided privately by a merchant who would obtain them from the crown. Further to 2000 muskets, copper could also be supplied for crafting weapons in Scotland, which the Swedes hoped to see returned later. The Swedish military council authorised the delivery of 200 muskets with accompanying artillery pieces through Maclean, for Leslie's use. The rest would be sourced from Örebro (where Alexander Hamilton, then a colonel in Swedish service, had established an artillery foundry) and then shipped on to the merchant John Maclean at Gothenburg.[28]

Within two weeks of the *Riksråd* debate, on 28 August, a Scottish vessel of Leith under shipmaster James Seaton left Stockholm carrying one lot of 744 ship-pounds of bar iron and 20 ship-pounds in another, along with two further consignments merely described as 'certified

25 Bergh 1895, 274, 2 August 1638; 276–77, 9 August 1638. For an English translation of the debates in the Riksråd that followed Oxenstierna's intervention, from 9 August onwards, see Grosjean and Murdoch 2007, 214–23.

26 Murdoch 2010b.

27 Indeed, most of these merchants were so well established that King Gustav II Adolf personally selected them, among others, to help set up an international shipping company: see Gejrot 1998, 170 and 308, 22 December 1628. The *Skieppskompaniet* Privilege was awarded on 29 January 1629: see Elthammar 2000, 5–6, 33. Although the company was mainly to benefit the Swedish crown, the founding merchants were allowed to use it for their own trade needs.

28 Bergh 1895, 278–79, 10 August 1638; 289, 22 August 1638. A point to note here is that Alexander Hamilton's artillery manufacturing plant had been established at Örebro in 1629: see Monro 1637, part II, list 1 and p. 1. Monro mentions it as 'Vrbowe'. For Alexander Hamilton's terms concerning his payment for and protection of his artillery design, see Stockholm Riksarkiv, ämnessamlingar, Personhistoria, Alexander Hamilton to the Swedish crown, undated, SE/RA/756/756.1/H/I/H 5. No direct evidence of a connection between the Örebro consignment and Hamilton's foundry has been established.

Swedish goods'.[29] Seaton's cargo included 600 riksdaler-worth of 'moschetter, stormhuer och des tilbehørrig', being muskets, assault helmets, and their accoutrements, which were itemised on his departure from the Sound.[30] The following day, another vessel from Osstzaan, carrying a very large cargo of iron goods (three different types), also departed from Stockholm destined for the Dutch Republic, similarly carrying two undetailed consignments of 'certified Swedish goods' with little clue as to their composition.[31] Mixed cargoes could allow for various amounts of munitions going unnoticed. On 17 September, for example, no fewer than 18 commodities lay among the hemp and hides that Robert Angus from Burntisland shipped from Stockholm, including 180 units of harness and 86 ship-pounds of iron bullets. It is a revealing discovery.[32] Indeed, from 1638 until the Treaty of London which ended the revolution in 1641, one might look at all the ships carrying flax, hemp, wine, and brandy for Scotland and muse as to what lay hidden beneath their cargoes. The *Vågböcker* only rarely registered muskets and those we have found lack a specified destination.[33] Instead, the entries record consignments of metals, namely, various types of iron and copper, as shown in Table 1.2.

Smaller consignments of copper flowed to Scotland from mid-1638 onwards, often mixed with other cargoes of metals.[34] Moreover, larger shipments of metals increased throughout the war and were not halted in the Sound. Cross-referencing the STRO with Scottish port books confirms the safe arrival in Aberdeen of metal cargoes brought in by Danzig traders such as John Anderson and Patrick Findlay, as well as those who collected shipments from regular Stockholm traders, such

29 James Seaton of Leith, STRO, ID 813492, 28 August 1638, from Stockholm.

30 Erroneously transcribed in STRO as 'moschatter, stoemhveer'. The manuscript clearly reads 'moschetter, stormhuer'.

31 Gerrit Jacobsen of Oostzaan, STRO, ID 813551, 29 August 1638, from Stockholm.

32 Robert Angus of Burntisland, STRO, ID 884141, 17 September 1638, from Stockholm. See also the same master, same date (separate entry), paying a toll for 'Swedish goods', STRO, ID 868751.

33 See, for example, Stockholm Riksarkiv, SWB, vol. 1639 (6), fol. 1, 8 August 1639. This entry records some 848 muskets being weighed and tax paid, but no destination is given for them.

34 George Duncan of Dundee, STRO, ID 869052, 13 November 1638, from Stockholm.

Table 1.2: Ships consigned from the Baltic to Dundee, 1638–1641

Date	Master	Ship	Port of Lading	Cargo	Corroborating Records
14/02/1638	William Gibson	*Mayflower* of Anstruther	Stockholm	33 lasts iron, pitch, kettles, pans	STRO, ID 824844, 17 November 1637. 505 ship-pounds bar iron and 7 ship-pounds copper plus flax, etc.
30/07/1638	Robert Law	*Androw* of Anstruther	Stockholm	666 ship-pounds iron, 0.5 ship-pounds kettles	STRO, ID 876505, 25 June 1638. Wrongly recorded as departing Anstruther with 234 ship-pounds iron and 1 ship-pound copper kettles. The destination is clearly Dundee.
13/08/1638	James Hay	*Johne*	Stockholm	699 ship-pounds iron	STRO, ID 876618, 26 July 1638, with 819 ship-pounds iron—a discrepancy of 120 ship-pounds.
31/08/1638	William Gibson	*Mayflower* of Anstruther	Stockholm	50 lasts iron, plus lint and kettles	STRO, ID 876687, 12 August 1638. 88 ship-pounds iron, 493 ship-pounds bar iron, 2 ship-pounds copper kettles.
08/10/1638	Robert Allan	*Lioness* of Queensferry	Stockholm	600 ship-pounds iron	STRO, ID 817389, 15 September 1638, with 'certified Swedish goods'.
02/04/1639	George Duncan	*Thomas*	Stockholm	420 ship-pounds iron	STRO, ID 867194, 13 November 1638, notes 475 ship-pounds iron but also 900 muskets, 1800 bandoliers and 1800 steel helmets. Another 200 muskets in a smaller consignment, with 55 ship-pounds iron and 3 ship-pounds copper, were not declared in Dundee. See also STRO, ID 869053.
07/05/1639	Andrew Kinnear	*Hope for Grace*	Queensbrig (Königsberg)	12 lasts iron, 10 lasts kettles, 4 lasts lint	STRO, ID 841569, 15 April 1539, cargo listed as 28 lasts flax but mostly metal goods arrived in Dundee and only 4 lasts flax-based lint.
18/10/1639	David Hay	*David*	Stockholm	90 lasts iron	SCA 1639. On 8 September 1639 there were four consigning merchants: John Henderson (fol. 16), Robert Rhind (fol. 21), James Maclean (fol. 58), and Henry Beaton (fol. 61), with David Hay as the master of the ship to be loaded. STRO, ID 841892, 30 September 1639, 'Scottish goods' plus 387 ship-pounds iron. Recipient merchants in Dundee via DSA: Patrick Burgh, James Simpson, and Robert Davidson, each receiving 30 lasts iron.
17/12/1639	Peter Thomson	*Lion* of Anstruther	Queensbrig (Königsberg)	12 lasts iron, plus lint, hemp, and ash	STRO, ID 862747, 6 November 1639, 20 ship-pounds bar iron, plus hemp, wax, and ash.

Date	Master	Ship	Port of Lading	Cargo	Corroborating Records
17/03/1640	George Duncan	*Thomas*	Stockholm	300 ship-pounds iron	STRO, ID 862852, 14 November 1639, home port erroneously recorded as Danzig instead of Dundee, and carrying 489 ship-pounds of iron (a discrepancy of 189 ship-pounds).
19/07/1640	Peter Thomson	*Lion* of Anstruther	Stockholm	40 lasts iron, 5 ship-pounds copper kettles	SCA 1640. On 8 June 1640, the Stockholm-Scottish traders Albert Strang (fol. 570), Robert Rhind (fol. 635), David Feiff (fol. 645), and William Petrie (fol. 691) collectively declared *c.* 450 ship-pounds iron and 7 ship-pounds copper to be shipped with Peter Thomson to Scotland. STRO, ID 856824, 19 June 1640, notes the cargo including 505 ship-pounds bar iron, 3 ship-pounds copper and 6 ship-pounds copper kettles. It has the port of loading as Anstruther when it should clearly be Stockholm. The DSA entry states 20 lasts delivered, but merchants William Weymss and Andrew Crand each declared 20 lasts iron, totalling 40.
12/08/1640	Alex Tyrie	*Alexander*	Stockholm	174 ship-pounds iron, 4 ship-pounds kettles	Note the discrepancy with STRO, ID 856911, 4 August 1640: Tyrie declared 300 ship-pounds iron and 7 ship-pounds copper.

Source: Dundee Ship Arrivals (DSA).

as George Duncan and Jos. Anstruther, both from Dundee.[35] Ports over which the Danes had no control also sent iron goods to Scotland. Significant shipments were sent via Gothenburg merchants, including

35 These two Aberdonian traders sailed together from Danzig and both arrived safely in their home port of Aberdeen: see John Anderson, STRO, ID 857044, and Patrick Findlay, STRO, ID 877815, both 10 September 1640 from Danzig. Their arrival in Aberdeen is recorded in Taylor 1972, 248. For the Dundonian traders, see George Duncan, STRO, ID 811161, 26 July 1641, and Jos. Anstruther, STRO, ID 811221, 7 August 1641. Both masters loaded their vessels in Stockholm. Another sailed from Stockholm on the same day as Anstruther, but the entry seems curious. Thomas Ogilvie of Dundee is listed twice on the same date, STRO, ID 808493 and ID 810511, 7 August 1641. He carried 442 ship-pounds of bar iron and 10 'lispund' of bar iron, but no toll fee is recorded. A lispund was the equivalent of approximately 7 kg.

the Scots John Maclean and James Mercer.[36] As noted above, Scottish merchants in Gothenburg had already been tasked with shipping cargo for Leslie in August. Intriguingly, Maclean's and Mercer's cargoes were consigned for smaller Scottish ports, such as Anstruther and Crail, where they continued to be delivered, before the opening of hostilities through to the end of the revolution in 1641.

Irrespective of whether these ships carried munitions destined for Scotland or otherwise, Charles I tried to inhibit the arrival of such supplies. James Hamilton, Marquis of Hamilton had already suggested in June 1638 that Stuart allies be contacted so that all shipping bound for Scotland could be stopped and searched for Covenanting supporters or supplies.[37] Christian IV, in particular, a blood-uncle of Charles I, was to be prevailed upon to prevent movement of suspect shipping through the Sound.

By December 1638, Sir Thomas Roe noted Christian IV's stopping of several Scottish ships transporting arms on arrival at the Sound and his apologies for any shipments which had previously run the blockade without his knowledge.[38] Some ships carrying Scottish weapons were refused permission to complete their journeys, while some found their cargoes impounded. In early 1639, the number of weapons stayed in the Sound that were of Swedish origin reveals the extent of Swedish support provided to the Covenanters. A consignment of 4300 muskets and forks arrived in the Sound on 12 November 1638 on board a ship bound from Norrköping to Medemblik in the Dutch Republic.[39] While these were duly recorded in the Sound Toll Register, it is worthy of note that, in February, Sir Thomas Roe described 4400 Swedish-made muskets, forks, and bandoliers held in the Sound for sale, albeit these

36 Göteborg Landsarkiv, Drätselkammare, no. 67 (Olof Rotter, master), 8 August 1638, with majority lading of bar iron by Johan Maclean; Drätselkammare, no. 85 (Hans Adam, master), [?] November 1638, John Maclean and James Mercer being two of nine consignees; Drätselkammare, no. 37 (James Robertson of Anstruther, master), 9 June 1641, John Maclean and James Mercer taking the largest share of the seven consignees.

37 Gardiner 1880, 17.

38 London National Archives, SP 81/45, fols. 307–11, Sir Thomas Roe to Secretary Coke, 7/17 December 1638.

39 Jan Pietersen of Medemblik, STRO, ID 820860, 12 November 1638, from Norrköping.

were clearly stayed and still belonged to the merchant.[40] The closeness of the numbers involved (out by only 100) and the items' provenance imply that it was one and the same cargo. Perhaps it was the lack of manifest for Scotland that prevented these weapons from being confiscated outright.

However, the day after the Dutch ship appears to have unloaded her muskets in Denmark, George Duncan of Dundee (see Table 1.2) also passed the Sound, doing so 'toll free' with a cargo openly manifested as being shipped from Stockholm on a Scottish-registered ship. His cargo included 900 muskets and forks and 1800 bandoliers, along with a smaller consignment of 200 muskets and forks (presumably consigned by a different merchant), 1800 helmets, and 475 ship-pounds of iron.[41] The five-month journey time indicates that Duncan did not sail directly to Dundee. When he unloaded his cargo in his home port, there were no weapons to be declared and a small quantity of the iron was gone, as was his shipment of copper, implying they had been unloaded elsewhere.[42] That same month, the remainder of Leslie's armaments arrived in Leith harbour in two Swedish ships. This shipment included up to 15 brass cannon, 4000 corslets, and 1800 muskets.[43] Within a month, the first shots of the Covenanting Revolution were fired, significantly increasing the need for arms for the Covenanting Army.

In January 1639, Charles I thanked Christian IV for his endeavours in preventing Swedish armaments passing through his waters,[44] and when the Danish monarch corresponded with Thomas Roe in January 1639 he appeared to confirm this policy, stating that blocking the Sound acted as a positive means of ensuring peace in Great Britain.[45] However, in February, just a few weeks later, the Danish Chancellery

40 London National Archives, SP 81/46, fol. 121, Sir Thomas Roe to Sir Henry Vane, 26 February 1639.

41 George Duncan of Dundee, STRO, ID 867194 and ID 869052, both 13 November 1638, from Stockholm.

42 DSA, *Thomas*, George Duncan (master), arriving from Stockholm, 420 ship-pounds of iron declared.

43 London National Archives, SP 81/45, fols. 307–11, Roe to Coke, 7/17 December 1638.

44 Copenhagen Rigsarkiv, TKUA England A I, Charles I to Christian IV, 31 January 1639.

45 London National Archives, SP 81/46, fol. 51, Christian IV to Roe, 18/28 January 1639.

issued a set of orders on Christian IV's instructions in direct contravention of Charles I's requests to maintain the policy. On 19 February 1639, Frederick Urne received the following directions:

> At the request of the Queen of Sweden the king has this time permitted that Monroe and Stuart may pass through the Sound with their recruits and equally Colonel Fleetwood with one English regiment and Colonel Hamilton with two Scottish regiments, and further 30 lasts of gunpowder, 30 ship-pounds worth of match and 2000 pairs of pistols.[46]

The transit of Monro and his volunteers through the Sound, with weapons, toll free, is quite remarkable, given Christian IV's distrust of the Swedes and reassurances to Charles I. This was not a one-off case. On 26 April 1639, it was observed that one Thomas Gilmour, in the service of James Maclean of Stockholm, also passed through the Sound, carrying 600 muskets, 2000 bandoliers, 2000 helmets, and unspecified munitions, on condition that the Swedish resident swore that the destination of these military provisions would be the Dutch Republic and not Scotland or Gothenburg.[47] Nothing in the STRO that we have seen helps to identify either the master of the ship or its name. Another voyage worthy of note is that of Andrew Kinnear and his ship *Hope for Grace* (see Table 1.2). On 15 April, Kinnear declared 28 lasts of flax at the Sound Toll. However, upon arrival in Dundee the following month, the cargo now consisted of 12 lasts of iron, 10 lasts of (copper) kettles, and only 4 lasts of lint (which could be equated with

46 Marquard 1949, 672–73, Missive to Frederick Urne, 19 February 1639: 'Efter Begæring af Dronningen af Sverrig har Kongen for denne Gang tilladt, at Monroe og Stuart maa passere gennem Sundet med deres Rekrutter og ligeledes øverste Flitwitz med 1 Regimenter Englænder og øverste Hammelton med 2 Regimenter Skotter, og endvidere 30 Læster Krudt, 30 Skippd. Lunter og 2,000 Par Pistoler.'

47 Marquard 1949, 722–23, Missive to Frederick Urne, 26 April 1639. 'Denne Thomas Gilmour, der tjener Jacob Makelius har berettet, at han sidste Efterhøst kon fra Stockholm med 600 Musketter, 2,000 Bandolerer og 2,000 Stormhatte til Øresund. Da han med denne Munition agtede at sejle til Skotland, blev han anholdt i Øresund, og same Munition blev af deres Faktor oplagt i Helsingør. Han har nu begæret Tilladelse til at fore same Munition gennem Sundet til Nederland. Kongen tillader denne Thomas Gilmour at fore same Munition genem Sundet til Nederland efter hans eget Tilbud og ikke til Gottenborg, som først nu omtales og aldrig er omtalt. Den svenske Resident skal kavere for, at same munition ikke føres til andre Steder end til Nederland.'

flax).[48] One wonders at the rationale for the deception, or the irregular recording of the cargo.

Whether by 'smuggling' (as in Kinnear's case) or overtly manifested arms consignments (as George Duncan in 1638 or Thomas Gilmour in 1639), by June 1639 the Covenanters had equipped an army strong enough to confront their royalist opponents at Duns Law. In a shrewd piece of one-upmanship, Leslie invited the royalist officers over to his camp for dinner, where he entertained them well and then allowed them to inspect his army, thereby dispelling any misconceptions they may have had as to its strength.[49] Now convinced that they could not win, the royalist military leadership prevailed upon Charles to meet rather than fight the Covenanters, and this led to the Pacification of Berwick later that month. Leslie had successfully removed the threat of imminent military engagement and could open the Scottish harbours. No one believed that the pacification would last long and so re-armament continued by both sides.

Within a month of the pacification, in July 1639, the *Marie* of Leith deposited 50 tons of swords, muskets, pistols, pikes, gunpowder, and cannon balls in Leith, along with six brass cannon, all from Amsterdam.[50] Arms, and the materials to make them, continued to arrive in Scotland throughout the remainder of the year, perhaps more easily identified in the various port records we have. Artillery is seldom mentioned in these shipments, but it must be remembered that General of the Artillery Alexander Hamilton not only passed the Sound with his two regiments in 1639 but he then established a cannon foundry where he produced numerous pieces—from his light field artillery to siege demi-cannon capable of discharging 36–40-pound shot. The metal for weapons construction and to produce ammunition was essential.[51] He was well supplied by the merchants Henry Beaton, John Hinderson, James Maclean, and Robert Rhind, all of Stockholm (see Table 1.3).

On 30 September 1639, David Hay from Dundee (see Table 1.2) registered at the Sound with his cargo of 387 ship-pounds of iron, but also an unspecified cargo of 'Scottish goods', begging the question as to

48 Andrew Kinnear of Dundee, STRO, ID 841569, 15 April 1639, from Danzig; DSA, *Hope for Grace*, Andrew Kinnear (master), 7 May 1639.
49 Hodgson 1910, 27–29.
50 Mowat 1993, 175.
51 Grosjean 2003, 184–86.

Table 1.3: Scottish traders shipping metals to Scotland

SCA folio no.	Name	Date	Goods	Quantity (ship-pounds)	Value (riksdaler and skilling)
16	John Hinderson	08/09/1639	Bar iron	54.5	408 rdr 24 sk
21	Robert Rhind	08/09/1639	Bar iron	279 4 lispund	2094 rdr
58	James Maclean	08/09/1639	Bar iron	79	592 rdr 16 sk
61	Henry Beaton	08/09/1639	Bar iron; copper	43 1.25	322 rdr 12 sk 93 rdr 24 sk

Source: Stockholm Customs Accounts (SCA), 1639.

why he did not have to declare what these were.[52] On arrival in Dundee aboard the *David* on 18 October, Hay declared 90 lasts of iron to be delivered to three merchants, but once again the contrast between the sources is revealing, not least as to what the 'Scottish goods' were or who received them. This is a very special consignment as we can name not only the merchants who shipped the goods from Stockholm but also the ship and the master, and the merchants who received the goods in Dundee. It is only one of two voyages for which we have this complete information, the other being that by Peter Thomson on the *Lion* of Anstruther in July 1640 (see Table 1.2).

Beyond the Scandinavian sources we can also trace goods consigned from the Dutch Republic by Thomas Cunningham of Campvere (Table 1.4). John Carse arrived in Leith in September 1639 with a shipment of arms on Cunningham's behalf.[53] It is well known that 11 out of the 13 munitions ships sent by Cuningham arrived safely in Scotland throughout the 1639–1641 period (see Table 1.4). Debate remains as to when these arrived: some scholars assert they all arrived in 1640, but this is disproved by Carse's arrival.[54] A caveat here is that

52 David Hay of Dundee, STRO, ID 841892, 30 September 1639, from Stockholm.

53 Mowat 1993, 175. For Carse (Kerss) as being freighted by Thomas Cuningham of Campvere, see Courthope 1928, 53–54.

54 Courthope 1928, 54. For all 11 ships arriving in 1640 (which necessarily includes that of Carse), see Edwards 2000, 183, Table 6. In Cunningham's own writing, the original states that the arms were shipped 'in and before anno 1641' rather than in 1640.

Table 1.4: Weapons sent by Thomas Cunningham from Veere (Dutch Republic) to Scotland, 1639–1641

Type of provision	Payments made, by whom, and when
• One frigate with guns commanded by Captain William Ramsay • 12 bronze cannons, 18- and 24-pounders • 49,982 lb cannonballs • 15,673 muskets • 18,013 bandoliers • 95,620 lb gunpowder • 123,098 lb match • 15,416 lb refined saltpetre • 6,965 swords • 52 pairs of horsemen's pistols with furnishings • 32 punschions flour	1640 and 1641: The Scottish Burghs paid: 67,619 guilders 10 stuyvers 1641: The Committee residing with the Covenanters at Newcastle: 10,528 guilders 17 stuyvers The Scottish Commissioners in London, August–October 1641: 40,000 guilders The Committee of Estates (Scottish Parliament) in Edinburgh, November–December 1641: 30,000 guilders The Scottish Commissioners in London, September 1642: 64,673 guilders **Total value: 212,821 guilders and 7 stuvers**

Source: Courthope 1928, 54–55.

where Cunningham sourced the weapons remains to be determined, along with which years he freighted which ships. Sweden seems the most plausible source, due not least to the numbers of ships passing the Sound, either on Swedish warships or simply being freighted with 'Swedish goods'. It is also clear that not all of these weapons were gifts from the Swedish government: Cunningham meticulously recorded the value of each and the moment that he was reimbursed for their purchase and shipment. It is certainly worth noting that, although we can demonstrate the arrival of his weapons in Scotland from 1639, he did not begin to get paid for them until 1640 (from the Scottish Burghs), and the debt to him was not cleared until September 1642.[55] Moreover, he did not collect any factoring fee until 1643, highlighting once more the importance of both social and financial credit in facilitating the revolution.

55 Courthope 1928, 54–55.

The factoring fee was charged in addition to the sums specified in Table 1.4. It was paid by the Committee of Estates on 27 February 1643 to the amount of 10,000 Scots money or approximately 8,333 guilders. The final total in guilders for all the above supplies was thus 221,154 (which equates to 22,115 pounds Sterling at a conversion of 10 guilders to the English pound).

The Second Bishops' War, 1640: Preparations

In early 1640, several more Scottish supply ships were taken into Berwick, with at least 5000 muskets on board.[56] These losses to the Royal Navy, as well as the shipwreck of a ship carrying Scottish officers in April, meant the Covenanters had to step up their request for help from their allies.[57] They sent their agent, Colonel John Cochrane, to Sweden to hasten the arrival of more munitions and material, including iron and copper.[58] Cochrane reminded the Swedish allies of the length of service and military alliance that Scots had provided to Sweden, which even Oxenstierna was moved to agree was at least 60 years old.[59] Cochrane insisted that the Covenanters required neither money nor troops, as Scotland was well supplied with both. Rather he sought only ships, arms, and relevant munitions, all of which he promised would be returned to Sweden once the struggle was over.[60] The *Riksråd* were duly persuaded and responded by promising what was requested—ships, artillery, and copper—through the Scottish merchants in Gothenburg, most likely John Maclean and James Mercer. The lack of records for the port of Gothenburg in 1640 hamper our attempts to establish what they sent, if anything at all.[61] Nevertheless, Cochrane's mission was followed by still more senior officers departing

56 Hamilton 1880, 154, 244, 260, 273.

57 University of St Andrews, Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707 (RPS), https://www.rps.ac.uk, A1641/8/138, losses of the Scots officers detained at Newcastle, 15 November 1641. Colonel James Wardlaw, Lieutenant Colonel Harry Sinclair, and four other officers had been shipwrecked near Newcastle in April 1640 and sought compensation for their and their servants' expenses in prison.

58 Murdoch 2010a, 58–61.

59 Grosjean 2003, 165.

60 Bergh 1896, 97, 9 July 1640.

61 Bergh 1896, 160, 27 July 1640; 217, 18 August 1640.

Swedish service and receiving 200 muskets and 200 suits of armour as parting gifts for their service.[62]

Within days, Swedish crown warships were committed for use to transport supplies to the Dutch Republic, thereby circumnavigating the blockades of the Danish and Stuart naval fleets. The Scottish 'Holm Major' in Swedish service, Richard Clerck (the younger), sailed to Amsterdam with five Swedish warships and disembarked his cargo by 15 August 1640.[63] Perhaps passengers such as the newly decommissioned Colonel David Leslie, Colonel James Lumsden, and Lieutenant Colonel George Monro were on board with their weapons. More concretely, we can observe that, in June and July 1640, both Richard Clerck and Admiral John Clerck suddenly got involved in purchasing copper from Hans Nyman and James Maclean.[64] The latter, of course, was the man usually tasked with supplying the metals required by the Swedish government when they sought to supply the Scottish Covenanters.

A perusal of the Stockholm customs records for 1640 also reveals that major Scottish merchants were tasked with deliveries of metals for the munitions industry to Scotland, and they did so in five significant shipments between July and November (Table 1.5). Of those, Robert Rhind participated in all five shipments, David Feiff and William Petrie had shares in four each, with others participating in only one or two. The first cargo of iron was freighted for Scotland by Albrecht Strang and Robert Rhind on 8 June 1640.[65] William Petrie also freighted cargo the same day, and it is interesting to note that just over 7 ship-pounds of copper were included, the exact amount declared by one Alexander Tyrie from Dundee as his ship passed the Sound on 4 August.[66] Once again there is a discrepancy between goods declared at the Sound and those unloaded. Specifically, in Dundee, Tyrie declared 4 ship-pounds of (presumably copper) kettles, and some 125 ship-pounds of iron were

62 Bergh 1896, 184, 5 August 1640.

63 Stockholm Krigsarkiv, Amiralitetskollegium kansliet, serie BIA, fols. 146, 176, 204, 216; Grosjean 2003, 181–82.

64 SWB (Copper), fols. 23–24, June and July 1640.

65 Stockholm Stadsarkiv, SCA, G1B Verifikationer, 3, 1640, fol. 570, Albrecht Strang; fol. 635, Robert Rhind; fol. 691 William Petrie, all 8 June 1640.

66 Alexander Tyrie of Dundee, STRO, ID 856911, 4 August 1640, from Stockholm, with a cargo of 300 ship-pounds of iron and 7 ship-pounds of copper.

Table 1.5: Scottish traders shipping metals to Scotland, 1640

Folio no.	Name	Date	Goods	Quantity (ship-pounds, lispund)	Value (riks-daler, skilling)
548	James Feiff	12/08/1640 30/09/1640	Bar iron Bar iron	54 skp 16 skp 3 lsp	648 rdr 193 rdr 25 sk
554	John Hinderson	30/09/1640	Bar iron	18 skp 1 lsp	216 rdr 19 sk
570	Albrecht Strang	08/06/1640	Bar iron	100 skp 9 lsp	1206 rdr
635–37	Robert Rhind	08/06/1640 18/07/1640 12/08/1640 30/09/1640 16/11/1640	Bar iron; Copper Bar iron Bar iron Bar iron Bar iron	135 skp 2 skp 14 lsp 255 skp 17 lsp 97 skp 16 lsp 169 skp 92 skp	1620 rdr 216 rdr 3070 rdr 6 sk 1173 rdr 19 sk 1920 rdr 1114 rdr 25 sk
645	David Feiff	08/06/1640 12/08/1640 30/09/1640 16/11/1640	Bar iron Bar iron Bar iron Bar iron	176 skp 17½ lsp 110 skp 13 skp 314 skp 2 lsp	2122 rdr 6 sk 1323 rdr 156 rdr 3769 rdr 6 sk
649	Donat Feiff	12/08/1640 30/09/1640	Bar iron Bar iron	48 skp 6 lsp 18 skp	679 rdr 19 sk 216 rdr
659	George Gar-dener	04/07/1640	Bar iron	361 skp (rounded up)	4329 rdr 19 sk
667	James Maclean	12/08/1640 30/09/1640	Bar iron Bar iron	99 skp (rounded up) 17 skp	1182 rdr 204 rdr
691	William Petrie	08/06/1640 18/07/1640 12/08/1640 16/11/1640	Bar iron; Copper Bar iron Bar iron Bar iron	43 skp 7 skp 10 lsp 20 skp 40 skp 95 skp 18 lsp	516 rdr 565 rdr 10 sk 240 rdr 480 rdr 1150 rdr 25 sk
701	George Gar-dener	16/11/1640	Bar iron	45.5 skp	546 rdr
725	William Duncan	30/09/1640	Bar iron	22 skp 7½ lsp	267 rdr 28½ sk

Source: Stockholm Customs Accounts.

also not accounted for.[67] These items may have been delivered honestly to another port, as yet unidentified, but that remains to be established.

On 4 July, George Gardener declared a large cargo of 360 shippounds of iron destined for Scotland.[68] Within a fortnight, William Petrie added another consignment of metals for the Scottish market, on 18 July.[69] The same day, Robert Rhind declared a similar cargo.[70] Rhind also dispatched a batch of iron to Scotland on 12 August 1640, along with cargo shipped by his countrymen, Donat Feiff and William Petrie.[71] This was sent aboard the vessel of James Seaton, who had already run the blockade of the Sound with iron and 'Swedish goods' in August 1638. The same month, James Maclean again paid customs duties on a consignment of iron destined for Scotland on 17 August.[72]

In August 1640, 18,000 Scottish soldiers crossed the border into England under Alexander Leslie's command for the main campaign of the Second Bishops' War. They defeated the royalist forces at Newburn on 28 August and occupied Newcastle by the 30th.[73] Charles I had little prospect of defeating them militarily and was forced to come to terms, leading eventually to a truce agreed at Ripon in October, and a peace formalised in the Treaty of London in August 1641. The Covenanters suspected the truce might only be temporary and prepared yet more supplies. The records for the last quarter of 1640 show no cessation in the supplies being sent to Scotland and with the connivance of the Swedish authorities (see Table 1.5). For example, in October Johan Oxenstierna wrote about the delivery of more copper to Scotland, and its urgency.[74]

The Stockholm-based Scottish merchants remained as involved as ever: James Maclean once more paid customs on iron leaving for Scotland on 30 September 1640.[75] That date was obviously important:

67 DSA, *Alexander*, Alexander Tyrie (master), 12 August 1640.
68 SCA, G1B Verifikationer, 3, 1640, fol. 659, George Gardener, 4 July 1640.
69 SCA, G1B Verifikationer, 3, 1640, fol. 691, William Petrie, 18 July 1640.
70 SCA, G1B Verifikationer, 3, 1640, f fol. 635, Robert Rhind, 18 July 1640.
71 SCA, G1B Verifikationer, 3, 1640, f fol. 635, Robert Rhind; fol. 649, Donat Feiff; fol. 691 William Petrie, all 12 August 1640.
72 SCA, G1B Verifikationer, 3, 1640, fol. 667, James Maclean, 17 August 1640.
73 Grosjean 2003, 182.
74 Stockholm Riksarkiv, Oxenstiernska samlingen, E 772, Johan Oxenstierna to Axel Oxenstierna, 31 October 1640.
75 SCA, G1B Verifikationer, 3, 1640, fol. 667, James Maclean, 30 September 1640.

David Feiff similarly shipped iron to Scotland on the same day, as did Donat Feiff and William Duncan.[76] It is tempting to think that at least some of this cargo was on board the *Pittenweem* freighted from Stockholm, which passed the Sound with a cargo of iron destined for Scotland on 16 November 1640.[77] The timing is certainly supportive of the idea. David Feiff again consigned iron on 16 November. On the same date, William Petrie and George Gardiner also consigned large cargoes of metals destined for the munitions industry in Scotland.[78] By the time they did so, the war was effectively over, and the last shipment of iron to pass the Sound that could meaningfully be ascribed for the Covenanter Revolution did so on 27 November 1640, aboard Robert Wood's ship destined for Crail in Fife.[79]

Conclusion

At the governmental level, members of both the Swedish and Danish governments can be shown to have facilitated the transportation of weapons, soldiers, and military materiel (both weapons and the required components to make them) for the Scottish revolutionaries. There was little specie available to pay for this, but in both Denmark between 1627 and 1629 and Sweden over a period of some 60 years, the Scots had built up social capital based on military service, which they utilised to great effect. If one was to compare the wealth and resources available to the composite Stuart state with the logistics required by the Covenanters to bring such store of weapons over the North Sea to Scotland, it is surely a remarkable achievement. Moreover, the rebels were also able to neutralise the closest Stuart allies (Denmark and France) and thus field the first professional army in the British Isles, winning two successive engagements with the royalist forces and ultimately forcing their monarch to recognise and address their political and theological grievances.

76 SCA, G1B Verifikationer, 3, 1640, fol. 645, David Feiff; fol. 649, Donat Feiff; fol. 725, William Duncan, all 30 September 1640.

77 Fredreck Kock of Pittenweem, STRO, ID 857352, 16 November 1640, from Stockholm.

78 SCA, G1B Verifikationer, 3, 1640, fol. 691, William Petrie; fol. 704, George Gardener, both 16 November 1640.

79 Robert Wood of Crail, STRO, ID 857394, 27 November 1640, from Stockholm.

At non-governmental level, the Scottish merchant diaspora became important agents in sourcing capital and goods for the fledgling Army of the Covenant. It is nigh on impossible to prove the provenance of many of the weapons brought into the British theatre by various agents on behalf of the Covenanters; nevertheless, clear grounds exist for informed speculation. While we have only patchy records for some of the sources used in this essay, we have very complete records for others. Comparing what was declared in Stockholm, what passed the Sound, and what arrived in Scottish ports such as Dundee offers a very valuable insight into who was involved in the ordering, shipping, and receipt of weapons, or the materials required to make them. We have been able to demonstrate a complete transaction for two voyages only: David Hay in 1639 and Peter Thomson in 1640. We have also been able to reveal cases of absolute deception, such as Andrew Kinnear's cargo of 'flax' declared at the Sound and its transformation into a largely metal cargo when unloaded in Dundee. His case alone gives grounds for the suspicion that there was more to many cargoes than what was declared in Denmark. The records show that the same Scottish merchants were, at this time, also involved in shipping notable quantities of iron and copper ostensibly to England, and a lot of work remains to be done on English shipping records. However, it is unclear to whom the shipments were made and whether the recipients were on the royalist side or otherwise. Furthermore, given the unreliable recording of destinations and goods, it is equally possible that these shipments were subsequently diverted elsewhere, including to Scotland.

This case study has illuminated the international network and connections of the rebellious Covenanting movement. We can now better explain how one small European country's revolution relied on a truly international support network based not on money but on decades of military service and amassed social capital at governmental and private level. All told, these actors demonstrably forced the climb down of what should have been a robust fiscal-military conglomerate state led by Charles I.

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CHAPTER 2

‘Cannons Have Made Him Very Rich’

Louis De Geer’s Role and His Network in International Arms Trade in the Baltic and North Sea Region in the Early 17th Century

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Abstract

The chapter focuses on Louis De Geer’s (1587–1652) role in international arms trade in the Baltic and the North Sea region during the first decades of the 17th century. De Geer was born in the southern part of the Low Countries, and he became a financier and a munitioner of the Swedish Crown during the reign of Gustav II Adolf. In addition to his position as a royal supplier, he was also involved in large-scale private trade of arms exported from Sweden to international markets in the Netherlands and other key centres of European arms trade. The chapter focuses on how De Geer’s personal contacts and social network enabled his military entrepreneurship. De Geer, together with his network of business associates, aimed to manage the means of production and

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resource flows in order to control both the manufacturing and trade of cast-iron cannon, ammunition and other types of ordnance. De Geer's network connected his business activities to a broader transnational supply system that was developed during the Thirty Years' War.

Introduction

In February 1636, the Swedish Council of the Realm discussed Louis De Geer's (1587–1652) significant claims on the Swedish crown. He was an influential entrepreneur and munitioner as well as a financier of the Swedish crown. According to the minutes of the meeting, Riksmarsk Count Jacob De la Gardie aptly noted that 'cannons have made De Geer very rich since he had ruined the position of the English'.[1] As an experienced officer and military entrepreneur, with personal interest in the production of cast iron cannon and responsibility for the command of the army, De la Gardie must have had a good perception of the scale of De Geer's business, which focused on the production and trade of cannon, munitions, and other types of military supplies.[2] In addition to this, he had personal business contacts with De Geer, to whom he sold iron that was produced in his ironworks.[3] De la Gardie's observation is also interesting because it refers to international aspects of De Geer's business.

Louis De Geer was born in Liège in the southern part of the Low Countries in 1587. As a result of the Dutch Revolt, known as the Eighty Years' War (1568–1648), and the confessional conflict between Catholics and Protestants, many craftsmen and merchants migrated from the south to the northern part of the Low Countries for economic, confessional, and social reasons. De Geer, whose father was a Calvinist, emigrated from Liège among many of his contemporaries. At first, he lived in Dordrecht and also in La Rochelle, which was an important centre of French Huguenots. Later, De Geer settled in Amsterdam, where he became a successful entrepreneur and arms trader.[4]

1 'Stycken haffve och gjort honom myckit rijck, der han ruijnerade dee Engliske.' Riksrådet, 24 February, in Bergh 1889, 64.
2 For De la Gardie's early entrepreneurial career, see Chapter 7 in this volume.
3 Concerning Louis De Geer's business contacts with Jacob De la Gardie, see, for example, Dahlgren 1923, 300; Dahlgren 1934, nos. 271, 340, 348, 350, 354.
4 Dahlgren 1923, 19–24; Nováky 2003, 4–8.

The focus of economic development in the Low Countries had shifted from Brabant and Flanders to Holland and other northern coastal provinces by the end of the 16th century. Dutch coastal cities had a large merchant fleet, and the Dutch were competitive in merchant shipping. As a result of the development of long-distance trade during the 17th century, financial services and inventories of commercial goods were also concentrated in Holland, where Amsterdam in particular became a dynamic hub of international business.[5] Politically, the Dutch Republic was a union formed by the rebellious northern provinces, in which Holland and the city of Amsterdam played a leading role.[6] In economic history, the republic has been described as the first modern economy.[7] It had strong ties to the Baltic Sea region, from where it imported grain and other important bulk goods.[8] Against this background, it is understandable that De Geer's business connections likewise soon extended from Amsterdam to the Baltic Sea region.

During the reign of Gustav II Adolf, De Geer established connections with the king as well as with his chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna, becoming a financier and munitioner of the Swedish crown at the time when Sweden rose to be a great power in Europe. In addition to his position as the royal supplier, he was involved in large-scale private trade of arms exported from Sweden to international markets in the Low Countries and other key centres of the European arms trade.[9] In historical research, however, much of the older literature concerning De Geer has been dominated by a nation-state-centred approach and needs revision.

According to György Nováky, the main biography on Louis De Geer[10] represents in many respects the early 20th-century perspective on the history of the Swedish great power period, highlighting the importance of great men as key figures in history. Nováky emphasises that De Geer and his entrepreneurship should be analysed in a broader historical context.[11] In the field of military history, new approaches have also emerged that are relevant in the context of this chapter. In

5 Israel 1989, 6–7, 20–22, 73–79; Deursen 1999, 145–48.
6 Israel 1998, 276–77, 291–97; Deursen 1999, 148–51.
7 Vries and Woude 1997; Zanden 2002, 619–41.
8 Israel 1989, 6–11, 18–21; Tielhof 2002, 1–5.
9 Dahlgren 1923; Lindblad 1995, 77–84; Wilson and Klerk 2022, 88, 100–101.
10 Dahlgren 1923.
11 Nováky 2003, 14–20.

recent study of military change in early modern Europe, increased attention has been paid to the role of military entrepreneurship and privatisation.[12] Linkages between the prosperity of the Dutch Republic and Dutch involvement in large-scale arms trade in the 17th century, as well as ethical perspectives related to this business, have also become subjects of more active historical research.[13] In recent years, the perception of De Geer has started to change as well. New aspects concerning his role in, for example, colonial trade and the slave trade have stimulated public discussion, especially in Sweden. Critics have argued that these sides of De Geer's business activities have not been sufficiently discussed in the past.[14]

These new perspectives and public discussion highlight the need to complement and reassess our understanding of Louis De Geer as an international arms trader and military entrepreneur, and also the position of the Nordic countries and the Baltic Sea region in the European system for the production and trade of arms. De Geer's business connections with the Swedish crown were an important aspect in Sweden's rise to great power status during the first half of the 17th century. Deliveries of arms, munitions, and other strategically important materiel were essential for the Swedish army and the navy, as well as for the development of production in Sweden.

In this chapter, I discuss Louis De Geer's role as a private agent and cooperation between key members of his business network in the international arms trade in the Baltic and North Sea region during the first decades of the 17th century and the early phases of the Thirty Years' War. The main question addressed here is that of how De Geer's personal contacts and social network enabled his private military entrepreneurship. First, I give an overview of existing literature concerning De Geer and the development of European arms trade. After this, I briefly discuss the characteristic features of Swedish production of military supplies in the 17th century and outline the central characteristics of De Geer's business network. In subsequent sections, De Geer's early cooperation with his brother-in-law Steven Gerard

12 Parrott 2012, 1–7.
13 Boterbloem 2020, 1–15.
14 See, for example, 'Louis De Geer: svensk slavhandel i Afrika', 2021, accessed 30 September 2025, https://urplay.se/program/220435-bildningsbyran-tanka-mot-strommen-louis-de-geer-svensk-slavhandel-i-afrika.

(?–1623), the entrepreneur Willem de Besche (1573–1629), and the Dutch businessmen Elias Trip (*c.* 1570–1636) and his second cousin Pieter Trip (1579–1655) is analysed more closely. These men were among key members of De Geer's business network, and they played an active role, especially in the arms trade.

Louis De Geer and the European Arms Trade as a Research Topic

Louis De Geer's business network and his international role as a private agent and entrepreneur in international arms trade has, until recently, attracted limited interest in historical research. An extensive two-part biography by Erik Wilhelm Dahlgren was published more than a century ago, in 1923, but it still forms the basis for research focusing on De Geer. Dahlgren concentrated on De Geer's activities in Sweden, paying much less attention to his role in international arms trade and to his business network. Another biography of De Geer, by the Dutch historian Froukje Breedvelt-van Veen, brought no significant new insight to the subject.[15]

In the field of economic history, De Geer's role and foreign influence on Swedish economic development attracted interest as far back as the early 20th century.[16] Some aspects of his wide-ranging business activities have been more thoroughly analysed in later historical research. György Nováky, for example, investigated De Geer's role in colonial trade in his doctoral dissertation, and Maj-Britt Nergård has explored the cooperation between the Swedish crown and De Geer, as well as the role of other foreign-born private actors in the development of Swedish ironworks and metal processing.[17]

Several important studies on early modern merchant houses in the Nordic countries and in the Netherlands are also worth mentioning in this context. Leos Müller, for example, has analysed the entrepreneurial behaviour and social networks of prominent merchant families in

15 Breedvelt-van Veen 1935. In more recent Dutch historical research, Thomas J. Lindblad, for example, has discussed De Geer's role as entrepreneur and as the father of the Swedish industry. See Lindblad 1995, 77–84.

16 See, for example, Hekscher 1936, 276, 314–17, 369–75, 447–55, 465–70.

17 Nováky 1990; Nergård 2001.

Stockholm during the early modern period.[18] John T. Lauridsen has studied the business activities of the Marselis family, whose members played a significant role in Denmark and Norway in the 17th century.[19] Alongside these Nordic historians, Peter Wolfgang Klein focused on the Trip merchant family and their business strategies in his pioneering doctoral thesis from 1965.[20] The Trip family specialised in wholesale business and trade of cannon and munitions in the staple market of Amsterdam, and they had personal ties and joint business activities with De Geer.

In addition to these studies, increased attention has been paid to the position of the Dutch Republic in the international arms trade and the linkage between war, the economy, and society.[21] Julia Zunckel has analysed the international trade of military equipment in Europe during the early stages of the Thirty Years' War. In this important study, she focuses on the position of Hamburg and Amsterdam as distribution centres for military supplies in North-Western Europe, and their links to Genoa in the Mediterranean region.[22] Marianne Klerk has explored the role of Amsterdam as a fiscal-military hub where French subsidies were transferred to Sweden during the Thirty Years' War.[23] And David Parrott has examined military entrepreneurship and the role of private contractors in the recruitment of soldiers and in the supply of war materiel in early modern Europe.[24] In this chapter, Louis De Geer's role in the international arms trade is discussed within the broader European framework. Its scope is limited, however, and it is not possible to provide a thorough analysis of De Geer's role as military entrepreneur, or the volume of his arms trade. The aim is to focus on his cooperation with the key members of his business network.

In early modern Europe, letters played a central role in the dissemination of information, and correspondence networks were an essential precondition, especially for international long-distance trade.[25] I therefore use De Geer's preserved and partially published business

18 Müller 1998.
19 Lauridsen 1987.
20 Klein (1965) 1999.
21 See, for example, Hoeven and Puype 1996; Hart 2014.
22 Zunckel 1997.
23 Klerk 2020.
24 Parrott 2012.
25 Müller 1995, 150; Müller 1998, 68–72, 221–25.

correspondence as the main primary source collection in this chapter.[26] De Geer held the management of his business in his own hands, so it is natural to place him at the centre of the business network, which was not static but evolved over time. Although source material covers only a minor part of his extensive business correspondence, it still provides an opportunity to increase our understanding of the nature of De Geer's networked business, and to discuss collaboration with the key actors of his network by examining individual business transactions related to the arms trade. In the following sections, I briefly outline characteristic features of the production of military supplies in Sweden and De Geer's business network.

Development of Arms Production in Sweden

During the reign of King Gustav II Adolf, Sweden was constantly involved in armed conflicts. The Kalmar War against Denmark (1611–1613) ended with defeat, and the Peace of Stolbovo in 1617 brought an end to the Ingrian War against Russia (1609–1617). As part of its expansion in the Baltic region, Sweden also continued the prolonged war against Poland in Livonia and Prussia, before joining the Thirty Years' War in Germany in 1630.[27] As a result of these wars and simultaneous changes in warfare, the Swedish crown needed more resources to recruit and equip the military.

In Sweden, the economic and administrative reforms carried out during the reign of Gustav II Adolf under Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna aimed at improving the fiscal position of the state in order to manage its financial obligations. Human resources from abroad were needed to implement the reform policy. The Swedish crown therefore welcomed foreign merchants and businessmen who brought with them valuable technical expertise, international contacts, and capital. Dutch and later also other nationalities, such as English and Scottish, challenged the formerly dominant position of German merchants during the 17th century in the Swedish economy and in long-distance trade. Immigration from the Low Countries was small in quantitative terms, but it had a significant impact on Swedish society. The foreign impact was visible above all in economic policy and in the development of cities and

26 Dahlgren 1934.

27 See, for example, Oakley 1992, 42–64; Lappalainen 2001, 46–63.

towns.[28] At the same time, Amsterdam replaced Lübeck's former leadership in maritime trade, although connections to the coastal cities of Northern Germany still continued to play an important role. The total volume of Swedish foreign trade grew significantly in the early 17th century. Iron and copper production was a key factor in explaining this growth, which connected Sweden to international long-distance trade.[29]

An important objective during the reign of Gustav II Adolf was to promote domestic production of arms and munitions and thus reduce dependence on imports of military equipment.[30] The general importance of mines and metal processing in Europe had increased during the 15th and 16th centuries as a result of changes in warfare. In addition to copper needed in bronze production, the use of iron became more common in manufacturing of cannons during the 16th century.[31] In Sweden, the starting points for developing domestic production of arms and munitions were excellent thanks to the rich iron and copper ore reserves and mines.

De Geer's family had its origins in the Prince-Bishopric of Liège, which was an important centre of metal processing and arms production in the Low Countries.[32] De Geer and many other businessmen with their background in the Low Countries were interested not only in trade but also in controlling production in Sweden. The processing of raw materials was concentrated in ironworks in Sweden and in Finland. De Geer and other private actors were able to use their access to private capital to develop their businesses more independently and introduce new technologies after the Swedish crown had given permission to lease ironworks. The main branch of industry in Sweden was metal production from copper and iron ore. Skilled Walloons with a high level of technical expertise in metal processing were recruited to Sweden from the southern parts of the Low Countries, in present-day Belgium and France.[33] De Geer, in cooperation with his business partners, leased a number of ironworks in Sweden and developed

28 See, for example, Hekscher 1936, 269–88, 360–68, 384, 672–90; Roberts 1973, 10–11, 81–98.
29 Magnusson 2010, 123–25.
30 Roberts 1953; Roberts 1958; Roberts 1973; Lappalainen 2001, 23–24, 39–45.
31 McNeill 1982, 86–87.
32 Dahlgren 1923, 1–14; Nergård 2001, chapter 3.
33 Hekscher 1936, 369–76, 462–70; Nergård 2001, chapter 4; Nováky 2003, 17–18.

large-scale production of iron, weapons, other military equipment, and brass during the 1620s and 1630s.[34] This development of metal production in Sweden was a part of broader change in Europe.

The scale of arms production increased also in many other European regions in the 17th century, thanks to the involvement of private businessmen and their capital. The process was accelerated by rising costs of war and cooperation between rulers, merchants, and bankers.[35] At the European level, the changes were linked to the Thirty Years' War in Germany and Central Europe between 1618 and 1648.[36] This war, a series of interlinked armed conflicts, has often been considered a significant watershed in European history.

Key Characteristics and Members of De Geer's Business Network

The Swedish crown was dependent on De Geer's and other foreign businessmen's connections in Amsterdam and in other European financial hubs. As a result, their significance grew during the 17th century.[37] Amsterdam experienced a dynamic phase of growth during the same era. A large number of businessmen and merchants migrated to the city from the southern part of the Low Countries. These new immigrants brought capital and business experience with them. They also had extensive and flexible networks based on confidential relationships between merchants and their families.[38] The key members of De Geer's business network, which formed the basis of his entrepreneurship focusing on the production and trade of weapons and munitions, are outlined in Figure 2.1.

During the 17th century, it was usual for a merchant's family to play a key role in their business. Social ties created through family relationships and marriages increased mutual trust between business partners and thus reduced transaction costs.[39] A typical feature of Dutch business in particular was also the agents who were located abroad. They

34 Dahlgren 1923, chaps. 4 and 9; Hekscher 1936, 369–70, 462–70.
35 McNeill 1982, 113–14; Parrott 2012, chapter 5.
36 Parker 1984; Schilling 2007, 507–38.
37 Hekscher 1936, 370–76.
38 Lesger 2006, 1, 9.
39 Müller 1998, 31–32, 36–38.



Figure 2.1: Key members of Louis De Geer's network in the arms trade

enabled members of the Dutch business communities to maintain strong economic and personal ties.[40] These characteristics are also visible in De Geer's network. From the perspective of his business activities, links between Sweden and the Low Countries were essential.

Louis De Geer's significant investments in metal processing and arms production in Sweden required travelling between the Low Countries and Sweden during the 1620s and 1630s, as well as longer-term living in Norrköping and later in Stockholm. It is likely that he arrived in Sweden for the first time in 1627 and lived there until 1631.[41] He next returned to the country in 1635 to discuss in person the rearrangement of his economic relations with the Swedish crown.[42] With the exception of these periods, he lived in Amsterdam until he moved to Sweden again on a more permanent basis in 1641.[43] For this reason, De Geer's transnational network played a key role in his business activities.

40 Tielhof 2002, 166–81.
41 Dahlgren 1923, chapter 5.
42 Dahlgren 1923, 257–63.
43 Dahlgren 1923, 304–5, 529–30.

Family members and trusted business partners could act as Louis De Geer's representatives during his absence. He delegated the management of his trading house in Amsterdam to his oldest son, Laurens, while he stayed in Sweden in the 1630s. De Geer's son-in-law Michael Amija, who was married to his oldest daughter, Jenneken, was also actively involved in his business operations, and took care of a significant part of the sales of Swedish iron in Amsterdam. Similarly, his brother-in-law Steven Gerard was his business partner and acted in the early stages as the head of De Geer's office in Amsterdam. Like De Geer, Gerard was a member of a migrant family from Liège, and De Geer had married his sister Adrienne (*c.* 1590–1634) in Dordrecht in 1615. Meanwhile, in Stockholm, the Dutch-born merchant Arnold Huybertszoon occasionally took care of De Geer's business affairs in the city. After De Geer returned from Sweden to Amsterdam in 1631, he gave the management of his business operations in Sweden to Johan Le Thor, who worked for him until 1636. Thereafter, his bookkeepers—Dirck de Keyser, and from 1646 onwards Abraham Bex—had an important role in coordinating his payment transactions and business correspondence in Sweden.[44]

Steven Gerard and the First Deliveries of Military Equipment

International trade flows were connected in Amsterdam, which became an important centre of long-distance trade in Europe during the first part of the 17th century. In her landmark study of capitalism in Amsterdam in the 17th century, Violet Barbour described the city as a centre of international finance too, where foreign princes and governments could seek Dutch loans and investments.[45] The rise of Amsterdam took place in a period characterized by military confrontation and political polarisation in Europe. As a result of the Eighty Years' War against Spain, the arms trade played a significant role in the economic growth of Holland and the other rebellious provinces. However, because of insufficient domestic production of arms, there was a need for significant imports. Amsterdam developed into a staple market for arms in Europe, where foreign agents could buy military

44 Dahlgren 1923, 18–23, 305–9.
45 Barbour 1963, chaps. 1 and 6.

supplies. In that city, foreign states were also able to obtain private credit needed for procurements. Alongside Amsterdam, Hamburg and the Hanseatic cities of Lübeck and Bremen were also important centres of arms trade.[46] In these fiscal-military hubs, merchants and financiers had broad international networks and they were able to provide states with credits and military resources.[47]

De Geer was one of the key players in the city's military supplies market. His early business connections to Sweden were linked to the commission trade of Swedish copper in Amsterdam. In the early 17th century, the Swedish crown aimed to benefit from its significant copper and iron ore reserves in order to obtain fiscal revenues. The importance of copper exports was emphasised especially in the payment of the Second Älvsborg Ransom to Denmark. The indemnity, stipulated in the Treaty of Knäred which had ended the Kalmar War in 1613, was a significant burden on the Swedish state finances.[48] The concentration of the copper trade in Amsterdam was linked to the political rapprochement between the Dutch Republic and Sweden. Gustav II Adolf hoped that the Dutch would finance the payment of the Älvsborg Ransom, either directly through loans granted by the States General or through private loans granted by Amsterdam bankers and guaranteed by the States General. The first loan agreement was signed in 1616, and the total amount of foreign debt grew rapidly in the following years.[49] There are no sources describing Louis De Geer's direct participation in the negotiations conducted by Swedish diplomats between 1614 and 1616, but it is possible that he was already actively involved in the negotiations.

In 1617, an extension of the previously agreed loan agreement was negotiated and possibilities for new loans were explored. At this stage, a consortium of Dutch businessmen offered financing to Sweden. De Geer took part in this loan offer, which was connected to competition for control of the commission trade of Swedish copper in Amsterdam. The negotiations continued between Jacob van Dijck, who represented Sweden, and De Geer, who had become the leader of the consortium.[50]

46 Barbour 1963, 105; Klein 1966, 195–96; Zunckel 1997, 41–42.
47 Klerk 2020, 214.
48 Hekscher 1936, 270–275, 443–44.
49 Dahlgren 1923, 30–38.
50 Dahlgren 1923, 42–48, 52–58.

A draft agreement from 1618 demonstrates De Geer's role. According to that document, the repayment of the 100,000 riksdaler would take place through copper deliveries. It was also possible that the loan would be granted by the States General itself, for political reasons, and in this case the consortium of businessmen would only be responsible for the sale of copper.[51] Negotiations continued, and a new agreement between the States General and Sweden was finally signed in November 1618. As a result of the agreement, De Geer and his business partners became intermediaries in the trade of Swedish copper.[52] According to Barbour, the arrangements concerning the Älvsborg Ransom were an illustrative example of a close relation between public and private loans. For De Geer, the agreement of 1618 marked the beginning of a long and complex financial relationship with the Swedish crown.[53]

De Geer and his business partners were also involved in large-scale arms trade between Sweden and the Dutch Republic. He made loans, advanced credit, and supplied munitions for the Swedish crown, which in turn used copper exports, leases of land, and allocations of customs duties to settle with its creditors. In addition to De Geer, there were other businessmen in Amsterdam actively involved in the arms trade and financing of the Swedish crown.[54] Steven Gerard was an important business partner for De Geer in the first arms deliveries. There is an interesting early reference to cooperation between De Geer and his brother-in-law in the minutes of the States General in April 1615. According to the records, the two merchants from Dordrecht had agreed with the Swedish crown on favourable terms for arms deliveries. Their aim was to export more than 400 cannon, cannonballs, saltpetre, and other needed materiel, and to deliver it at a reasonable price to the Admiralties in the Dutch Republic.[55] Soon after this, the Swedish diplomatic representative in The Hague, Jacob van Dijck, mentioned in a letter to Axel Oxenstiera that the Dutch Republic had decided to

51 Dahlgren 1934, no. 14, Contract between Jacob van Dijck and Louis De Geer, July 1618.

52 Dahlgren 1923, 58–62.

53 Barbour 1963, 104–5, 111.

54 See, for example, Barbour 1963, 111–12. Abraham Cabiljau and his business associates had already been involved in copper and arms exports from Sweden to the Dutch Republic. On Cabiljau's role, see Wirta, Tikka, and Björklund 2022.

55 Nationaal Archief, The Hague, Archief van de Staten-Generaal, no. 3174, Resolution of the States General, 30 April 1615.

transfer the trade of cannon, cannonballs, and other war materiel to Sweden from Germany, England, and Liège. According to Dahlgren, van Dijck exaggerated the change and it was possibly a question of business speculation.[56] In any case, this indicates that Gerard and De Geer were active in the large-scale arms trade with Sweden even before De Geer had settled in Amsterdam.

A few years later, Gerard travelled to Stockholm to take care of his and De Geer's joint business affairs. This demonstrates that connections to Sweden had already become an important part of their business.[57] Despite its domestic iron ore reserves, Sweden had to import military supplies. An early example of this was a contract between De Geer and the Swedish diplomatic representatives Johan Skytte and Jacob van Dijck signed in The Hague in 1618, concerning a major supply of arms worth 60,000 guilders. The contract was based on a commission from Gustav II Adolf. The military supplies were to be delivered in accordance with a quotation submitted by Gerard and approved by the king in Stockholm.[58] The contract was adjusted later; according to the new agreement, the costs had increased to 80,000 guilders, part of which would be covered by the subsidies provided by the States General of the Dutch Republic. A detailed list including, for example, prices of powder, muskets, carbines, and swords is appended to the contract.[59]

Orders for military supplies to be delivered from the Netherlands to the Swedish crown continued in the following years. For example, Gerard agreed in Stockholm in 1620 to deliver gunpowder, armour, and burgonet-style combat helmets from the Netherlands.[60] De Geer signed a contract in Amsterdam in 1622 with the Swedish diplomat Jan Rutgersius concerning the supply of weapons and military equipment either to Stockholm or to Riga as quickly as possible. The contract included equipment such as bandoliers, fourquets, helmets, pistols, holsters, and cuirass armour.[61] The background to the contracts was

56 Dahlgren 1923, 38–39.
57 Dahlgren 1923, 38–42.
58 Dahlgren 1934, no. 10, Contract Concerning Delivery of Weapons to the Swedish Crown 24 January 1618.
59 Dahlgren 1934, no. 12, New Contract Concerning Delivery of Weapons, 30 May 1618.
60 Dahlgren 1934, no. 24, Contract Concerning Delivery of War Materiel, 5 February 1620.
61 Dahlgren 1934, no. 37, Order for Weapons, 16 June 1622.

Sweden's expansive foreign policy in the Baltic Sea region and its military operations in the Baltics as part of the war against Poland.[62] In light of these early contracts, it is clear that Gerard had an important position in De Geer's business network, which enabled significant deliveries of military supplies according to prices determined in advance.

Partnership with Willem de Besche in Sweden

Another key person in De Geer's business network was Willem de Besche, who, like De Geer, came from Liège. De Besche had moved to Sweden in 1595 at the request of Karl IX, and he was engaged in brass and iron production in Nyköping. Later, he returned to the Netherlands to straighten out his finances, and it appears that it was during this trip that he became acquainted with Steven Gerard and De Geer's trading house.[63] The exact date is not known, but it must have happened at an early stage, as there were business contacts between De Geer and Willem de Besche as early as 1614. In the initial phase, De Geer sold products exported by Willem from Sweden to Amsterdam.[64]

De Geer's early arms deliveries were largely based on the transportation of military supplies from the Low Countries to Sweden. It was difficult, however, to meet growing demand, which raised prices and caused supply difficulties. The war between Spain and the Dutch Republic made river transport of military supplies on the Meuse more difficult from the important production area in Liège to Dordrecht and onwards to the northern provinces.[65] In his letter to Chancellor Oxenstierna in 1621, De Geer rejected new orders proposed by the king. He referred to rising prices, and also to new orders from other buyers in, for example, France. At the same time, the Swedish crown was heavily indebted to De Geer.[66] As a result of these developments, it

62 For a general overview of military campaigns in the Baltic region during the Polish–Swedish War of 1617–1629, see, for example, Lappalainen 2001, 46–55. For the cost of the war, see Chapter 9 in this volume.

63 Dahlgren 1934, no. 1, Louis De Geer's Account of His First Business Connections with Willem de Besche, undated.

64 Dahlgren 1934, no. 2, Willem de Besche's oldest preserved account in De Geer's bookkeeping, undated. See also Dahlgren 1923, 26–28.

65 Dahlgren 1923, 105–6.

66 Dahlgren 1934, no. 35, Letter to Axel Oxenstierna, 25 June 1621. See also Dahlgren 1923, 93–97, 106–7.

was understandable that De Geer was interested in developing production in Sweden.

Louis De Geer's father had invested in iron processing in Liège, and his son was thus aware of the business opportunities offered by this sector. Nergård has pointed out that entrepreneurs involved in the iron industry in Liège learned to build networks between production and trade, with family connections also often having an entrepreneurial function. According to her, De Geer and Gerard transferred this practice to Sweden, with support from Willem de Besche.[67] Gerard had discussed with Willem the prospects of manufacturing cast iron cannon during his stay in Sweden in 1617–1618. Probably based on his assessment and information, a joint lease agreement between Willem de Besche and the Swedish crown concerning the lease of Finspång ironworks was concluded in 1618.[68] From the perspective of De Geer's business activities, Finspång became a central ironworks over the years, along with Lövsta and other production plants in Uppland and Östergötland, near Dannemora iron mine.[69] It turned out to be a long-term investment for De Geer, and in 1625 the lease agreement was extended by six years.[70] Gerard visited Sweden again in 1622–1623, to take care of the negotiations with the crown. However, he died in December 1623.[71] This further emphasised Willem de Besche's overall role in De Geer's network.

The production of cannon increased in the following years, and in 1625 the king renewed the privilege granted in 1622 to de Besche and some of his other business partners for the production of iron cannon. This time, the privilege was granted for both Willem de Besche and Louis De Geer. According to the document, De Geer was also granted the right to become a Swedish subject, but he could have burgher's rights and permission to practise commerce only after he had settled in Sweden.[72] Two years later, in 1627, De Geer moved to Sweden for the first time.[73]

67 Nergård 2001, 146–54; See also Wirta, Tikka, and Björklund 2022.
68 Dahlgren 1934, no. 13, Agreement on Leasing of Finspång Ironworks, 20 July 1618.
69 Dahlgren 1923, 26–28.
70 Dahlgren 1934, no. 49, Renewal of Agreement on Leasing of Finspång Ironworks, 22 June 1625.
71 Dahlgren 1923, 97–105.
72 Dahlgren 1934, no. 50, Renewal of Privilege for Willem de Besche and his partner Louis De Geer, 25 June 1625.
73 Dahlgren 1923, 153–57.

While in Sweden, De Geer stayed in Norrköping and in Finspång, close to his ironworks and other production plants.[74] Soon after he had settled there, he was able to significantly strengthen his position in the production of weapons and military supplies. In the spring of 1627, he and his business associate de Besche obtained a new royal privilege for a period of six years to produce cast iron cannon in Sweden. According to the privilege, they also had the right to export cannon produced in Österby and Finspång to international markets free of customs duties, unless the products were needed for the use of the Swedish crown.[75] At the same time, the lease contract of Finspång was extended by six years.[76] The crown also agreed to lease out additional ironworks and production facilities.[77] The new privilege and the lease contracts enabled De Geer and de Besche to effectively control the production and trade of cast-iron cannon in Sweden.

In 1627, the same year De Geer moved to Sweden, the king decided that the operation of iron-manufacturing facilities producing weapons and other military equipment should be transferred to Louis De Geer and Willem de Besche instead of the Swedish Iron Company. The Swedish crown had earlier planned to control the production and trade of iron by establishing a new company. The plans were not realised, however, and the king turned to individual entrepreneurs to manage and develop iron manufacturing in Sweden.[78]

An interesting joint project for supplying the Swedish army was a plan to build a new centralised arsenal in Stockholm. The king made an agreement with De Geer and de Besche concerning this venture in 1627. According to that agreement, De Geer and de Besche had presented a plan to improve the production facilities for various military supplies in order to increase production volumes. Some of the growing production could also be exported for profit. The agreement stated that De Geer and de Besche would undertake to build a new warehouse or arsenal at Skeppsholmen in Stockholm, where they would stockpile

74 Dahlgren 1923, 176–77.
75 Dahlgren 1934, no. 79, Privilege for Louis De Geer and Willem de Besche, 24 April 1627.
76 Dahlgren 1934, no. 74, Renewal of Agreement on Leasing of Finspång Ironworks, 27 April 1627.
77 Dahlgren 1934, no. 77, Lease Agreement Concerning the Works in Nyköping, 27 April 1627.
78 Hekscher 1936, 490; Tikka 2020, 96–100.

significant amounts of military supplies for a total of 15 infantry regiments and 3000 horsemen. The Swedish crown could use the supplies stored in the arsenal for its armed forces at the prices specified in the agreement.[79] This construction project did not materialise as such, but the plan is still a significant example of a large-scale private military supply solution. It also highlights the rapidly changing and often volatile business environment.

In the following year, De Geer and the Swedish crown amended the formal agreement, and the arsenal construction project was abandoned. According to the document, De Geer still undertook to provide the crown with significant quantities of either domestically produced or imported military supplies.[80] At this stage, orders were connected to the decision of Gustav II Adolf to join the Thirty Years' War in Germany.

Sweden supported the besieged German city of Stralsund on the Baltic coast in 1628; two years later, the landing of a Swedish field army in Northern Germany marked the beginning of the Swedish intervention.[81] The crown needed significant amounts of supplies from De Geer for the military operation.[82] De Geer received, for example, a large order for supplies at the beginning of 1630. The order included 28 six-pounder cast-iron cannon and 66 three-pounder cannon produced in Finspång, as well as thousands of muskets and other pieces of military equipment.[83] During the reign of Gustav II Adolf, Swedish field artillery was developed, and the number of different artillery calibres was reduced in order to facilitate the supply of ammunition. Before the Swedish intervention in the Thirty Years' War, the three-pounder cannon had become the standard weapon used by the regiments of the field army.[84] Sweden remained at war until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 which ended the Thirty Years' War. The orders from the Swedish

79 Dahlgren 1934, no. 78, Contract for the Establishment of an Arsenal, 27 April 1627. See also Dahlgren 1923, 125–32.

80 Dahlgren 1934, no. 107, Changed Agreement Concerning the Establishment of an Arsenal, 2 May 1628.

81 Oredsson 1992, 12–13, 237–61; Lappalainen 2001, 57–63; Bäckström 2020, 23, 27–28.

82 Dahlgren 1923, 137–43.

83 Dahlgren 1934, no. 129, Contract for the Delivery of Supplies for the War in Germany, 18 January 1630. See also Dahlgren 1923, Table 6.

84 Lappalainen 2001, 44–45.

crown for the army in Germany decreased significantly, however, following the fall of Gustav II Adolf in the Battle of Lützen in 1632.

Louis De Geer's key business associate in Sweden, Willem de Besche, had died in 1629. De Geer had relied on Willem, and their business partnership was also strengthened by family ties: Willem's son Carl had married De Geer's daughter Ida. According to Dahlgren, Willem had technical skills needed for their joint projects, but the capital for large-scale investments came through De Geer.[85] In the literature, the cluster of privatised production capacity, capital, and skilled workforce built in Sweden by De Geer and de Besche has been compared to Albrecht von Wallenstein's business activities in Central Europe during the same period. Despite many differences, the ability to mobilise private capital and credits, as well as the extensive international network through which contacts, resources, and military supplies were transferred, was common to both systems.[86] During the first part of the 17th century, the development of more permanent state structures for armies and navies and long-term armed conflicts in Europe increased the demand for arms and created markets for munitioners. In the resulting arrangements, the businessmen and their consortia engaged in the trade of military supplies often tried to control not only the distribution of war material but also its production.

The International Arms Trade in Amsterdam and Connections with the Trip Family

In earlier literature, Zunckel concluded that Louis De Geer was involved in a consortium in Amsterdam that focused on the trade in military supplies and operated at the European level.[87] De Geer was not only a financier and supplier of materiel to Sweden but he also had business relations with countries such as Denmark, France, Venice, and Portugal.[88] He cooperated especially with the Trip family. In addition to a business partnership, there were close family ties, which were strengthened by marriages. Maria, Louis De Geer's sister, had married Elias Trip in Dordrecht, where both families lived before settling

85 Dahlgren 1923, 176–79.
86 McNeill 1982, 122–23; Parrott 2012, 196–203, 236–39.
87 Zunckel 1997, 76.
88 Barbour 1963, 37–39.

in Amsterdam. Jakob Trip, Elias's brother, was married to another of De Geer's sisters.[89] In the 17th-century business environment, it was important to reduce and diversify the risks associated with business operations. Trust between actors and access to credit were therefore important preconditions for trade.[90]

De Geer established an official business partnership with Elias and Pieter Trip in 1624, and extended it a couple of years later. Their consortium focused on the trade of Swedish cast-iron cannon in Amsterdam. In 1628, De Geer made a new arrangement with the two Trips, as well as with other members of their family, concerning trade in weapons, salpetre, and copper. The Trip family managed the sale of Swedish cannon in the Low Countries on behalf of De Geer, who was in Sweden at the time. They had previously been active in the trade of munitions imported from Liège and English cannon that had dominated the Western European market before large-scale exports from Sweden started. According to Klein, their consortium could monopolise the trade of Swedish cannon in Western Europe, and the Trip family also financed De Geer's investments in Sweden. Cooperation on this scale was short-lived, however, ending in 1631.[91] In the same year, De Geer returned from Sweden to Amsterdam.[92] The relationship between De Geer and the Trip family became more strained and competitive after this.[93]

De Geer's preserved letters from the time of his first trip to Sweden in 1627 give the opportunity to analyse more closely his practical cooperation with Elias and Pieter Trip. On his way from Amsterdam to Sweden in 1627, he sent a letter to Pieter Trip from Hamburg. According to that letter, De Geer was actively negotiating for several transactions concerning arms trade. De Geer wrote that he could take a new order for 100 large 12-pounder cannons, if he was able to acquire new production facilities and expand existing ones in Sweden. The prices would have to be increased, however, because the costs were high and it was possible to lease ironworks only for six years.[94] In his following

89 Dahlgren 1923, 23; Klein (1965) 1999, 27–35, 98–99.
90 Mathias 1995, 5–18; Müller 1998, 31–32, 36–38.
91 Klein (1965) 1999, 244–62; Klein 1966, 197–98.
92 Dahlgren 1923, 178–79.
93 Barbour 1963, 36–37.
94 Dahlgren 1934, no. 65, Letter to Pieter Trip, 24 January 1627.

letter, De Geer described a shortage of weapons in Sweden, which was why the recently recruited horsemen and soldiers in Kiel were not equipped. De Geer himself was unable to assist, since his own arms transport was stuck in Bremen due to icy conditions.[95]

After his arrival in Sweden, De Geer reported to his business partners on the situation in Sweden concerning payments for arms supplies already delivered to the Swedish crown. He also described the arrangements for the leasing of ironworks. According to him, it had been possible to start the production of cannon. He also believed that it would be possible for him to establish a monopoly over cannon production in Sweden, if he could reach an agreement with other producers in Sweden.[96] In his second letter, De Geer hoped that his business partners were satisfied with his actions, which had cost them a lot, but as a result he was now able to control production throughout Sweden. De Geer believed that it was also possible to export substantial quantities of munitions, such as cannonballs, from Sweden to the Low Countries, and he requested a ship for transportation.[97] His aim was to produce as many as 1000 cannon in 1627, and he therefore advised his business partners in Holland to stop buying English cannon.[98] In the light of these letters, we can see that practical cooperation between De Geer and the Trip family was close.

Although De Geer's correspondence mainly deals with transactions related to Sweden, other aspects of the international arms trade were occasionally discussed. For example, in his letters to Elias and Pieter Trip, he repeatedly advised them to be cautious and not to engage in business with France.[99] In Amsterdam, the Hoeufft family had close business relations with France, and De Geer complained that Jan Hoeufft was slow in paying for arms he had delivered to France.[100] These experiences probably explain De Geer's advice to refrain from doing business with the French government. De Geer also mentioned Guglielmo Bartolotti, a businessman who may have served as

95 Dahlgren 1934, no. 66, Letter to Pieter Trip, 2 February 1627.
96 Dahlgren 1934, no. 68, Letter to Elias and Pieter Trip, 23 February 1627.
97 Dahlgren 1934, no. 69, Letter to Pieter Trip, 23 February 1627.
98 Dahlgren 1934, no. 72, Letter to Pieter Trip, 14 April 1627.
99 Dahlgren 1934, nos. 71 and 72, Letters to Elias Trip, 14 April 1627, and Pieter Trip, 14 April and 1 May 1627.
100 Dahlgren 1934, no. 72, Letter to Pieter Trip, 14 April 1627; Barbour 1963, 45–46, 105–6.

an agent for the French crown in Amsterdam.[101] Bartolotti, a son of an emigrant merchant from Antwerp, was one of the wealthiest businessmen in Amsterdam; according to Zunckel, he was another of the key actors in the international arms trade.[102] There are references to business connections between Bartolotti, the Trip family, and De Geer: for example, concerning a company established in Amsterdam for the sale of copper and saltpetre in the 1630s.[103] It is possible that De Geer had other business connections with Bartolotti. The contacts with Bartolotti and more intense cooperation with the Trip family thus demonstrate that De Geer was well connected with other key players in Amsterdam who were active in the arms trade.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the focus has been on Louis De Geer's role as a private actor in the international arms trade. It is possible to understand his role through his business connections and family ties that formed the core of his transnational network. By analysing closely his interaction and collaboration with the key members of his network, it is possible to conclude that the development of the privatised arms production in Sweden, and De Geer's involvement in large-scale international arms trade, were made possible by the expertise, capital, and information provided by his business associates. These resources were transferred within the network, whose members often had overlapping roles as business partners and family members, which strengthened trust between them.

In earlier research focusing on early modern entrepreneurial behaviour, Klein emphasised monopolistic practices, especially in the arms trade. Nergård, on the other hand, stressed the control of production, and Müller highlighted social networks as a tool to secure merchants' social position. All of these aspects are important in understanding early modern entrepreneurship, and all are clearly visible when we analyse De Geer's relationships and cooperation with Steven Gerard, Willem de Besche, and Elias and Pieter Trip as members of his business

101 Dahlgren 1934, nos. 71 and 72, Letters to Elias Trip, 14 April 1627, and Pieter Trip, 1 May 1627.

102 Zunckel 1997, 76; Israel 1998, 347.

103 Dahlgren 1934, no. 214, Articles of Association of Elias Trip's Copper Company, 13 June 1634; Zunckel 1997, 106.

network. Instead of focusing on individual military entrepreneurs in the arms trade, it is important to acknowledge the networked nature of their business. More systematic analysis of the collaboration between different actors and their roles within De Geer's network helps us to understand how such entrepreneurs operated. Members of his network had access to market information, capital, and other resources which helped to meet the growing and often also volatile demand for arms. Entrepreneurs could offer relatively efficient and flexible ways to utilise resources to produce and supply arms with the help of their networks.

De Geer, together with his network of business associates, aimed to manage the means of production and resource flows in order to control both the manufacturing and the trade of cannon, ammunition, and other types of military supplies. His network connected his business activities to the broader transnational supply system that was developed during the Thirty Years' War. During the first half of the 17th century, protracted armed conflicts in Europe led to constant demand for weapons and ammunition. This increased regional specialisation in arms manufacturing and created profitable business opportunities.

De Geer also offers a valuable Nordic perspective on military entrepreneurship. Although he was a private actor, he and his business associates had close connections to the Swedish crown. From the perspective of the crown, De Geer's arms manufacturing and export trade was important. His network provided credit and supplied arms to the royal army and the navy. Through his network of business connections, he had access to international capital and expertise that were necessary for the development of the Swedish economy and domestic manufacturing. As a result of this strategic partnership, Sweden became more self-sufficient in arms production. In many ways, the country's present-day defence industry has its historical roots in the 17th century. On the other hand, there were significant risks involved in depending on business relations with the Swedish crown. The role of Amsterdam as a centre of international arms trade made it possible for De Geer and his network to supply arms to other governments as well, thus decreasing their dependence on procurements from Sweden.

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CHAPTER 3

Private Enterprise and Commercial-Diplomatic Exchange

British Arms Supply and Sweden, 1654–1660

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Abstract

This chapter explores the clandestine activities of Sweden's diplomats who sourced and dispatched military materiel from England to help fuel Karl X Gustav's northern wars of the mid-late 1650s. Founded on a cache of documents and accounts unearthed in the Sweden National Archives this chapter highlights the dual nature of Sweden's diplomatic representatives and demonstrates the networks, methods and extent of arms and goods involved. It represents the first published research by the author that seeks to reassess Sweden's military trade and its relationship with foreign producers during the later seventeenth century.

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Introduction

Karl X Gustav ascended the Swedish throne in June 1654 and presided over a near six-year reign dominated by conflict. During his short tenure, the Swedish king would make war on both land and sea, engaging in hostilities with Poland–Lithuania (1655–1660), Russia (1656–1658), Brandenburg-Prussia (1657–1660), and Denmark–Norway (1657–1658 and 1658–1660). Despite his premature death in February 1660, treaties signed with Poland–Lithuania (Treaty of Oliva) and Denmark–Norway (Treaty of Copenhagen) saw Sweden reach its territorial apex and gain an unprecedented position of dominance in the Baltic.[1]

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how private enterprise and commercial-diplomatic exchange facilitated the procurement of military materiel between England and Sweden during the 1650s. It will demonstrate the extent to which Anglo-Swedish cooperation directly fuelled and provided support for Swedish wars during this period.[2] The levying of British soldiers, particularly during the first half of the 17th century, is a facet of British (particularly Scottish–Swedish relations) which is well known and has received significant scholarly attention in the preceding two decades.[3] However, the process by which diplomats, merchants, and the burgeoning trade of England and Sweden from 1650 onward drove the procurement of military materiel, as well as the processes and functioning behind this, is still to be explored. While the spatial confinements of this chapter do not permit a full appraisal of the entire subject, it will provide a platform to adequately introduce the topic.

1 For more on this issue, see Landberg 1952, 81–122; Göransson 1956; Andersson 1969, 71–99; Frost 2000, 166–86; Asker 2009, 173–283.

2 The naval and diplomatic support provided to Sweden from England in the later 1650s, which led to a number of financial, commercial, and territorial concessions from Denmark–Norway, has been deemed outside the confines of this chapter. For more on this issue, see Landberg 1952, 101–22; Anderson 1969, 94–101; Grosjean 1998, 252–59; Ailes 2005. Enrolment in Swedish service by high-profile English naval men led to a number of ennoblements in Sweden. See entries in the Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical Database (SSNE), https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne/: 'Ayscue, George' [4133]; 'Coxe, Owen' [4179]; 'Montague, Edward' [4444].

3 For more information, see Grosjean 1998; Murdoch 2001; Grosjean 2002; Murdoch 2003; Grosjean 2003; Marks 2023; Schiavone and Björklund 2023.

Military materiel is considered here to be any commodity that was important to the undertaking of warfare or the sustenance of a nation during times of war. Commodities vital to the building of a navy and production of armaments, among other potential martial uses, such as iron, copper, tar, pitch, and timber were exported to England from the Swedish Empire in vast amounts for just such purposes.[4] Similarly salt, foodstuffs, and textiles were imported into Swedish harbours from England and elsewhere on English ships, with heightened activity during times of war.[5] What is less well known is the importance of military equipment for Anglo-Swedish commercial and diplomatic relations.

The chapter analyses the activities of Commissary Johan Barkman (later ennobled Leijonberg), Lieutenant General George Fleetwood, and other associates who acquired armaments and other goods that enabled Sweden to fight wars with Poland–Lithuania and Denmark–Norway during the mid- to late 1650s. The activities of Fleetwood as a recruiter and Great Britain as a base for the levying of troops for Sweden have received previous attention.[6] However, the activities of Barkman as a diplomat-turned-arms dealer, as well as England's production and dispatch of armaments for use in Swedish wars, requires examination.

The rapid expansion of England as a maritime power in the second half of the 17th century is well known. What has not been fully understood until recently is the importance of Sweden to this expansion.[7] This is surprising given that the relationship between England and Sweden which blossomed over the latter half of the 1600s grew to become the most pivotal commercial and diplomatic relationship of the era for both nations. This relationship was founded on a growing commercial reliance between both parties, which was enshrined in the first Anglo-Swedish treaties of the 1650s and 1660s, and culminated in a renewed and improved treaty in 1700.[8]

4 For the latest appraisal of Swedish 17th-century trade, see Grimshaw 2023; Grimshaw 2024.
5 Grimshaw 2023, 147–52, 196–202.
6 Grosjean 2002; SSNE, ID 2208.
7 See Grimshaw 2023; Grimshaw 2024.
8 Details and differences in the treaties can be found in Grimshaw 2023, 93–102, 127–33, 209–10, 246–47. More research surrounding the negotiations and conclusions of the treaties of the 1650s can be found in Grosjean 1998, 241–56; Grosjean 2002, 239–57.

Prior to the establishment of an English Republic in the 1650s, relations between England and Sweden had been scant and inconsistent, with little desire for direct contact. With England's growing global aspirations and the wish for a state-owned navy, the republic shifted the organisation of its Baltic trades from the harbours of the southern Baltic coastline to those under the control of the Swedish Empire.[9] This also generated a change in how the commercial prospects of Scandinavia and the Baltic region were perceived, as it entailed a fundamental shift from an economic exchange which saw the Baltic primarily as an export area for domestically produced English goods to one in which that same area could furnish all of the necessary goods to build a navy capable of projecting power globally. Thus, England found in Sweden a commercial partner that could deliver the majority, if not all, of the raw materials required to fill its naval shipyards. Sweden, for its part, found in England a commercial partner and diplomatic ally that allowed the nation to lessen its previous economic and geopolitical dependence on the Dutch Republic and France.[10] Sweden and England's association was not only pivotal to the success of each nation in isolation; it also had a global impact. Research into the two country's diplomatic and commercial undertakings has demonstrated an unprecedented commercial-diplomatic, and ultimately military, reliance. Each nation furnished the other with goods to support participation in war during the later 17th century.

The bedrock of Anglo-Swedish interaction were the people on the ground who drove forward commercial endeavours and diplomatic

9 For more on such shifts in commercial organisation, see Hinton 1959; Åström 1963; Grimshaw 2024.

10 The commercial and diplomatic associations between Sweden and the Dutch Republic and Sweden and France have been given considerably more attention than those with England, despite the latter's primary economic and diplomatic importance to Sweden in the second half of the century. For the Dutch Republic, see Sandström 1990; Müller 1998; Wirta and Hannula 2021; Hannula 2023. A recent study of Sweden's early modern trading companies and immigration, particularly in Gothenburg, has omitted a discussion of representatives of a sizeable British community in Sweden and their commercial endeavours; see Tikka 2023. For France, see Norrhem 2020. Traditional historiographies of Sweden's foreign relations in this period have similarly devoted a disproportionate amount of attention to France and the Dutch Republic, to the detriment of viewing other international partners. See Heckscher 1936; Landberg 1952.

exchanges in both peace and wartime. From the mid-1650s, as trade with Sweden became more crucial to England's European and global ambitions, the size of the English mercantile community grew in Swedish ports. This was particularly the case in Stockholm, which became the focus of the majority of Anglo-Swedish trade and diplomatic exchange. This community was supplemented by a semi-permanent presence of English diplomatic representation, in the form of ambassador-led embassies. It was the meeting of the diplomatic and commercial spheres that drove forward English ambition in Sweden.[11] The balance of trade was overwhelmingly in Sweden's favour, a fact that was appreciated by both sides, but the English required naval stores. Thus, English merchants and diplomats often collaborated and sought each other's assistance in order to remedy difficulties brought about by a hostile local community and a government seeking to maximise its profit from its primary partner.[12] Similarly in London, the presence of Swedish diplomats from the 1650s and the appointment of a Resident from 1661 allowed the Swedish government to have constant representation in the English capital. Swedish merchants likewise sought the protection of the state and often solicited diplomats when difficulties such as privateering and outright piracy from English ships impacted their trade.[13] It was this collaboration—the blending of the 'official' diplomatic arms of state representation at court and the 'unofficial' sphere of private enterprise of independent merchants and agents in port—that drove trade. It also came to define the Anglo-Swedish relationship in negotiation and codification.

11 For a fuller survey, see Grimshaw 2023.

12 For example, George Shuttleworth, an English merchant who lived in Stockholm, became a temporary consul in Sweden for the English government in the time between the turnover of an official ambassadorial posting in 1666. The National Archives of England and Wales (TNA), State Papers (SP) 95/6, fols. 59, 81. English merchants were consulted on a range of commercial matters that provided a significant input which affected the negotiation and character of Anglo-Swedish treaties. TNA, Colonial Office Papers (CO), 388/1, 13 November 1660, and SP 95/13, 17 July 1689.

13 Likewise, Johan Barkman Leijonberg, the Swedish Resident in London, was successfully able to intercede on behalf of Swedish interests by presenting articles of the Anglo-Swedish Treaty of 1661 to prevent the Eastland Company from imposing fees on Swedish goods. TNA, Privy Council (PC), 2/55, fol. 204, 8 May 1663. For more on this issue, see Murdoch 2019.

Military Supply and Swedish Diplomats at Cromwell's Court

The importance of England to Sweden by the mid-1650s can be glimpsed in the flurry of diplomatic representation with which it was accorded. No fewer than four Swedish representatives were on English soil concurrently in 1656. Envoy Peter Julius Coyet, Ambassador Christer Bonde, Lieutenant General George Fleetwood, and Commissary Johan Barkman were all tasked with pursuing Sweden's interest at the court of the English Republic.[14] The intensification of diplomatic relations on British soil on the part of Sweden was a feature of Karl X's foreign policy which distinguished it from that of his cousin and predecessor, Queen Kristina. Negotiations leading to the initial Anglo-Swedish Treaty of 1654 very much drew their impetus from the English, taking place in Sweden with the English ambassador, Bulstrode Whitelocke, operating in a relatively solitary role. Karl X sought to take the initiative to England by sending his representatives to London with the need to solicit political, commercial, and military backing in preparation for his upcoming campaigns against his Baltic rivals.

It is not surprising that the focus of research on the mid-1650s is perhaps the deepest for any period of Anglo-Swedish relations. Aside from the muted marriage proposals of Erik XIV to Elizabeth I, or the interventions of the English diplomat Sir Thomas Roe to broker a peace during the Thirty Years' War, the 1650s were the first great period of contact between England and Sweden.[15] Following a period

14 Documents dating the correspondence of Swedish diplomats in England can be found in Diplomatica Anglica volumes in The National Archives of Sweden in Stockholm. Svenska Riksarkivet (SRA), Diplomatica Anglica (DA), vol. 6, Envoyen Peter Julius Coyet 1654–1656; vol. 7, Ambassadören Christer Bonde 1655–1656; vol. 8, Kommissarien Johan Barckman-Leijonberg 1655–1659; vol. 9, Generallöjtnanten Georg Fleetwood och envoyén Johan Fredrik von Friesendorff 1655–1661. There were actually five Swedish representatives on the ground in England in 1655, as Benjamin Bonnel (also an Englishman) was recalled to Sweden but was unable to leave England as he had incurred debts as part of his service and feared reprisals. Johan Barkman was intended to be his replacement. SRA, DA, vol. 515. Brev från Benjamin Bonnel 1653-1655; Roberts 1988, 104, 155.

15 Andersson 1935; Brown 1970. Swedish recruitment of English soldiers had occurred on a number of occasions but was sporadic. Stuart diplomacy was often Scottish-led and appointed by a Scottish king, which provided a significant barrier to direct Anglo-Swedish interaction. See Grosjean 2003 for a wider

of Scottish-led dominance in such affairs in the first half of the century, the mid-1650s heralded the first extensive diplomatic contact between the two courts.[16] Codified treaties paved the way for the flourishing of direct trade which was to be a cornerstone of Swedish foreign relations and of central importance to that country's iron trade for the next three hundred years.

J. Levin Carlbom dedicated a thesis to the negotiations surrounding the second Anglo-Swedish treaty, focusing specifically on the actions of the ambassadors Peter Julius Coyet and Christer Bonde, as well as George Fleetwood.[17] Michael Roberts supplemented this work with extensive English translations of Coyet's and Bonde's correspondence from 1655–1656.[18] Timothy Venning and Alexia Grosjean have also provided detailed accounts of England and Sweden's relations. Venning's study positioned the Baltic within the wider context of Oliver Cromwell's foreign policy.[19] Grosjean's work has provided the most detailed study of Scottish–Swedish relations and has juxtaposed the diplomatic machinations occurring between the Swedish Crown and Charles II on the one hand, and the English Republic on the other.[20] Most recently, my own work has provided an appraisal of the factors determining why active diplomacy was taken up by the English Republic, as well the first commercially focused study of England and Sweden's relationship during this period.[21] This body of literature has left us with a rich understanding of the main political events, treaty negotiations, and even the process behind levying for troops on British soil which was undertaken by the likes of the military men George Fleetwood, William Cranstoun, and Alexander Leslie.[22] While detailed knowledge of such levying has been established for some time due to the aforementioned studies, reference to the significant quantities of

treatise. For recruitment of English soldiers, see Björklund and Schiavone 2021; Grimshaw 2023, 21; Marks 2023, 144–68.

16 Grosjean 1998, 242–46; Grimshaw 2023, 94–102.

17 Carlbom 1900.

18 Roberts 1988.

19 Venning 1995.

20 Grosjean 1998; Grosjean 2002.

21 Grimshaw 2023.

22 Grosjean 2002. See also SSNE entries, 'Fleetwood, George' [2208]; 'Cranstoun, William' [2101]; 'Leslie, Alexander' [1].

armaments that were produced, sourced, and dispatched from England and intended for use in Swedish wars has, until now, remained elusive.

Why has such an important aspect of Anglo-Swedish relations been overlooked? The answer lies in the sources utilised. Previous studies have consulted an extensive and wide array of primary material, but such sources are largely silent on the issue of raising armaments in England for deployment in Sweden's wars. The minutes from the Swedish State Council (*Riksråd*) during this period understandably make frequent reference to England in relation to alliance politics but do not contain information or a discussion surrounding the supply of the Swedish army.[23] Neither Coyet's nor Bonde's instructions from the Swedish crown mention the solicitation of arms from England, while their correspondence contains only one cursory mention of armaments.[24] As the senior Swedish representatives on British soil, Coyet's and Bonde's instructions prioritised the ratification of the treaty of 1654 and negotiations for an improved treaty. This led to the conclusion of the articles of agreement for the treaty of 1656 in the summer of 1655.[25] For both diplomats, geopolitical, as well as commercial, considerations were of utmost importance. They were to ensure that a number of primary Swedish goods such as iron, copper, tar, and timber were not to be considered contraband in wartime. The commercial edge of the alliance was to draw up articles to ensure English support for the liberty of Swedish trade and dominion in the Baltic. In this respect they were successful.[26] Appended to both diplomats' instructions was the provision that they would assist the likes of Fleetwood, Cranstoun, and Leslie in attempting to recruit English and Scottish soldiers for military service. This they undertook with vigour, often

23 For example, the Swedish Privy Council discussed the possibility of obtaining subsidies from the English in direct reference to Christer Bonde's instructions. However, the procurement of armaments is never directly mentioned. Sondén 1923, 425, 20 March 1656; Thanner 1959, 38, 13 April 1658, and 43, 15 April 1658. References to England supporting Sweden with troops *are* clearly mentioned: Enblom 1929, 159, 1 June 1657; Thanner 1959, 23, 29 March 1658.

24 Roberts 1988, 325–27.

25 Patterson 1937, 566–91.

26 Roberts 1988, 49.

petitioning Cromwell and senior statesmen such as John Thurloe to be granted permission to bang the drum for Swedish service.[27]

The arrival of George Fleetwood in early July 1655 gave the Swedish delegation another edge. Instructions dispatched from Karl X intended Fleetwood to act in a 'purely private capacity' in regard to alliance negotiations. This was in the hope that, as a native Englishman and respected figure in his homeland, he could grease the wheels for the Swedes. However, Fleetwood's most significant mission was to help raise troops for Swedish campaigns.[28] Already it becomes clear that the Swedish crown quite naturally saw the necessity for a division of labour in their diplomatic retinue. Plurality in position, appearance, and practice was needed. While the high-ranking and noble ambassadors would treat at court with England's leading politicians, Fleetwood would use his background to act as a go-between, but also to employ his military acumen to acquire troops on the ground.[29]

But what of Sweden's fourth representative in England, the relatively unknown and obscure Johan Barkman? It has recently emerged that Barkman acted as Sweden's arms dealer. Unfortunately, his diplomatic instructions have not yet emerged. However, the discovery of his expense reports and accounts from the 1650s in the National Archives of Sweden (Riksarkivet) demonstrate the nature and extent of his activity in England during this period.[30] Despite an extensive and illustrious career as a diplomat, Barkman's exploits have largely been ignored.[31] Although he was at an early stage in his career in 1655, and was the least senior of Sweden's four diplomats in England, Barkman was to

27 Roberts 1988, 49, 104, 148, 168, 174–76, 181, 186–87, 191, 263–64, 271–72, 274, 283, 294, 299, 307.

28 Grosjean 2002, 69. As Karl X Gustav expressly sought the recruitment of Scottish troops who had a long-standing familiarity and high reputation in Swedish service, it was also Fleetwood's Scottish associations which were of value. Fleetwood had long been active in Swedish service among Scottish soldiers and officers and was considered an honorary Scot.

29 Fleetwood also had important ties to Oliver Cromwell through his brother Charles's marriage into the Cromwell family. Barnard, Toby, 'Fleetwood, Charles, Appointed Lord Fleetwood under the Protectorate', in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/9684.

30 SRA, DA, vol. 115, Beskickningar, 1655–1687. The obscurity of this volume of documents appears as part of an extensive collection of materials organised according to Barkman's later role as Swedish Resident in England.

31 Grimshaw 2023, 114, 124, 129.

become one of the most important Swedish diplomats of his age. In 1661, as Sweden's first Resident in London he would become the most central, knowledgeable, and consistent figure in Anglo-Swedish relations. Delving into his extensive correspondence, spanning some four decades, it becomes clear that he was not merely a 'drunkened spy', as remarked by Bulstrode Whitelocke.[32]

Barkman's origins are uncertain. It has been alleged that he was the son of an innkeeper from Söderköping, but, given his extensive commercial exploits in Stockholm witnessed through his personal correspondence, it appears much more likely that he was the son of the Stockholm burgess J. Barkman.[33] Furthermore, Johan's younger brother Jöns was also a merchant in Stockholm and later active in Amsterdam.[34] This leads us to suppose that both men were likely adept at garnering commercial experience at an early age, possibly through such familial ties. Given the discovery of pertinent documents and the nature of his activity in the arms trade in England, it bolsters the view that Barkman was deliberately chosen for his commercial acumen. In fact, his credentials led further credence to his suitability for such a role, given the deeply commercial nature of Sweden's relationship with England.

Barkman's first taste of diplomatic work had been in Moscow under the leadership of Johan Adler Salvius in 1647, at the age of 22. This was quickly followed by representation at the Swedish mediation of the Peace of Westphalia under Peter Spiering Silfercrona, with subsequent postings to Spain in 1651. Barkman first arrived in England as part of Israel Lagerfelt's delegation in 1652. A principal aim of this mission was to secure restitution for Swedish ships and cargo that had been captured during naval engagements stretching back to 1647 and during the course of the First Dutch War.[35]

32 Anon 1977–1979.

33 In one particularly instance, it is clear that Jöns Barkman was overseeing his brother Johan's export trade, particularly with regard to iron. SRA, DA, vol. 106, Brev från åtskilliga, 1657–1691, Jöns Barkman to Johan Barkman, Stockholm, September 1656.

34 Jöns wrote Johan a flurry of letters over the period 1664–1666 which were profoundly based on commercial affairs. SRA, DA, vol. 106, Brev från åtskilliga, 1657–1691.

35 Anon, 1977–1979.

Further research into Barkman's private correspondence reveals the breadth and extent of his network. His later career as a Resident spanned some thirty years and demanded an extensive array of contacts. However, by the early months of his posting to England in the mid-1650s, Barkman was already corresponding with English merchants in England and abroad, senior Swedish political figures, high-level diplomats across Northern Europe, merchant capitalists in Amsterdam and Hamburg, and members of the French nobility and naval administration; he even had access to contacts in Queen Kristina's retinue in Rome. This network of correspondents demonstrates both Barkman's ability and how he sought to operate, even as a seemingly peripheral and lower-status diplomatic figure at this time.

At the beginning of August 1656, following the successful conclusion of a new treaty, Christer Bonde was organising his long-awaited departure from English shores. He wrote to the Swedish king, stating that he was leaving 'the management of details to General Fleetwood and Commissary Barkman, of who I am capable of building on the foundations already laid, to the advantage of Your Majesty'.[36] Coyet had already departed England some weeks before and Bonde was leaving the raising of troops and the continuance of dialogue with the English government to Fleetwood and Barkman as senior representatives of the Swedish state. How far Bonde was aware of the extent of Barkman's activities in procuring military materiel and significant quantities of armaments is unclear. Despite frequent reports on the levying of troops, neither Bonde's correspondence nor Coyet's gives much reference to the armaments trade.

The only glimpse of the two senior diplomats' involvement in procuring armaments was when Bonde wrote to Karl X stating: 'I have this week obtained permission to export 500 centner or tons, of powder, whose purchase Herr Coyet, negotiated on your Majesty's behalf, and I shall bring it with me to Hamburg.'[37] This is very likely the same consignment of gunpowder that appears in Barkman's accounts. There is a copy of a letter to the English Privy Council from William Jessop,

36 Roberts 1988, 325–27.

37 Roberts 1988, 325–27. One centner was equivalent to 170 kg. The weights and measurements used in this study are based upon those found in Carlsson 1989, as well as those found in the specialist guide in the Sound Toll Registers Online (STRO), https://soundtoll.nl.

Clerk of the Council, from 16 September 1656, granting permission for 'the Lord Ambassador Extraordinary from His Majesty of Sweden, or his assignes to transport beyond sea five hundred barrels of powder, for the service of the sayd King … Custome free'. The document notes that the first correspondence with the Commissioners of Customs was dated 1 August, which would fit with the dates outlined in Bonde's correspondence. The document goes on to state that 'Mr Barkman, Agent for Sweden', was to be held responsible for the gunpowder's transportation.[38]

That this was the only reference to shipments of armaments from England intended for Swedish use belies the true extent of materiel that was successfully solicited. Barkman had been involved in the arms trade in England as a Swedish agent long before the two more celebrated and illustrious diplomats Coyet and Bonde set foot in the country. Two documents in Barkman's accounts demonstrate that he had been sourcing armaments and other military materiel in England as early as May 1654. This predates the official Swedish diplomatic missions and occurred around the same time as the conclusion of the treaty of 1654. An undated note found wedged between a cook's bill and a Covent Garden fishmonger's invoice to Barkman shows that he was involved in sourcing and shipping a large amount of armaments with a 'Leut. Lethen'. This was most certainly Alexander Leslie, 1st Earl of Leven. Leslie's association with the Swedish armies of the Thirty Years' War is well known. It was actually Leslie who would become the pivotal player in the recruitment of troops shipped off into Swedish service under the leadership of his son-in-law William Cranstoun.[39]

By February 1655, Karl X had instructed Coyet, upon his arrival in England, to collaborate with Leslie to raise six to eight regiments of Scottish soldiers for Swedish service.[40] Leslie had been imprisoned for four years following the royalist defeat at Dunbar and it was only after the petitioning of Karl X that Oliver Cromwell sanctioned his release in 1654. Leslie thus had a number of reasons to support the levying of troops and went as far as to sign off his annual 2000 riksdaler pension

38 SRA, DA, vol. 115, Beskickningar 1655–1687, William Jessop to the English Privy Council, London, 16 September 1656.

39 Grosjean 2002, 72–75; Murdoch and Grosjean 2014; SSNE, 'Leslie, Alexander' [1].

40 Roberts 1988, 49.

from Swedish service to Cranstoun to fund this initial wave of recruitment.[41] It provides just one example of private enterprise funding the conflicts of Karl X Gustav.

The document concerning Barkman and Leslie's activity is written in a mixture of Swedish and German and not in Barkman's hand. With two contrasting handwriting styles, it is difficult to assign authorship. Two vessels are listed that were to be loaded with armaments to be shipped out. The first ship mentioned is the *James* of London, whose skipper is noted as a 'Cap. Michell Russell', with the goods specifically listed as under the care of 'Leut. Lethen'. Russell was to carry 488 pairs of stockings, 308 muskets, 308 bandoliers, 1 centner (170 kg) of gunpowder, 1 centner of projectiles, and 1 centner of fuses. The second ship, under the command of 'Capten Douthies', was carrying 122 pairs of stockings, 77 muskets, and 77 bandoliers.[42]

Although the document is undated, searches in the Sound Toll Registers Online database (STRO) have revealed that the only voyage made by a 'Michel Ruselt of London' during the 1650s occurred on 29 May 1654. Similarly a 'Thomas Dukh of London' passed the customs inspection at the Danish Sound (henceforth the Sound) on the same day. Both ships were registered in London and departed London. However, the difficulty in attempting to trace armaments from England passing the Sound becomes readily apparent. The cargo listings for both ships taken and recorded by Danish customs officials at the Sound reveal no armaments or military materiel on board. Michael Russell is listed as carrying 31 piber (14,384 litres) of undisclosed spirit alcohol.[43] Thomas 'Dukh' is listed as travelling in ballast, with a small array of 'krameri' (miscellaneous items of small value). Unfortunately, at this juncture the Sound Toll Registers do not record destination with any level of consistency. The return voyage of 'Dukh' has not yet successfully been traced, but a 'Michel Ryssel from Lunden' is recorded passing back through the Sound westwards from Riga on 3 August 1654, loaded with hemp, flax, and clapholts (clapboards).[44] It is very likely that this was the same Michael Russell delivering his goods to one of Sweden's principal ports. Leslie's involvement is further bolstered

41 Grosjean 2002, 72.
42 SRA, DA, vol. 115, Beskickningar 1655–1687.
43 STRO, ID 794946 (Michel Rutsel of London).
44 STRO ID: 794509 (Michel Ryssel of London).

given that, in the spring of 1654, he had been pardoned by Cromwell for his actions against the Republicans and had arrived in Sweden on 5 July 1654.[45] It is highly probable that he was on board Russell's ship.

Barkman continued apace during the course of 1654 and had already completed another deal for 152 pikes and 8 halberds that were delivered to the Tower of London for storage, awaiting shipping on 10 December 1654. The document states that Barkman was acting in collaboration with the 'Right Honourable My Lord Fleetwood'.[46] It is unclear exactly which member of the Fleetwood family this document refers to. Lieutenant General George Fleetwood did not arrive on British shores as a Swedish agent until the following summer, but it is not unlikely he could have requested this shipment of goods through correspondence. It is also possible that his brother Sir Charles Fleetwood, Lord Deputy of Ireland, had been instructed to work with Barkman to ensure that stores were acquired in good time. Charles Fleetwood was well acquainted with Coyet and Bonder, acting as an active social fixer during both their embassies.[47]

What both examples of Barkman's activity from 1654 demonstrate is that Swedish networks were actively being deployed to acquire armaments in an unofficial capacity. These networks were pivotal to the fuelling of Swedish wars undertaken at the behest of Karl X Gustav before the Swedish king had even been crowned. It is likely that Barkman had stayed on in England after his involvement in Israel Lagerfelt's mission in 1652. However, we know that he did not re-receive official accreditation as a Swedish diplomat until Coyet's instructions were issued in November 1654, when he was to relieve Benjamin Bonnel.[48] Barkman spent the intervening period utilising British contacts who had a history of service or sympathy towards Sweden, as well as

45 Carlbom 1900, 7.

46 SRA, DA, vol. 115, Beskickningar 1655–1687, 'Mr Birkmans Bill for Pikes delivered into the Tower of London for the Right Honourable My Lord Fleetwood'.

47 Charles Fleetwood acted as facilitator for private social engagements between leading members of the English Parliament and the Swedish diplomats. He also passed messages on from Oliver Cromwell and likely engaged in mustering activity after the arrival of his brother George, which is alluded to in correspondence: 'I think that Sir Charles Fleetwood will be paying me a visit to-morrow, although it would appear contrary to their regulations.' Christer Bonde to Karl X, London, 19 and 23 October 1655, in Roberts 1988, 181–83.

48 Roberts 1988, 104.

their kin, to facilitate the raising of military materiel at a juncture when Sweden's impending king was assembling to take the nation to war.[49]

As Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch have demonstrated in Chapter 1 of this volume, attempting to trace the existence of military materiel from the STRO during this period can be particularly tricky. We do not know exactly how such goods were smuggled through the Sound, but the aforementioned evidence shows us that it did occur. When Barkman was most active as an arms dealer, between 1654 and 1658, searches in the STRO reveal only one result apiece for armaments and soldiers being shipped from England to the Baltic during the ten-year period. This is despite the fact that is it clear that such manpower and materiel were being exported.[50] Of course it is possible that soldiers and goods were never intended to be exported through the Sound.[51] Christer Bonde was quite clear that 'his' shipment of gunpowder was to be shipped out to Hamburg.

Attempting to place exactly where military materiel was to be delivered into Swedish hands remains just as difficult regarding the transport of soldiers. A total of 1000 troops were raised under William Cranstoun's recruitment drive and were shipped out in two waves. The first 600 men were shipped sometime after April 1656 and arrived in Pillau in Prussia. Swedish muster rolls show that these men actively entered Swedish service. However, 300 of Cranstoun's troops immediately deserted upon arrival on the continent, likely due to royalist allegiances. Some entered Danish service at Glückstadt and others found

49 For more on such associations and kin networks in Northern Europe, see Murdoch 2006.

50 One 'party' of English soldiers passed the Sound on 9 August 1658 on Cornelis Jansse of Vlieland's Dutch ship. Daniel Gurnett's French ship cleared customs at the Sound en route from London with 722.5 kg of gunpowder on 2 July 1660. STRO, ID 758577 and ID 1701072. It was not uncommon for soldiers to be listed as cargo on ships passing the Sound. The STRO does reveal a number of soldiers listed on ships entering the Baltic between 1603 and 1634, some examples of which are specifically denoted as being in the King of Sweden's service, en route to ports as far flung as Colberg, Elbing, Rostock, Stralsund, Wismar, Wolgast, and locations in Russia. Grimshaw 2023, 21.

51 STRO, ID 758577. Only one such instance has been found of soldiers shipped out from Western Europe through the Sound. This was Cornelius Jansse's Dutch ship, noted as carrying an unspecified number of English soldiers from London with no known destination in August 1658.

their way to the Scottish–Dutch brigades.[52] Swedish possessions outside the Baltic, such as Bremen-Verden, were utilised by Karl X Gustav to mobilise troops already on the continent. By April 1655 the Swedish king already had plans in place to march his troops through German lands towards the Polish theatre of war. It is therefore possible that such British recruits never passed through the Sound at all.[53]

Given what has been discovered through consultation of Barkman's accounts, in addition to what we know about successful levies of British troops in the later 1650s, it seems peculiar that the STRO do not record such passages of soldiers and goods of military significance bound for Eastern European theatres of war. Or is it? There was active hostility between Denmark–Norway and Sweden at the time, meaning that such goods would surely have had to have been disguised or smuggled, or customs inspectors would have had to have been paid off. Customs officials at the Sound were notoriously rigorous, which is apparent to any scholar who peruses the records for even a short amount of time. Yet between the years of 1650 and 1660 there are no fewer than 11 references to ambiguous 'Swedish goods' carried aboard ships with home ports registered in Sweden, England, Danzig, Lübeck, and Courland, all of which are noted as departing British ports. Although the provisions for the exemption and non-searching of Swedish ships were not finalised until after the Treaty of Copenhagen (1660), it demonstrates that an ambiguity accorded to 'Swedish goods' was not particular only to Swedish ships in this regard.[54] Therefore this increasing frequency of

52 Grosjean 2002, 75–76. Charles II made several attempts to recall his subjects in Swedish service in an attempt to get them to defect.

53 Asker 2009, 183–85.

54 See STRO, IDs: 763602 (1651), 802457 (1653), 791648 (1654), 786885 (1654), 779486 (1655), 785209 (1655), 1015754 (1655), 788859 (1655), 765588 (1656), 763525 (1658), 1700148 (1660). Laursen 1920, 363–64, treaty signed in Copenhagen on 27 May 1660. The issue of free passage to Swedish ships was so important that it was given priority as point three in the treaty. Swedish goods on non-Swedish ships had to provide the necessary certifications to avoid interference, which was outlined in the treaty: 'Men det svenske godz, uthi fremmande skepp inlastat, som icke kan framvijsa sin ratte certification, skall tulltåchten uthi Sundet och Beit vara under kastat.' This latter point likely provides good reason why the above-mentioned non-Swedish ships were allowed to pass with ambiguous 'Swedish goods'. Some scholars have noted that the non-search policy in regard to Swedish ships at the Sound was in place as early as the 1650s. See, for example Veluwenkamp and Scheltjens 2018, 146.

such vague recordings of 'Swedish goods' passing the Sound after 1655 from England, in tandem with when Barkman and his associates were helping to fuel Swedish warfare with consignments of armaments, cannot remain unnoticed or uncommented in the same context.

That we know Barkman and Fleetwood were still active recruiters of armaments in the late 1650s is evident from the accounts and inventories that survive in Barkman's own hand. The haphazard nature of the collection of documents means that it is unclear whether all the accounts have survived or whether more are waiting to be discovered. It is evident, however, that the two diplomats were actively sourcing and exporting goods in 1656, with their most prolific period occurring from the summer of 1657 into 1658.

After collating the figures that are quoted in the accounts, it appears that, during the period between October 1657 and February 1658, Barkman and Fleetwood sourced and dispatched a considerable quantity of goods. At a conservative estimate, they included 1166 muskets, 1339 bandoliers, 596 pikes, 8 halberds, 615 kg of fuses, 595 kg of gunpowder, 425 kg of bullets for muskets, 170 kg of cannonballs and projectiles, 1856 pairs of stockings, 1244 pairs of shoes, and 1000 military coats.[55] However, brief forays into Barkman's correspondence suggest that such haphazardly organised accounts detailing the acquirement of military materiel may not reflect the true extent of the goods being sent from England.[56] Barkman was a prolific correspondent, detailing his diplomatic work in London throughout the later 1650s. Yet, without other corroborative sources it becomes difficult to determine the true extent of his sourcing activity.

Barkman's accounts are extremely meticulous. He was careful to list not only the amount paid for certain goods organised on a daily basis but also his transport and provisional costs. This suggests that he was keeping track of expenses, as he was purchasing goods on his own and possibly George Fleetwood's credit. It demonstrates the nature of how Barkman sourced goods, hiring carriages for personal transport

55 SRA, DA, vol. 115, Beskickningar, 1655–1687. Some of the accounts appear to be copies, which is why a conservative estimate has been taken, to avoid inflating the number of goods which were exported. Various accounts are unnamed and utilise terminology such as 'Räkning för soldaternes equippage' and 'Allerlag Rechnungen über ein Regiment Soldaten die Crone Schweden betrachtet'.

56 SRA, DA, vol. 17, Brev till KM 1655–1659 (Kommissarie Johan Barckman Leijonberg).

around London, and even arranging a number of boat trips to acquire and transport goods to and from port. The speed at which he sourced and shipped goods would indicate that he was an extremely efficient operator. Although it has been demonstrated that, at an earlier date, Barkman and Fleetwood stored armaments at the Tower of London, by late 1657 and 1658 they were acquiring significant amounts and dispatching them abroad within a number of days. One such document reveals that Barkman continued to use the *James* of London, as he had four years earlier, but this time to dispatch goods to Hamburg. Some notes show that certain goods that were to be used by soldiers, such as coats, stockings, and munitions, were sent with the levied soldiers, although the destinations are not provided.[57]

Given the extent of goods dispatched by Swedish diplomats in England, the question of financing should be addressed. This is particularly pertinent in regard to the contribution that private enterprise played. The role of Swedish diplomats and officials, their contributions to financing warfare, and the crossover between private and public roles still remain understudied during this era. Karl X Gustav had a number of financial resources available to help instigate his wars. Income from the sale of crown copper and the customs levied on foreign trade provided a direct and sizeable form of finance.[58] Karl even instigated a repossession of formerly donated Swedish lands back into crown possession.[59] Despite such efforts, the Swedish king's Polish and Danish campaigns were heavily reliant on credit. Much of this credit was supplied by private individuals who were in Swedish service. A number of wealthy individuals scattered within and outwith the borders of the Swedish Empire provided credit for Karl X Gustav soon after the decision to go to war with Poland–Lithuania. The king's brother-in-law and Swedish treasurer, Magnus De la Gardie, the General-Governor of Bremen-Verden, Hans Kristoffer von Königsmarck, the Swedish copper broker and former member of the Swedish Board of Trade, Mårten

57 SRA, DA, vol. 115, Beskickningar 1655–1687.

58 Karl used these income streams as surety against borrowings: see Asker 2009, 178–81. For an in-depth study of Karl X Gustav's sources of finance, see Landberg 1971, 1–136. For the value of the Swedish export trade from two of their principal domestic ports, see Grimshaw 2023, 18–20.

59 Known in Sweden as a *reduktion*. Several of these processes took place across the course of the 17th century. For more information, see Dahlgren 1964; Upton 1998, 51–70.

Augstinsson Leijonsköld, and the Swedish Resident in Hamburg, Vincent Möller, all provided credit or loans to the Swedish crown to finance Karl's war.[60]

Alexia Grosjean has already shown how the British recruitment drives of the mid-1650s were similarly reliant on credit.[61] In this respect they were not atypical in regard to the strategy of Karl X's overall war drive. The same, or at least similar, methods appear to have been utilised for the payment of troops as for the purchasing of weaponry. The go-between for raising credit on private London merchants was Vincent Möller.[62] This was in part due to his location in Hamburg as a financial centre and in part because Karl X had deposited 20,000 riksdaler of his wife Hedvig Eleonora's dowry in the Bank of Hamburg. Möller personally supervised this deposit and even travelled to Gottorp to receive and transport the funds. It was also because Möller was a wealthy man and one of the largest private contributors to the war drive.[63]

Although it is unclear whether Barkman was utilising his own funds and credit to raise arms, two bills of exchange, drawn on the London-based merchants Jean Buck and Charles Marescoe, reveal that George Fleetwood certainly was. It has already been shown that Alexander Leslie also committed a considerable amount of his own funds to the war drive. That Barkman felt it necessary to denote interest which had passed for four months and eight days in one reckoning shows that there were problems with payment.[64] Bonde, Coyet, and Benjamin Bonnel had all raised credit in London to pay for their embassies and the payment of levying British troops for Swedish service. This almost led to their financial ruin.[65] Möller in Hamburg was likewise supposed to be the signatory in collusion with Karl X and the Swedish crown to remit payment for such bills.[66] Such difficulties appear to have been

60 Landberg 1971, 3–6, 42–45, 68–71, 91–94, 118–23; Asker 2009, 178–80. Forms of credit systems are also touched upon in Chapter 10 of this volume.
61 Grosjean 2002, 74–76.
62 Grosjean 2002, 74–75.
63 Asker 2009, 179; Landberg 1971, 91–94.
64 SRA, DA, vol. 115, Beskickningar 1655–1687.
65 Roberts 1988, 175–76, 210, 269.
66 Trying to gain payment in trade with Sweden was a perennial problem for English merchants. The Swedish crown consistently defaulted on payments on a number of occasions that spanned the course of the 17th century. Grimshaw 2023, 47–54, 224–33.

spearheaded by Möller himself. Both Coyet and Bonde consistently complained that Möller rejected their pleas for payment after advances had been made.[67] That the buck stopped with Möller is not surprising. He not only acted as a conduit for credit and a guarantor of Karl X's own funds but had also sunk a considerable portion of his own fortune into helping to pay for Karl X's coronation and into the war drive too.[68] It is therefore unsurprising that he diligently inspected and scrutinised the activities of his compatriots across the sea in London.

Conclusion

This short study has shown how Anglo-Swedish commercial and diplomatic networks were essential to the supply of military materiel in supporting Karl X Gustav's conflicts of the 1650s. The blending of the 'unofficial' actions of England's and Sweden's private enterprise and the participation of the 'official' arms of state employees, namely diplomatic representatives, were crucial to the effective sourcing and supply of goods. The contribution of private enterprise within the juncture of commercial-diplomatic exchange could often be enshrined within the activities and roles of a single individual. The examples of Johan Barkman and George Fleetwood in covertly sourcing goods, at first as private agents and then later in tandem with their official accreditation as official diplomatic representatives of the Swedish state in England, shows the dual roles of individual actors. The official activities of diplomats in concluding commercial agreements which laid the foundations for trade to effectively flourish under the guise of private enterprise could easily be seen as separate actions. However, the effectiveness of such diplomatic overtures and the successful supply of weaponry, provisions, and soldiers is readily apparent. It has been possible to demonstrate the diversity of actors involved, the ingenuity of methods employed, and the effectiveness of such associations fostered through private enterprise and commercial-diplomatic exchange. It has been suggested in a recent study of Anglo-Swedish commercial association that a mutual commercial dependence began to develop between the two nations, particularly during the 1680 and 1690s.[69]

67 Roberts 1988, 159, 168, 187.
68 Asker 2009, 178–80.
69 Grimshaw 2023, 191–223, 247–75.

However, perhaps it is more pertinent to see Anglo-Swedish entanglement well established by the 1650s, given that military materiel was already being dispatched in the shadow of shifting alliance politics.

Given the depth of previous research into British–Swedish diplomatic and commercial relations during this period, it is startling that the existence and extent of such military materiel shipped from Britain into Swedish hands has previously gone undocumented. Furthermore, owing to the rich array of source material that has been consulted in previous research on Swedish recruitment of British soldiers (ranging from political discourse to personal correspondence) and now with the consultation of extensive commercial records in this study, it seems even more bizarre. Recruitment of soldiers was well documented in Swedish political discourse and in letters dispatched between Britain and the Baltic. It is curious then that this aspect of British and Swedish cooperation was overt, while Barkman's and Fleetwood's arms dealing remained distinctly covert. Exactly why this was the case is still to be answered. Moreover, the role of Barkman as his nation's arms dealer in England generates further questions. It redefines how the activities and importance of 'lesser' diplomats should be viewed. More extensively, the solicitation of such an essential amount of military materiel from abroad begs the need for more research into exactly how and why Sweden sought to finance and supply its conflicts during this period. This is especially pertinent given the existence of Sweden's own armaments industry alongside a growing control of the domestic trade in metals and other products which, in theory, could have been utilised as a considerable source of supply.

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CHAPTER 4

Global Commodity Chains and Military Supplies during the Russo-Swedish War, 1741–1743

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Abstract

In this chapter, I investigate the Swedish government's system of supplying the army and navy with foodstuffs during the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743. The investigation focuses on the interactions between the government officials and the merchants, and how the government demand for resources created transnational flows of goods. The results show that the war generated activities both within the state apparatus and in several mercantile networks which could provide the necessary supplies to the army and navy. The merchants viewed the plans as business opportunities, while the state needed the merchants' expertise, information, and credit.

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Introduction

On 17 June 1741, the skipper Caspar Hinrichs arrived with his ship in the harbour of Stockholm fully loaded with grain and peas. The ship came from Stralsund in Swedish Pomerania and its cargo was owned by several leading Stockholm-based merchants, among them Christian Hebbe and Jürgen Röhl.[1] Hebbe and Röhl were well-established traders in the capital and specialised in the import of grain to Sweden. While it was normal for merchants to import grain to the Swedish market, the demand had increased significantly in 1741 due to the Swedish government's plans to start a war against Russia. The mobilisation of parts of the army and navy, and the subsequent shipment of troops to Finland, required substantial volumes of foodstuffs to be assembled to support the troops. The government was unable to handle such large procurements on its own because it lacked the necessary business contacts and the information about market conditions. It was this government demand for supplies that Hebbe and Röhl were attempting to meet when they shipped goods from Stralsund to Stockholm in June 1741.

These mercantile efforts were not limited to a few merchants in Stockholm since they had to activate their networks of associates in different locations throughout the Baltic region to be able to meet the Swedish government's demand for resources. This need for resources, together with similar demands from other warring states, resulted in chain reactions in several mercantile networks, which had an impact on existing commodity chains in Northern Europe by altering prices, the availability of goods, and the time it took for actors to receive their merchandise. But the wartime demand for resources also had an impact on the relationship between the states and the merchant communities, due to the states' reliance on the assistance of merchants. At the same time, the states tried to maintain control of the procurement processes to prevent negative effects, such as corruption, inflated prices, and the delivery of substandard goods.

These relationships between states and merchants constituted a crucial part of the business of war in Europe during the early modern period. It has been argued that the military entrepreneur who provided

1 Stockholms Stadsarkiv (Stockholm City Archive, SCA), Stadskamreraren, Räkenskaper, Verifikationer, Tolagsjournaler ingående 1741, vol. 280.

troops and supplies to states was replaced by stronger and more capable states in the 18th century. However, private actors continued to play an important role in organising warfare during the century.[2] This reliance on private actors has led historians to use the term 'contractor state' to capture the character of war-making states and their close relationships with merchants.[3] It has also been argued that fiscal-military hubs existed throughout Europe where states could procure the necessary resources needed for warfare.[4] However, scholars have mostly employed these concepts to analyse organisational developments in major European powers. In other words, military operations in the Baltic Sea area during the 18th century have seldom been the object of analysis.

In this chapter, this lacuna will be addressed by investigating the Swedish government's system of supplying the army and navy with foodstuffs during the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743. The analysis is based on several sources, among them the material from the Procurement Commission in Stockholm set up to organise the purchases and deliveries of goods to the army and navy, ledgers and copy books from the merchants involved in the supply of resources, and toll registers detailing the arrival and departure of ships and their goods. The investigation focuses on the interactions between the government officials and the merchants, and how the government demand for resources created transnational flows of goods. Moreover, the chapter examines what the relationships between the Swedish state and the main suppliers tell us about the overlapping public and private roles of merchants involved in supplying goods to the army and navy, and the political power the merchants wielded, given their importance in the mobilisation of war supplies. Additionally, I explore the strategies that government officials utilised to both limit potentially harmful effects of the influential position of merchants and maintain control of the fiscal-military system.

The Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743 has attracted very limited scholarly interest, especially when compared to conflicts in the 17th century.[5] The main reason behind this lack of interest is probably that

2 Parrott 2012; Torres Sánchez, Brandon, and 't Hart 2018.
3 Knight and Wilcox 2010; Torres Sánchez 2016.
4 Wilson and Klerk 2022.
5 On wars in the 17th century, see Nilsson 1990; Glete 2002.

Sweden has been characterised as a declining European power after the Great Northern War (1700–1721)—a power that only participated in limited wars that did not have any broader societal effects. In other words, unlike the wars in the previous century, wars after 1718 did not lead to socioeconomic changes or to the growth of state capacity.[6] Moreover, the war of 1741–1743 has been considered a disastrous campaign. It started in August 1741 with the aim of advancing into Russian territory and retaking areas that had been lost at the peace in 1721, but it soon lost momentum and ended in August 1742, when the army surrendered to the Russians outside Helsinki. When peace was reached in 1743, Sweden had to cede territory in Finland to Russia.[7] Scholars tend to be attracted to more successful campaigns, such as Sweden's participation in the Thirty Years' War, than to examine failed military operations. Likewise, historians who have worked on merchants and the growth of Swedish long-distance trade during the 18th century have not been interested in the role that military supplies played in mercantile activities during wartime. Instead, they have focused on the production and export of iron products and the import of salt from the Mediterranean, as well as the increasing imports of coffee, sugar, tea, and textiles from America and Asia.[8]

One exception to the trend of ignoring the war of 1741–1743 is Sampsa Hatakka's work on the supply system, in particular the supply of grain and bread to the army in Finland, during the campaign. He shows that there were very limited crown storage magazines, only one crown bakery, and no crown mills in Finland before the war started. The available transport capacity to send bread and other supplies from bakeries to the army was also restricted. To mitigate the deficient baking infrastructure in Finland, officials had to involve the crown bakery and the bakers' guild in Stockholm, which produced 1.6 million kilograms of bread in 1741. Large quantities of rye and barley, together with the bread, were also shipped from Sweden and Swedish Pomerania to Finland. Hatakka concludes that, despite the efforts of several leading government officials, the failure in war preparations was one of the main reasons why the Swedish army experienced such difficulties in the early part of the war. The political and military leadership

6 Glete 2007.
7 Hatakka 2021, 178.
8 E.g. Müller 1998; Müller 2004; Evans and Rydén 2007; Hodacs 2016.

had simply underestimated all the challenges that were associated with fighting a major war in Finland.[9]

Other scholars have examined the subsidies that the French government paid out to support the Swedish war effort and to promote its interests in the Baltic Sea region, which included an aim to prevent Russia from intervening in the ongoing War of the Austrian Succession. By receiving subsidies, Sweden became part of the French alliance system. It has also been emphasised that the Bank of the Estates played an important role in providing credit to the state during the war and that a procurement commission was set up to handle most of the expenditure relating to the war effort. Thus, the commission provided the army and the navy with the necessary supplies and organised the transportation of these supplies to the army in Finland.[10]

Despite these insights into the organisation of the campaign and the challenges that existed in Finland, our knowledge about the interactions between government officials and leading merchants is scant. Although the campaign was relatively short and eventually unsuccessful, it required large procurements of goods that can help us understand how the Swedish fiscal-military state functioned in the middle of the 18th century during a war against Russia, an expanding European power.

Supplies, Merchants, and Negotiations

Organising the military campaign in Finland involved several government bodies. Beside the army and navy, there was the civil administration in Finland, headed by the county governors (*landshövdingar*), who were responsible for mobilising the civilian workforce, mostly the peasantry. The peasants were needed to provide the army with transport capacity, food, and fodder, for which they were paid.[11] Like most European states, the Swedish state also utilised a war commissariat, which oversaw the supplies and their storage and distribution in Finland. Moreover, the commissariat procured goods locally in Finland,

9 Hatakka 2021.

10 Åmark 1961, 832–39; Winton 2018, 233–44; Norrhem 2019; Bodensten 2020.

11 On the role of the local administration during war, see Linde 2000, 208–29.

from peasants and merchants.[12] However, unlike many military campaigns in continental Europe, it was not sufficient to rely only on the local war commissariat to provide the necessary supplies. To expand the supply system, a centralised procurement system was set up. Thus, a procurement commission (*Utredningskommission*) was established in Stockholm to coordinate the supply activities.[13] Similar administrative actions had been taken in the 1710s during the Great Northern War, when procurement of grain was centralised by a special committee (*Upphandlingsdeputationen*) in 1716, and credit was administered by a special office (*Kontributionsränteriet*), which issued government bonds and fiat coins.[14] Such centralisation efforts had not been put in place during the Swedish military campaigns in the 17th century, however. As Hans Landberg and Jaakko Björklund have shown, preparations for war were far more decentralised and relied to a much greater extent on powerful intermediaries who could provide credit and resources.[15]

The commission relied on the cooperation of the merchant community in Stockholm and their networks throughout Europe and beyond to get hold of supplies. They also relied on cooperation with the war commissariat in Finland. In short, the commission was responsible for getting resources to Finland and the crown storage facilities in Hamina, Helsinki, and Porvoo, while the commissariat oversaw the storage and distribution of the goods to the army. The relationship between the two organisations could lead to tensions, especially regarding questions about deficiencies in the supply system.[16]

The procurement commission's activities in Stockholm were financed by earmarked taxes and French subsidies. The taxes were then used as collateral to borrow funds from the Bank of the Estates. Thereby, more funds became available quickly, which was important since the collection of taxes was generally associated with long time lags. In August 1742, the commission had received around 2.3 million *daler silvermynt* (hereafter abbreviated dsm) in subsidies, 4 million dsm

12 Kocken 1969, 27–30. On campaigns in areas with more local resources, see Goossens 2014.
13 Winton 2018.
14 Lindeberg 1941; Lindegren 2018.
15 Landberg 1969, 20–28; Björklund 2021.
16 Hatakka 2021.

in funds from the bank, and 490,000 dsm in taxes.[17] These numbers show that domestic credit together with external resources in the form of subsidies played crucial roles in financing the operations of the Swedish fiscal-military state in the middle of the 18th century, and that taxation merely functioned as a guarantee for the loans received from the bank. Taxes also funded large parts of the army and navy during peacetime through the military allotment system.

The procurement commission in 1741 consisted of top-ranking civil servants and military administrators with experience from the Great Northern War. One such was Gustaf Fredrik von Rosen (1688–1769), who was a councillor of the realm in 1741, but who had long experience from leading positions in both the army and the navy. He had, for example, overseen the supplies to the navy in 1717–1718 during the campaign against Norway.[18] Another member was Theodor Ankarcrona (1687–1750), who had received training as a merchant before he started his career as a supercargo in the Dutch West India Company. During the War of the Spanish Succession, he moved to serve in the French navy and then to the British navy, where he became an officer. In 1711, he returned to Sweden, where he quickly advanced in the admiralty from captain to commander. Later he became an admiral and head of the navy squadron in Stockholm.[19] A third member of the commission was the leading wholesale merchant in the capital, Thomas Plomgren (1702–1754). Plomgren learned the practices of being a merchant from his mother, who operated a flax creamer business after her husband's death. When he was 17, Plomgren moved to Königsberg to further strengthen his knowledge about trade by serving in a merchant house. In 1725, he moved back to Stockholm to set up his own firm, and in 1730 he formed the merchant house Anders & Thomas Plomgren with his older brother. They were instrumental in starting up the Swedish Levant Company in 1738, which focused on trade in the Mediterranean, and Thomas Plomgren became one of the governors of the Bank of the Estates in 1739.[20]

When the planning of the military campaign against Russia gained momentum in the first months of 1741, the commission made

17 On the resources of the commission in 1742, see Åmark 1961, 835.
18 Nilzén 1998–2000.
19 Sörensson and Häggman 1920.
20 Grage 1995–1997b.

enquiries into the availability of resources in different storage facilities in Finland and Sweden. It was hoped that it would be possible to utilise significant volumes of foodstuffs and fodder from Finland, but the reports from there were very negative throughout 1741. Similar reports were also coming in from the county governors, who stressed the limited availability of grain and hay.[21] Thus, it became increasingly clear for the members of the commission during the spring and summer that it would be necessary to bring in large volumes of food and other supplies from areas outside Finland. The administrators had a recent precedent for such operations, namely the Swedish campaign against Norway in 1718, when the forces had to bring supplies with them because of the lack of local resources.[22]

The difference between local suppliers in Finland and the centralised procurement arranged by the commission becomes apparent if we compare the largest suppliers. The commissariat's biggest suppliers were the burghers in the towns of Turku and Naantali, who sold goods to the Swedish army in 1742 valued at around 35,000 and 11,000 dsm respectively. The commissariat also bought victuals from the merchant Jobst Niclas Schultz in Turku, valued at close to 8000 dsm, and from the merchant Jacob Johan Tesche in Hamina, valued at around 7000 dsm.[23] These sums can be compared with goods purchased from the biggest supplier in Stockholm, Christian Hebbe. In 1741, Hebbe sold goods to the procurement commission valued at close to 240,000 dsm.[24] Thus, the merchants in Stockholm were more important in terms of the volume and the value of the procured goods than their counterparts in Finland.

When the procurement commission in Stockholm started its acquisitions in March 1741, it hoped to sign a broad-ranging contract with a few leading merchants to supply food and drink to the Stockholm navy squadron during a specific period. In such an arrangement, the merchants would be paid a definite sum per supplied sailor. However,

21 Riksarkivet (Swedish National Archives, SNA), Täby, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741, vol. 1a, 21, 26, and 31 March, 2 and 11 April, 16 June; vol. 1b, 2 September, 6 October; SNA, Stockholm, Skrivelser till Kungl. Maj:t från landshövdingar, Från Nylands- och Tavastehus län, vol. 14, 2 and 7 March, 2 June, 4 and 18 August, 21 September 1741.

22 Lindegren 2018.

23 SNA, Krigsrustningshandlingar, Den finska fältstatens huvudbok 1742, vol. 2.

24 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Huvudbok 1741, vol. 56, fols. 369–72.

when the commission presented this offer to the leading merchants in the capital, Johan Clason replied very cautiously, saying that he had lost money when he provided supplies to the crown during the Great Northern War. He was therefore not willing to take on such a big commitment, but if he received information about the requested quantities of food, he was willing to provide resources to the navy. The deliveries would in that case be based on individual contracts where he only had to commit to one transaction at a time. The commission received similar answers from the other merchants. The members of the commission tried to persuade the merchants that the current political system was more trustworthy than the previous royal one and that they would receive prompt payment after they had fulfilled their part of the contract, but this did not convince the merchants to change their minds. Thus, the commission had to accept signing several contracts with many merchants to gain access to the necessary supplies.[25] This arrangement shows many similarities with the supply system of the British army in the mid-18th century.[26]

The merchants benefited from this procedure since they could adapt the prices they offered the crown according to the supply and the prices of goods on the various markets in which they operated, as well as according to the information they received about the crown's demand. They could thereby alter their prices if the market conditions changed over time in a way that would not have been possible if they had committed to long-term contracts based on prices per supplied sailor or soldier. In other words, the risks for the merchants were reduced, while it became more difficult for the commission to hedge price variations over time and to secure large quantities of goods from a few reliable suppliers. On the other hand, the arrangement opened up opportunities for the commission to compare offers from several suppliers and to create competition between the suppliers to reduce prices.

The commission's negotiation strategy in relation to the merchants was based on the realisation that information regarding the upcoming campaign and the subsequent demand from the crown for goods would affect the price of the products the commission wanted to buy. The time aspect was also crucial, since they needed to purchase

25 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741, vol. 1a, 19 and 21 March.
26 Bannerman 2018, 26–33.

sufficient volumes in just a few months before the war began. In total, the commission calculated that they had to feed around 28,000 men in Finland on a daily basis, a number which included only the army and not the navy. Breaking the requirements down into different commodities, the army demanded 62,052 *lispund* of dried bread, 17,236 barrels of beer, 6018 barrels of peas, 3818 barrels of salted beef, and 1378 *lispund* of tobacco per month during the campaign.[27] The commission therefore stressed that they should try to keep the negotiations secret to avoid a general price increase on the market following the large demand from the state. To achieve this, they argued that they should primarily interact with the leading merchants in the capital, who had more knowledge, business contacts in foreign trading ports, and credit to acquire the necessary goods and to serve the crown in a satisfactory manner.[28] Moreover, when interacting with the merchants, the commission did not want to disclose the price they were willing to pay or the volumes they demanded. Instead, they always wanted the merchants to first inform the commission about the volumes they could deliver, and the price and quality of the goods they offered. They also realised that the initial price the merchants offered was probably excessive, so they argued that the price should be lowered in light of what other merchants offered or the conditions that were associated with supplying goods to the state.

This strategy becomes evident when examining the interactions between the commission and two tobacco manufacturers, Hinrich Busch and Charles Tottie, who were summoned to the commission and asked how much pressed tobacco they could sell, what price they could sell it for, and when they could deliver the goods. Busch and Tottie were also reminded that they were selling to the crown and that they were going to be paid promptly upon delivery, which meant that the commission expected to receive a fair price on the tobacco. Busch and Tottie replied that the best price they could offer was 21 *daler kopparmynt* (dkm) or 7 dsm per *lispund*. The commission responded that this price was too high, but the manufacturers answered that the price was based on current Dutch prices on tobacco leaves, and the

27 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Räkenskaper 1741, vol. 41a, Uträkning på en månads Profwiant för Arméen i Finland. A *lispund* was equivalent to 8.5 kg.

28 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741, vol. 1a, 21 March.

fact that the prices would probably increase even further following a bad harvest caused by flooding in the tobacco plantations.[29] Although they did not state where the plantations were located, they were probably referring to American tobacco. Tottie had family ties in England and imported many of his commodities from London, which was an important hub for the distribution of tobacco from the Chesapeake colonies to Europe. However, American tobacco was also distributed through Amsterdam, which meant that tobacco destined for the Swedish realm arrived from the Dutch port too.[30]

The commission was not convinced by Busch and Tottie's arguments and stressed that the quantity that the crown wanted to buy was so large that it should affect the price. However, since Busch and Tottie did not want to lower the price, the commission told them to think about it further and return the following day. After the tobacco manufacturers had left, the members of the commission reiterated their sentiment that the offered price was too high and they therefore decided to summon other manufacturers to hear what they could offer.[31]

After a short while, the two tobacco manufacturers Hinrich Wilhelmi and Johan Hoving arrived at the commission, and they were asked the same questions as their competitors. Wilhelmi and Hoving replied that foreign tobacco was costly and that they could deliver it at 20 dkm. After they were told that it was too expensive and that they would be paid promptly, they lowered the price to 19 dkm. They also said that they would be able to deliver 500–600 *lispund* at the end of April.[32] No decision was made during this interaction, but the information was used the following day when Busch and Tottie were confronted with the offer of 19 dkm. Busch replied that it was impossible to sell good-quality tobacco at that price, since the market prices were so high. He also emphasised that he only sold good tobacco, which

29 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741, vol. 1a, 27 March.

30 On Tottie's imports, see SCA, Stadskamreraren, Räkenskaper, Verifikationer, Tolagsjournaler ingående 1741, vol. 280, 22 April (Siese Fouckes from Amsterdam), 9 June (Wlliam Drayson from London), 18 August (John Wilckinson from London), 4 September (Charles Burne from London). On the export of tobacco from America to Europe, see Nash 2005, 100–111; Schnurmann 2005, 189–91.

31 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741, vol. 1a, 27 March.

32 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741, vol. 1a, 27 March.

implied that the competitors could offer 19 dkm because of the poor quality of their goods.[33]

Clearly, the commission was faced with a choice here. They could either accept the offer by Busch and Tottie, whom the commission deemed to be trustworthy suppliers, or choose the cheaper, but more disputed, offer from Wilhelmi and Hoving. To solve the issue, both parties were invited to provide samples of their goods so that members of the commission could test the quality.[34] Hoving was the first to arrive with a sample of his tobacco, which was only half pressed. When the members of the commission asked about fully pressed tobacco, Hoving replied that he thought that it was acceptable to sell half-pressed tobacco and that his offer of 19 dkm was based on this quality. If the commission required fully pressed, he wanted 20 dkm for his goods. A few days later, Tottie showed up with his sample, which was fully pressed. After testing it, the members of the commission expressed the opinion that his tobacco was better than Hoving's, but they also told Tottie that they had been offered fully pressed tobacco for 20 dkm. After discussing the issue a bit more, Tottie agreed to sell 700 *lispund* of fully pressed tobacco for the same price as Hoving. This settled the matter and a contract was subsequently signed with Tottie in which he committed to deliver the agreed volume in May.[35]

Although both Tottie and Hoving agreed to sell the requested tobacco for 20 dkm per *lispund*, the members of the commission did not trust Hoving's ability to deliver a good-quality product. This suspicion was strengthened after the manufacturer showed up with a poor sample that did not meet the navy's quality standard. Thus, the opinion that Tottie had expressed earlier about the poor quality of his competitor's offer turned out to be true. This episode strengthened the commission's trust in Tottie's judgements and in his capacity to deliver the specified goods on time. In other words, it seems that Tottie's reputation in Stockholm as a reliable provider of tobacco strengthened his position in relation to the crown. When the commission needed more tobacco in May, the members therefore turned directly to Busch and Tottie to procure 800 *lispund* without bothering to contact Hoving or

33 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741, vol. 1a, 28 March.
34 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741, vol. 1a, 28 March.
35 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741, vol. 1a, 30 March and 2 April.

Wilhelmi to hear if they could deliver tobacco at a cheaper price. All that mattered was that Busch and Tottie could sell the tobacco at the same price as before, 20 dkm per *lispund*.[36]

Similar negotiations took place between the commission and merchants selling other merchandise, such as grain, peas, beef, and pork. In March 1741, the commission requested the leading merchants Johan Clason, Christian Hebbe, and Jean H. Lefebure to inform the members about the availability of products and their prices. Clason replied that it was difficult to provide overall market information because it depended on many aspects. He pointed out, for example, that the best, but also the most expensive, beef came from Courland, while there were cheaper varieties from Turku and Ostrobothnia available on the market. According to Clason, these latter types were more lean and therefore of lower quality than the beef from Courland. Later, Hebbe also provided examples of goods that he could provide and their prices, such as 1000–1200 barrels of peas at 40 dkm per barrel. He declared that he was willing to supply foodstuffs to the crown, but he wanted to do it alone and not in cooperation with other merchant houses. Clason also provided information about the goods he could provide, such as salted beef from Courland for 5 dkm per *lispund*, pork from Scania for 15 dkm per *lispund*, and peas from Pomerania for 42 dkm per barrel. However, he was unwilling to provide detailed information about the volumes of goods, explaining that he first wanted to know what the crown needed so that he could divide the volume into several deliveries.[37]

The commission answered the merchants that the offered prices were excessive and that they needed to lower them. The merchants replied that these were market prices and that there were shortages. After the merchants left the meeting, several commission members argued that it was necessary to negotiate separately with each merchant to prevent them from coordinating their prices. Moreover, they argued that it was crucial to start signing contracts with merchants quickly, to prevent them from increasing their prices even further, and, perhaps more importantly, to stop foreign merchants from profiting from the rumours that the Swedish crown was preparing a large military

36 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741, vol. 1a, 21 May.

37 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741, vol. 1a, 21, 26, and 27 March.

campaign.[38] Clearly, the commission was aware that the markets were transnational in character, and that the Stockholm-based merchants were dependent on their associates in cities such as Amsterdam, Flensburg, London, Memel, and Stralsund to provide the necessary supplies.

In the next step of the negotiations, and after another meeting with the group of merchants had failed to reduce prices, the commission met separately with Christian Hebbe. They asked again what goods he could deliver and the relevant prices. He said that he was expecting to receive pork from Holstein and that he would be satisfied with a 1 dkm profit per *lispund* after his purchasing price and overhead costs had been deducted. However, he could not say how much he could sell the pork for. Meanwhile, he had purchased 1000 *lispund* of pork in Scania that he could sell for 13 dkm per *lispund*. After the commission asked him to lower the price, he agreed to sell it for 12 dkm. Additionally, Hebbe offered to sell 600 barrels of Pomeranian peas for 40 dkm per barrel and 300 barrels of groats from Scania for 54 dkm per barrel. Again, the commission asked Hebbe to lower the price on these commodities, but he refused to do so on the peas, claiming that it was impossible for him reduce the price further. Regarding the groats, he first accepted 51 dkm and then, after further negotiations, very reluctantly he agreed to 50 dkm per barrel. Concurrently, he pointed out that he was not looking for any special profits on these transactions and that he had agreed to better prices compared to the other merchants' offers, such as Clason's. He therefore requested that the deals be kept secret to prevent hostility or jealousy from other merchants in the capital.[39]

Clearly, Hebbe was keen to position himself as a reliable supplier of foodstuffs to the crown and that he could deliver the necessary goods at better prices than many of his competitors. Thus, he could accept price reductions on certain deliveries if it meant that he was given the opportunity to deliver large quantities to the crown. For the commission, the negotiations with Hebbe showed that it was possible to lower prices if there were competing bids between merchants, but the members were also interested in establishing a good relationship with a trader who had the capacity to deliver large volumes. Such capacity

38 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741, vol. 1a, 27 March.
39 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741, vol. 1a, 28 March.

reduced administrative efforts, and it increased the probability that the crown would receive the necessary goods on time.

In the negotiations with Clason, the commission again stressed that his prices were too high, but Clason did not want to make any reductions. He argued that they were market prices and that he could sell the specified goods to hawkers in Stockholm for the stipulated price if the crown did not accept his offers. Although the commission argued that he, as an honourable subject, should serve the crown when the crown needed assistance and when he would be paid promptly for his services, Clason did not budge from his position. He therefore continued to offer 5000 *lispund* of salted beef from Courland for 5 dkm per *lispund*, as well as pork from Scania for 15 dkm per *lispund*. After Clason had left the meeting, the commission concluded that they needed the salted beef that he could deliver, since they had to procure 32,960 *lispund* in total. They therefore had to accept his expensive offer. However, when it came to the pork, the commission refused his offer and turned again to Hebbe and convinced him to sell the pork from Scania for 11½ dkm per *lispund*. They also agreed to buy his incoming shipment of pork from Flensburg for 14 dkm per *lispund*. According to the commission, the pork from Holstein was tastier and would last longer, which made it more valuable than the pork from Scania. Additionally, they agreed to buy Hebbe's 300 barrels of groats from Scania for 50 dkm per barrel.[40]

The contracts signed between the procurement commission and the merchants specified the terms of the interactions, such as the volume that should be delivered and when the merchants would be paid for the goods. For example, on 8 December 1741, Johan Albert Kantzow signed a contract with the commission that stipulated the delivery of 1600 barrels of Pomeranian peas the following year. If the peas were delivered in Finland, he would be paid 10.7 dsm per barrel; otherwise he would receive 10 dsm. When the contract was signed, Kantzow received one third of the value of the shipment (5,334 dsm), and the remaining part he would receive after the final delivery and inspection of the goods. The goods, which consisted of 1640 barrels of peas, were delivered in Stockholm on 20 May 1742, and Kantzow

40 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741, vol. 1a, 30 March.

was subsequently paid 11,066 dsm on 1 June 1742.[41] This meant that the delivery of the Pomeranian peas cost the state 16,400 dsm in total. It also meant that it was Kantzow who was responsible for paying his associates in Swedish Pomerania and the skipper, and for arranging the necessary bills of exchange to facilitate the payment between Stockholm and Pomerania. Thus, by using the merchant in Stockholm as an intermediary, the state gained access to international markets without having to use foreign currency. Moreover, Kantzow provided credit to the state since the state did not have to pay the whole sum upon the signing of the contract, or when the shipment was arranged in Swedish Pomerania.

The activities of the commission ensured that there was a steady flow of goods coming into storage facilities in Stockholm, Helsinki, Porvoo, and Hamina from March to December 1741, and from March to August 1742. In June 1741, for instance, it was reported that there were so many goods in the crown storehouses in Stockholm that the commission had to rent storage space from merchants.[42] During the winter it was impossible to arrange shipments by sea to Finland, which meant that everything that was needed for winter quarters had to be shipped no later than December. The commission focused on the needs of the army and navy, and of the war commissariat in Finland, without paying much attention to the movements of the army or how the military campaign was going. From their perspective, the demand for resources was the same whether the army was standing still or was moving towards or retreating from the enemy. Thus, neither the loss at the Battle of Lappeenranta in August 1741, nor the advance into Russian territory in November 1741, nor the Russian attack in June 1742 altered the priorities for the centralised procurement system.[43]

It was the task of the war commissariat, with the aid of local peasants, to arrange transport from the storage facilities to the army, and to adapt these transport movements to the demands of the commanding generals. The commissariat faced many problems executing their

41 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Räkenskaper 1741, vol. 41b, Contract with merchant Johan Albert Kantzow, 8 December 1741.

42 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741, vol. 1a, 18 June.

43 E.g. SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741, vol. 1b, 6 October, 4 December; Protokoll 1742, vol. 2a, 15 April, vol. 2b, 20 August. On the military movements, see Hatakka 2021, 178–79.

tasks, such as poor roads, restricted storage and baking capacities, a peasantry that had limited resources at their disposal, and a short supply of ready cash to pay the peasants for their services.[44] These deficiencies made the army quite immobile and, in the end, the forces moved to where the food was located in Helsinki, rather than the other way around.[45] To make things worse, the retreat from the advancing Russian forces in June and July 1742 created panic among the local population, which made it difficult for the local state machinery to function.[46]

The procurement commission tried to mitigate some of the problems in Finland. The lack of ready cash and the subsequent debts incurred to the peasantry were addressed by sending both silver coins in small denominations and bank notes to Finland. When the members learned in September 1741 that the peasants could not provide the necessary fodder as originally planned, they broadened the number of goods they purchased in various foreign locations by including oats.[47] Moreover, the commission paid the merchant Anders Plomgren 28,000 dsm in 1741 to arrange the building of a large bakery in Finland.[48] However, these efforts could not solve the problems of organising a major military campaign in a region with limited local resources.

The Role of Networks in Structuring Deliveries

The merchants who were negotiating directly with the commission were only front figures for social networks of merchants that operated on transnational markets. These social networks, which reduced risks and transaction costs for the participants, were based on relatively long-term exchanges of information, goods, and capital between equals, which created trust and obligations of reciprocity for the

44 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1742, vol. 2a, 28 January, 18 February, 16 June; SNA, Skrivelser till Kungl. Maj:t från landshövdingar, Från Nylands- och Tavastehus län, vol. 14, 9 March and 29 June 1742; Hatakka 2021.

45 Kocken 1969, 94.

46 E.g. SNA, Skrivelser till Kungl. Maj:t från landshövdingar, Från Nylands- och Tavastehus län, vol. 14, 30 June and 3 July 1742.

47 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Huvudbok 1741, vol. 56, fols. 353–58, Protokoll 1741, vol. 1b, 2–3 September.

48 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Huvudbok 1741, vol. 56, fols. 395–96.

members. These ties made it easier to conduct trade since they simplified transactions over long distances.[49]

No single merchant network traded in all commodities, nor was it active on all markets, since it was constrained by the participating members and their expertise. In order for the network to be effective, the number of members had to be limited and there had to be a level of economic and social exclusivity. This meant that merchants tended to marry within their network, but also that they traded with goods that they were knowledgeable in and in locations where they had associates. In Stockholm, for example, there were many merchants with ties to the old Hanseatic towns, who specialised in commodities from these towns, such as grain, while there were other merchants with ties to the Dutch Republic and the British Isles who specialised in exporting bar iron from Sweden to Amsterdam and England.[50] For the state, this specialisation meant that they had to interact with several networks of merchants to get hold of all the necessary supplies.

These differences are visible in Table 4.1, which shows the variations in type of goods the leading networks supplied and the origins of these goods. Although there were some overlaps, especially regarding grain, there were specialisations. One of the providers of grain and peas was the merchant house of Valentin & Johan Refunck in Stockholm. In 1741, they sold goods to the crown valued at 33,774 dsm, and in 1742 they provided goods together with several other merchant houses in a consortium for 192,600 dsm.[51] Valentin and Johan were brothers and the family originated in Swedish Pomerania. Thus, the merchant house based its business on its knowledge of the local grain market and the contacts it had in the province. Valentin had died in September 1739, which meant that it was Johan who was responsible for the business transactions during the war.[52]

One of the main partners of the merchant house was the merchant Johann Friedrich Baumann in Stralsund, who traded in grain and who participated in Refunck's transactions with the Swedish crown.

49 On the concept of social networks in early modern trade, see Müller 1998, esp. 33–35.

50 Müller 1998; Ågren 2007.

51 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Huvudbok 1741, vol. 56, fols. 417–18; Huvudbok 1742, vol. 58, fols. 852–63.

52 SCA, Justitiekollegium, Boupptеckningar, Valentin Refuncks boupptеckning 1740, vol. 125, fol. 771.

Table 4.1: The leading suppliers of goods to the Swedish military campaign in 1741

Merchant	Value of contracts (dsm)	Type of goods delivered	Origin of the goods
Christian Hebbe	236,737	Beef, butter, grain, peas, pork	Courland, East Prussia, Holstein, Livonia, Ostrobothnia, Scania, Swedish Pomerania
Johan Clason	187,762	Beef, cheese, herring, pork	Courland, Holstein, Jutland, Norway, Scania
Johan Albert Kantzow	117,559	Grain, peas, beef	Courland, East Prussia, Swedish Pomerania
Hinrich Hahr	71,330	Hemp, rye	East Prussia, Lübeck, Riga, St Petersburg
Anders Plomgren	46,304	Cheese, herring, grain	Danzig, Dutch Republic, Norway, Scotland, Wismar
Valentin & Johan Refunck	33,774	Grain, peas	Swedish Pomerania
David Gottlieb Wagner	29,683	Beef, pork, butter	Holstein

Source: SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Huvudbok 1741, vol. 56.

Baumann was well connected in the province, having interactions with several landowners, leading Swedish officials, and other merchants in Greifswald, Stralsund, Wismar, and Wolgast. Additionally, he had ties to Hamburg and Amsterdam, and he also traded with Bergen in Norway. However, his biggest and most important market was the Swedish realm, especially selling grain to the navy at Karlskrona, the garrison at Stralsund, and to other military installations in Sweden.[53] He was therefore knowledgeable in providing large volumes of goods, and as such a very useful partner in providing grain to the Swedish campaign in Finland. This usefulness manifested itself when Baumann was involved in providing grain to the troops in Finland through the intermediation of two Swedish officials in Stralsund, Nils Gyllenpatron and Ture Gustaf

53 Stralsund City Archive, Johann Friedrich Baumann, rep. 36, vol. 83, Kassa-Hauptbuch 1738–1744, e.g. fols. 3, 7–15, 38, 43, 51, 61, 83, 182, 210, 276.

Klinckowström.[54] Thus, Baumann was not solely dependent on the ties with Valentin & Johan Refunck to trade with the Swedish crown. However, Refunck was his main partner in Stockholm, which was important when negotiating with the procurement commission and when contracts with the Swedish state were signed.[55]

In the transactions, it was Baumann and Refunck as well as the different skippers who were involved and who owned parts of the cargo. In 1741, one of the skippers whom Baumann and Refunck employed was Jacob Horn from Stralsund. Horn made three voyages to Sweden: one to Karlskrona in April and two to Stockholm in May/June and July/August. On the first trip to Stockholm, which arrived in the Swedish capital on 4 June, the ship carried 72 barrels of peas, 384 barrels of rye, 390 barrels of malt, and a sack of wool; on the second voyage, which arrived on 3 August, the ship carried 900 barrels of malt, 36 barrels of oats, 24 barrels of wheat, and 3 sacks of wool.[56] Interestingly, the first vessel arrived in Stockholm before Refunck signed any contracts with the commission. Thus, Refunck signed two contracts on 8 and 12 June regarding the delivery of peas and rye after the arrival of the ship from Stralsund. In the correspondence between the merchants, the transfer of troops to Finland was discussed in April, which shows that the network was planning the deliveries and discussing several options at least two months before its members were certain that the commission would accept its offers. They also had to take into account what other merchants and warring states were doing.[57] Later, in the autumn of 1741, they signed a contract to ship rye and peas to Helsinki, which were not sent from Swedish Pomerania until April 1742. Regarding the shipments of malt that the network also arranged, these were not sold

54 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Räkenskaper 1741, vol. 36a, Receipts regarding trade with grain from Swedish Pomerania.

55 In Baumann's ledgers, Valentin & Johan Refunck was the main contact in Stockholm: see Stralsund City Archive, Johann Friedrich Baumann, rep. 36, vol. 83, Kassa-Hauptbuch 1738–1744.

56 Stralsund City Archive, Johann Friedrich Baumann, rep. 36, vol. 83, Kassa-Hauptbuch 1738–1744, fols. 291, 309, 368, 380; SCA, Stadskamreraren, Räkenskaper, Verifikationer, Tolagsjournaler ingående 1741, vol. 280.

57 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Huvudbok 1741, vol. 56, fols. 379–80; Stralsund City Archive, Johann Friedrich Baumann, rep. 36, vol. 86, Kopiebuch 1739–1741, Letter to Valentin & Johan Refunck, 15 April, 2 May, 6 May 1741; vol. 87, Kopiebuch 1741–1742, Letter to Valentin & Johan Refunck, 17 June 1741.

directly to the commission. Instead, the consignments were probably bought by the brewery guild in Stockholm, which had signed several contracts to deliver drink to the crown.[58]

Like the other contracts signed by the commission, Refunck was paid an instalment when the contracts were agreed in June, with the rest following delivery of the goods in July. Concurrently, Refunck was responsible for paying Baumann and Horn for their parts in the transactions. This was done through bills of exchange drawn up in Stockholm and denominated in the currency of the Hamburger Banco, which were exchanged for Reichsthaler in Hamburg by an intermediary. The most common intermediary in the transactions between Refunck in Stockholm and Baumann in Stralsund was the banker Hinrich Boldt, who had credit ties to both parties.[59]

There were several competing networks involved in delivering grain from Swedish Pomerania to the army and navy, so the commission was never dependent on just one group of merchants. Christian Hebbe, for instance, did not have any dealings with Baumann in Stralsund. Instead, he interacted with another merchant in the town.[60] The same situation also existed in relation to other markets—for example, the procurement of fish such as dried and salted herring. One important hub for the international trade in fish was the town of Bergen in Norway, but Scottish and Dutch fisheries also played important roles in the first half of the 18th century.[61] To be able to participate in these markets, and for the Swedish state to procure goods from them, the Stockholm merchants had to have contacts in Bergen and Glasgow. As argued above, merchants involved in the grain trade did not necessarily have such contacts, although a merchant like Johann Friedrich Baumann in Stralsund frequently traded with Bergen. The commission

58 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Huvudbok 1741, vol. 56, fols. 379–80, 417–18; Stralsund City Archive, Johann Friedrich Baumann, rep. 36, vol. 83, Kassa-Hauptbuch 1738–1744, fol. 395.

59 SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Huvudbok 1741, vol. 56, fols. 417–418; Stralsund City Archive, Johann Friedrich Baumann, rep. 36, vol. 83, Kassa-Hauptbuch 1738–1744, fol. 309; vol. 87, Kopiebuch 1741–1742, Letters to Hinrich Boldt, 18 July, 8, 15, 19, 22, 26 August 1741.

60 Stralsund City Archive, Kopiebuch eines Stralsunder Kaufmanns 1736–1742, rep. 36, vol. 163, Letters to Christian Hebbe, 18 April, 3 and 17 June, 25 July, 9 September, 17 October 1741.

61 Fossen 1979, 557–95; Coull 1996, 60–76.

therefore relied on Johan Clason and Anders Plomgren, who focused more on an Atlantic trading strategy than, for example, Kantzow and Refunck. Plomgren had visited several Scottish towns in 1737–1738 and had established ties with many local merchants.[62] It was therefore not surprising that, in 1741, three ships from Greenock and two ships arrived in Stockholm from Glasgow with Scottish herring owned by the merchant house Anders & Thomas Plomgren. During the year, the merchant house also arranged for the shipment of Norwegian herring on ships from Bergen, and Anders Plomgren signed four different contracts with the commission for the supply of 873 barrels and 966 *lispund* of herring.[63] The following year, from March to May, three ships from Glasgow, one from Greenock, and one from Anstruther arrived in Stockholm with Scottish herring, and Plomgren signed a contract with the commission in May to supply 217 barrels of herring from Scotland.[64]

Unlike Plomgren, Johan Clason did not trade with Scotland. Instead, he focused on the Danish–Norwegian realm, with contacts in Bergen, Aalborg, and the Duchy of Holstein. This strategy meant that he could procure large volumes of beef, pork, cheese, and fish. In relation to the import of fish, Clason had four ships arriving in Stockholm in 1741 with salted and dried herring: one ship from Aalborg with Danish herring, two ships from Bergen, and one ship from Copenhagen with dried fish.[65] In 1742, there were five ships arriving from Bergen with herring that was owned by Clason. Some of that fish came all the way from Iceland. In these shipments, Clason often used Danish skippers, such as Lorentz Jochim Windt from Copenhagen and Hans Andersen Eeg from Korsør. The crown was interested in dried fish in particular, and Clason therefore signed several contracts with the commission in the second half of 1741 and the first half of 1742 to supply

62 Grage 1995–1997a.

63 SCA, Stadskamreraren, Räkenskaper, Verifikationer, Tolagsjournaler ingående 1741, vol. 280; SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Huvudbok 1741, vol. 56, fols. 395–96.

64 SCA, Stadskamreraren, Räkenskaper, Verifikationer, Tolagsjournaler ingående 1742, vol. 284; SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Huvudbok 1742, vol. 58, fols. 786–89.

65 SCA, Stadskamreraren, Räkenskaper, Verifikationer, Tolagsjournaler ingående 1741, vol. 280; SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Huvudbok 1741, vol. 56, fols. 373–76.

this commodity.[66] This shows that the commission was preparing for a campaign that would last at least throughout the whole of 1742.

These transnational networks of merchants played a crucial role in supplying the Swedish army and navy with goods during the campaign against Russia. Without their assistance, it would have been very difficult to get hold of all the necessary foodstuffs and the campaign would have been impossible to organise, since the war commissariat was simply unable to purchase all the demanded goods in Finland. It was the Stockholm-based merchants who led the negotiations with the procurement commission and their names were stated in the contracts. Thus, they were legally responsible for the commitments of their networks and they could be charged with negligence if they did not deliver as promised. Their associates in foreign ports, on the other hand, were more invisible and not liable but, because of the transnational character of the networks, problems in one part of the network, such as difficulties to deliver, easily spread across borders and affected all merchants in the network. The economic success and the reproduction of the network were therefore dependent on all members delivering.

However, one big difference between the Stockholm merchants and the foreign partners was the fact that it was only the former who could be subject to political pressure from the commission, such as the language arguing that the duty of subjects was to serve the crown and that this had to be taken into account when offers were presented to the commission. It could be argued that the Stockholm-based merchants were publicly accountable since many of them held top positions in the burgher estate and participated in the meetings of the estates. Their actions and, in the long run, the position of the merchants in public life depended on their performance and their ability to provide expertise to the state, but also on using their credit, knowledge. and contacts to serve the common good. They could not therefore simply seek profit maximisation in all transactions. Nevertheless, their position in public life was vulnerable, since it was easy for critics to argue that they only accepted their role to gain inside information and other commercial

66 SCA, Stadskamreraren, Räkenskaper, Verifikationer, Tolagsjournaler ingående 1742, vol. 284; SNA, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Huvudbok 1742, vol. 58, fols. 780–81. The origin of the skippers is mentioned in NNA, Generaltollkammeret, Tollregnskap Bergen, vol. 31, 1741–1742.

benefits.[67] The example that Anders Plomgren signed contracts on behalf of the merchant house Anders & Thomas Plomgren while his brother Thomas was a member of the commission showed how these different roles could very easily be blurred.

Conclusion

The Swedish state's plans to start a war against Russia in 1741 generated several activities both within the state apparatus and in several mercantile networks which could provide the necessary supplies to the army and navy. The merchants viewed the war plans essentially as a business opportunity, while the state needed the merchants' expertise, information, and credit. It was therefore in many ways a mutual relationship between the state and the merchants. The state's demand for the merchants' services functioned as an impetus for merchants not just in Stockholm but also in several European towns, from Bergen and Glasgow to Aalborg, Lübeck, Stralsund, and Memel, to increase their commercial activities.

The Swedish state's greatest leverage in the interactions with the merchants was the fact that it provided the demand for large volumes of goods, and that it promised to pay the suppliers promptly upon delivery of the merchandise. Moreover, the state had several markets and merchant networks to choose from. If merchants were unable or unwilling to provide acceptable prices or goods of sufficient quality, it was possible for the state to move to other suppliers or markets, and to avoid the risks of monopolisation by a few dominant actors, which often, for example, plagued the Spanish system of government procurement. The Swedish system of flexible arrangements therefore displays many similarities with the British military supply system during campaigns in the mid-18th century and the Napoleonic period.[68] In other words, the Swedish state did not rely solely on local markets close to the theatre of war to provide the supplies. This capacity, which depended on access to organised credit through the Bank of the Estates and the participation of willing merchants, was a strength

67 For a discussion about acceptable and problematic actions by merchants, see Runefelt 2005; Ruotsalainen 2024.

68 Knight and Wilcox 2010; Bannerman 2018. For the Spanish system, see Torres Sánchez 2016.

of the centralised system of procurement that developed during the 18th century. It also helped the state representatives to keep control of the war-making machine, and to reduce the influence of powerful intermediaries.

In comparison, the Swedish system during the first half of the 17th century was much more decentralised, as it depended on the local economies where the campaigns were located and on the credit and contacts of commanders and other suppliers. Usually, creditors also had to wait a long time to receive payment for their services to the crown.[69] As shown in the chapters by Mickelsson, Grimshaw, and Björklund in this volume, such arrangements were flexible and they could provide sufficient resources to the campaigns, at the same time as they created opportunities for resourceful individuals to profit from the transactions in ways that did not exist in the 18th century. Actors such as Jacob De la Gardie and Louis De Geer wielded more power than Johan Clason and Christian Hebbe could a century later. But the 17th-century solution had its limitations, especially in relation to sustaining a functioning system of public credit, and arranging large military campaigns in regions with limited local resources, such as the campaigns in Norway in 1718 and in Finland in 1741–1742. Thus, the state had to play a greater role.

It could therefore be argued that the Swedish fiscal-military state developed its administrative and fiscal capacities to wage war during the 18th century, and that it strengthened its ties with the mercantile community, which could provide access to more markets, located further away. Thus, the Swedish system of war-making had developed into a contractor state that was based on close cooperation between the state and merchants.[70] However, it is important to stress that the Swedish state relied on transnational networks of merchants that operated in several locations and that interacted with many political entities. In this way, the centralised system was still dependent on older decentralised practices. Thus, rather than emphasising domestic actors and their interactions with the state, which scholars who focus on the contractor state perspective tend to do, the Swedish state was operating in a multi-polar context. It is also clear that the Swedish state did not just rely on the resources of one or two European fiscal-military hubs,

69 Landberg 1969, 20–28; Björklund 2021.
70 Cf. Torres Sánchez 2016.

such as Amsterdam or Danzig. Its ability to utilise the capacities of several networks of merchants therefore reduced the opportunity for international military entrepreneurs to profit from Swedish military campaigns in the 18th century.[71]

All of this means that the military setbacks in the campaign in Finland in 1741–1742 cannot be attributed to a shortage of central resources or to a lack of cooperation with key merchants. Instead, the problems were primarily caused by hurdles and limitations in Finland, such as restricted transport and storage capabilities, and a limited supply of ready cash to pay peasants for their services. Even when the representatives of the contractor state tried to address these problems, it was not enough to change the outcome of the campaign. Some of the limitations could have been alleviated by better preparations—for instance, regarding the volume of cash in circulation—but other problems were more structural in nature and would have required several years of attention. However, members of the state apparatus learned from these deficiencies, and after the war the Swedish state made large investments into the military infrastructure in Finland to avoid a repeat of the events of 1741–1743. New fortresses, dockyards, and storage facilities for grain were built, and the efforts were supported by merchants and other burghers in towns such as Helsinki, who saw the investments as lucrative business opportunities.[72] In other words, the Swedish contractor state strengthened its capacity to act against the military power of the Russian Empire.

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71 Cf. Wilson and Klerk 2022.
72 Gustafsson 2015; Hatakka 2015.

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PART II

Soldiers

CHAPTER 5

Intelligence, Security, and the Military Market in Sweden, 1538–1547

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Abstract

Foreign affairs in 16th-century Europe were characterized by an unpredictable dynamic caused by the great emphasis on private military entrepreneurs. For this reason, the international military market became a focal point in strategic decision making. During the reign of king Gustav Vasa (1521–1560), many anti-Swedish intrigues were forming abroad. The study examines how networks of agents scrutinized developments on the military market to provide early warning of impending attacks. It provides several examples of agents, their mode of operations, what intelligence they provided, and how it proactively affected strategy. They illustrate the cycle of intelligence operations, threat analysis, and decision-making. The study argues that reliable military intelligence represented a commodity for which princes would pay handsomely and that it became increasingly vital in strategic predictions. It further emphasises the transnational character of fiscal-military structures and illustrates the entangled nature of private enterprise, intelligence, and strategic uncertainty.

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Introduction

In 16th-century Europe, feudal hierarchy and urban military corporations gave way to a market-oriented military economy. While standing national armies developed very slowly, the international military market became the dominant provider of soldiers. The new fiscal-military structures that emerged during this period were decidedly transnational in character. The growing number of private military entrepreneurs created a peculiar dynamic in international conflicts, in which substantial funds and good contacts were the only real prerequisites for war-making, with the fluctuating frequency of conflict deciding the balance of supply and demand on the market.

Hans-Joachim Behr provides examples from 16th-century Saxony where unemployed soldiers tended to band together in great companies (*Vergardungen*) between service periods. Such bands sometimes grew to the equivalent of small armies. Many European princes preferred the Northern German military market, because of the relative ease through which enlistments could be carried out there.[1] By secretly contracting readily available troops, unscrupulous princes could launch surprise attacks on their antagonists. Hans-Achim Schmidt argues that the growing problem of *Vergardungen* stressed the need for accurate intelligence that could provide early warning. He shows that even the military entrepreneurs themselves relied on intelligence networks to keep track of market developments—to guard against surprise attacks and to be well advised if the need to enlist troops arose.[2]

From a financial perspective, a prospective war-maker had to balance the great cost of retaining units of foreign mercenaries against the advantages of military readiness. In order to diminish the importance of timing, from the mid-16th century it became increasingly common for princes to pay peacetime fees to military entrepreneurs against their readiness to provide troops in a time of crisis. These were either long-term or short-term payments (*Dienstgeld* or *Wartgeld*), which

1 This study has been funded by the Swedish Research Council (project no. 2022-02048). Behr 1995, 46.

2 Schmidt 1929, 8–9, 13, 15. In her study of early modern intelligence in Saxony, Anne-Simone Rous also briefly touches on this military aspect of intelligence (Rous 2022, 152).

would ensure availability and would also prevent the entrepreneur from being contracted by the enemy.[3]

If a prince did not establish such contracts beforehand, it was very difficult and costly for him to start the process when hostilities had already begun. Prospective war-makers who could not find readily available *Vergardungen* months in advance of a campaign had to make use of diplomatic and social networks to contract military entrepreneurs who carried out enlistments. It therefore became increasingly important to establish networks on the military market well in advance of a conflict.[4] It was also expedient to determine what *Dienstgeld* or *Wartgeld* contracts the enemy had established beforehand. Scrutiny of the actions of the entrepreneurs contracted by the enemy could provide early warning: the process of enlistment was hard to carry out secretly, and vigilant statesmen might divine the intentions of other princes simply by carefully surveying transactions on the military market. That market became a focal point in European politics and it was imperative for princes to survey troop movements. Many princes consequently established clandestine intelligence networks in order to obtain early warning of hostile intent.

How should we understand intelligence in a 16th-century context? The political scientist Jennifer E. Sims argues that intelligence is distinctly set apart from the general flow of information because it is engineered or obtained through design. Intelligence must be understood as a purposeful learning endeavour and a tool shaped to competitive purposes. Well-organised intelligence becomes a decision-maker's advantage, which makes it an underappreciated form of power. States that pursue intelligence-driven decision advantages will fare better in the international competition than those that do not. Intelligence is never perfect—it must simply be better than that of the opponent, and the quality will determine its competitive usefulness. In foreign policy, intelligence thus aims to provide 'decision advantage'. This gives time to manoeuvre, and allows for proactive rather than reactive strategic decision-making.[5] This is a useful perspective that will be examined further in this study.

3 Redlich 1964, 56–57.
4 Björklund and Schiavone 2021, 58–61.
5 Sims 2022, xii–xiii, 6–16.

The deployment of efficient intelligence networks could provide an advantage in the competition on the military market, and the interplay between intelligence and the market is a crucial, yet understudied, part of early modern military history. In his taxonomy of foreign military labour in the fiscal-military system, the historian Peter Wilson provides a novel approach to the state-building paradigm by including intelligence as one of six primary forms of war-making resources.[6] From this perspective, intelligence became a commodity necessary to navigate the military market. It was created by collecting and assessing vast amounts of information, and wrapping that information up to suit the needs of a patron. This required some expertise, and, if fresh, the product could be sold for profit. The growing need for accurate intelligence also created opportunities for entrepreneurial intelligence specialists.

This chapter provides examples of the prominence of intelligence in the context of 16th-century state-building. It examines the role of the military market in Swedish security considerations during the reign of King Gustav Vasa (r. 1521–1560). Throughout his reign, Sweden was the target of international intrigue and threats of invasion. This study encompasses the period 1538–1547, which serves as an example of one of the most intensive decades in foreign affairs. From 1538 onwards, in response to the many foreign threats, the king increasingly organised extensive intelligence networks in Northern Europe in order to monitor military developments, though the pressure on Sweden lessened somewhat with the outbreak of the Schmalkaldic War in Germany in 1547. Some earlier works on Swedish diplomacy shed light on the foreign policy during this period but rarely discuss the interplay with intelligence and the military market.[7] This study argues that the military market became a growing security problem and that intelligence networks developed into a crucial tool to identify future threats.

A great number of different agents were deployed abroad by Gustav Vasa, of whom several scores of names can still be identified in the extant sources. Most of the organisers or handlers of these networks were royal administrators, such as regional governors, bailiffs, or royal secretaries. However, the agents who collected the intelligence

6 Wilson 2020, 14.

7 Landberg 1925; Svalenius 1937; Andersson 1943; Ahnlund 1956; Lundkvist 1960; Carlsson 1961.

abroad and passed it on either to handlers or directly to the king were mostly private individuals. As in the military market, the intelligence networks thus largely operated through an interplay between public and private interest. Although the levels of reimbursement are seldom explicitly mentioned, the increased demand for intelligence seems to have offered pecuniary possibilities for entrepreneurial specialists and amateurs alike. While some of these non-state actors were residents in key cities, others travelled to collect intelligence at designated places. Some only operated temporarily, while others provided intelligence for a number of years.

The 1530s: War, Uncertainty, and Isolation

The sequence of events examined here starts with King Christian II of Oldenburg, who was deposed in the three Nordic realms in 1523 but was determined to reconquer them. In November 1531, he landed in Norway with an army financed by Emperor Charles V, which caught both Danes and Swedes by surprise.[8] Even though the agent Henrich Nyebur, a Lübeck burgher in the service of Gustav Vasa, sent worrying reports to the king about Christian's invasion plans, at first this scenario was not taken seriously.[9] When his army suddenly landed in Norway, the king acted in panic and mobilised all available forces to repel the attack. Christian's attempt eventually failed and he faced life imprisonment in Denmark. This frightening episode nevertheless shaped the Swedish king's strategic mindset in subsequent decades, with a heavy focus on intelligence and foresight.

These events were followed by the Count's Feud (1534–1536), in which Count Christopher of Oldenburg championed the cause to reinstate Christian II. During this war, Swedish agents closely followed troop movements in Holland, Germany and Denmark.[10] In late May 1534, the Vadstena burgher Swen Skute reported to the king about Lübeck plans for a military intervention in Sweden, and the dispatch of 4000 *Landsknechte* to Holstein.[11] In July, Joachim Bornemann,

8 Heise 1877, 5–15; Hansen 1943, 112–20; Sellmer 1999, 65–66.
9 Hammarström 1956, 438.
10 GIR 1534, 146–48, 340, 379–80, 386–88; GIR 1535, 87–88, 100, 142, 147, 149, 232–33, 259–60, 280; GIR 1536–1537, 54–55, 80, 83, 97, 204–8.
11 Lundkvist 1960, 116: GIR 1534, 122–25.

probably a burgher and resident of Ratzeburg, similarly reported to the king about enemy troop deployments in Northern Germany.[12] The Swedish army was continuously mobilised during this conflict, and Swedish warships patrolled the sea as a precaution against surprise attacks.[13] The military deployment lessened the sense of urgency and the need for decision advantage during the war. On the conclusion of peace in 1536, the Swedish army and navy demobilised, however, which meant that any further attacks could not quickly be met. In times of war, statesmen were vigilant and their troops constantly deployed and ready to meet a sudden threat. But a military organisation drowsy from years of peace required much time to prepare a defence. In that sense, peace was a more dangerous state than war.

In the later 1530s, Sweden's international diplomatic standing deteriorated. Old enemies—Count Christopher, Duke Albrecht of Mecklenburg, and Lübeck—remained hostile.[14] The former ally Christian III of Denmark gradually turned against Sweden. Swedish exiles smeared Gustav Vasa's name in Germany and he was denied membership among the Protestant princes in the Schmalkaldic League.[15] Furthermore, the Elector Palatine Fredrick II and Duke Francis I of Lorraine both held claims to the Nordic thrones, through their marriages with daughters of Christian II. Christian's father in-law, Charles V, was also unfriendly towards Sweden.[16] The Swedish monarch's situation was clearly problematic. In response, he maintained a high level of military readiness, and, as will be further demonstrated, he invested heavily in intelligence networks that could provide him with early warning of hostile intent.[17]

In 1538–1539, there were several *Vergardungen* in Holland and on the Lower Rhine, which caused considerable unrest in these regions. Schmidt shows that the Landgrave Philip of Hesse's extensive

12 Riksarkivet, SE/RA/1133/1133.01/3, Skrivelser till Gustav I, vol. 3 (1531–1535) (image 256–57). Although Bornemann is unknown from before, there are four further reports extant from 1536 which show that he served the king as a resident intelligencer in Ratzeburg during these years (SE/RA/1133/1133.01/4, Skrivelser till Gustav I, vol. 4 (1536–1545), 6–15 (3 March, 30 and 31 July, 6 August 1536)).

13 GIR 1534, 197, 200.

14 Sellmer 1999, 417.

15 Carlsson 1954; Carlsson 1961; Lundkvist 1985–1987, 363.

16 Hansen 1943.

17 Landberg 1925, 22–23; Lönnroth 1944, 147; Hammarström 1956, 359.

intelligence network kept a careful watch on these concentrations.[18] Apart from a lull in the perpetual feuding in the German Empire, the great number of discharged troops may have been due to the Truce of Nice in the Habsburg–French Wars, which was in effect by the end of November 1537.[19] In early 1538, there were 17 *Fähnlein* of unemployed *Landsknechte* gathering in the land of Utrecht, on the Geldern and Ostfriesland borders. In March, seven of them were enlisted by the Duke of Lorraine, while Christopher of Oldenburg enlisted four in April, for his feud with Münster.[20] In July 1538, the Swedish king demanded that his agent in Hamburg, Martin Barentin, who was probably a burgher of this city, should provide intelligence about the troops presently gathered in the Netherlands and the Bishopric of Münster, and of any intrigue directed against Sweden. The king considered this information so delicate that he instructed Barentin not to entrust anyone to carry the written reports, but to report directly to the king's own servant, who was on his way to Hamburg.[21] In August, Gustav Vasa also received intelligence about troops encamped in Northern Germany and instructed his commanders in the south of Sweden to send agents to Denmark and Germany to obtain intelligence about their intentions.[22] If any of these troops were heading north, the king wanted time to prepare his defence.

The governor of Älvsborg Castle, Severin Kiil, deployed his agents on a continuous basis in Denmark, Norway, Lübeck, Burgundy, and Holland.[23] In May 1539, Kiil forwarded letters to the king from his agent in Holland, Biörn Groffue, who reported of a concentration of troops ready to ship out. The king instructed Kiil quickly to find out where these troops were headed.[24] The royal bailiff on the southern border, Jöran Jönsson (Svan), also coordinated a number of spies

18 Schmidt 1929, 16, 25–26; Behr 1995, 47.
19 Shaw, 2019, 222.
20 Behr 1995, 47. The *Fähnlein* was the smallest tactical unit in the *Landsknecht* organisation and nominally consisted of 500 men. In the 17th century, it was replaced by the battalion.
21 GIR 1538–1539, 74.
22 GIR 1538–1539, 85.
23 GIR 1532–1533, 46, 347; GIR 1534, 253; GIR 1535, 87–88, 149; GIR 1536–1537, 83, 116–17; GIR 1538–1539, 17–18, 181–82, 192–93, 205–6, 238–39.
24 GIR 1538–1539, 192–93.

in Denmark and Hamburg.[25] In early 1539, one of his Copenhagen agents was exposed and brought in front of the Danish king, at which point his clothes were torn on the suspicion that he had letters hidden underneath.[26] In May 1539, in parallel with Groffue's statement, Svan's Hamburg agent reported a suspicious concentration of warships in the harbour, and a malicious rumour, spread in Germany by the Danes, that the Swedish king intended to ally with the emperor.[27]

Worrying reports kept arriving. In early June, Gustav Vasa received further intelligence, obtained by Kiil's agent in Lübeck, concerning a large concentration of infantry and cavalry in Frisia. According to rumours, these troops would be deployed in an imperial attack on the Lutheran princes. When they were eventually disbanded, the king's enemy Berend von Mehlen enlisted some of them, which was confirmed through other reports.[28] In mid-June, the king was informed that the Danish king had enlisted six or eight *Fähnlein* of the troops earlier concentrated in Germany; Gustav Vasa asked Kiil for fresh intelligence about Christian's intentions.[29]

The intelligence about Danish enlistments in Germany greatly troubled the Swedish monarch, who naturally feared an attack on Sweden. He instructed his bailiff Anders Krabbe to dispatch trusted agents into Denmark and Holstein 'who knew how to operate without being detected'. The king promised to pay them 100 marks annually for reliable intelligence—a sum comparable to the annual salary of a full-time serving professional soldier.[30] The agents should enquire according to a set of questions. The king especially wanted to know: the numbers of cavalry and infantry that the Danish king kept; if he was recruiting additional troops; if he planned to billet them in Scania (close to the Swedish border); what his overall military intentions were; whether the Danish navy was prepared to sail; and what schemes the Holstein nobles were up to among the troops.[31] During the autumn of 1539,

25 GIR 1536–1537, 235, 322; GIR 1538–1539, 161–66.
26 GIR 1538–1539, 163.
27 GIR 1538–1539, 192–93.
28 GIR 1538–1539, 205–6.
29 GIR 1538–1539, 211–12.
30 GIR 1538–1539, 213–15. 100 marks was the approximate equivalent of 37 guilders (see exchange rates from 1543 in SE/KrA/0455/G I 1543/3, Militieräkningar 1537–1827, G I 1543, vol. 3, 10).
31 GIR 1538–1539, 213–15.

Gustav Vasa grew even more suspicious about Danish intentions and ordered the dispatch of additional agents to Denmark and Germany.[32] At this time, however, the real threat seems to have come from Lübeck, which tried to persuade other Hansa cities to join in a war against Sweden. This project failed, but the hostile intentions of Lübeck nevertheless illustrate the precarious Swedish situation. Gustav Vasa desperately needed allies and, even though he certainly did not trust Christian III of Denmark, he was considered the best option.[33]

German Plans Unfold

In the autumn of 1540, Dano-Swedish negotiations commenced in Kalmar, but the Swedish distrust towards Denmark persisted.[34] In late May 1541, Gustav Vasa daily received intelligence of large Danish military enlistments in Germany. He discarded as 'merchants' tales' a rumour that the Danish fleet was destined for Iceland—a less likely target given the uncertain situation in Northern Europe at the time. He asked the governor of Västergötland, Gustav Stenbock, quickly to send spies to Denmark and Frisia, to enquire secretly about the Danish king's real intentions. He also asked Stenbock to handle the instruction with utmost secrecy and not even show it to his own scribes.[35] In September 1541, however, Gustav Vasa and Christian III finalised the Dano-Swedish Treaty of Brömsebro. The treaty stipulated reciprocal military aid and foreign policy cooperation.[36] The main reason behind the Dano-Swedish accords was the emperor's decision at the Diet of Regensburg in 1541 to side with the Elector Palatine in his claims to the Nordic thrones. Francis I of France was a natural choice for a further strong ally against the Habsburgs, and Franco-Danish and Franco-Swedish alliance treaties were signed in November 1541 and July 1542 respectively.[37] Through these treaties, Sweden broke its isolation in foreign relations created by Gustav Vasa's overthrow of Christian II in 1521. The treaties diminished the number of foreign threats,

32 Lundkvist 1960, 154.
33 Lundkvist 1960, 163, 169.
34 Landberg 1925, 23; Lundkvist 1960, 170.
35 GIR 1540–1541, 272–73.
36 Landberg 1925, 24–32; Lundkvist 1960, 175.
37 Sprinchorn 1880, 3–8.

most importantly neutralising Denmark, which had the most suitable geographic position to launch a surprise attack on Sweden. The alliance with France did, however, also mean that the Swedish king nominally became the enemy of Charles V.[38]

Due to the growing strategic uncertainty during the period 1538–1543, Gustav Vasa issued commissions for at least 30 different German entrepreneurs to enlist troops abroad.[39] Even before the Dacke Rebellion erupted in the summer of 1542, the king kept at least five *Fähnlein* of German *Landsknechte* permanently retained in Sweden. In response to the rebellion and to parallel foreign threats in 1543, he temporarily enlisted at least ten additional *Fähnlein*.[40]

In April 1543, Swedish agents discovered that the Elector Palatine and the 'Burgundians' had gathered ten *Fähnlein* in Bremen, which the Duke of Mecklenburg intended to deploy for an invasion of Sweden and Denmark. At this time, the royal chancellor, Conrad von Pyhy, was commissioned to enlist troops in Germany to quell the uprising. On receipt of intelligence of a hostile concentration in Mecklenburg, he acted quickly. With the troops enlisted so far, he joined forces with the Danish commander Johan Rantzau. Together they launched a surprise attack on Mecklenburg and forced the duke to flee to Lüneburg.[41] This effectively foiled the Elector Palatine's plans to use Mecklenburg as a base for his invasion. This is one of several examples of how apt intelligence may provide decision advantage and enable expedient action.

Despite the Swedish–Danish alliance, distrust persisted, and the king kept several secret agents in Denmark. In October 1543, he sent a detailed instruction to Henrik Klasson Horn and Bertil Tolk about what intelligence to obtain while travelling there. Gustav Vasa wanted information about the war between France and the Empire: if any battles had occurred and who held the upper hand; what military preparations the emperor had made and what colonels he had contracted; what German princes had joined either the French or the imperial side; whether the Landgrave of Hesse, the Elector of Saxony, the dukes of Braunschweig and Mecklenburg, or the city of Lübeck had chosen

38 Lundkvist 1960.

39 SE/RA/1112.2/1 (1522-1592), B, Titularregister till riksregistraturet, fols. 64–77.

40 Barkman 1937, 244, 369.

41 GIR 1543, 278–79; Sellmer 1999, 438–40.

sides, and the strength of their armies; possible plans for campaigns and whether they concerned Sweden or Denmark; and whether the Danish king was enlisting foreign troops, how strong his forces were, and what ships he kept at the ready. Gustav Vasa concluded the instruction with an order to send spies to the imperial field camp in Germany, to find out about imperial intentions.[42] All these efforts were intended to obtain early warning of any serious efforts to invade Sweden, and to provide the king with a decision advantage.

In the following years, the situation did not improve. In the winter of 1544, a rumour reached Gustav Vasa of the reconciliation between Christian III and the emperor. Reports spoke of a six-year truce, with the release of Christian II as a condition. Another rumour spoke of Danish enlistments of 30 *Fähnlein* of *Landsknechte*, and, while the treaty obviated the need for troops against the emperor, the king suspected that Sweden was the target. He feared that this treaty included a secret anti-Swedish clause.[43] The king's worries were exacerbated by the fact that the Danes made excuses not to communicate directly with him. In a letter to Erik Fleming, Gustav Vasa expressed his fears that 'there is a wolf buried in this affair'.[44] Consequently, all Swedish commanders were instructed to prepare against surprise attacks.[45] Throughout 1544, the Danish king chose to keep a number of expensive foreign troops in his pay, which puzzled and worried the Swedish king. In March 1544, he discussed the Danish–imperial reconciliation in letters to Stenbock, and mentioned a new rumour that the Danish king had discharged six *Fähnlein* of *Landsknechte*. Parallel rumours told of a great new war tax imposed on the Danish peasantry. Stenbock was urged to send more agents to Denmark to obtain intelligence about the foreign troops.[46]

Another important secret source of intelligence during these years was the bailiff of Rügen, Matteus Norman, who regularly provided the Swedish king with intelligence from Stralsund.[47] In May 1544, Norman reported that the imperial six-year truce stipulated that Denmark must leave its French alliance and that all foreign troops in Danish service

42 GIR 1543, 548–50.
43 GIR 1544, 17–18, 65–66, 76, 88–89, 102–3, 109–10.
44 GIR 1544, 76.
45 GIR 1544, 76, 102–3, 109–10.
46 GIR 1544, 109–10, 132–35, 186.
47 SE/RA/1441/1/2, Kanslitjänstemäns koncept och mottagna skrivelser, 1 Gustav I:s tid 1523–1560, vol. 2, Letters from Matteus Norman, 1540–1547.

must be transferred to imperial service.[48] This was certainly bad news for the Swedish king, who demanded conclusive intelligence about the purpose and current location of these troops. He instructed the governor of Kalmar Castle, Germund Svensson (Somme), to dispatch agents disguised as peasants who should sail along the Danish coast on the pretence of wishing to buy grain, while secretly collecting intelligence.[49] Somme should also dispatch a secret messenger with a letter to Norman in Stralsund, who should not sail back until he had received Norman's written reply. This messenger should also be disguised as a merchant and bring goods for sale in order not to raise suspicions; to disguise agents as merchants seems to have been a fairly common practice in Sweden at the time. Norman's letter should be handled with the utmost secrecy and its contents were not to be disclosed to anyone. In early June, the king confirmed receipt of the report from Norman. He did not disclose the contents in writing, but emphasised that additional reports from Norman must be hurried to Stockholm 'through night and day'.[50]

Fears of a Danish Surprise Attack

In the spring of 1544, there was a great number of troops gathering in Lower Saxony and on the Lower Rhine, and no one seemed to know to whom they belonged.[51] Gustav Vasa also received reports of yet another attempt by the Duke of Mecklenburg to instil a rebellion in Sweden, preparatory to a possible invasion.[52] Despite this, it was the foreign troops in Denmark that most worried the king, because of that country's geographic proximity to Sweden. In early summer, several agents reported that the Danish king had begun transferring the troops over to Scania and that the burghers of Varberg had been instructed to prepare to accommodate a large number of horses. Gustav Vasa feared that Christian might either launch a surprise attack himself or hand the troops over to Sweden's enemies—and this could be dangerous if the troops were still in Scania at the time of their discharge. Stenbock,

48 Svalenius 1937, 202.
49 GIR 1544, 186.
50 GIR 1544, 233–37, 384–85.
51 Schmidt 1929, 53.
52 GIR 1544, 186.

Svan, and other bailiffs were repeatedly urged to keep their agents busy in Denmark and quickly relay any intelligence about numbers, billeting location, and orders for deployment.[53] If these troops did in fact attack Sweden, early confirmation would provide Gustav Vasa with a crucial decision advantage.

Additional reports, especially from the royal agent Claes von Born, who made observations *in situ* at the German diet at Speyer, seemed to confirm the 'treacherous' Danish treaty with the emperor. According to rumours, Christian III had enlisted more foreign troops, in addition to the ones already in his service. A Dutch fleet had entered the Danish Sound (henceforth the Sound), purportedly to ferry troops over to Scania. Gustav Vasa concluded that there could no longer be any doubt about Danish intentions. He gave orders to prepare Stockholm Castle for a siege, to prepare the fleet and to gather it at Älvsnabben to preclude a naval surprise attack, and to transfer the troops in Finland to Sweden.[54] From these instructions, it is evident that the king relied heavily on the ominous intelligence provided by his agent networks. It was paramount to his strategic decision-making process and his pursuit of decision advantage.

During the summer, the governor of Stockholm Castle, Botvid Larsson (Anckar), and several agents, among them Jöran Skrivare, reported that the Danish king intended to deploy his troops against Dithmarschen, or that perhaps even Scotland was the objective of the foreign troops in Denmark. Gustav Vasa nevertheless insisted that the troops would be deployed against Sweden, and he argued that all reports to the contrary were a Danish deception produced to cloak the real intentions. Stenbock was instructed to dispatch a trusted agent to Hamburg or Holstein to obtain reliable intelligence, while Anckar was to prepare for war and enlist as many soldiers as possible.[55] There is a somewhat paranoid discourse expressed in these letters. Dithmarschen was actually not an unlikely Danish objective: the Oldenburg kings had repeatedly tried to subdue this area (and finally did so in 1559),

53 GIR 1544, 326–27, 346, 369–70, 387–88, 430–31, 438.

54 GIR 1544, 443–45, 473–75.

55 GIR 1544, 394–96, 484–85. In early August, Stenbock confirmed the dispatch of an agent to Hamburg, who was also instructed to gather intelligence of the secret intrigue allegedly put together by Duke Albrecht, the Elector Palatine, and Swedish exiles (GIR 1544, 523–25).

and in 1539, Bernhard von Mila, the commander of a *Vergardung* near Bremen, suggested that the troops should invade Dithmarschen if the German princes and the Danish king gave their consent.[56]

When reports eventually came in late July 1544 that the foreign troops billeted in Halland and Scania had departed for Holstein, the king scolded his bailiff Jöns Brun for having trusted unfounded intelligence and 'merchants' tales'. He argued that Brun should have sent an agent directly to the Sound to observe whether the troop ships entered the Sound or debarked at Zealand or elsewhere. He demanded proof from independent sources, and that Brun must immediately increase the number of agents but make sure to report back only when certain intelligence could be obtained.[57] On the following day, Gustav Vasa scolded the bailiff Svan in a similar tone for not paying enough attention to this matter. Svan's latest report was of little use because it could not confirm Brun's report of the departure of the foreign troops. Until Svan had obtained certain proof directly at the Sound, the king assumed that the troop movement was a Danish deception. Svan was further admonished that, even if the troops were currently at Dithmarschen or Mölln, they might well be deployed against Sweden again shortly. To enforce the gravity of the situation, the king disclosed to Svan that he, personally, had received written proof of a great secret intrigue designed to instil rebellion and discord in the Nordic realms.[58]

In somewhat less reproachful letters to Somme at Kalmar, the king concluded that the Danes still kept a large number of foreign troops in their pay at great expense. This was strange in view of the Danish peace with the emperor. He still discarded the reports that Ditmarschen was the objective and urged Somme to guard against surprise attacks at Kalmar Castle. Somme must quickly also dispatch a trusted agent to Denmark to obtain intelligence about the foreign troops, and on what terms the Danish peace with the emperor was agreed.[59]

Finally, in the late summer of 1544, Gustav Vasa seems to have accepted that the threat of war was no longer imminent and he instructed his bailiff in Sunnerbo, Anders Marbo, to cancel further enlistments of troops. Some of the foreign troops discharged by the

56 Schmidt 1929, 35–36.
57 GIR 1544, 488–89.
58 GIR 1544, 491–93.
59 GIR 1544, 493–95, 520–21.

Danish king now even sought service in Sweden. This was considered proof that the Danish plans for an attack had been abandoned.[60] In mid-October, however, the king again made ominous interpretations of intelligence obtained from Denmark, Germany, and Lorraine that there was a great concentration of troops by the Elbe under Colonel Conrad Pennynck. No one knew what prince these mysterious troops were currently serving, and in a letter to Stenbock Gustav Vasa made the reflex assumption that they would be deployed against Sweden. He reasoned that there was presently a relative peace in Germany and that Pennynck was an old favourite in the service of the Danish kings.[61] Pennynck was indeed one of the most famous Lower German *Landsknecht* colonels of the 16th century, and he repeatedly served the Danish kings.[62] This at least made the Swedish king's assumption plausible.

The king also told Stenbock of a rumour that Ditmarschen had fallen out with the Danish king once more, and that this might actually be the objective of the troops presently gathered in Denmark. Some said that the troops by the Elbe served the Elector Palatine and the Duke of Lorraine and would be deployed for an attack on Denmark and Sweden. This would explain the Danish military preparations, the king argued. He also knew that Holstein and Denmark were holding secret negotiations at the Burgundian court, 'from which nothing good could come for us'. Because of all these ominous developments, Stenbock was to send additional agents to the German coast and to the Elbe, to enquire *in situ* to whom these troops belonged, their intentions, the possible objective, and what Danish intrigue was brewing.[63] In October, Gustav Vasa continued to scold Svan for providing outdated intelligence reports. He must send trusted agents into Holstein and down to the Elbe in order to obtain fresh intelligence concerning the troops there, the intentions of the Elector and the Duke of Lorraine, and the Danish overtures at the Burgundian court. Henceforth,

60 GIR 1544, 538.

61 GIR 1544, 659–61.

62 Beneke 1887, 358–60; Potter, 1996, 47–49, 55; Hamre 1998, 469. Pennynck served on Christian II's campaign to Sweden in 1520 and to Norway in 1532, under Frederick I, under Christian III during the Count's Feud, and under the French king Francis I in 1543. He then entered the service of Henry VIII of England in January 1546.

63 GIR 1544, 659–61, 669–74.

he must also send messengers directly to the king, irrespective of the costs.[64]

In modern times, political decision-makers have increasingly delegated the management of intelligence to others. Sims emphasises, however, that if the distance between decision-makers and those who gather intelligence becomes too great, they run the risk of lost advantages.[65] In the examples discussed here, Gustav Vasa himself was greatly involved in the intelligence organisation, which must arguably have produced a rapid processing of all intelligence attained.

German Intrigue Continues to Stir

In 1545, intelligence suggested continuous anti-Swedish intrigue forming in Germany. On 1 April, Gustav Vasa instructed Stenbock to send agents to Bremen, Hamburg, and elsewhere in Germany, to find out more and especially to be vigilant of any troop concentrations.[66] A few weeks later, the king relayed fresh intelligence to his commanders that there was presently a large number of troops concentrated at de Langestraat and by the Rhine. The intelligence once again claimed that the Elector Palatine, the Duke of Mecklenburg, and some of the German Hansa cities were in consort with exiled Småland rebels and intended to deploy these troops against Sweden. The Swedish commanders consequently received instructions to make military preparations.[67]

During the summer, the king repeatedly received intelligence that Duke Albrecht was gathering troops in Mecklenburg, and that he intended to persuade Rostock and other port cities to ferry them over to Sweden. The insolent diplomatic notes recently received from Rostock and Wismar indicated that they would oblige the duke. Indeed, there were also Danish fears that these troops might be intended for an invasion of the Danish isles. Gustav Vasa, however, concluded that the Swedes must take precautions irrespective of this and emphasised the short sailing distance from Rostock to Kalmar. If the duke managed

64 GIR 1544, 669–74.
65 Sims 2022, 12.
66 GIR 1545, 215–19.
67 GIR 1545, 243, 245–46, 247–48, 249; Schmidt 1929, 56. Similar rumours of the Elector's plans for an attack on Denmark and Sweden were rife in Braunschweig in the early summer of 1545.

to get even one or two *Fähnlein* ashore along with the exiled Swedish rebels, this could create a dangerous situation.[68] In early June, the king pondered whether the duke could expect aid from a Dutch fleet that had just arrived in the Baltic or whether the Hansa cities would provide him with ships, provisions, and artillery. He even instructed Sten Eriksson (Leijonhufvud) and Jacob Bagge that Swedish warships should be deployed to patrol the southern coast and to intercept and destroy any troop-carrying ships.[69] In order to preclude an attack from Mecklenburg, Leijonhufvud went so far as to suggest to the king that Swedish forces should attack the duchy, seize the island of Poel and the harbour and fortress of Gollwitz, and further fortify them. This time, however, the king claimed to have insufficient intelligence for such an operation, concluding that it would probably be impossible to supply and defend this location, even if seized.[70] It was simply more expedient to continue to collect intelligence in order to obtain decision advantage than to carry out a risky pre-emptive strike.

In mid-June, the king received further intelligence that, when Duke Albrecht failed to obtain sufficient shipping in the German port cities, he intended to feign the disbandment of the troops, while secretly marching them to Frisia. His real intention was to find shipping and to embark the troops there instead. Soon, the Swedish king was informed that the troops had indeed left for the Netherlands. Several Swedish agents were hurriedly dispatched to Frisia to enquire about the location and intentions of these troops, and to find out whether they would receive Frisian support.[71]

Gustav Vasa instructed Leijonhufvud and Somme at Kalmar to send a small ship to Lübeck on the pretext of trade, but with the purpose of spying. These false merchants were also instructed to collect messages from the Swedish agents Berend von Lüneburg, Mattheus Norman in Stralsund, and Hans Krafft in Lübeck and quickly bring them back to Kalmar.[72] These agents soon provided upsetting news of a treaty between Christian III and the Duke of Mecklenburg. The Swedish king grew increasingly suspicious when Christian refused to

68 GIR 1545, 276–80, 313–16. See also Sellmer 1996, 444–46.
69 GIR 1545, 330–36, 357–58.
70 GIR 1545, 391–92.
71 GIR 1545, 377–80, 395–97.
72 GIR 1545, 381–83, 384, 400–401.

disclose the articles of this agreement but insisted that Gustav Vasa should salary the foreign troops, which Christian kept concentrated in Holstein for 'the common cause'. Gustav Vasa flatly dismissed this request.[73] In late August, the king was also informed of a heavy new tax imposed by Christian to provide for the great number of foreign troops. The bailiff Marbo was instructed to quickly dispatch agents to Denmark to obtain intelligence about the real Danish intentions.[74] On receipt of intelligence from Marbo, in September the king admonished the bailiff to send out his agents once more to find out about the Danish instructions given to the foreign troops, about yet another troop concentration south of the Elbe, and about Duke Albrecht's rumoured secret meeting with a German military entrepreneur.[75] Gustav Vasa informed Somme of a rumour that Duke Albrecht was among the troops concentrated south of the Elbe. These troops were rumoured to belong to Elector Fredrick and the Duke of Lorraine, and their objective was apparently Holstein. The king asked Somme to either enquire among German merchants or deploy his own agents to clarify the situation.[76]

In parallel, there was another rumour circulating, that the Danish king intended to land in Scania with an army, purportedly for an attack on Sweden. He suddenly cancelled his plans, however, and returned to Jutland, where he soon after enlisted all troops that he could find.[77] This was partly confirmed when Gustav Vasa was informed by Christian himself that the troops by the Elbe planned to invade Holstein and Denmark. In a letter to one of his commanders, the Swedish king then smugly remarked, 'in such situations, the Danish king sends many sweet words to us, but we know of his true intentions'.[78] Gustav Vasa did, however, realise that this might also be a threat to Sweden. While he may not have intended to aid Christian, he instructed all his commanders to quickly mobilise a great number of soldiers, and to prepare for the defence of the realm.[79]

73 GIR 1545, 406–14.
74 GIR 1545, 482.
75 GIR 1545, 493–94.
76 GIR 1545, 495–96, 498–500.
77 GIR 1545, 495–96.
78 GIR 1545, 498–500
79 GIR 1545, 498–500, 502–3, 505–6.

In August 1545, the king dispatched the Swedish nobleman Nils Boye to obtain information in Bremen. In October, Boye and the Danish king both reported to Gustav Vasa of a great number of cavalry and infantry presently gathered in the territory of Bremen, under the command of the Elector Palatine and the Duke of Lorraine, intent on attacking Sweden and Denmark.[80] On receipt of this intelligence, Gustav Vasa instructed the governor, Anckar, to enlist more troops. The king informed him of the two separate concentrations of troops by the Elbe and at Bremen, and of a report of a third concentration by the Rhine. He concluded that 'the whole of Europe seems to be in arms' and Sweden must prepare for war.[81]

In December, intelligence reports finally confirmed that Duke Henrick of Braunschweig had contracted the troops at Elbe and Bremen. He remained a staunch Catholic and, with imperial support, he planned to retake his Duchy of Wolfenbüttel lost, in 1542. This brought a momentary relief to the Swedish king, who nevertheless insisted on keeping his own troops ready. He complained that because of this intelligence many of his commanders were discharging their troops, despite his admonishments to the contrary. He feared that as soon as their troubles with Braunschweig and the emperor were concluded, the Protestant princes would try their luck on Sweden and, surely, the Danish king would assist them.[82] On 21 December, the king informed Somme of new intelligence, provided by his German agent Andreas von Nyhusen, that Duke Henrick had been betrayed and defeated by the Landgrave Philip of Hesse. The landgrave had enlisted the troops formerly in Henrick's service and intended to wage war against those who had aided the duke against him. According to intelligence, the Danes had spread a false rumour that the Swedish king had kept and paid some of the troops in Duke Henrick's service, which would now make Sweden a target. Gustav Vasa concluded that such rumours clearly implied that the Protestant princes were looking for a formal cause to attack Sweden. Due to these developments, the Swedes must continue to enlist troops.[83]

80 GIR 1545, 485, 531–33, 544–45.
81 GIR 1545, 535.
82 GIR 1545, 550–52, 562–65.
83 GIR 1545, 587–88.

The Schmalkaldic War and the Count of Buren

In 1546–1547, the Schmalkaldic War between the emperor and the Protestant princes shaped events in Northern Europe. At the outbreak of hostilities in June 1546, Gustav Vasa was informed by Duke Philip of Pomerania, who in turn forwarded copies of letters from the Elector of Saxony, that a great conflict had begun between the emperor and the Protestant cities. For many years, disgruntled former Swedish servants, such as Berend von Mehlen, now in the Protestant camp, had successfully kept the Swedish king out of the Schmalkaldic League. When the king informed Stenbock of the war, with a degree of *Schadenfreude* he smugly remarked that 'only now in their desperate situation the league offers us to join them'. Gustav Vasa, however, still watched the unfolding events with great concern. Reports spoke of a large fleet presently being equipped in the Netherlands and manned by the troops recently discharged by the English and the French. According to rumours, its objective was the Baltic Sea. Because of these news, the king instructed Stenbock quickly to dispatch agents to Denmark and Germany, to obtain further intelligence.[84]

In the spring of 1547, intelligence reports indicated that a peace in Germany could be expected soon. This was not altogether positive for Sweden, however. In a letter to Stenbock in February, Gustav Vasa claimed to have been informed by his agents in Germany that as soon as the evangelicals made peace with the emperor they would turn on Sweden.[85] In early April, the king was told that most of the Protestant princes and cities in Germany had indeed yielded to the emperor, and probably also the Landgrave of Hesse. The Danes, having anticipated this outcome, sent a legation to the emperor. In a letter to Leijonhufvud and Stenbock, Gustav Vasa warned that this might spell trouble.[86] In mid-June, a report from the agent Joachim Burwitz confirmed the successful Danish legation to the emperor and told of Danish negotiations with the Elector Palatine and the Duke of Lorraine. Gustav Vasa pondered whether the Swedes should also send a legation to the emperor and give their excuses of past enmity in order not to be included as a mere object polity in subsequent peace treaties.[87]

84 GIR 1546–1547, 104–7.
85 GIR 1546–1547, 364–66.
86 GIR 1546–1547, 471–72.
87 GIR 1546–1547, 588–90.

In the summer and early autumn of 1547, the Swedish monarch continued to receive intelligence that the Danes were enlisting soldiers in Holstein and had simultaneously tried to prevent foreign troops from seeking Swedish service. Once more, the king feared a Danish attack and he admonished Stenbock to keep his agents busy to obtain further intelligence about the Danish enlistments.[88] In August, the gunner Michael von Erfurt, and an undisclosed agent in Denmark, also provided intelligence of a Lübeck plan to land with a few thousand troops in Småland and invade Sweden, while the Danish king intended to remain passive in spite of the treaty.[89]

On 12 September, with some relief, Gustav Vasa reported to Stenbock that one of his own agents in Denmark had reported that the Danes had in fact not yet contracted any troops. Stenbock must nevertheless keep his agents busy to find out more.[90] In spite of this knowledge, a week later, the king provided outdated intelligence to Somme at Kalmar, that the Danes were presently enlisting as many troops as they could find. The purpose, no doubt, was to persuade Somme to keep a good watch at Kalmar Castle. Somme was also reminded to constantly keep a number of trusted agents busy to obtain intelligence abroad. The king acknowledged that he daily expected the return of his agents Burwitz, Jöran Fincke, and Hans Gastemberger, who would bring fresh intelligence.[91] In the following days, he similarly informed Axel Eriksson (Bielke) and Knut Ribbing of extensive Danish attempts to enlist troops, and that a number had already been contracted. Because of Danish attempts to prevent foreign troops from entering Swedish service, he concluded that the Danish plans were surely directed against Sweden.[92] In spite of information to the contrary, the king seems to have been so convinced of an imminent attack that he chose to relate only the most troublesome and even outdated information to his commanders. It has been emphasised that Gustav Vasa at times displayed a

88 GIR 1546–1547, 640, 724–25.
89 GIR 1546–1547, 693–94. Michael von Erfurt sent several reports: GIR 1546–1547, 690, 698–99. For the unnamed agent in Denmark, see GIR 1546–1547, 695–97.
90 GIR 1546–1547, 729–30.
91 GIR 1546–1547, 738–40.
92 GIR 1546–1547, 740, 764.

behaviour close to paranoia.[93] The extensive intelligence correspondence sometimes shows a similar pattern. The suspiciousness was not entirely unwarranted, however.

In mid-October, the king's agent Olof Dyster returned from a long stay in Malmö and Copenhagen, where he had secretly obtained detailed intelligence of a plan for a concerted attack on Sweden. The king informed Leijonhufvud that the Elector Palatine had concentrated troops in the Netherlands under the command of Maximilian d'Egmont, Count of Buren (1500–1548), and intended to attack Västergötland and besiege Älvsborg. Another force enlisted by Lübeck would attack Småland, and its peasantry would join them. Gustav Vasa admitted that he could not positively confirm the truth in this report, but it fitted well into the established threat pattern. He urged Leijonhufvud to mobilise and concentrate troops in Southern Sweden, because with a good wind such a force might sail from the Netherlands to Älvsborg within four or five days.[94]

On the following day, the king sent a number of letters his royal councillors and commanders, informing them of the expected attack. Without certain proof, he claimed that the Danes had in fact entered a secret agreement with the Elector Palatine, and other German princes, who were gathering ships and troops in Holland under the Count of Buren. He also reminded his commanders of the severe military crisis in 1531, when no one paid heed to the rumours of Christian II's army in the Netherlands, which suddenly appeared in Norway. Consequently, all of his commanders were ordered to mobilise their Swedish forces, and the Finnish forces were required to join the army in Sweden.[95]

In his instruction to Stenbock, Gustav Vasa provided additional intelligence: that ten of von Buren's *Fähnlein* were already gathered at Bremen, three more would soon follow, and the enemy would surely attack in late autumn. Stenbock must therefore keep his spies busy in Denmark and Norway, to report of troop movements.[96] Von Buren was indeed one of the most renowned German military entrepreneurs of the century, having commanded 4000 imperial troops on Henry VIII's

93 Söderqvist 1898, 73, argues that suspiciousness was a trait common to the whole Vasa family.
94 GIR 1546–1547, 808–10.
95 GIR 1546–1547, 811–15.
96 GIR 1546–1547, 816–18.

campaign in France in 1544.[97] The Swedish king would certainly have had cause to worry if his enemies had realised this somewhat fantastic plan. However, despite the fact that it was seriously considered in Germany, as described in the intelligence reports, wars cost money and the plan was eventually discarded as unmanageable.

This was the general problem. Even though agents collected intelligence in earnest, it was usually hard to discern the status of the information. Nevertheless, so considerable was the impact of intelligence on the king's strategic thinking during the decade under scrutiny here, that in fear of invasion he did not hesitate to mobilise repeatedly the available forces in the realm—a very costly endeavour. For some years after 1547, the Schmalkaldic Wars in Germany lessened the imminent military threat to Sweden. New perils did, however, occur throughout the reign of Gustav Vasa, and his strategic decision-making would continue to rely heavily on intelligence efforts directed towards the European military market.

Conclusion

The reign of Gustav Vasa was characterised by a complicated pattern of anti-Swedish intrigue in Northern Europe. The production of intrigue was a common pastime at many European courts, however, and was not a major problem in itself. Real danger occurred when serious efforts were made to translate such plans into military action. Scrutiny of suspicious developments on the international military market could provide early warning of impending attacks. Fresh and reliable intelligence became increasingly vital to the accurate reading and interpretation of such developments. Troop concentrations abroad became a focal point in the king's feverish correspondence with agents abroad. This study has demonstrated how the Swedish intelligence networks operated, what intelligence the agents provided, and how that intelligence affected strategic policy-making. Numerous preserved instructions admonish officials to deploy ever more agents abroad. The study has provided the names of more than a dozen agents, but the identities of the majority remain unknown. The examples illustrate the cycle of intelligence operations, threat analysis, and decision-making. The critical goal with the enquiries into the military market was to attain

97 Looz-Corswarem 1959, 340–41; Potter 1996, 27, 48.

a crucial decision advantage in the perpetual inter-state competition. Furthermore, military intelligence also represented a commodity generally overlooked in earlier studies. Princes were prepared to pay handsomely for intelligence that enabled proactive rather than reactive strategic decision-making. This is yet another aspect of how the business of war generated a turnover in the early modern European economy.

The constant stream of ominous intelligence reports from abroad does, however, seem to have fuelled Gustav Vasa's paranoid mindset and created a confirmation bias where every development was interpreted as equally threatening. Even though Sweden was never invaded during this period, costly military preparations became the king's proactive default measure. His apparent inability to sift through and soberly assess the credibility of the intelligence or estimate the likeliness of an attack seems to have affected the strategic decision-making process negatively. Despite this, the reduction of relative uncertainty and the achievement of a decision advantage were clearly the main goals of the complex intelligence activity. And the unpredictable dynamic caused by private military entrepreneurs naturally made the military market the focal point of these efforts. This study has called attention to fascinating new facets of the military market, and of how it generated strategic uncertainty. It has further illustrated the struggle for control of the transnational fiscal-military structures and the entangled nature of private entrepreneurship, intelligence, and strategic security issues in 16th-century Europe.

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CHAPTER 6

The King's Scots

The Swedish Crown's Attempts to Utilise and Control William Cahun's Cavalry Squadron in the Northern Seven Years' War

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Abstract

William Cahun and his Scottish troop arrived at Swedish service in 1565. Cahun's unit has been seen in the previous research as a starting point of continuous presence of Scottish troops in the Swedish military apparatus, but only little has been written about Cahun's impact to Swedish-Scottish military network which developed through reigns of the early Vasa-kings. Not only was Cahun's unit crucial for forming of this network but also a springboard for multiple Scottish officers of this unit who went to make their careers elsewhere in the Swedish military, further widening the network. By focusing on William Cahun's troop, this chapter showcases how the relationship between the Swedish Crown and Cahun developed, sowing the seeds of the of Swedish-Scottish military network. The chapter discusses how the

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Swedish Crown tackled challenges related to recruiting, utilising and controlling Cahun's unit in the theatre of war and how the Swedish Crown learned lessons from their experiences with Cahun.

Introduction

Between 1563 and 1570, the Kingdom of Sweden waged its longest war since gaining independence from the Kalmar Union (1397–1523). This Northern Seven Years' War was fought against Denmark–Norway, whose king, Fredrik II, invaded Sweden cherishing a hope of restoring the Union.[1] In the context of fiscal-military history and the Swedish crown's attempts to use foreign professional soldiers and military entrepreneurs in the development of the country's military apparatus, the Northern Seven Years' War provides an important landmark. Sweden already had a well-established network by which to recruit German soldiers,[2] but by the end of the war, for the first time, it also possessed three complete Scottish cavalry squadrons: those of William Cahun, Sir Andrew Keith, and William Moncrieff served the Swedish Crown.[3] Indeed, in the course of the war, a military network formed and evolved between the Swedish crown and many Scottish officers and soldiers.[4] A small group of Scottish soldiers arrived on their own initiative in Sweden on the eve of the war—the first of a series which would retrospectively be called the Northern Wars.[5] They were formed into a troop of cavalry which steadily grew into a complete squadron by 1565. That year, William Cahun (aka Colquhoun) arrived in Sweden.[6] He was made the master of horse of this Scottish squadron, which would continue its service in Sweden until 1574, while some of

1 Andersson 1950, 208–12; Frost 2014, 37.

2 See Melander 1933; Skoog 2017; Skoog 2021; Skoog 2025.

3 A *fhane* or a squadron was officially 300 men strong, but in reality the size of these units varied considerably. See Hannula 1931, 219; Krigsarkivet (KrA), Militieräkningar, 1569/8, Anders Månssons och Mats Bengtssons räkenskaper rörande avloning för utlandska värvade ryttare, 1569–1573, Gammalt nummer 1569/74.

4 Dow 1965; Grosjean 2003; Schiavone and Björklund 2023.

5 Riksarkivet (RA), Räntekammarböcker, vol. 40 (6), 10–11. For the Northern Wars, see Frost 2014.

6 Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical Database (SSNE), https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne/, entry 6046: William Cahun.

its officers would remain in Swedish military service until the end of the century.[7]

In the Northern Seven Years' War, both Erik XIV and Johan III faced new challenges related to Scottish troops: how to evaluate their officers, how to use them in military operations, and how to supply and pay them in a war that lasted for years. This chapter discusses themes of transnational military migration and military entrepreneurship. By focusing on William Cahun's squadron, it showcases how the relationship between the Swedish crown and Cahun's squadron developed through the war, sowing the seeds of the evolving Swedish–Scottish military network. Moreover, it demonstrates the ways in which the Swedish crown attempted to utilise Cahun and his squadron. The chapter argues that, to be able to make best use of the Scottish officers and their troops in the theatre of war, as well as to resolve the typical problems caused by using foreign hired troops, the Vasa kings had to successfully build trust between themselves and their Scottish officers and to negotiate on a regular basis both with the Scots and with the Swedish peasants whom the kings had ordered to accommodate the Scots during the war. The chapter thus analyses: use of William Cahun's squadron in offensive warfare, especially in siege and skirmishing operations; use of Cahun himself as a military entrepreneur and network builder between Scottish recruits and the Swedish crown; and use of his expertise and that of his officers as leaders for the new Sottish recruits. It also acknowledges two main problems that the Swedish crown faced in using William Cahun's squadron: those caused by accommodating the squadron among the peasantry; and those caused by the crown's inability to pay the squadron its wages.

Both of these problems were connected to the broader political challenges and impact involved in the increased use of private foreign military suppliers. Indeed, the problems the Swedish crown faced in its attempts to utilise Cahun's squadron were common to all early modern militaries. How to manage paying foreign private soldiers and how to control them when payment was not possible were dilemmas no early modern European ruler could escape.[8] Likewise, the problems that the Swedish crown faced with William Cahun's squadron were not exclusive to Scottish troops alone. Indeed, *borgläger* (a system of upkeep

7 Grosjean 2003; Schiavone and Björklund 2023.

8 Glete 2002, 203; Querengässer 2021, 188, 191; Skoog 2021.

and quartering of soldiers among peasants), in particular, was a typical source of problems for the crown through the 16th century, no matter whether the quartered soldiers were natives or foreign soldiers such as Germans or Scots. From the beginning, the quartering system was highly unpopular among peasants. On top of this, soldiers' misconduct towards the peasants quartering them was far from uncommon, especially when the men had not received their pay, generating further tensions between the soldiers and the civilian population.[9] This chapter argues that the Swedish crown's success in these scenarios depended on its ability to negotiate with Cahun and build trust with the Scots. Lastly, the chapter shows that the crown needed to manage its thin monetary resources well if it wanted to utilise the Scots. Because the crown was seldom able to pay Cahun and his squadron their full wages, it needed to concentrate on paying the Scots when it mattered most for cultivating Cahun's trust and having his squadron available for military operations.

The chapter engages with historiographical discussions concerning early modern Scottish military entrepreneurship in and military migration to Sweden. More broadly, it addresses issues common in many early modern militaries that struggled with the use of private foreign troops. Scottish involvement in the Swedish military apparatus—as well as more widely in early modern Swedish society—is a theme that has garnered considerable attention from historians, starting with Thomas Fischer's seminal work *The Scots in Sweden* (1907).[10] Subsequent generations of historians have built on Fischer's work, broadening and diversifying the picture of the Scottish presence in early modern Sweden.[11] The works of Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch in particular have created important new input for the subject by delivering information about social, political, and military networks between Scotland and Sweden.[12] Much of the past research has naturally gravitated towards the 17th century, given the broader variety of existing sources in that century. Likewise, previous research can sometimes adopt a predominantly Scottish perspective, particularly for the period under consideration. The more recent research has attempted

9 Ylikangas 1977, 24–41; Katajala 2002, 180–82; Mäkinen 2002, 62–66.
10 Fischer 1907.
11 Berg and Lagercranz 1962; Dow 1965; Fallon 1972; Åberg 1990; Miller 2007.
12 Grosjean 2003; Murdoch and Grosjean 2014.

to widen the scope of this research theme by bringing in the perspective, motives, and agency of the Swedish crown towards its Scottish troops and officers.[13] My chapter further elaborates on this research. By focusing on the Northern Seven Years' War and on William Cahun's squadron of Scottish cavalry, it attempts to shed more light on this less-researched formative phase of the Swedish–Scottish military network.

The main sources are the letters of the Swedish crown from the Riksregistraturet's collection and the letters of William Cahun and his men from the Skrivelsert till konungen collection. Both of these are found in the Riksarkivet (Swedish National Archive). Muster rolls and payrolls from the Militieräkningar and Strödda militiehandlingar före 1631 collections are also housed in the Riksarkivet; especially important are items in the Krigsarkivet (Swedish Military Archives) subdivision. To complement these sources, the chapter draws on biographies from the Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern Europe database, written, edited, and updated by Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean, and maintained by the University of St Andrews, as well as biographies found in the *Svenskt biografiskt lexicon*.[14]

The Swedish Military Apparatus and Its Mercenaries, 1563–1570

Like the ruling dynasties in any contemporary European kingdom, each of the Swedish Vasa kings attempted to develop the military apparatus to meet the needs of changing early modern warfare. Trained provincial regiments had already been established in Gustav Vasa's reign and Erik XIV continued professionalisation of the native troops. Indeed, it was King Erik's desire to develop in Sweden a *Landsknecht*-style army capable of utilising professionally contemporary pike formations and fighting techniques, in imitation of continental practices.[15] Yet, the war against Denmark erupted in the third year of his reign and training of the vast army of 20,500 infantry and 5500 cavalry required time

13 Björklund and Schiavone 2021; Schiavone and Kortekangas 2022; Schiavone and Björklund 2023.

14 The SSNE is available online at https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne/. The *Svensk biografiskt lexicon* is available online at https://www.riksarkivet.se/sbl.

15 Hannula 1931, 195–96.

and resources the king could not afford.[16] Another problem faced by both the Swedish and Danish crowns was that the theatre of war in Scandinavia consisted mostly of rough, heavily wooded, and mountainous terrain, which was far from optimally suited for pitched battles where large pike formations and heavy cavalry could be deployed effectively. Only one true pitched battle was fought during the whole of the Northern Seven Years' War, in Axtorna in 1565, where the Swedish army was crushed by a Danish force. The majority of the land-based conflicts were either sieges or skirmishes between small forces of tens or hundreds of men raiding enemy territory.[17] After Johan III ascended the Swedish throne in 1568, he quickly abandoned Erik's military reforms. Pike formations, along with most of the army's armour, were abandoned and replaced by a heavy reliance on missile weapons. Sweden's military offensive capabilities thus relied heavily on mercenary troops.[18]

The term 'mercenary' is problematic in an early modern context, as recent research has demonstrated. At least on a surface level it can be argued that early modern mercenaries were typically considered to be lowborn men who fought for profit in the service of a warlord, without their own prince's blessing. However, Stephen Morillo has shown that throughout history many soldiers labelled as mercenaries by their employers have in reality been something else.[19] His findings apply also in the context of this study, as the Swedish crown seldom recognised distinctions between its foreign troops but rather treated them all as mercenaries. Yet, William Cahun and his squadron were not mercenaries. The majority of the Scottish units serving in the Swedish military apparatus in the second half of the 16th century were licensed by the Scottish government, and their leaders remained loyal to the Scottish crown, fighting under its blessing.[20]

In the eyes of the Swedish crown, mercenaries were regarded as unreliable but also necessary.[21] The most common problem connected to their service was that the crown had to tackle the obvious fact that

16 Mankell 1865, 6; Hannula 1931, 217–27; Frost 2014, 31–32.
17 Frost 2014, 30–32.
18 Hannula 1931, 228, 229.
19 Trim 2002, 81–85; Morillo 2008.
20 Murdoch and Grosjean 2014, 25–46; Linnarsson 2015; Sproule 2019, 45–64.
21 Linnarsson 2015.

they had to be paid. Mercenaries could become hard to manage and even refuse to fight if they were denied their wages for protracted periods. Typical ways for the employer to solve this problem were either to attempt to negotiate a debt with the military entrepreneur leading the mercenaries or to borrow money from merchants in order to pay them.[22] Like any early modern European state, Sweden could not afford to ignore the skills and services these hired soldiers carried with them. Indeed, mercenaries brought with them a professionalism in warfare, demonstrable military expertise of contemporary tactics, their own weapons, and a willingness to fight long campaigns beyond their homeland's borders. These aspects were vital for successful warfare and were not usually found among the native, conscripted troops in Sweden.[23] Thus, right from the beginning of the Northern Seven Years' War, King Erik started to broaden his recruitment networks and actively attempted to recruit soldiers from Scotland.[24]

Scotland's strong military culture, together with the tumultuous period of wars in the 16th century, had created a large pool of potential officers and soldiers to be recruited abroad.[25] For recruited soldiers and their officers, foreign service offered everything from a chance to start a new life to the opportunity to climb the social ladder in the land of their service. For the Stuart regime, allowing military entrepreneurs to recruit men from Scotland to fight for another European crown was a way to get rid of both excess soldiers and unwanted men. Still more importantly, the Scottish crown could (or at least attempted to) control who had access to this military resource, meaning that the Stuart kings could use licences to recruit soldiers from Scotland as a valuable diplomatic lever in European politics.[26]

In the Scottish military landscape of the 16th century, mounted troops were overwhelmingly lightly armoured troops on fast horses, capable of performing quick raids and ambushes. These troops were usually recruited from the Scottish Borders, where cavalry was used predominantly in skirmishes and raiding operations.[27] Notably, the

22 Redlich 1964, 68–69, 258–63; Björklund 2021.
23 Dow 1965; Roberts 1995, 14–16; Linnarsson 2015.
24 Grosjean 2003, 11–16.
25 Murdoch and Grosjean 2014, 27–40.
26 Carswell 2012, 37–41; Murdoch and Grosjean 2014, 45–46.
27 Phillips 2012, 180, 228–33; Murdoch and Grosjean 2014.

theatre of war in the Northern Seven Years' War was in this regard quite akin to the Scottish Borders, with the conflicts being skirmishes and raids rather than field battles. Scottish cavalry, which was already well regarded internationally, possessed expertise to operate effectively in such theatres of war, and was thus well suited to work as part of the Swedish military.[28] Indeed, although initially the Swedish crown had also attempted to recruit infantry from Scotland, as the war progressed it resorted to recruiting only cavalry.[29]

In previous research, William Cahun and his squadron have been seen as the starting point for the continuous presence of Scottish troops in Swedish service.[30] Yet, Scottish soldiers were no strangers to Sweden at the beginning of the Northern Seven Years' War. Small groups had already entered Swedish service on their own initiative, from at least the 1550s. Likewise, at least one Scottish cavalry squadron, commanded by the master of horse John Maxwell, operated in Livonia in Swedish service between 1563 and 1564.[31] Nevertheless, the presence of Scottish troops in Sweden before the Northern Seven Years' War tended to be sporadic and their time of service short. The Swedish crown had attempted to recruit troops from Scotland on a large scale twice before the start of the war: Gustav Vasa had tried to recruit a regiment of 2000 Scots in 1556, and Erik XIV had tried the same in 1563. Both attempts had failed due to insufficient networking between Sweden and Scotland and, especially in the latter case, Danish intervention.[32] The Scottish crown's policies towards recruitment to Sweden started to change during the course of the 1560s. At the beginning of the decade, the Stuarts let small groups and individuals enlist themselves into Swedish service. During the second half of the decade, the crown felt comfortable enough to let the Swedes execute a fully fledged recruitment operation in Scotland. The Scottish felt that they could

28 Black 2006, 77; Carswell 2012, 37–41.

29 KrA, Militieräkningar, 1569/8, Anders Månssons och Mats Bengtssons räkenskaper rörande avloning för utlandska värvade ryttare, 1569–1573, Gammalt nummer 1569/74; Grosjean 2003, 14–15; Frost 2014, 31.

30 Åberg 1990, 90.

31 Skoog 2021; SSNE, entry 2794: John Maxwell; RA, Strödda militiehandlingar före 1631 Del 1: Armén, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Rullor, Avlöningsrulla för skottar under Hans Maxels fana Odat, Odaterade, förband; Odaterade, övrigt.

32 Grosjean 2003, 14–15.

benefit from playing Sweden and Denmark against each other; Scotland was in an official alliance with Denmark, but the Scottish crown had no troubles unofficially letting its subjects serve in Sweden.[33]

In the Service of Erik XIV

The Scottish cavalry troop that was to become William Cahun's squadron entered Swedish service around August 1563. This troop, which did not have the status of a squadron but was instead called *skotzke rytterne* ('Scottish riders') in the payrolls, consisted of only 60 men and was commanded by Robert Crichton.[34] By June 1564, the strength of Crichton's troop had grown to 76, rising to 119 before the end of the year, and 154 in 1565.[35] This showcases how this unit was not the result of a full-scale Swedish recruitment operation from Scotland. Rather, in the first years of the Northern Seven Years' War, this unit comprised Scottish individuals and small groups of cavalrymen who dribbled, little by little, each in their own way, into Swedish service. Some must have come from Scotland, but it is probable that some had jumped from the Danish side or were forcibly recruited prisoners of war.[36]

William Cahun arrived in Sweden somewhere around August 1565. A payroll from 1566 states that from August 1565 to September 1566 he commanded between 119 and 143 cavalrymen.[37] Yet, it is unclear how many men Cahun brought with him. After his arrival, we can see from 1565 to 1568 payrolls, muster rolls, and correspondence between the Scottish cavalry unit and the Swedish crown that Cahun began to be named as the master of horse of the Scottish cavalry and the unit was referred to as William Cahun's *fhane*, giving it the status of a

33 Grosjean 2003, 15–16.

34 SSNE, entry 6048: Robert Crichton; RA, Räntekammarböcker, vol. 40 (6), 10–11.

35 RA, Räntekammarböcker, vol. 41 (5a) (1564), 10; RA, Strödda militiehandlingar före 1631, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Register över Kungl. Maj:ts krigsfolk i hela riket utdraget ur mönsterregistren vid mönstingarna åren 1565, Från Rött nr 162; KrA, Militiehandlingar, 1564/1, Register (koncept) över kronans krigsfolk (regementen, fanor och fänikor).

36 Both the Swedes and the Danes actively tried to recruit each other's foreign troops and forcibly recruited prisoners. See Rørdam 1884, 190; Tidander 1892, 196; Riis 1988, 87, 91–92.

37 KrA, Militieräkningar, 1566/1, Eskil Jönssons räkenskaper för de pengar som han för kronans krigsfolks avlöning uppburit och utbetalat.

squadron. Robert Crichton is listed as an officer in Cahun's squadron.[38] This suggests that Crichton's troop was merged with the troops that Cahun had brought with him and Cahun was made the commander of this newly formed and fast-growing squadron of Scottish cavalry. Crichton's troop had been part of field commander Charles de Mornay's force since at least March 1565, and it seems that, as Cahun took command of the squadron, it remained in this position.[39] In autumn 1565, the squadron took part in the siege of Varberg with de Mornay. On 15 September the Swedish forces stormed the walls and captured the fortress, killing all adult males inside, save 150 foreign troops in Danish service, including soldiers from France, Germany, and Scotland. These troops were forcibly taken into Swedish service and the Scots from the fortress were enlisted into Cahun's squadron. A payroll from 1566 lists 63 'Scottish prisoners' to whom the crown paid salary as part of Cahun's squadron, indicating that these men were forcibly recruited. After conquering Varberg, the Scottish squadron, along with other Swedish forces, successfully defended the fortress against Danish attempts to recapture it.[40] After this, Cahun's squadron took part with de Mornay's forces in the battle of Axtorna on 20 October.

In February 1566, the king sent Charles de Mornay's force, including Cahun's squadron, to lay siege to Bohus.[41] Before this, King Erik gave his troops a month's pay.[42] (Troops on active duty in the Swedish military were supposed to be paid monthly. However, this was seldom possible as the royal treasury was chronically stretched.[43]) Yet, Charles

38 KrA, Militieräkningar, 1566/1, Eskil Jönssons räkenskaper för de pengar som han för kronans krigsfolks avlöning uppburit och utbetalat; RA, Skrivelser till konungen, William Cahun's squadron to Erik XIV, 24 May 1566; KrA, Militieräkningar, 1569/10, Lönelängd över William Kohuns fana, Gammalt nummer 1569/75.

39 RA, Riksregistraturet, Erik XIV to Charles de Mornay, 15 March 1565, and Erik XIV to infantry and cavalry serving under Charles de Mornay, 15 March 1565; Tidander 1892, 184.

40 *Svenskt biografiskt lexikon*, entry for Charles de Mornay; Hannula 1931, 222–25; KrA, Militieräkningar, 1566/1, Eskil Jönssons räkenskaper för de pengar, som han för kronans krigsfolks avlöning uppburit och utbetalat.

41 *Svenskt biografiskt lexikon*, entry for Nils Boije; RA, Riksregistraturet, Erik XIV to Charles de Mornay, 19 and 24 March 1566, and 9 and 20 April 1566.

42 RA, Riksregistraturet, Erik XIV to troops serving Charles de Mornay, 16 February 1566.

43 Juvelius 1927, 132–34.

de Mornay was not able to conquer Bohus fortress and in the spring the campaign came to an unsuccessful end.[44] By late April, de Mornay had returned to Småland, together with his army.[45] At the time, the crown's relationship with William Cahun and his squadron had started to become strained. For the previous three months, Cahun's squadron had served under de Mornay without pay. On 24 May, Cahun's men wrote to King Erik lamenting that they lacked pay, horses, and clothing.[46] From this point onwards, the crown continued to have serious problems in paying Cahun's squadron.

An important factor that weakened the Swedish crown's capacity to pay its foreign troops was Erik's decision to recruit still more Scottish cavalry. The Swedish military was still in need of men. Attempts to recruit large numbers of soldiers from Scotland had failed in 1563 because of the lack of diplomatic ties, and later that year Sweden had lost its window to the west when its sole port to the Atlantic, Älvsborg, fell to the Danes. Now, with the conquest of the coastal fort of Varberg, that window was open again. At the same time, the Scottish government had become more willing to allow Scottish recruitment to Swedish service. Acknowledging the need to use foreign soldiers to bolster the Swedish ranks, King Erik quickly seized this opportunity.[47] In 1566, the crown contracted Pontus De la Gardie to handle the recruitment. Hundreds of new recruits arrived in Sweden and were put under William Cahun's command, signifying that Erik acknowledged the usability of Scottish cavalry in this theatre of war.[48] By the following year, the squadron numbered 360 men, and in 1569 it had grown to 554.[49] King Erik's decision to recruit even more men in a situation where he already had problems paying existing mercenaries was in no way uncommon in the early modern context. European princes habitually

44 *Svenskt biografiskt lexikon*, entry for Charles de Mornay.
45 *Historiska Handlingar* 1870, 64.
46 RA, Skrivelser till konungen, William Cahun's squadron to Erik XIV, 24 May 1566.
47 Andersson 1935, 113, 114, 123, 124, 134; Grosjean 2003, 13–16.
48 Ödberg 1897, 3.
49 RA, Strödda militiehandlingar före 1631, Pontus De la Gardies, Hans Kyles, Måns Erikssons, Nils Larssons och Henrik Matsons räkenskap för krigsfolkets avlöning (2 ex.), (fuktskadade) 1569, Från Mil 4.

recruited more men in wartime than they could afford, in hopes that they could pay them with the loot that came with victorious battles.[50]

In the summer of 1566, Cahun's squadron took part in skirmishing operations against Daniel Rantzaus's army, which was at the time plundering Västergötland. De Mornay did not confront Rantzau in a field battle but rather, as was the typical Swedish response to Danish offensives in this war, attacked Danish marching columns, camps, and baggage trains.[51] The use of Cahun's men in such raiding missions proved to be the optimal employment of the Scottish cavalry, who were accustomed to this kind of warfare.[52] The campaign ended for Cahun on 29 September, when de Mornay was captured by the Danes. On 1 October, King Erik wrote to de Mornay's men informing them of Mornay's capture, as well as promising to pay them two months' salary.[53]

At the beginning of 1567, Cahun's squadron was quartered in Västerås, where they stole food and horses from peasants.[54] At the same time, another problem arose to strain the relationship between King Erik and Cahun. Sometime in 1566, possibly jointly with Pontus De la Gardie's recruitment operation, Erik had attempted to utilise Cahun to help him find a Scottish military entrepreneur who could recruit more Scots to Sweden. As Cahun was an officer who had brought troops with him from Scotland, Erik seemingly hoped that Cahun would have a sufficient network to find more men like himself to serve the Swedish cause. This operation, however, was not a success, as the person Cahun had identified for the task failed to complete the recruitment. It ended up costing both Cahun and Erik XIV a notable sum of money, which, together with Erik's inability to pay Cahun's existing troops, further strained the relationship between the crown and the Scots.[55]

In February 1567, Cahun's squadron was put under Colonel Johan Siggesson's command in Norway, where Swedish forces attempted an offensive in the late winter and spring. In a letter to Siggesson, Erik

50 Carswell 2012, 238.

51 *Svenskt biografiskt lexikon*, entry for Charles de Mornay; Juvelius 1927, 220, 221.

52 Phillips 2012, 230, 231.

53 RA, Riksregistraturet, Erik XIV to cavalry and infantry under command of Charles de Mornay, 1 October 1566.

54 RA, Riksregistraturet, Erik XIV to Johan Siggesson, 4 February 1567.

55 RA, Skrilvelser till konungen, William Cahun and Thomas Buchan to Erik XIV, February 1567; SSNE, entry 6064: William Cahun.

stated that, if the Scots proved to be untrustworthy, they should be ordered back to Sweden.[56] Siggesson reached Oslo and laid siege to the fortress of Akershus in February. However, he was not able to breach the walls of the fortress and he was forced to abandon the siege at the end of May.[57] Well before this, on 6 April, King Erik had called Cahun and his men back from Norway to be quartered in Närke.[58] It seems that this decision was at the king's own initiative. As the siege of Akershus was dragging on and had not achieved the desired conclusion, Erik decided to remove the Scots—whom he did not, in any case, trust—from the disastrous theatre of war.

In Närke, problems with *borgläger* continued. In August, the local population complained about the Scots to the king, who then started an investigation about misdeeds the squadron had been accused of. Bailiff Peder Gadde was sent to Östergötland to lead the investigation; in the end nothing came of it, and the investigation seems to have concluded before November.[59] The reason for this seems to be that the Danes were plundering Östergötland between October 1567 and February 1568, altering the priorities of the crown when considering what to do about the problems that the Scots had caused for the peasantry.[60] Erik sent Cahun's squadron to harass the Danes, along with other detachments of his forces.[61] This deployment made it clear that the king would rather utilise Cahun's squadron militarily than further antagonise the Scots and potentially risk a scenario in which Cahun refused to fight. The change in King Erik's attitude towards Cahun's squadron was made clear when, on 13 January 1568, peasants in Vånga complained that the Scots had stolen food from them.[62] Unlike the response of the previous August, this time the peasants' complaints garnered no action against Cahun's squadron.

On 6 November 1567, the Danes managed to capture William Cahun. He remained their prisoner until 5 February 1568, when a Swedish force attacked the Danish supply train where he was held. Under cover of the resulting chaos, he was able to escape back to the

56 RA, Riksregistraturet, Erik XIV to Johan Siggesson, 4 February 1567.
57 Helland *et al.* 1917, 343.
58 RA, Riksregistraturet, Erik XIV to William Cahun, 6 April 1567.
59 RA, Riksregistraturet, Erik XIV to Peder Gadde, 12 August 1567.
60 Tidander 1886.
61 Tidander 1886, 11.
62 Rørdam 1884, 245.

Swedes. Remarkably, instead of killing him, the Danes had held Cahun prisoner for almost three months.[63] As a foreign military expert who had fought on the enemy's side, he represented a potentially valuable asset, whom the Danes probably attempted to recruit for themselves.[64] It remains a matter of speculation if Cahun remained totally loyal to Sweden during his captivity, but it is notable that in the end he returned to the Swedes and was put back in command of his Scottish squadron.

An important development in the relationship between the Swedish crown and Cahun's squadron took place in the spring of 1568, when Erik XIV promoted Robert Crichton to the rank of master of horse. As Cahun's squadron had by now grown from a small troop to an oversized unit that far outnumbered the official standard of a 300-strong cavalry squadron, it made sense to divide the squadron into two more logistically and tactically feasible units. We know that Crichton's troop was never made into a complete squadron as it was never called *fhane*.[65] It seems that he and his men remained subordinate to William Cahun's command in some way. This is confirmed by the fact that, in addition to leading his own troop, Crichton retained an officer's position in Cahun's squadron.[66]

On 26 July, Cahun's squadron was placed under the command of Åke Bengtsson Färla and transferred to Vadstena Castle.[67] Soon afterwards, dukes Johan and Karl started a rebellion against their brother Erik XIV, in which Cahun and his squadron quickly participated. As Färla was one of the few nobles loyal to King Erik until the very end, it seems that Cahun made the decision to side with the dukes on his own account, rather than following his superior. The reason behind the decision appears to be that the crown had, yet again, been unable to pay Cahun and his men their salary for a period of at least three months.[68] By 1568, as the Vasa siblings feuded, two more squadrons

63 Tidander 1886, 11; Vaupell 1891, 158–59.

64 Rørdam 1884, 190.

65 KrA, Militieräkningar, 1569/8, Anders Månssons och Mats Bengtssons räkenskaper rörande avloning för utlandska värvade ryttare, 1569–1573, Gammalt nummer 1569/74.

66 KrA, Militieräkningar, 1569/10, Lönelängd över William Kohuns fana, Gammalt nummer 1569/75.

67 RA, Riksregistraturet, Erik XIV to the Scottish cavalry, 26 July 1568.

68 *Svenskt biografiskt lexikon*, entry for Åke Bengtsson Färla; Rørdam 1884, 173; Ödberg 1897, 3; Petrini 1942, 145.

and two smaller troops of Scottish cavalry had joined Cahun in Swedish service.[69] The fast-growing number of mercenaries in Swedish service made it ever more difficult for the crown to pay its troops either in time or at all. King Erik's decision not to prioritise the Scottish squadrons' salaries made it far easier for the Scots to pick their side in the rebellion.

In the Service of Johan III

Duke Johan, afterwards Johan III of Sweden, apparently understood William Cahun's motivation to side with him in the rebellion. The new king immediately prioritised paying Cahun's squadron, going as far as taking out a loan from the merchant Willem van Wijk to be able to do so. Right after the rebellion Cahun's squadron became the highest-paid cavalry unit in the whole Swedish army.[70] Yet, even if Johan III prioritised paying his Scots, he did not escape problems caused by the poor finances of the crown. Payments of the Scots' salaries again dragged. For the rest of 1568, Scottish troops were not used on the battlefield. It was understood that the Scots would have refused to fight because they had not been paid. King Johan, whose grasp of the throne was flimsy in the period immediately after the rebellion, did not wish to antagonise the army and was careful in the way he treated with his armed forces. Eventually, the crown managed to pay its Scottish troops in December 1568, when the troops were compensated for eight months' pay.[71]

In the coming months, King Johan made stronger attempts to pay Cahun in time. In January 1569, he ordered musters and payments to Cahun's and Sir Andrew Keith's squadrons.[72] In February, the crown paid all its foreign troops. In a letter to the bailiff Eric Andersson, the

69 KrA, Militieräkningar, 1569/8, Anders Månssons och Mats Bengtssons räkenskaper rörande avloning för utlandska värvade ryttare, 1569–1573, Gammalt nummer 1569/74.

70. SSNE, entry 6046: William Cahun.

71 SSNE, entry 6064: William Cahun; Rørdam 1884, 173; Hannula 1931, 228.

72 RA, Riksregistraturet, Johan III to Måns Ericson, 12 January 1569. Sir Andrew Keith's cavalry squadron, which entered the Swedish service in 1568, was the second complete Scottish squadron that served in Sweden in the Northern Seven Years' War. Keith was a military entrepreneur like Cahun, having brought his own squadron with him to Sweden. See SSNE, entry 1534: Andrew Keith.

king remarked that he had already paid some of Cahun's squadron's salaries to William's brother Hugh Cahun.[73] The incident highlights active communication between the crown and the Scottish squadron and that in 1569 King Johan was ready to negotiate about payments with Cahun. It was clearly his intention to keep the relationship with the Scottish squadron from souring.

In March, both Cahun's and Keith's squadrons were ordered to move to Småland to quarters.[74] They clashed with the local population and the peasants complained to the crown about violence that the Scots had done to them. In response, King Johan sent his servants to keep the Scots in check.[75] Yet, the king also seems to have made attempts to negotiate with both the Scots and the peasants. As apparent in a letter to the bailiff Anders Göstasson on 30 March, the king explained that he needed to keep the Scots in service, at least until peace with Denmark was settled.[76] As a way to appease the peasants, he sent Keith's squadron to be quartered into a different location.[77] Regardless, in June tensions between the Smålanders and William Cahun's troops grew when peasants attacked some of the Scots. Johan again sent his servant to deal with the problem.[78] In the same month, just three weeks before his coronation, he wrote to Cahun's Scots in Småland to prepare to defend the region in case of a Danish surprise assault. The king promised the Scots that their salary would be paid as soon as possible. In the same letter, he acknowledged that the crown again owed Cahun's squadron money and promised to pay them what was owed.[79] In September, Johan ordered a muster of his whole army. In this muster Scottish troops were both paid and resupplied.[80] It was probably after this muster that King Johan decided to promote another of Cahun's officers: Second Lieutenant William Moncrieff became the commander of a new Scottish cavalry unit, this time a complete squadron. By this point both Cahun's and Keith's squadrons numbered over

73 RA, Riksregistraturet, Johan III to Eric Andersson, 5 February 1569.
74 RA, Riksregistraturet, Johan III to Nils Pehrsson, 12 March 1569.
75 RA, Riksregistraturet, Johan III to Nils Persson, 20 July 1569.
76 RA, Riksregistraturet, Johan III to Anders Göstasson, 30 March 1569.
77 RA, Riksregistraturet, Johan III to his subjects in Östergötland, 6 May 1569.
78 RA, Riksregistraturet, Johan III to Johan Siggesson, 5 June 1569.
79 RA, Riksregistraturet, Johan III to his German and Scottish cavalry, 18 June 1569.
80 RA, Riksregistraturet, Johan III to Pontus De la Gardie, 19 September 1569.

500 men, so it is probable that Captain Moncrieff's new squadron was formed from men taken from both of these bloated squadrons.[81]

Early in 1569, King Johan attempted to pay Cahun on a monthly basis as promised, but sometime after February the realities of the poor crown finances made this impossible. Cahun's squadron was kept in quarters, which again caused problems between the Scots and the local peasants. Once more, King Johan tried to mediate between the two parties, while attempting to limit aggression between the parties and especially against the crown. Like Erik XIV before him, Johan III now prioritised paying Cahun on the eve of military campaigns. But, unlike his brother, by 1569 Johan had demonstrated that he was both willing and able to pay Cahun what was owed and so had managed to garner a measure of trust from the Scots.

At the beginning of March 1570, Cahun's squadron was placed under the overall command of Eric Stenbåck, commander of all Swedish land forces. Under Stenbåck, the squadron was mustered in April and then sent to take part in an offensive against Norway.[82] In the same month, King Johan had heard rumours that some of the Scots were planning to rebel and change sides, because of their unpaid salary. The king wrote both to Johan Bielke and to Eric Stenbåck about this and sent Knut Posse to detain the rebellious Scots implicated in the plot.[83] Johan did not blame or antagonise Cahun or any of his other Scottish officers about this affair but rather attempted to find out who the rebellious Scots were and what they were up to. The relationship between Cahun and the crown remained strained because of the unpaid salaries, but Johan, unlike Erik, seemed to still trust his Scottish officers. Indeed, in November, Johan wrote to Cahun and asked him to keep Scottish as well as other foreign troops in Småland in order, so that the

81 KrA, Militieräkningar, 1569/8, Anders Månssons och Mats Bengtssons räkenskaper rörande avloning för utlandska värvade ryttare. 1569–1573, Gammalt nummer 1569/74; RA, Strödda militiehandlingar före 1631, Pontus De la Gardies, Hans Kyles, Måns Erikssons, Nils Larssons och Henrik Matsons räkenskap för krigsfolkets avlöning (2 ex.), (fuktskadade) 1569, Från Mil 4.

82 *Svenskt biografiskt lexikon*, entry for Eric Stenbåk; Riksarkivat, Riksregistraturet, Johan III to William Cahun, 2 March 1570, and Johan III to Eric Stenbåck 3, 12, 26, and 28 February and 6 April 1570; KrA, Militieräkningar,1569/10 Lönelängd över William Kohuns fana, Gammalt nummer 1569/75.

83 RA, Riksregistraturet, Johan III to Johan Bielke, 5 April 1570.

local peasants would not be overburdened by the *borgläger* duty.[84] The king also sought to avoid antagonising the whole Scottish squadron, by attempting to keep paying them and rewarding them when he felt that such was earned. On 1 July, he king wrote to his servant Jöns Månsson and ordered Månsson to pay the Scottish troops who had been successful in capturing and holding Gullberg hill in Västegötland in a skirmish against the Danes.[85]

In December, after the Peace of Stettin, King Johan finally felt able to discharge his foreign troops. He ordered them to be paid in full and then sent home. He nevertheless offered to keep those officers in service who wished to stay in the kingdom, showing that, unlike the troops themselves, he did not see the officers as a burden but rather acknowledged their value to the Swedish military apparatus.[86] Johan changed his decision, however, in 1570, with the outbreak of the Russo-Swedish Twenty-Five Years' War, and he all kept these foreign squadrons in service. Captain William Cahun, together with his squadron, remained in Swedish service until at least 1574, when his name finally vanishes from Swedish records.[87]

Conclusion

William Cahun's squadron was the longest-serving Scottish unit in the Swedish military during the Northern Seven Years' War and it played a fundamental part in the forming of the Swedish–Scottish military network. By the end of the war, his squadron had grown to over five times its original size and was accompanied by three other Scottish cavalry units, two of which had found their leaders from the ranks of Cahun's officers.

Erik XIV and Johan III had roughly three and half years and two and half years, respectively, to utilise Cahun's squadron in the war. For a considerable part of that time, the Scots were kept in quarters due to lack of pay and fear of mutiny, but even so both kings managed to utilise the squadron in most of the major Swedish military operations of the war. These were predominantly small-scale skirmishes, usually in

84 RA, Riksregistraturet, Johan III to William Cahun, 8 November 1570.
85 RA, Riksregistraturet, Johan III to Jöns Månsson, 1 July 1570.
86 RA, Riksregistraturet, Johan III to Andrew Keith, 21 December 1570.
87 SSNE, entry 6064: William Cahun; Schiavone and Björklund 2023.

rough terrain that was not suitable for conventional field battle weapons. As Scottish cavalry, Cahun's squadron was accustomed to this kind of warfare and excelled in it. Both Erik and Johan acknowledged this, and for the rest of the war the Swedes recruited solely cavalry from Scotland. As the need for high-quality troops grew, both kings utilised Cahun in helping to bring new Scots to Sweden and both used the squadron as a serving place for the new Scottish recruits. As a Scottish master of horse who had already proven his ability to lead his men in the theatre of war, it was safer for the crown to place new recruits under William Cahun's command than to find new leading officers. When Cahun's squadron became too bloated, both Erik and Johan found leaders for the new units among Cahun's officers. King Erik also attempted to utilise Cahun's network when searching for new Scottish military entrepreneurs.

The main problems faced by the Swedish crown regarding Cahun's squadron were connected to the *borgläger* system and the crown's inability to pay the cavalry. After 1566, there were yearly complaints about Scottish misconduct towards peasants, or otherwise about problems and distrust between both parties. King Erik quickly grew mistrustful of the squadron's loyalty, withdrawing them from the Norwegian offensive when the campaign started to fail. King Johan, on the other hand, attempted to negotiate with both the peasants and the Scots in similar situations. Cahun quickly jumped to Johan's side in the Dukes' Rebellion and from the start this created a measure of trust and social dept between the two men. When solving problems caused by the Scots' behaviour in *borgläger*, Johan explained to the peasants why it was important that they accommodate the Scots, and at the same time wrote to Cahun, ordering him to keep his men in line. Indeed, even when the king was told that some of the Scots were harbouring thoughts of betrayal, he did not antagonise Cahun but rather started an investigation to resolve who the traitors were, rather than pursuing a blanket condemnation.

During the same period, the crown was never able to pay Cahun for more than a few months in a row. King Erik's military policy was to recruit more Scottish cavalry than he could comfortably pay. He attempted to pay Cahun at the beginning of campaigns, when it was most important that the Scots carried out their orders. But by 1568 the king had overreached himself with his recruitment operations. When the dukes rebelled, the unpaid Scots quickly changed sides. This again

highlights the importance of trust between the crown and the Scots. King Erik was distrustful towards Cahun and for his part Cahun certainly did not trust the king to pay him. King Johan, on the other hand, had to tread carefully with the army. Because of his status as a usurper, he dared not antagonise his troops, including Cahun to whom he was socially indebted for supporting the coup. Johan prioritised paying Cahun's squadron—even going so far as to take out a loan to be able to do so. When he was unable pay Cahun, he communicated his promise to pay the squadron what was owed them. For his part, Cahun gave Johan his trust and remained loyal, even when the king was unable to pay him or his squadron.

This study's findings of the problems involved in the use of foreign private soldiers are in line with the broader research on the political significance of private military supply solutions. The use of foreign professional soldiers in early modern Europe always came with a risk for domestic political tensions. This chapter has suggested that the personal relationship between the Swedish crown and its Scottish commanding officers played a major role in how severely these problems manifested themselves. Depending on how well the crown was able to negotiate with the Scots and build trust between them and itself, it was able to resolve and sometimes completely dodge typical problems connected to the use of foreign troops. These troops could become a liability when left unpaid, as demonstrated with the Scots siding with the dukes against Erik XIV over unpaid wages. Likewise, use of foreign troops caused considerable tensions with the civilian population, as almost constant conflict between the Scots and Swedish peasants in the context of *borgläger* demonstrates. Johan III was conscious of the threats posed by private suppliers and thus took strong means to ensure they were paid—if not on time, then at least continuously enough to keep the Scots from causing problems, to integrate trusted officers into Swedish society, and to build trust between them and himself.

By the end of the Northern Seven Years' War, King Johan had learned how to effectively utilise Scottish cavalry in the Swedish military apparatus. The use of private military suppliers and foreign troops was a necessity and thus the crown had to find a way to control its foreign troops and to know their abilities and worth, so as to optimally utilise them in warfare. Both Erik XIV and Johan III quickly acknowledged the value of Scottish cavalry in the course of the Northern Seven Years' War and opted for recruiting solely cavalry from Scotland for

the rest of the war. The Scots' specialised knowledge of calvary raids and skirmishes and their ability to operate in wooded and mountainous terrain made them well suited for the way in which the Swedes were waging this war. By 1570, Johan III was familiar with the employment of Scottish cavalry in skirmishing and raiding warfare, had tested how Cahun and his men could be negotiated with, and knew how to react to problems caused by the Scots in *borgläger*. Most importantly, he now had at his disposal a growing network of tried and tested Scottish officers and their units, which remained in Swedish service when the Russo-Swedish Twenty-Five Years' War began.

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CHAPTER 7

An Officer and a Businessman

Jacob De la Gardie as Military Entrepreneur during the Ingrian War, 1609–1617

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Abstract

This chapters follows the career of Count Jacob De la Gardie, commander in chief of the Swedish army fighting in Russia 1609–1617. It looks at the forms of military entrepreneurship practiced by De la Gardie, the extent of his credit lending practices, and the profit he made. In particular, this chapter traces the history of De la Gardie's lifeguard regiment, which the Swedish entrepreneur recruited, supplied, and financed in part with his own funds and in part with those of the crown. In his double position as colonel-proprietor of a regiment and commander of Swedish forces De la Gardie combined private and public roles. These roles were further blurred with the incorporation of other units—both privately owned and those belonging to the king—into De la Gardie's regiment, thereby raising complex and contentious questions over the ownership of these units and the loyalty of their men.

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Introduction

Military entrepreneurship played a crucial role in Swedish warfare and imperial expansion during the 16th and 17th centuries. It is well known that a significant portion—sometimes even the bulk—of the Swedish army consisted of foreign soldiers recruited from international markets by well-connected military contractors. Foreign soldiers were needed not only to augment Sweden's own meagre manpower reserves, but also to provide a core of motivated professionals with specialised expertise to carry out offensive operations outside the borders of the realm. No less important were the significant amounts of credit these contractors were willing to advance to the Swedish king to recruit, outfit, and provision the soldiers.[1]

Military entrepreneurs have traditionally been regarded as socially unembedded, self-interested private agents.[2] Swedish military entrepreneurship has been largely overlooked: in part because most Swedish officers served as commanders of domestic units, which were not their personal property, but also because Swedish historiography has treated military contracting as the domain of foreigners.[3] This chapter challenges these prevailing notions by looking at forms of military entrepreneurship practised by Count Jacob De la Gardie, a Swedish nobleman and the commander-in-chief of the Swedish army fighting in Russia during the Ingrian War (1609–1617).

De la Gardie's entrepreneurial practices have previously been studied by Erik Grill, while the recruiting processes have been discussed in *Sveriges Krig*, the Swedish general staff's history of the wars of Gustav II Adolf. Grill's study provides a good synthesis and starting point for this research but suffers from a degree of superfluity—jumping to the bottom line and post-war activities of De la Gardie, while omitting most of the details and sources that help explain how he got there. *Sveriges Krig* provides an excellent synthesis of the war but is focused on areas other than the entrepreneurial practices of De la Gardie and the army's other officers. My own study, 'Officers as Creditors during the Ingrian War', focuses more strongly on this particular aspect of the business of war, but from the perspective of the officer class

1 Skoog 2017.
2 Percy 2007, 64–69, 78–79; Morillo 2008; Linnarsson 2014.
3 For an important exception of a study focusing on Swedish military entrepreneurs, see Chapter 8 in this volume. See also Björklund 2025, 3.

collectively. The current chapter builds upon these three publications, and is further supported by extensive archival research of the army's own financial records, civil-military correspondence, and De la Gardie's personal accounts.[4]

De la Gardie's Lifeguard *Cornet*

In 1609, Sweden intervened in the Russian Time of Troubles (1598–1613) at the request of and as an ally to Tsar Vasili Shuiskii. The beleaguered tsar was in desperate need of Swedish help to defeat Polish–Lithuanian-backed rebel forces, and the Swedish king, Karl IX, agreed to provide an army of 5000 men in exchange for territorial concessions and the chance to fight a common enemy. Later, this alliance broke down and the Swedish army became an invading force in what is now known as the Ingrian War (1609–1617).[5]

To command the army, the Swedish king appointed twenty-five-year-old Jacob De la Gardie, son of the renowned French condottieri-cum-Swedish nobleman Pontus De la Gardie and King Johan III's illegitimate daughter Sofia Gyllenhielm. Highborn, well connected, talented, and ambitious, De la Gardie was a good candidate for command. Although he lacked experience, he had served in the retinue of the Dutch Stadtholder Maurice of Nassau and had acquired a reputation as a specialist in the most up-to-date Dutch art of war. Most importantly, he was young, not particularly wealthy, and had been raised at court, which promised to make him easily controlled and dependent on Karl IX.

De la Gardie's commission and instructions for the conduct of the campaign were officially issued on 28 December 1608.[6] His official rank was lieutenant general to the regent, Duke Gustav Adolf, 'over all the people, both domestic and foreign, cavalry and infantry, who in Finland are'. However, during the first year of the war De la Gardie had already assumed the more prestigious title of Feldherr—a title that

4 Generalstaben 1936; Grill 1949; Björklund 2021.

5 Almquist 1907, 123–27, 134; Generalstaben 1936, 326.

6 Riksarkivet (RA), Riksregistratur, Commission for Jacob De la Gardie, 28 December 1608, and Instructions for Jacob De la Gardie, 28 December 1608.

stuck until the end of his life.[7] His salary would be 500 daler a month, to be covered in part through the enfeoffment of Pedersöre and Leppo parishes in Ostrobothnia.[8]

Besides overall command, De la Gardie's patent gave him command over the 'French cavalry regiment', as well as his personal lifeguard *cornet* of cavalry (a company-strength unit). The regiment was composed of four French, one English, and one Swedish *fana* (companies), thrown together for administrative and tactical purposes. The French units had been recruited and were the property of Colonel Regis de Vernet, and De la Gardie merely managed these in his absence. As it happened, Vernet would not regain control of these troops, as the colonel and his fresh recruits were diverted to Estonia instead.[9]

The regiment ceased to exist after a series of mutinies in 1610.[10] The lifeguard *cornet* proved longer lasting, serving for the duration of the war under the command of *ryttmästare* (captain) Lorenz Wagner, a Baltic German nobleman. Wagner had received a recruiting patent the previous summer, and these recruits formed the nucleus of the *cornet*.[11] The unit was heterogenous, consisting of domestic Swedish and Finnish recruits, as well as German-speaking Livonians. It included both independent enlisted cavalrymen and retainers outfitted by noblemen. Later, it came to include all manner of volunteers recruited within the war zone, including a sizeable contingent of Polish–Lithuanian cavalrymen.[12]

De la Gardie favoured his lifeguard, which grew steadily throughout the war (Figure 7.1). Additional men were incorporated by individual recruitment, and by the process of re-formation, whereby understrength units were merged and surplus officers either discharged or kept on partial pay. Besides its growing size, there was a trend for the number of horses owned by individuals to increase over time. This

7 Krigsarkivet (KrA), Militieräkningar 1609/5; RA, Riksarkivets ämnessamlingar, Militaria, Krigshistoriska samlingen, Ryska kriget 1609–1617, Strödda handlingar, Mikhail Shuiski to Jacob De la Gardie, 21 August 1609.

8 RA, Riksregistratur, Letter of enfeoffment for Jacob De la Gardie, 14 December 1608, and Order for Jacob De la Gardie, 30 December 1608; Grill 1949, 17.

9 Generalstaben 1936, 338; Björklund and Schiavone 2021.

10 KrA, Militieräkningar 1609/5; RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(3), Jöran Tomassons räkenskap för löner.

11 RA, Riksregistratur, Missive for Lorenz Wagner, 13 July 1608.

12 KrA, Militieräkningar 1609/5, 1610/1.




Figure 7.1: Size of Jacob De la Gardie's lifeguard *cornet*, 1609–1617 (excluding officers)
Sources: KrA, Militieräkningar 1609/5, 1610/1, 1613/1, 1614/8, 1614/18, 1617/2; Tartu University Library (TUL), Cordt Collection, F6 Cordt 3B, 135–38, Jacob De la Gardie to Karl IX, 9 December 1610; RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(3).

would suggest that furnishing horses was a good investment, and a place to deposit a portion of accumulated wealth.[13]

De la Gardie was permitted to outfit 24 cavalrymen for his *cornet*.[14] Additionally, he had a small retinue of some 15–28 arquebusiers to act as his bodyguard, messengers, and assistants, plus a small personal staff. The size of the staff varied, but included a personal priest (*predikant*), two or three assistants (*uppvaktare*), a personal quartermaster, a stablemaster, a chef, and others. These subordinates received wages, varying from 5 and 10–12 daler per month for arquebusiers and cavalrymen, respectively, to 50 daler for the quartermaster.[15]

The cavalry, arquebusiers, and personal staff gave De la Gardie ample opportunities to manage the flow of funds. His private financial records throughout the war show that he was constantly selling equipment and supplies to his subordinates, purchasing horses, or using his subordinate's wages for various expenses. The 'business of the company' consisted of many small transactions and turning a profit on

13 Björklund 2021.
14 RA, Riksregistratur, Letter for Jacob Pontusson, 15 January, 1609.
15 KrA, Militieräkningar 1609/5; RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(3).

them, while at the same time being responsible for the upkeep and pay of his subordinates. Due to the haphazard and incomplete nature of surviving records, it is difficult to say how much money was involved, or what kind of profits could be made in this way. It seems likely that it was not enough to make a fortune, but it did contribute to the numerous small streams through which war became profitable. More importantly, access to such revenue flows, and power over the allocation of resources, gave De la Gardie stronger control over the military venture and his subordinates, as well as a regular source of liquid cash to act as security and to be used in facilitating other transactions.[16]

The campaigns of 1609 and early 1610 were a great success—both militarily and financially. The joint Muscovite–Swedish army cleared a path through Novgorod territory to the Volga, where they defeated a rebel army at Tver. The region north of Moscow was cleared of rebel forces, the siege of the capital was broken, and on 12 March 1610 the army entered the liberated city in triumph. Although the road to Moscow had seen much disagreement between the allies over military policy, a mutiny within the Finnish contingent of the army, and haggling over wages, the campaign had been a success. Moreover, the tsar paid the army remarkably well, and Swedish forces gained rich plunder from defeated enemies, together with gifts and contributions from places liberated.[17]

By the beginning of June 1610, De la Gardie had received 15,023 daler in cash, 5,400 daler in sable furs, and 210 cubits of damask cloth (worth perhaps 520 daler) as salary from the army pay chest. Profits from managing his lifeguard *cornet* and other subordinates were probably not great, given the brevity of this first campaign and the small number of men under his direct command. However, profits received from the 'spoils of war' were significant. Although it is impossible to give exact figures, De la Gardie sent home large quantities of cloth, expensive items such as a jewel-encrusted dagger, several jewelled fur coats, 'Turkish' tapestries, a pearl necklace, fine bedsheets, ten books, and many other things.[18]

16 Redlich 1964, 48–53; Parrott 2012, 297–99; Björklund 2021.

17 KrA, Militieräkningar 1609/5, 1609/21.

18 RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(3); KrA, Militieräkningar 1609/5; TUL, Lossius Collection, A1, 257, Arvid Tönnesson to Jacob De la Gardie, 8 June 1609; Lund University Library (LUL), De la Gardieska släktarkivet från

An additional source of revenue came in the form of the aftermarket for goods received, procured, and taken in the war zone. Due to a lack of cash, the tsar paid a large portion of the army's wages in precious and easily transportable sable furs. During the 15 months from April 1609 to 24 June 1610, the Swedish army received somewhere in the region of 710–750 *timmer* (28,400–30,000 pieces) of sable furs.[19] Years of warfare had built up demand for these furs in aftermarkets, and consequently there was an opportunity for great profits in exporting them. Eventually thousands of furs found their way to Finland, the Baltic region, and Sweden, from where they were shipped to Danzig, Lübeck, and further abroad at high prices.[20]

Few were in a better position than Jacob De la Gardie to participate in this commerce. During the first 15 months of campaigning, he awarded himself 17 *timmer* in wages and received a further 2 *timmer* from the tsar as gifts. Additional furs were obtained as either loot or procurements, and 30 *timmer* (1200 furs) were sent out of the country. Higher-quality furs were preferred, and the ones that De la Gardie received as pay were on average worth 8.5 daler each, while those issued to the army overall averaged only 3.9 daler per fur. By the time the commander's sables were inventoried in Stockholm, they were valued at an average of 13.3 daler each.[21] To transport the wares, De la Gardie combined his personal business with that of running the army. Furs were transported to Finland and Sweden in small batches, often using envoys enjoying diplomatic and military protection.[22]

Löberöd (DlGL), vol. 12(1), Lars Abrahamsson's account of items sent by Jacob De la Gardie and taken to Runsa, 1611.

19 KrA, Militieräkningar 1609/5; RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(3).

20 One of the crown's largest creditors, Abraham Cabiljau, alone exported 2760 sable furs. RA, Lokala tullräkenskaper, 381(3), Stockholm 1610, 150; Wirta, Tikka, and Björklund 2021, 34.

21 LUL, DlGL, vol. 12(1), Lars Abrahamsson's account of items sent by Jacob De la Gardie and taken to Runsa, 1611; Jacob De la Gardie's account with Bertill Rotken, 1609–1611; and Upkeep for Jacob De la Gardie's Finnish estates, 1609. KrA, Militieräkningar 1609/5; RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(3).

22 LUL, DlGL, vol. 6(1), Memorial to Valentin Kern; RA, Riksarkivets ämnessamlingar, Militaria, Krigshistoriska samlingen, Ryska kriget 1609–1617, Strödda handlingar, Jacob De la Gardie to Arvid Tönnesson and Tönne Jörensson, 23 June 1609; KrA, Militieräkningar 1609/5; RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(3).

De la Gardie's entrepreneurial strategy involved sending a portion of the winnings back home to safety, where they were both stored and invested in profit-yielding ventures, while a portion was kept on hand in the war zone or reinvested in the military. The sable furs received in Sweden alone were worth 14,300 daler. These funds were used to repay De la Gardie's creditors and spent on improvements to his estates at Runsa, through the construction of a new main building, stables, and a mill. The most valuable furs, valued at 5,700 daler, were stored at his estates as liquid assets to be used as needed, while his siblings Johan and Brita were handsomely rewarded with jewellery, furs, and cash. Indeed, Brita seems to have played a very active role in managing the 'back end' of these financial operations, and acted as creditor to Jacob De la Gardie and to other officers in the army, making this a truly family venture.[23]

Formation of De la Gardie's Lifeguard Regiment

Such good things could not last, however, and the second half of 1610 saw a series of disasters that led to the collapse of Swedish positions. In May, King Sigismund III Vasa of Poland sent an army under Hetman Zolkiewski to capture Moscow. The Muscovite–Swedish army sent to counter this threat was defeated at Klushino on 24 June, which also marked an end to the Muscovite–Swedish alliance. A considerable portion of the Swedish army surrendered or mutinied soon after, some joining Zolkiewski's army for the advance on Moscow. The remainder were given leave to return home against a promise of not taking up arms against Sigismund again. Three months later, a second army besieging Ivangorod mutinied as well, resulting in the total collapse of Swedish positions in the east.[24]

The survivors limped back across the border, where the Swedish commanders set about reorganising their forces. From this point on,

23 LUL, DlGL, vol. 12(1), Jacob De la Gardie's account with Bertill Rotken 1609–1611, Lars Abrahamsson's receipt, 28 August 1610, Lars Abrahamsson's account of items sent by Jacob De la Gardie and taken to Runsa, 1611, and Account for Jacob De la Gardie's Finnish estates, 1609; LUL, DlGL, vol. 6(1), Memorial to Valentin Kern and Memorial for Henrik Burn; LUL, DlGL, vol. 5(1), Jacob De la Gardie to Lars Abrahamsson 8 October 1610; Björklund 2021.

24 Generalstaben 1936, 335–41; Frost 2001, 199–201; Grosjean 2003, 30–31; Björklund 2021.

De la Gardie and the other senior commanders were forced to assume a more active role in financing and supplying the operation through private means. De la Gardie himself provided 5474 daler 8 öre worth of cash, clothes, and equipment to the military treasury and, together with governor Arvid Tönnesson, guaranteed repayment of a loan of 1000 daler taken from the burghers of Viborg.[25]

In order to consolidate the remaining forces into battle-worthy units, depleted companies were re-formed and surviving companies merged into larger regiments. Most of the French survivors were placed under Colonel Pierre de la Ville, while men recruited from the British Isles were incorporated into Colonel Samuel Cockburn's regiment. These colonels would subsequently advance considerable sums to outfit, provision, and pay the men under their command.[26] The origin of De la Gardie's lifeguard regiment lay in these reorganisations. In April 1611, the four remaining Dutch and German companies were reformed under the command of Captain Daniel Hepburn—a naturalised German officer of Scottish descent, who had served as a lieutenant and participated in the recruitments of 1609.[27] This would eventually become De la Gardie's lifeguard company, and the kernel for his personal regiment.

These measures were sufficient to get the army back on its feet and, through combining pay and provisions provided by De la Gardie and his subordinates, promises, and guarantees of future riches, as well as resources extracted from the local population, De la Gardie was able to launch his second invasion. With Muscovy still reeling from the chaos of civil war, Polish–Lithuanian invasion, regional separatism, and the presence of a number of marauding bands looking for plunder, the moment was opportune. On 17 July 1611, the Swedish army made its greatest conquest by seizing the wealthy city of Novgorod by storm. This was followed by further conquests. Swedish forces consolidated

25 Provianträkenskaper11(3); F6 Cordt 3B, 138–47, Jacob De la Gardie to Karl IX, 5 January and 25 January 1611.

26 Björklund 2021.

27 RA, Strödda militiehandlingar före 1631 Del 1: Armén, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, vol. 7 (1594–1621), Likvidation med befälspersoner, som skola resa till Tyskland för att värva krigsfolk, 1609; Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean, The Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical Database (SSNE), https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne/, entry 6871.

their control over the territory south and east of Novgorod and in Kexholm province, and the following year they seized the fortresses of Ingria one by one. By the end of 1612, the Swedish controlled the territory north and west of Lake Ilmen and were requisitioning grain as far east as Beloe ozero (Russian Belozersk), 400 km east of Novgorod.[28] Only Pskov on the Livonian border continued to resist.[29]

The capture of Novgorod alleviated the army's supply situation and strategic positioning considerably, as De la Gardie and his staff took control of the administration of this wealthy city with its dependent territories. The possessions of those Novgorodians whom the Swedes branded as traitors were confiscated, and the city was forced to pay a large indemnity to support the army. Over the next five years, over 668,000 daler worth of cash obtained from the burghers, monasteries, taverns, and tolls of Novgorod and its surroundings passed through the military treasury, alongside vast amounts of grain and other victuals used to provision the forces.[30] Besides taxing the inhabitants, the Swedish administration took over the mint and issued a debased coinage. De la Gardie himself reminted over 1000 roubles, which yielded a personal profit of some 330–1100 daler.[31]

However, what the wealthy city could not provide was manpower. Maintenance of the large Swedish gains, coupled with the needs of ongoing operations, meant that the army of some 6750 men was woefully understrength for the task ahead. With the outbreak of the Kalmar War against Denmark (1611–1613), support was not forthcoming from Sweden, while domestic Finnish forces proved reluctant, even mutinous, to serve deep within Russia, and could not be counted on to spearhead attacks.[32] Pierre de la Ville's French were depleted and had to be sent to refit and recover in Finland, and in 1612 Cockburn's

28 Löfstrand and Nordquist 2009, 354 and 355.

29 Generalstaben 1936, 341–401.

30 KrA, Militieräkningar 1613/4, 1614/7; RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(3); vol. 12(1), Falentin Jöransson Frosts räkenskap för Novgorod, 1613; vol. 12(3), Isak Månssons räkenskap för kommiss i Novgorod, 1613–1614; vol. 13(8), Anders Muncks räkenskap för proviantet i Novgorod, 1611–1617.

31 Berglund and Zakharov 1983, 8–28.

32 Most of the domestic conscripts were left to garrison fortifications along the border in Ingria, Kexholm, and Nöteborg, while the job of defending Novgorod and its surroundings was entrusted to enlisted units—both foreign and domestic. Generalstaben 1936, Bilaga 8 and Bilaga 9.

underpaid and fatigued unit had to be pulled out of the line as well.[33] As a result, De la Gardie chose to take matters into his own hands, and started the systematic build-up of his own regiment.[34]

Towards the end of the year, Daniel Hepburn was dispatched to recruit additional forces in Germany. Little is known of this operation, though it is quite likely that the men were recruited by way of Rostock and Lübeck, which were important fiscal-military hubs for the North German military market used recurringly by Swedish recruiters, in which Hepburn had family connections, and which he is known to have used in a later recruitment. A little over 200 men arrived, apparently in two or more groups, by way of Narva. On 15 August 1612, the first 112 men were formed into a company under the Livonian nobleman Jost Clodt von Jürgensburg, who had served as Hepburn's ensign the year before.[35] They were followed by 92 men mustered under Franz Petzner, who had formerly been in the service of the city of Danzig.[36]

Around the same time, two other companies were also incorporated within the new regiment. In November, a company of German infantry commanded by Asmus Glasenap arrived in Narva. Glasenap was one of those officers who had fought at Klushino and had elected to return home. He now offered his services to De la Gardie, promising to serve loyally and wishing to cleanse his tarnished name through good service.[37] Glasenap's men were soon followed by a re-formed company consisting of German-speaking survivors of several formations already in Swedish service. This company was commanded by Edmund Kolb, who, like Glasenap, had surrendered at Klushino. Besides bringing in new recruits from Riga, Kolb had purchased his way to command by

33 Generalstaben 1936, 388–400; Grosjean 2003, 31–33; Björklund 2021.

34 Björklund 2021.

35 KrA, Militieräkningar 1611/6; RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(2), Kvittenser från fälttåg i Östersjöprovinserna och Ryssland, 358, Jost Clodt's receipt, 15 August 1612; 360, Daniel Hepburn's receipt 9 September 1612; 362, Jost Clodt's receipt, 28 September 1612.

36 KrA, Militieräkningar 1612/12; TUL, Lossius A1, 228, 272, De la Gardie's patent for Franz Petzner, 24 November 1612, and Franz Petzner's reverse, 24 October 1612; Lossius A2, 723–24, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf, 28 August 1615.

37 TUL, Cordt Collection, F6 Cordt 4, 216, Asmus Glasenap to Jacob De la Gardie, 5 December 1612; KrA, Militieräkningar 1613/14, 1615/12.

winning the auction for the captaincy of the deceased Swiss captain Kasper Möller (organised by Möller's widow).[38]

Within a short period, De la Gardie had thus formed a small regiment of five companies, combining two newly recruited formations with three companies re-formed from depleted units and transferred under the command of new officers. However, it is still somewhat vague at which point the regiment came into being and the men associated themselves as belonging to the Feldherr's lifeguard, much less how the proprietorship of these units was determined. De la Gardie's lifeguard company exists in provisioning and pay records from as early as February 1611, and the regimental staff is listed as receiving pay from 1 February 1612, but these accounts were drafted retroactively.[39]

The first surviving document to explicitly refer to the lifeguard regiment was the patent issued to Petzner on 24 October 1612.[40] However, Daniel Hepburn seems to have maintained some notion of proprietorship over the two companies he had recruited and the lifeguard company he had commanded. A receipt signed in November refers to 'Hepburn's new company' under the command of Franz Petzner, while another receipt from February 1613 refers to the three companies 'belonging to Lieutenant Colonel Hepburn'.[41] Indeed, Hepburn seems to have paid for the recruitments out of his own pocket, and these were not reimbursed to him until 5 February 1613, when he received 706 roubles (2521.4 daler) *värvgeld* (recruitment money).[42]

There was also friction over command and use of the troops. Asmus Glasenap, a former *Rittmeister* (cavalry captain), was unwilling to take orders from Hepburn, who had previously acted as *Hauptman* (infantry captain). Field marshal Horn had also advanced funds to pay and provision some of the men, and would have liked to keep

38 KrA, Militieräkningar 1610/8, 1613/14; TUL, F6 Cordt 4, 602–3, 631–32, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie, 27 July and 13 December 1612; TUL, Lossius A2, 775–78, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf, 18 March 1613.

39 The regimental staff were recruited from among De la Gardie's personal retinue and good administrators within the army. KrA, Militieräkningar 1611/6, 1613/14, 1615/12; RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(3) and vol. 13(8).

40 TUL, Lossius A1, 228, De la Gardie's patent to Franz Petzner, 24 October 1612.

41 RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(2), 363, Daniel Hepburn's receipt, 21 November 1612; 365, Georg Thomas Weiss's receipt, 17 February 1613.

42 RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(3).

some of the units under his command.[43] This was perhaps a transitory phase in the proprietorship of the companies, as the regiment was still in the process of forming. Establishment of the regiment was, in any case, an organic process, dictated by military necessity, availability of independent companies, and the need to establish an efficient hierarchy and administration for the payment, supply, and management of these diverse units. In February 1613, Hepburn signed several receipts as lieutenant colonel and captain of De la Gardie's lifeguard company, and henceforth the regiment appears as a distinct entity in military accounts. It had become a reality at least as an administrative unit, if not as a proprietary whole and collective identity.[44]

Enlarging the Regiment

In the course of 1612, the still developing regiment had already assumed an active role in Swedish operations, contributing to the capture of Koporie, Jama, and Gdov, and particularly the siege of Ivangorod. In 1613, the regiment's role and the significance of De la Gardie's financial contributions to the war effort increased, reaching their peak the following year. During the winter, Swedish-controlled territory was beset by large-scale Cossack raids, which overran several garrisons and ravaged large swathes of territory to the south and east of Novgorod. Much of the task of countering these incursions, and of garrisoning Novgorod itself, fell on the regiment.[45]

A more serious threat loomed on the horizon, however. After much haggling, coercion, and fighting, Michail Romanov was elected tsar on 21 February 1613. Although the new regime continued to face internal troubles, rebel forces, and Polish–Lithuanian invaders, Michail's election brought a semblance of order, united many Russians, and galvanised resistance towards the Swedish invaders. The tsar's forces started applying increasing force towards Novgorod, capturing Ustrika in May 1613 and Tichvin in June, and besieging Ladoga in November—thereby severing riverine access to Novgorod and threatening to

43 TUL, F6 Cordt 4, 635–36, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie, 13 January 1613.

44 RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(2), 314, 353, 458, Daniel Hepburn's receipts, 1, 5, and 9 February1613; RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(3) and vol. 12(1); KrA, Militieräkningar 1613/4.

45 Generalstaben 1936, 400–401.

outflank the beleaguered Swedish position. Meanwhile, a large Muscovite army started to amass at Torzok, gathering its strength throughout the year for the main offensive against the city of Novgorod itself.[46]

Apprehensive of the worst and having learned the news that peace had been signed with Denmark (the Treaty of Knäred, 21 January 1613), De la Gardie sent numerous requests to Gustav Adolf requesting more men, funds, provisions, and armaments from Sweden to stem the faltering situation.[47] Although the king eventually promised to send sizeable reinforcements, these were very slow in arriving, due to problems in paying and outfitting the men, and uncertainty over whether the war against Denmark would resume. No funds and little grain could be sent either and, as the delays became apparent, De la Gardie was ordered to make do with what resources he had. If the position became untenable, the Feldherr was ordered to loot everything he could from Novgorod, burn the city to the ground, and hole up with his garrison within its citadel in order to buy as much time as possible against the Muscovite onslaught.[48]

In this gloomy situation, De la Gardie resolved to enlarge his regiment, which had become the backbone of the defence. Sometime after February, Hepburn was again dispatched to recruit in Germany. This time the funds were provided by De la Gardie himself, who also sent his servant Johan Bäer to assist with the operation.[49] Recruitment proceeded quickly, and by June 1613 Hepburn had returned with 320 men, who were issued a month's pay. Some of the men were allocated to reinforce Jost Clodt's and Franz Petzner's companies, but the bulk were used to form a new company under the command of the French petardier d'Argencourt. Captain Berent von Saltz also received funds from the treasury on 3 May to recruit a company, and arrived on 22 May.[50]

46 Generalstaben 1936, 413, 431–38.

47 TUL, Lossius A2, 775–86, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf, 10 February, 18 March, and 13 April 1613; *Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brefvexling* (*AOSB*), vol. 2(5), 32–37, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, 21 March and 12 April 1613.

48 TUL, Cordt Collection, F6 Cordt 1A, 8–13, 42–43, Gustav Adolf to Jacob De la Gardie, 30 April and 23 September 1613; Generalstaben 1936, 432–33.

49 RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(3); TUL, Lossius A2, 792–798, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf, 6 July 1613.

50 Such a rapid recruitment—a mere three weeks—suggests that either the men were recruited within the war zone or nearby Livonia, or that the dates recorded in the account books do not conform to when the recruitment commenced,

Finally, an eighth company of 72 men recruited by Baltzar Foss were mustered on 26 August.[51]

Berent von Saltz's and Baltzar Foss's backgrounds are obscure, but d'Argencourt was a distant relative of De la Gardie's, recruited by the Feldherr and with multiple years' experience in the Swedish army.[52] The Frenchman was both trusted and favoured by De la Gardie, who made him not only a captain over the men recruited by Hepburn but also *överste wachtmestare* of the regiment. This was probably an effort on De la Gardie's part to have a trusted kinsman among his officers, and to strengthen his control of the regiment.[53] De la Gardie also attempted to entice his cousin Monsieur de Pouzols, then in France, to recruit additional men and come to join him, promising glory, riches, and easy advancement, and assuring Pouzols that many of their countrymen were already with the army.[54]

Nothing came of the attempted recruitment of Pouzols, and d'Argencourt was killed soon after, leading an assault to retake Tichvin.[55] This foiled De la Gardie's attempts at staffing his regiment with relatives. Command over d'Argencourt's company passed to the German-born Scotsman Jakob Duwall, De la Gardie's servant.[56] Although not as close to the Feldherr as d'Argencourt, Duwall's captainship

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or that the men had already arrived. RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 12(1), Daniel Hepburn's receipt, 27 November 1613; KrA, Militieräkningar 1613/14, 1615/12.

51 KrA, Militieräkningar 1613/14.

52 TUL, Lossius A2, 815–18, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf, 1 September 1613; Académie des arts et sciences (Carcassonne) 1856, 213, M. d'Argencourt to M. de Pouzols, 22 August 1613.

53 D'Argencourt had already attempted to purchase Kasper Möller's company at De la Gardie's behest the year before, but could not come to an agreement with Möller's widow regarding price, with the result that Evert Horn approved Edmund Kolb's bid to purchase the company instead. TUL, F6 Cordt 4, 631–32, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie, 13 December 1612.

54 Académie des arts et sciences (Carcassonne) 1856, 212–16, Jacob De la Gardie to M. de Pouzols and M. de Bouscat, 26 August 1611; Jacob De la Gardie to M. Pouzols, 13 March 1613; M. d'Argencourt to M. de Pouzols, 22 August 1613; Jacob De la Gardie to M. de Pouzols, 25 August 1614.

55 TUL, Lossius A2, 808–11, Jacob De la Gardie to Swedish commissaries, 1 September 1613.

56 KrA, Militieräkningar 1613/1, 1613/14, and 1615/12; RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(3); TUL, Lossius A2, 815–18, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf, 1 September 1613; TUL, Lossius A1, 236, De la Gardie's patent for Jakob Duwall, 31 July 1614; SSNE, entry 1623.

nonetheless provided De la Gardie with more control over the regiment, and a counterbalance to Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Hepburn and his clique of officers and enlisted men.

The formation of the regiment through recruitments and amalgamation of existing units had thus far occurred on De la Gardie's orders, with appointments made in the name of the Feldherr, but pledging loyalty to the king and crown of Sweden. De la Gardie first wrote of the recruitments in a letter to the king dated 6 July 1613. He apologised for having acted on his own initiative, without knowledge of the peace signed with Denmark in January, which would free up reinforcements for the eastern theatre. However, he defended his decision as having been imperative, since no support was forthcoming and he needed more men to counter Muscovite attacks.[57]

Besides seeking the king's approval and recognition of his proprietorship, De la Gardie asked for reimbursement. In September the Feldherr wrote to the king again, as well as to his friend and patron, Chancellor Oxenstierna, asking for an assignment of copper from Stora Kopparberget for the 4000 riksdaler (6000 daler) he had spent on the recruitment.[58] Gustav Adolf accepted the undertaking retroactively as a fait accompli. A settlement was reached in October, and De la Gardie was awarded an annual assignment of 25 skeppund (*c*. 4,250 kg) of copper, until the debt had been repaid. With contemporary prices this would take roughly six years. However, there were to be numerous problems with repayments, and the crown's constantly growing debt to the Feldherr would be renegotiated multiple times.[59]

These sums were in any case dwarfed by De la Gardie's other loans to the crown. Between 16 July 1611 and 1 September 1613, the Feldherr advanced 41,014 daler in cash and more than 7,764 daler in

57 Based on his letters, De la Gardie was fully aware of the peace before initiating the recruitment. TUL, Lossius A2, 629, Gustav Adolf to Jacob De la Gardie, 18 December 1612; 792–98 and 815–818, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf, 6 July and 1 September 1613; Académie des arts et sciences (Carcassonne) 1856, 213–14, Jacob De la Gardie to M. de Pouzols, 13 March 1613.

58 TUL, Lossius A2, 815–18, 823–26, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf 1 September 1613 and 14 September 1613; *AOSB*, 2(5), 53–55, 61–69, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, 17 September and 18 December 1613.

59 TUL, F6 Cordt 1A, 44–47, Gustav Adolf to Jacob De la Gardie, 16 October 1613; *AOSB*, 1(2), 150–53, Axel Oxenstierna to Jacob De la Gardie, 16 October 1613.

clothes, provisions, and equipment to the army's treasury in Novgorod. Although this sum went to the upkeep of the army as a whole, at least 318 muskets and vast quantities of clothes were used to outfit his own regiment.[60] In the course of 1613, De la Gardie provided an additional 2885 roubles (10,303 daler) for pay to the men in his regiment, and he purchased at least 968 muskets and 67 pistols at his own expense.[61]

De la Gardie was also a regular supplier of victuals. The produce of his estates was imported using his personal ships, to be sold at a good profit to the needy burghers of Novgorod and the soldiers of the Swedish army.[62] Besides enjoying tax exemptions for these imports, De la Gardie was in the unique position of being privy to the precise economic and military situation and had the means of transporting his wares with full military protection. As commander of the army and governor of Novgorod, he also had control of the treasury and military procurements, and could therefore act as both private supplier and public administrator approving these purchases.

Although records of most transactions are lacking, we know that this commerce was a regular affair. For example, in 1612 De la Gardie sold 174 barrels of grain, 48 barrels of salt and 3 lasts of salted herring to the garrison of Nöteborg.[63] A failed harvest in 1613, combined with long-standing over-taxation and the exigencies of war caused a famine in Novgorod, to which the Feldherr was forced to react. In the autumn of 1613, he imported 700 barrels of grain, which he offered to sell for 3 dalers per barrel. Rye had previously cost 1 daler per barrel but continued to rise to 5 daler by New Year 1614, peaking at 15 daler by the summer of 1614. As the crisis deepened, another 1000 barrels worth 5100 daler were purchased on credit from merchants in Narva and Reval.[64] Later, De la Gardie and Secretary Måns Mårtensson Palm provided a further 730 barrels of rye and malt, and in 1614 De la Gardie purchased butter

60 RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(3).
61 RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 12(1).
62 TUL, Cordt Collection, F6 Cordt 3C, 10–11, Jacob De la Gardie to Erik Andersson, 10 June 1614.
63 RA, Baltiska fogderäkenskaper 187(1), Jöran Jöranssons räkenskap för Nöteborgs slott, 1612.
64 *AOSB*, 2(5), 61–69, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, 18 December 1613.

in Koporie, which he had transported to Novgorod and then sold with considerable profit to the burghers and garrison of the city.[65]

Another critical resource was clothes, which were required in prolific amounts, particularly if the army wished to retain its operational capabilities during the harsh winter. By October 1613, De la Gardie had already procured 13,000 daler worth of clothes, primarily from the Narvan merchant Claes Grambou. Towards the end of the year, however, the ill-clothed army was headed towards disaster, particularly as a Muscovite winter offensive seemed imminent and clothes could no longer be obtained from Novgorod due to the severance of its traditional trade routes through enemy-controlled territory. As a result, De la Gardie wrote multiple pleas and propositions to the king and Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna, requesting clothes or offering to procure these if repayment was secured. These letters went unanswered, and in the pressing situation the Swedish commanders were forced to act. De la Gardie procured 30,000 daler worth of clothes with his personal credit from merchants in Narva and Reval, and his second, Evert Horn, another 10,000 daler worth. When these proved insufficient, an additional 6000 daler of cloth was purchased from a Dutch merchant operating from Lybeck.[66]

Although these wares were purchased by representatives of the Swedish crown and with royal credit, the merchants did not trust the ability or willingness of the crown to repay them. As a result, De la Gardie and Horn were forced to act as guarantors of the loans by pawning their own estates as security. Public and private debt thus became intermingled. This was problematic as the same estates were then unavailable as security for the commanders' own loans, which were needed for many transactions. More gravely, the crown had difficulties repaying the merchants, and at least one of the debts incurred in 1613 remained unpaid as late as 1623. Although De la Gardie seems to have avoided having to relinquish control of the pawned estates, he

65 TUL, F6 Cordt 3C, 6–9, Jacob De la Gardie to Måns Mårtensson, 29 September 1614; *AOSB*, 2(5), 102–3, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, 22 March 1616; RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 13(8).

66 TUL, Lossius A2, 556–60 and 572, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf, 13 March and 8 May 1614; *AOSB*, 2(5), 58–69, 71–77, 85–87, amd 118–21, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, October 1613, 18 December 1613, 13 and 29 March 1614, 5 May 1614, 10 January 1616, and 9 September 1616; Rosen 1938, 44.

was nonetheless forced to pay interest on behalf of the crown,[67] which incurred additional costs and reflected poorly on his reputation in mercantile circles.[68]

The High Point

By the end of 1613, De la Gardie's regiment and cavalry *cornet* had grown to 981 and 206 men, respectively, which amounted to 11 per cent of the army's total strength (10,763 men).[69] Moreover, the funds advanced and equipment purchases guaranteed with De la Gardie's credit represented a staggering 22 per cent of the cash and goods that passed through the army's treasury in the period from 16 July 1611 to 30 September 1614.[70] Other officers had also advanced considerable sums and, when the substantial arrears owed to the officers and their men are also factored in, it can be said that the Swedish war effort had become largely dependent on private capital.[71]

Faced with the impending Muscovite counterattack and with many existing units tied to garrison duties, more were needed, however. In particular, De la Gardie wanted motivated, well-equipped veterans whom he could count on, and over whom he had full control. As a result, and bolstered by the crown's recognition of the funds he had advanced previously, De la Gardie embarked on a new stage of expanding his regiment. Using the by now well-established recruitment network of Daniel Hepburn, an additional 500–700 men were recruited

67 The annual interest rate was probably the same 6–8 per cent outlined in other military procurements. RA, Riksregistratur, Gustav Adolf's instructions to commissaries Gabriel Bengtsson Oxenstierna, Reinhold Taube and Adam Schraeffer, 18 October 1612; *AOSB*, 2(1), 68–74, Gustav Adolf to Axel Oxenstierna, 25 July 1614; TUL, F6 Cordt 4, 658–59 and 663–64, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie, 21 May and 30 October 1614; Björklund 2021.

68 *AOSB*, 2(5), 71–73, 83–85, 99–105, 118–21, 241–44, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, 13 March 1614, 22 March 1616, 9 September 1616, and 27 October 1623.

69 KrA, Militieräkningar 1613/1.

70 This includes the purchases guaranteed by De la Gardie and his direct loans to the army, but excludes grain sold or loaned by him. The percentage is calculated based on the army's accounts in Novgorod and does not include pay to soldiers sent to quarter in Finland or elsewhere outside the war zone.

71 Björklund 2021.

in Northern Germany.[72] These men arrived in three detachments via Narva between February and June 1614, and were used to form a new company under Lorentz Fischer and to reinforce existing companies.[73]

This was Hepburn's last recruitment for Sweden. He used the occasion to retire to his family estates in Karsnitz, East Pomerania, and would subsequently enter imperial German military service.[74] However, there was continuity through Hepburn's father-in-law and uncle-in-law, Peter and Paul Gottberg, who had participated in previous recruitments and who took over management of this one.[75] Paul Gottberg assumed Hepburn's position, and received command of Jost Clodt's company (men previously recruited by Hepburn and the Gottbergs), which was strengthened. Command of the lifeguard company transferred to Leuin Clamar von der Knesebeck, a new arrival who was made lieutenant captain, while De la Gardie himself was the nominal captain. With Hepburn gone, De la Gardie would have liked to appoint the experienced Swedish officer Knut Hand as his lieutenant colonel but felt compelled to elevate Paul Gottberg to the position instead.[76]

After the recruitment, and the two previous recruitments of 1612 and 1613, De la Gardie was heavily indebted to Hepburn and the Gottbergs—both socially, for having managed the operation, and financially. Although Hepburn had been issued 3600 riksdaler (5400 daler) recruitment money from the army's treasury, the Gottbergs seem to

72 RA, Proviantträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(3).

73 TUL, Lossius A1, 228, 272, De la Gardie's patent for Franz Petzner, 24 October 1612, and Franz Petzner's reverse, 24 October 1612; TUL, F6 Cordt 4, 658–59, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie, 21 May 1614; LUL, DlGL, vol. 5(1), 16, Von der Knesebeck's reverse, 24 February 1614; KrA, Militieräkningar 1614/23; Generalstaben 1936, 459.

74 Hepburn received his outstanding wages of 2993.5 daler before departing. LUL, DlGL, vol. 5(1), 30, Daniel Hepburn to Jacob De la Gardie, 26 November 1613; RA, Proviantträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 12(1); SSNE, entry 6871.

75 Paul Gottberg had served as *hauptman*. It seems likely that Hepburn's servant Andreas Gottberg and his commissar Jacob Gottberg, who had been involved with recruitments in Rostock 1609, were also relatives, making this military network a true family affair. KrA, Militieräkningar 1603/1, 1609/6, and 1611/6; LUL, DlGL, vol. 6(1), 27–28, Jacob De la Gardie to Peter Gottberg, 20 May 1617.

76 TUL, Lossius A2, 560–62, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf, 1614; Lossius A1, 182, Patent naming Paul Gottberg lieutenant colonel of De la Gardie's regiment, 2 June 1614; KrA, Militieräkningar 1613/1, 1614/18, 1614/19, 1614/23, and 1615/12.

have covered additional expenses, perhaps amounting to as much as 2000 riskdaler (3000 daler).[77] Hepburn was also owed 984 riksdaler (1476 daler) for past recruitments and muskets purchased in Reval, and 479.75 riksdaler (720 daler) for clothes and cash provided. These were debts that De la Gardie had incurred on behalf of the crown, and which he had pledged to repay if the crown failed to do so by midsummer 1614.[78] As additional security, De la Gardie was forced to pawn 652 *lod* (*c*. 8.58 kg) of silverware to Daniel Hepburn and Peter Gottberg.[79] This silverware remained pawned in Danzig until 1617, when De la Gardie settled the remainder of his debts and paid interest to the family.[80]

The greatest enlargement of the regiment occurred towards the end of 1614. The Dutch siege specialist Colonel Mönnichhofen was killed leading an assault and, rather than appoint a new colonel, De la Gardie chose to incorporate Mönnichhofen's seven companies into his regiment, which now expanded to a massive force of 2334 men. If we include the Feldherr's lifeguard *cornet* of cavalry, which had also been expanded to its greatest strength of 409 men, De la Gardie's personal forces now amounted to 27 per cent of Swedish military strength in the war zone.[81]

Re-formation of two regiments into one and De la Gardie's appropriation of the companies was a major undertaking. Mönnichhofen's estate was owed considerable sums by the crown, and a web of debts, social ties, and obligations criss-crossed within and between the companies of the regiment. The men, too, were owed considerable arrears, and merging the two regiments both financially and socially required time and money. Military records reveal that, although De la Gardie had already started viewing Mönnichhofen's companies as part of his

77 RA, Provianträkenskaper 1545–1560, vol. 11(3); LUL, DlGL, vol. 6(1), 27–28, Jacob De la Gardie to Peter Gottberg, 20 May 1617.

78 LUL, DlGL, vol. 6(1), 36, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf, 25 November 1613; LUL, DlGL, vol. 5(1), 30, Daniel Hepburn to Jacob De la Gardie, 26 November 1613.

79 LUL, DlGL, vol. 12(1), Notary Tobias Freundt's inventory of silverware pawned to Peter Gottberg and Daniel Hepburn, 10 February 1614.

80 LUL, DlGL, vol. 6(1), 27–28, Jacob De la Gardie to Peter Gottberg, 20 May 1617.

81 KrA, Militieräkningar 1614/18 and 1614/23; Generalstaben 1936, 478, Bilaga 12.

regiment in September 1614, it was not until 24 December that the 'new regiment' was mustered in its entirety under the Feldherr's direct command.[82] Separate pay records were kept for the 'old' and 'new' companies until 4 March 1616, which suggests that the financial and administrative arrangements for the re-formation took 17 months to complete.[83]

Return of the King

Leadership over the Ingrian War took a turn at the start of 1613, as peace was made with Denmark. The Treaty of Knäred resulted in heavy indemnities but also enabled the crown to divert attention and resources to the war with Muscovy, which De la Gardie had conducted for the past two years almost entirely independently. Financially overextended, Gustav Adolf's first instructions were to end hostilities against Muscovy. However, once it became apparent that Swedish forces could not be extricated until victory was at hand, the young king instead opted for escalation. To this end, he started to make preparations to send additional troops to the war zone, and to come and lead the army personally.

To take the field, the king wanted to establish his own lifeguard regiment, inspired by the precedent set by De la Gardie. Although the core of the royal regiment would consist of the trabant company (*drabantkompani*), the remainder were to be taken from existing units and experienced officers. This in turn created competition and friction between the king and private entrepreneurs. As early as the summer of 1613, De la Gardie found that Colonel Reinhold Taube, whom he wished to recruit, had been appointed lieutenant colonel of the king's regiment. After Taube was killed, the king appointed Jost Clodt of De la Gardie's regiment to the position, with Clodt's company redesignated as the king's lifeguard company.[84]

Jost Clodt's company represented a significant investment for De la Gardie. On the other hand, the Feldherr realised that he had to act with caution regarding this unit, which Gustav Adolf now called 'our own

82 KrA, Militieräkningar 1614/23 and 1615/12.
83 KrA, Militieräkningar 1615/12, 1615/13, 1616/1, 1617/2, and 1617/16; Björklund 2021.
84 Barkman and Lundkvist 1963, 211–16, 230–33.

Guard'. As a result, De la Gardie promised to follow the king's orders, but he did no such thing. Instead, Clodt was given command of the men who had previously been under Reinhold Taube, and this unit was henceforth listed as Jost Clodt's company in the military records. Clodt's previous company, including De la Gardie's recruits, was instead given to the freshly arrived Paul Gottberg, who strengthened the formation with his new recruits. Clodt was transferred on 15 May and by 12 June Gottberg was in command of the original company.[85]

Worried about his investment, De la Gardie sent the king a memorandum in which he outlined the sorry state of the army, highlighted his own significant investments, and requested guarantees that the regiment should be kept under his personal command.[86] The king's response, if any, is unknown. For the most part, De la Gardie's regiment was secure, although in the autumn the king again interfered, reallocating 26 men from De la Gardie's lifeguard company to Asmus Glasenap's weakened company, irrespective of questions of proprietorship and the financial investments of various officers.[87] Other entrepreneurial officers were also treated with a heavy hand, such as Colonel Pierre de la Ville, who had recruited 740 French recruits at De la Gardie's request. The king refused to endorse the recruitment, and the men were disbanded without pay or restitution.[88]

This was perhaps a reminder to De la Gardie and others that, although they had enjoyed great autonomy in the management of the war effort over the previous few years, the king had the final say in matters. In the course of 1614 and 1615, Gustav Adolf was personally present on the front, inspecting the troops, administering justice, and directing military operations. In the course of these inspections, he made some inconvenient discoveries, such as several church bells looted by De la Gardie's lifeguard *cornet*, which the Feldherr was attempting to smuggle to Finland contrary to the king's express orders.[89]

85 KrA, Militieräkningar 1613/14 and 1615/12; TUL, Lossius A1, 182, Patent naming Paul Gottberg lieutenant colonel of De la Gardie's regiment, 2 June 1614; Lossius A2, 577–81, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf, 8 July 1614; Barkman 1963, 216.

86 TUL, Lossius A2, 560–62, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf, 1614.

87 KrA, Militieräkningar 1614/23.

88 Björklund 2021, 53, 77.

89 *AOSB*, 2(5), 113–14, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, 7 May 1616; *AOSB*, 1(2), 274–75, Axel Oxenstierna to Jacob De la Gardie, 24 May 1616.

In the spring of 1614, the long-awaited Muscovite counterattack finally came. This resulted in a protracted battle at Bronnicy, near Novgorod. Although the situation remained tense for a while, and the army was on the brink of mutiny, the Muscovite force was eventually defeated. The victory in turn gave operational freedom to the Swedes, who used the occasion to capture Gdov in September 1614, and to besiege Pskov the following year. The operation to capture Pskov was a major undertaking, which the king directed personally, and into which the Swedish realm poured many of its remaining resources. This was not enough, however, and after the siege was abandoned in October 1615, the war started to wind down. Both sides were militarily and financially exhausted and, while fighting continued throughout 1616, much more serious negotiations for peace were broached. In these negotiations De la Gardie played a crucial role as one of the chief representatives for the Swedish side.[90]

The king was anxious to discharge troops and find other means to save costs. As early as March 1615 he had ordered that payments to domestic units should be prioritised and that the army should start to discharge more expensive foreigners.[91] In November De la Gardie was ordered to replace Paul Gottberg as lieutenant colonel; in 1616 the king commanded the discharge of Gottberg's and Kolb's companies, Cockburn's regiment, and several other companies of foreigners.[92] Officers' wages were to be reduced, and soldiers' salaries reinterpreted, with 40-day months rather than the customary 30.[93]

De la Gardie agreed to discharge Cockburn and other foreign units but was again reluctant to dismiss his own men. Nor were wages altered. The Feldherr maintained that his regiment was needed to secure Novgorod and guard the ongoing diplomatic negotiations. Moreover, he warned that Novgorod was too impoverished to pay off the men without sparking a mutiny. As a concession, he offered to discharge the recently deceased Edmund Kolb's company and other units,

90 Almquist 1907; Generalstaben 1936, 468–81, 518–34; Jönsson and Vetuschko-Kalevich 2023.

91 TUL, Lossius A2, 429–30, Gustav Adolf to Evert Horn, 6 March 1615.

92 *AOSB*, 2(1), 83, Gustav Adolf to Axel Oxenstierna, 16 March 1615; TUL, Lossius A2, 446, Gustav Adolf to Jacob De la Gardie, 15 November 1615; Lossius A1, 28–30, Gustav Adolf to Jacob De la Gardie, 3 March 1616; KrA, Militieräkningar 1616/1.

93 TUL, Lossius A2, 728, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf, 6 February 1616.

if the king arranged funds to pay the men and Kolb's widow what was owed.[94]

As De la Gardie well knew, Gustav Adolf did not have such funds to send. In effect, Kolb's men were retained in service and used to bolster companies owned directly by the Feldherr. Indeed, De la Gardie continued to increase his stake in the regiment by appropriating the late field marshal Evert Horn's company, and by purchasing the company commanded by Frans Petzner, who returned to the service of Danzig. Finally, a last detachment of 93 men under Jürgen Hemming joined the regiment in October 1615.[95]

The last phases of the war required additional investments too. In 1615, the Feldherr negotiated with Gustav Adolf over recognition and repayment of the large debts incurred. In return for securities on past loans, De la Gardie advanced a further 10,000 daler for the army besieging Pskov.[96] Maintaining stately appearances and entertaining the diplomatic delegations negotiating for peace were also expensive. State purchases guaranteed by De la Gardie's credit thus increased to at least 79,729 daler, and the Feldherr himself provided a further 3062.53 roubles (10,938 daler) in various instalments to the treasury in Novgorod.[97]

Peace was finally settled at Stolbova on 27 February 1617. The outcomes of the treaty were very favourable not only for Sweden but for De la Gardie personally.[98] Successful management of the war and negotiations had earned him the king's thanks, and secured repayment of his considerable investments. Victory also opened opportunities for further profit. De la Gardie's regiment was one of the last units to vacate Novgorod territory, and on the way out the unit participated in wholescale looting. Resources that the Feldherr had earlier refused

94 TUL, Lossius A2, 649–53, 728, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf, 6 February 1616, and Jacob De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf 6 February 1616; *AOSB*, 2(5), 94–105, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, 4 and 22 March 1616; TUL, Lossius A1, 13–15, Gustav Adolf to Jacob De la Gardie, 10 May 1616.

95 TUL, Lossius A2, 723–24, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustav Adolf, 28 August 1615; KrA, Militieräkningar 1615/13; LUL, DlGL, vol. 5(1), 21, Jürgen Hemming's commission, 10 May 1615; Generalstaben 1936, 519.

96 *AOSB*, 2(5), 99–105, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, 22 March 1616.

97 KrA, Militieräkningar 1614/7; *AOSB*, 2(5), 85–87 and 118–21, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, 10 January and 9 September 1616; Rosen 1938, 44.

98 For the significance of the Stolbova peace treaty, see Jönsson and Vetuschko-Kalevich 2023.

to plunder despite royal orders, because Novgorod's support might be needed if the war continued, were no longer secure. De la Gardie himself was accused of stealing 65 church bells and 9 brass mortars from Novgorod, Staraja Russa, and Ladoga. This was in direct violation of the peace treaty, but Swedish authorities refused to address the complaints levelled against Swedish soldiers.[99]

The greatest return for De la Gardie's entrepreneurial activities came in the form of enfeoffments, however. At the conclusion of the war, the crown recognised an outstanding debt of 104,304 daler, of which 45,736 daler had been spent on De la Gardie's regiment, and the remaining 58,568 daler for the army more generally.[100] To service this debt, the Feldherr was granted the tolls from Åbo, Björneborg, and Raumo in Finland for 1615–1618, which were renewed for 1619–1622. These yielded a profit of 40,082 daler 31.5 öre.[101] Funds advanced for De la Gardie's regiment were to be repaid with 626.5 *skeppunds* of copper over the years 1617–1620, but by 15 October 1623 only 254 *skeppunds*, worth 16,419.87 daler, had been paid.[102] Furthermore, the Feldherr received 4562.53 roubles (16,294.75 daler) from the indemnity paid by Muscovy, of which 1500 roubles (5357.14 daler) were a reward for De la Gardie's service in negotiating the peace treaty, while the rest contributed to the repayment of the royal debt.[103]

The most significant and lucrative return was the enfeoffment of the conquered provinces of Kexholm and Nöteborg for six years, later extended by another four years. De la Gardie was allowed to retain all the tolls and taxes of the provinces and had the right to import and export commodities toll free, provided these did not infringe on the rights of the burghers of Viborg and other smaller towns. He was

99 TUL, Lossius B1, 49–50, John Merrick to Jacob De la Gardie, 1 April 1617; Generalstaben 1936, 563–71; Korhonen 1953, 50–52.

100 LUL, DlGL, vol. 11(1), 47, His Majesty's account with Count Jacob De la Gardie for his loans and what he has given to matters of war; RA, Riksregistratur, 21 July 1617, the crown's recognition of outstanding debts to Jacob De la Gardie.

101 *AOSB*, 2(5), 121–22, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, 20 December 1616; LUL, DlGL, vol. 11(1), H.K.M.tz och Cronones korth räkningh med greffwe Jacob De la Gardie på hans försträckning och leffwerer till krigzsaker.

102 RA, Riksregistratur, Till Jacob De la Gardie på betahling af Kopparberget för försträchning, 21 December 1617.

103 KrA, Militieräkningar 1614/7; RA, Riksregistratur, Instructions for Jacob De la Gardie, 23 January 1617.

contractually obliged to maintain the garrisons of Kexholm and Nöteborg, whose commanders had a role in ensuring that the Feldherr did not abuse the tenants. In return for this enfeoffment, the crown's debt to De la Gardie would be reduced at the rate of 5475 daler per annum.[104]

The actual yield was much greater, however. In 1618, the enfeoffment yielded 7445 daler, 6718 barrels of grain, and 1301 barrels of oats. By 1622, these figures were 18,564 daler, plus 12,123 and 5,139 barrels of grain and oats respectively. The counties recovered quickly after the cessation of hostilities, but De la Gardie also took active measures to improve the yield. He had excellent records thanks to the archives of Novgorod, which he had appropriated when evacuating the city, and employed experienced bailiffs and other personnel recruited among Swedish military personnel and the civil-military administration of Novgorod. Peasants were enticed to move into the area illegally from Finland, and the Feldherr provided them with loans and imported horses to help them get started.[105]

The crown's revision committee eventually realised their mistake, and in 1624 the cost of renting the enfeoffment was raised to 20,000 daler per year. Nonetheless, the enfeoffment remained profitable, and Erik Grill has calculated that over the period 1618–1628 De la Gardie made a profit of 170,218 daler, after repayment of the crown's debt and costs of maintaining the garrisons are deducted. To this figure should be added some 92,325 daler profit made from exporting grain to Amsterdam and Northern Germany. Indeed, while controlling these enfeoffments, De la Gardie was one of the largest grain exporters operating in the area, and subsequently became one of the wealthiest men in Sweden.[106]

Conclusion

De la Gardie's lifeguard regiment was mustered for the last time on 14 June 1617 in Stockholm. The men received their pay and the units were disbanded, with some individuals and companies retained in service for Sweden's future wars. As part of the process of identifying each man, his length of service, and his arrears, the original posting of each

104 Grill 1949, 25–28, 42.
105 Grill 1949, 28–31; Korhonen 1953, 63.
106 Grill 1949, 42–47, 69–70.

of the 981 men then present was listed. Although some of the details are sketchy, the soldiers had come from at least 42 different formations, and included 28 Swedish and Finnish soldiers who had somehow found their way into the better-paying foreign regiment.[107]

This highlights a key component of De la Gardie's entrepreneurial strategy during the Ingrian War: the appropriation of diverse units and their incorporation into his personal regiment. New men were recruited by De la Gardie himself and his subordinates—especially Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Hepburn and his in-laws the Gottbergs. However, the bulk of the regiment came from existing units that were re-formed into the regiment and its companies. These included depleted units that De la Gardie purchased from their captains, as well as 'leaderless' units, whose commanders had often died, which the Feldherr appropriated.

More broadly we can see a pattern of profit and reinvestment. Throughout the war, De la Gardie continued to increase his stake in the military venture by various means. Growing his regiment was part of this, but his methods also included purchasing clothes and armaments for his men and the army more generally, and importing provisions from his own estates as well as purchasing these elsewhere. Part of the revenue of these transactions was sent home for safety or reinvested in other secure locations, such as estates. The rest was used to keep the military going, and to increase the crown's debt to De la Gardie.

Many of the resources invested by De la Gardie came from the profits of war: his wages, the rewards of looting, and a multitude of financial transactions in and around the war zone. Command of his regiment and lifeguard *cornet* and command of the army enabled many of these. However, significant sums also came from third parties—merchants, friends, and family, from whom De la Gardie borrowed funds and obtained resources on credit. This group also included his subordinate officers, who advanced funds for many of the recruitments which the Feldherr subsequently claimed as his own. In effect, De la Gardie was not only an investor but a significant middleman in a chain of borrowing: someone who had better access to credit than the crown, and through whom multiple groups financed the war.

Success was the result of canny solutions in finding the best possible margins, tapping multiple resource flows, and negotiating very favourable terms of repayment and other forms of reward from the

107 KrA, Militieräkningar 1617/6.

crown. De la Gardie was helped by his diverse resource base: estates back home, family and friends, good credit, and a regiment of his own. Above all, the Feldherr could capitalise on a unique combination of acting in a triple role of commander of the army, governor of Novgorod, and private entrepreneur. This gave him unique knowledge of the fiscal-military situation and the needs of the military, as well as providing him with power to make and approve contracts.

There were elements which are viewed as forms of corruption nowadays and were not without their problems in the 17th century either, such as unlicensed looting. However, many other forms of mixing private affairs with public business, such as selling grain to the army, were not viewed as problematic. Indeed, although De la Gardie stood to benefit from these transactions, so did the crown. Without the personal involvement and resources of De la Gardie and other private agents, the crown would not have been able to prosecute the war to its happy conclusion, and the situation would probably have collapsed as early as 1611 or 1612.

De la Gardie knew this and used it to his advantage. Indeed, part of his entrepreneurial strategy was to make himself indispensable. The crown became indebted to the Feldherr both financially and socially and, in recognition of De la Gardie's good service, was morally bound to repay these funds and services. Through his clientele appointed to military and administrative positions, his network of merchants and creditors, and his command of his personal regiment, De la Gardie was the crucial component that tied together much of the army and its supply organisations. He acquired a unique knowledge of the situation in the east and of Novgorod's administration, which the king and administration in Sweden found hard to contest. The Feldherr refused to follow some orders—citing his unique knowledge of the changing situation and the slow communications from Sweden as reasons—and ignored others. To further increase his power, he asked for leave on numerous occasions, and threatened to resign unless he received the support he was requesting. As the crown was dependent on De la Gardie, these requests for leave or discharge were not granted, thereby leaving the commander with further authority to do as he pleased.

De la Gardie was not the only military entrepreneur involved with the Ingrian War, nor with Sweden's other wars of the 16th and 17th centuries. However, he was one of the most successful. Although the context of the Ingrian War was perhaps unique and De la Gardie's

entrepreneurial actions particularly broad, this chapter has sought to demonstrate the mechanisms whereby Swedish military entrepreneurs might operate, and the possibilities that such public–private interaction could produce. In the context of the Ingrian War this proved to be a mutually beneficial solution. In the space of just eight years, the Feldherr made a massive fortune and rose in rank to become one of the pre-eminent noblemen in the realm. In return, the crown gained very extensive new territories in the east—the first step in Sweden's transformation from an embattled Nordic kingdom to a Baltic empire.

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CHAPTER 8

Military Entrepreneurship and Migration

Swedish Mercenaries in Venetian Service

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Abstract

Privatised military activity played an important role in early modern warfare. Military entrepreneurs raised regiments through transnational networks of rulers, bankers, diplomats, local politicians, and recruiting agents, thereby creating a transnational labour market that involved tens of millions of migrants. Sweden is mainly known for receiving foreign mercenaries, many of whom settled on the shores of the Baltic. However, Swedish military entrepreneurs had, since the Thirty Years' War, also offered their services to other European powers. This activity peaked during the last two decades of the 17th century, when Venice waged war against the Ottomans. Among the European military entrepreneurs offering Venice help, we find several Swedish

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aristocrats. In this chapter, we give an overview of who they were, why they left Sweden, and whether any of them settled in Venice or Italy for the rest of their lives.

Introduction

Recent research has placed ever more emphasis on the importance of privatised military activity for early modern warfare.[1] Military entrepreneurs raised regiments and armies with the help of transnational networks consisting of rulers, bankers, diplomats, local politicians, and recruiting agents. These *Gewaltgemeinschaften* created a kind of transnational labour market, characterised by social as well as geographical mobility. Tens of millions of people migrated during the early modern period because of military enterprise, mixing different nationalities and thereby spreading ideas and influences from a plethora of cultures all over Europe.[2] Some of these migrants returned home after years of foreign service, but some decided to settle for ever abroad.

During the 17th century, Sweden was heavily dependent on foreign mercenary troops, drawing as much as 80 per cent of its manpower from abroad in the Thirty Years' War.[3] Many of these foreign mercenaries settled on the shores of the Baltic Sea, where their descendants still live, while, at the same time, some of the regular Swedish and Finnish troops deployed on the continent during the war decided not to return home after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.[4] What is less well known is the fact that Swedish military entrepreneurs offered their services to other European powers, foremost of which were France, the Netherlands, German principalities, and Venice, thereby creating a bridge from the Baltic Sea to the larger pan-European market. Swedish

1 E.g. Wilson 1995; Hanlon 1998; Jaun *et al.* 2009; Parrot 2012; Fynn-Paul 2014; Rogger and Hitz 2014a; Speitkamp 2017; or, most recently, Sutherland 2022. The classic work on the importance of military enterprise during the Thirty Years' War is still Redlich 1964–1965.

2 According to Rogger and Hitz 2014b, 26, as many as 45 million people migrated between 1500 and 1800 due to military enterprise (this number does not include the Balkans). For more on this topic, see also Asche *et al.* 2008; Wilson 2020.

3 Glete 2002, 34–35.

4 See e.g. Murdoch 2013; Ericson Wolke 2017; Kepsu 2017; Skoog 2021; Schiavone and Björklund 2023, with further references. For Finnish troops not returning, see Pleiss 2017, 108–10, 341–43.

participation in the business of war on the continent goes back to the Thirty Years' War and peaked during the two last decades of the 17th century, when Sweden enjoyed the longest period of uninterrupted peace as a European great power.[5]

The Swedish nobility had grown ever stronger in the wake the Thirty Years' War, continually receiving new fiefs from the crown as thanks for their service in the field. This came to an abrupt end in connection with the great reduction of 1680, when the Swedish crown recaptured a large part of the lands earlier granted to the nobility. The old, landed nobility, whose influence had been based on land ownership, was replaced by a new nobility closely dependent on the crown as civil servants.[6] Concurrently the long period of peace made it difficult for young aristocrats to make a career in the Swedish army. A number of the old nobility who found it difficult to adapt to the new conditions decided to try their luck as military entrepreneurs abroad.[7]

During the second half of the 17th century, the demand for skilled officers and troops was high across Europe, with many states unable to fill the ranks of their expanding armies with their own subjects. The percentage of foreign troops in the French army, for instance, varied between 10 and 32 per cent during the century, later stabilising around 15 per cent.[8] The Netherlands and the Northern Italian principalities, whose economies blossomed thanks to trade, also had the financial means to hire troops from abroad. Beginning in the 17th century, the

5 For a general overview, see Ericson Wolke 2017, with further references. The long peace between 1679 and 1700 was partly interrupted by the Nine Years' War, when Sweden sent a couple of regiments to support the Netherlands and the allied troops in the Rhineland against France. However, these regiments were mainly raised in the German provinces of Sweden.

6 For the great reduction of 1680, see e.g. Ågren 1973; Magnusson 1985; Upton 1998, 51–70; Rystad 2003, 181–203. For the Swedish nobility in general during the 17th century, see Englund 1989. Towards the end of the 17th century, after the reduction, only about a third of the Swedish nobility owned land.

7 For a masterly description of how, because of the reduction, Nils Bielke decided to leave Sweden in 1683 and join the imperial army fighting against the Ottomans in Hungary, see Eriksson 2000, 179–86. Karl XI later persuaded Bielke to return back home, by elevating him to the status of count and appointing him as governor general of Swedish Pomerania.

8 Rowlands 2010, 145–46. In 1693 the French army encompassed as many as 85,000 foreign troops. However, one should not forget that, at the same time, tens of thousands French soldiers fought abroad under a foreign flag (often before having deserted from the French army). See e.g. Corvisier 1964, 728–35.

Italian peninsula experienced a unique 'demilitarisation', caused by a dwindling nobility who were ever less interested in having military careers.[9] Thus around 35 per cent of the army of the Duchy of Savoy/Kingdom of Sardinia was foreign during the first half of the century, with the majority hailing from the German principalities and Switzerland.[10]

Venice had developed even further than the other Italian principalities. The number of male adult patricians was very low (well below 2000 during the second half of the 17th century) and the representatives of this elite, aside from those who filled positions in the government, mainly served as military administrators (*provveditori*) or captains for the galleys.[11] There was thus a huge demand for foreign land troops for the Venetian army, which was traditionally commanded by somebody from abroad. What is more, the republic could very well afford this, as its state finances were still among the most robust in Europe.[12] It is thus hardly surprising that military entrepreneurs from the Swedish realm were attracted by the opportunities raised when, in 1684, Venice began to enrol more foreign troops because of a new war against the Ottomans, the Morean War (1684–1699). In this chapter we discuss aspects of military entrepreneurship and migration connected with the Swedish subjects who served under Venetian arms in this war.[13]

Swedish Subjects in the Morean War

Venice waged more or less constant war with the Ottoman Empire between 1645 and 1718: the War of Candia (1645–1669), the Morean War (1684–1699), and the Second Morean War (1714–1718).[14] In 1684, the Holy League was created, consisting of the Holy Roman Empire,

9 For the progressive estrangement of Italian society from martial pursuits between the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 and the French Revolution, see Hanlon 1998.

10 Loriga 1992.

11 See e.g. Hanlon 1998, 143–78.

12 For the Venetian economy during the 17th and 18th centuries, see Georgelin 1978.

13 For earlier studies on this topic, see Hakkarainen 2017; Forsén 2017; Forsén 2020. For general surveys of the war, see Setton 1991; Perini 1999; Infelise and Stouraiti 2005; Eickhoff 2009; Pinzelli 2020.

14 For the relations between Venice and the Ottoman Empire as viewed from a longer perspective (the 16th and 17th centuries), see most recently Poumarède 2020.

Poland–Lithuania, Venice, and Russia, with the aim of opposing the Ottomans, who the year before had nearly succeeded in capturing Vienna. After joining the Holy League, Venice attacked the Ottomans in Dalmatia and on the Peloponnese (called Morea by the Venetians) in the so-called Morean War. The Venetian enterprise was to a certain degree a separate war, although at the same time connected to the main Great Turkish War, which was fought concurrently in the Balkans, mainly in Hungary and Serbia.[15] The Morean War was furthermore distantly linked to the War of Candia, in which Venice had lost Crete to the Ottomans: the captain general (*capitano generale da Mar*) who led the Venetians to war in 1684, Francesco Morosini, had served in the same position at the end of the War of Candia.[16]

The Venetians were already heavily dependent on foreign troops during the War of Candia, and several diplomatic attempts had been made to encourage Sweden to send military assistance. No Swedish regiments were ever sent, but a handful of Swedish officers joined the Venetian troops, among them members of families of the upper nobility, such as the Banér, Wrangel, Oxenstierna, and von Königsmarck families.[17] The Venetian interest in Swedish troops continued during the Morean War, when the republic attracted more officers but still no regiments. Many of the officers had previously served among the imperial troops on the Hungarian frontier and this was true for most of the commanders-in-chief of the Venetian land troops (*generali da sbarco*).[18] The high esteem for Swedish military skills is well emphasised

15 For the connection of the Morean War to the Great Turkish War, see e.g. Setton 1991; Eickhoff 2009.

16 For Morosini, see the contributions in Ortalli *et al.* 2021, with further references.

17 For the diplomatic efforts and the Swedish officers taking part in the War of Candia, see Hakkarainen 2017, 20–25. Hanlon 1998, 156, clearly exaggerates the Swedish input. Pinzelli's assumption (2020, 64) that the Swedish marshal Carl Gustaf Wrangel (1613–1676) would have taken part in the defence of Candia is wrong. The person occurring in the sources is his less well-known younger family member Feldmarschall-Leutnant Gustaf Hermanson Wrangel (1630–1688). Cf. Merian 1670, 23, where Gustaf Wrangel is described as a cousin (*Vetter*) of Carl Gustaf Wrangel, a word which at that time could also be used to refer to close friends or relatives in general. For Gustaf Wrangel, see *Svenskt biografiskt lexicon*, ny följd 10 (1907), 666–67.

18 The only exception being Charles Félix de Galéan, duc de Gadagne, who served as commander-in-chief for the Venetian land forces, 1689–1691 (Achard 1787, 324–27).

by the fact that two of the seven commanders-in-chief of the Venetian land troops in the Morean War (Otto Wilhelm von Königsmarck and Carl Carlsson Sparre) were Swedish subjects, in addition to which the Venetians tried twice—in vain—to encourage Nils Bielke to accept the same position.[19] Bielke was apparently interested but did not receive permission from Karl XI to leave.[20]

The Venetians had good marine but poor land forces; however, what they did have were the financial means to hire competent officers and to buy the services of whole regiments from German principalities.[21] The German princes made an agreement with experienced officers or military entrepreneurs, some of whom were Swedish subjects, who recruited and commanded the regiments as subcontractors. The profits were divided between the princes, the military entrepreneurs, and, to some extent, other officers of the regiments. The soldiers were generally badly treated, having to pay for food and accommodation themselves. Those who were enrolled in the ranks were often adventurers or criminals who were trying to avoid arrest and punishment at home.[22] Some were tricked into enlisting with the help of cheap women or drinks; others were forced to enrol: deserters, prisoners of war, and criminals were sold to the recruiters, and those who refused to cooperate were sold on to the galleys. During the later 1680s, a large proportion of the soldiers fighting in Morea for the German regiments were prisoners of war (often French) or sentenced criminals.[23]

19 Carl Sparre became acting commander-in-chief early October 1690 when the duc de Gadagne returned from the Levant to Venice. He was designated successor to the duc de Gadagne, but died before de Gadagne was officially released from his duties as commander-in-chief.

20 Riksarkivet (RA), Italica 41, Doge Francesco Morosini to Karl XI, 26 March 1692, referring to the need to find a new commander of the land troops as skilled as the previous ones. According to Eriksson 2000, 271–72, the Venetians contacted Bielke again in January 1693. Rumours that Bielke would have accepted the offer circulated throughout 1692 and 1693 (*Avvisi italiani, ordinarii e straordinarii*, 24 May 1692; 23 April 1693; 11 September 1693; 31 October 1693; 25 November 1693).

21 For a detailed overview of the Venetian military forces during the 17th century, see Tamburini 2007.

22 For good overviews of the social realities facing military entrepreneurs and their men, see e.g. Huntebrinker 2010; Rogger and Hitz 2014b, 15–36.

23 For the close connection between being sent to war or to the galleys, see e.g. Castan and Zysberg 2002, 109–13; Pelizaeus 2014. For French deserters being sent to the galleys, see Lynn 1997, 407–12. For deportations from the Habsburg

How many Swedish subjects served in the Venetian forces during the Morean War? As the sources are incomplete, it is difficult to give an exact answer, but after years of archival work we know that there were at least 100 officers and soldiers, who were followed in the field by around 50 wives, servants, and others. We have without doubt underestimated the number of those following, as they seldomly appear in the sources. The total number of Swedish subjects involved in the war thus probably rose above 200, of whom nearly every other person was somehow connected to Otto Wilhelm von Königsmarck, who served as commander-in-chief of the Venetian land forces from 1686 to 1688.[24]

Von Königsmarck came from a comital family renowned for its military deeds. His father had plundered Prague during the last days of the Thirty Years' War and his uncle had campaigned for the Venetians in the War of Candia. Von Königsmarck had himself served for the French during the 1670s; he was later appointed as Swedish field marshal in 1676, and governor general of Swedish Pomerania in 1679. After most of his lands had been reclaimed by the Swedish crown as part of the great reduction, in 1684 von Königsmarck joined the imperial troops in the Great Turkish War against the Ottomans, from where he soon proceeded to Venetian service. Under the Venetian flag he conquered the Peloponnese from the Ottomans in 1686–1687, finally dying of plague during the siege of Negroponte in 1688.[25] When he left for the Levant in 1686, he was followed by about 100 individuals, including 20–30 military experts, adjutants, and a lifeguard; 15–20 volunteers; and 50–60 members of his and his wife's personal court (secretaries, bookkeepers, a priest, an equerry, saddlers, lackeys, pages, a marshal de logis, cooks, bakers, sommeliers, cupbearers, ladies-in-waiting, and handmaidens).[26]

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monarchy in general, see Steiner 2014. For Swedish prisoners of war who at the end of the Great Northern War were sold to military entrepreneurs recruiting regiments to be offered to Venice during the Second Morean War, see Östlund 2015; Hakkarainen 2017, 47.

24 For a first preliminary survey of our results, see Hakkarainen 2017, since which we have found references to a few more people.

25 For von Königsmarck, see Åberg 1975–1977; Hakkarainen 2017, 26–29.

26 Hakkarainen 2017, 28. For von Königsmarck's own court and many of his suite, see Åkerhielm 1970, appendices 2 and 3. According to von Königsmarck's contract with Venice (Bibliotecha Museo Correr (BMC), Ms Morosini-Grimani 563), the Signoria paid for 6 military experts, 2 adjutants and 12 soldiers for

We also have more information on about 90 of the Swedish officers and soldiers who took part in the Morean War. Six of them reached a position as regiment commander, brigadier, or even higher; in addition, we know of seven officers with a rank above that of lieutenant colonel. A total of 43 individuals served as lower officers (that is, between ensign and major), 15 were volunteers, and 19 were ordinary soldiers or non-commissioned officers. The social background was broad. The officers and volunteers included members of many well-known Swedish noble families, such as von Königsmarck, Lewenhaupt, Sparre, von Rosen, von Erskein, De la Gardie, Ekeblad, Lilliehöök, Fleming af Lais, Posse af Hedelund, De Geer, von Fersen, and von Koskull, but there were also members of newly ennobled bourgeoisie families and families who had moved to Sweden shortly before and had gained a position in the Swedish nobility.

The volunteers were mostly young men of the nobility, who during their *Kavalierstour* in Europe followed von Königsmarck in the field for a campaign or two, no doubt encouraged by his reputation, the commander's achievements having been recounted in pamphlets printed and distributed even in Sweden.[27] The volunteers did not receive a wage or food supply, but a sum of money (*stipendio*) to cover their travel and stay at the front, where they either had to survive on their own means, live off the spoils of war, or gain a position in a regiment, when one of the regular officers died.[28] Although the number of ordinary soldiers is probably an underestimate, as they are difficult to trace in the sources, the large percentage of officers or volunteers—in total about 79 per cent—clearly shows that the Swedish subjects taking part in the Morean War mainly belonged to those classes who personally gained or hoped to gain from the business of war. It should be added that most of the common soldiers and non-commissioned

a lifeguard, but von Königsmarck could well have had further soldiers for the lifeguard alone.

27 For the *Kavalierstoure* of young Swedish aristocrats in general, see Winberg 2018, but Winberg does not include any examples of how these young men often combined shorter stints serving as lower officers or volunteers for foreign armies with the rather more cultural activities of the *Kavalierstoure*.

28 For the pamphlets and volunteers, see Hakkarainen 2017, 32. Christoffer Ekeblad can be mentioned as an example of a volunteer, who during his *Kavalierstour* decided to enrol in von Königsmarck's entourage (Forsén 2020).

officers arrived together with either von Königsmarck or some other high officer and were thus privileged compared to their comrades.

What was the fate of these Swedish subjects enrolling in a war in which the rate of mortality was shockingly high, with approximately 80 per cent of the troops dying during the first two years of their service, mostly from illness? [29] The Swedish participants fared better, probably due to the connection to von Königsmarck and the fact that most of them were officers or wealthy volunteers. Thus, only 20 died of illness and 3 in battle (the fate of a further 11 remains unclear). A total of 56—that is, about 62 per cent of our sample—returned alive to the Swedish realm, whereas a total of 24 persons built a future elsewhere. The majority of the latter settled down in Northern or Central Europe, typically in German principalities, although some stayed in Italy. We know of five, or possibly six, such cases.[30] We will focus here on Erik Carlsson Sparre (d. 1754) and Johan Schiller (d. 1731); in addition we will consider Gustaf Fredrik Lewenhaupt (1658–1723), who, although he returned to Sweden, still upheld close contacts across Europe and Northern Italy.

The Sparre Brothers as Military Entrepreneurs

Carl Carlsson Sparre (b. 1650) and his half-brother Erik Carlsson Sparre (some 18–20 years his junior) both made their careers as military entrepreneurs in Europe. Their father belonged to the upper nobility and to

29 See Forsén 2017, 74 with reference to UUB, X240, Carl Sparre to his sister Märta Rosenhane, 6 January 1690, according to which 700 of 3500 men of the Württembergian regiments, 500 of 2000 men of the Brandenburg-Bayreuthian regiments, 230 of 1200 of the Wolfenbüttel regiment, 760 of 3350 men of the Saxonian regiments, and 200 of 1300 of the Hanoverian regiment returned after two years of service. This gives a rate of mortality between 75% and 80%, but that calculation does not include the reinforcements which many of the regiments received while in the field, which would give an even higher rate of death.

30 The others being Johann Henning Neumeyer, Lars Galdenblad, and Daniel d'Hütterot. For the first two, who converted to Catholicism, see Hakkarainen 2017, 41–42 (Galdenblad's fate is unclear: he is said either to have retired as a Venetian colonel or to have fought for the imperial forces during the Siege of Belgrade in 1693). For Major Daniel d'Hütterot, who enrolled anew for the Levant in 1701 after having already served nine years during the Morean War (partly under Erik Sparre), see Archivio di Stato Venezia (ASV), Collegio, suppliche commesse ai savi, b. 577, 21 July 1701.

the group who suffered badly from the reduction, losing most of the family lands in 1680. Carl Sparre gained his first military experience abroad during the early 1670s in the Netherlands. In large families of the upper nobility, it was common during the second half of the 17th century that some of the children began their military careers abroad, with the hope of later returning to their home country. Carl Sparre returned for a while to Sweden, before leaving again for a career as military entrepreneur in the Netherlands and later also in the German principalities, partly because his family had lost so much land in the reduction. He was not the only member of the Sparre family fighting for foreign powers in Europe—we know of 17 of his close relatives who were active at this time in France, Venice, the Netherlands, and England.[31]

Carl Sparre was hired in 1686 by the margrave of Brandenburg-Bayreuth with the task of raising two regiments that the margrave wanted to 'rent' to Venice. When these regiments left for the Levant in 1687, he took along his younger half-brother, 'in order to help him to find a piece of bread'.[32] Carl Sparre made a spectacular career in the war and was soon hired as major general in the Venetian army, a position parallel to the one he had held in the Brandenburg-Bayreuthian regiments. He then rose to general and commander-in-chief of the Venetian land forces after the resignment of the duc de Gadagne in late September 1690. He was killed by an accidental cannon shot from his own troops while defending Vallona against the Turks in February 1691. By that point, Erik Sparre, with the help of his brother, had risen to lieutenant colonel in the Brandenburg-Bayreuthian regiments.[33]

Erik Sparre was known as a passionate but ill-fortuned card player, who was always in need of more money.[34] His conscientious brother left behind more than 15,000 Reichsthaler in silver, equivalent to two years' salary for the Lord High Treasurer in Sweden. Carl Sparre's only living sister, Märta Rosenhane, was supposed to inherit from him, but Erik Sparre seized the savings, claiming that he had been assigned sole heir by court-martial, for which he could not, however, produce any

31 For Carl Sparre's career, with references to other family members' service, see Forsén 2017.

32 UUB, X240, Carl Sparre to his sister Märta Rosenhane, 6 January 1690: 'så att iagh håppas mädh guds hiälp, att han och skall få här sitt stycke brödh'.

33 Forsén 2017, 75–77, 93, with further references.

34 Thürheim 1881, 80.

proof. Märta's husband, Johan Rosenhane, who was president of the Wismarer Tribunal, the highest court of appeal in the German provinces of Sweden, wanted to file a lawsuit against his brother-in-law. However, the distance proved to be too great and, with Erik Sparre unreachable in Morea most of the time, Rosenhane realised that nothing was to be done.[35]

Erik Sparre also tried to 'inherit' his brother's rights to the Brandenburg-Bayreuthian regiments. When that did not succeed, he managed instead to persuade the von Degenfeld family to make him colonel of their regiment, which also served Venice. This proved a catastrophic decision, for Sparre pocketed most of the money meant for the regiment. He cut the salaries of officers and soldiers, neglected to replace uniforms and equipment, stopped paying the von Degenfeld family, fired officers who complained, and sold their positions to adventurers.[36] As if this were not enough, he did not even always turn up in the field, instead spending the summer of 1692, for instance, in Rome, Florence, and Naples.[37] Sparre spent much of his money on an extravagant social life, not only in Morea, but also in Venice during the winters, where he even commissioned the libretto of an opera which had its premiere in November 1692.[38]

Eventually, the von Degenfeld family filed a lawsuit against Sparre, which continued until 1698, when the Venetian Senate decided to disband the Degenfeld regiment.[39] However, by use of bribes and blackmail, Sparre managed to avoid punishment—on the contrary, after the end of the Morean War he was hired as a *sergente maggiore di battaglia* (brigadier) in the Venetian army and thus stayed in the republic, which had need of qualified officers when it created a regular army to

35 For a more detailed description of the case, see Forsén 2017, 92–93. The papers relating to the inheritance case have been preserved as part of UUB, X240.

36 For a detailed description of Erik Sparre's scandalous treatment of the Degenfeld regiment, see Thürheim 1881, 79–93, 99–101.

37 Bibliotecha nazionale Marciana, It. X, 36 (6529), no. 66, Erik Sparre to Johan Conrado Seither in Venice, Napoli di Romania, 7 November 1692.

38 For Sparre's social life and the opera *La Rosalinda*, see Forsén 2017, 94–95, with further references.

39 The files of the lawsuit were seen by Andreas Thürheim during the late 19th century (Thürheim 1881), but they may have been lost during the Second World War.

replace the mercenary army of the war.[40] He served first as *provveditore generale* in Palmanova, then as commandant and governor of Crema, a Venetian outpost close to Milan,[41] before being transferred to Dalmatia, where, as major general, he had some success in commanding the Venetian troops against the Ottomans during the Second Morean War.[42] He then, in 1730, rose to the rank of lieutenant general.[43] After some years as *Governator dell'Armi* of Zara,[44] he was promoted to commander of all Venetian troops in Northern Italy (at this time amounting to 14,000–15,000 men), a position he held for most of the 1740s, with a seat at Verona.[45]

From 1700 onwards, Erik Sparre continued taking an active part in the social life of Venice, managing to build close contacts with several patrician families, thereby influencing the political life of the republic until his death in 1754. He cut off all contact with Sweden no later than the beginning of the Great Northern War (1700–1721), after which knowledge of his whereabouts was lost. Elgenstierna's record gives him as dying in 1708 as a Venetian major general;[46] in reality, he lived for another 46 years, creating his own Venetian branch of the Sparre family. This previously unknown branch very much resembles the well-known French branch of the Sparre family that was founded in 1675 when Erik Sparre's uncle Peder Larsson Sparre received the French title of count. Many of Peder Sparre's descendants (under the name de Sparre) also had successful military careers—for instance, owning the famous Royal Suédois regiment in France from the 1740s

40 For Erik Sparre becoming *sergente maggiore di battaglia*, see Thürheim 1881, 93. For the process of replacing the mercenary army with a standing army, see Tamburini 2007.

41 ASV, Senato, Deliberazione Terra, Registri b. 241, with the decision of promoting *sergente maggiore di battaglia* Sparre to *provveditore generale di Palma* for three years, 26 January 1700. For the position in Crema, see Thürheim 1881, 100.

42 For Erik Sparre during the Second Morean War, see e.g. *Avvisi italiani, ordinarii e straordinarii*, no. 45, 20 March 1715; no. 123, 31 July 1715; no. 131,1 4 August 1715; no. 144, 4 September 1715; no. 180, 14 October 1716; no. 85, 25 May 1718; no. 90, 1 June 1718.

43 ASV, Savio di Terraferma, Decreti e scritture, b. 181, 23 December 1730.

44 De Benvenuti 1940, 260.

45 ASV, Savio alla Scrittura, b. 221–23, various Piedeliste del Milizie etc. in Terra Ferma between 31 January 1742 and 1 September 1747.

46 Elgenstierna 1932, 336.

to the 1780s.[47] The predecessor of the Royal Suédois had been commanded by Erik Axelsson Sparre (1665–1726) between 1694 and 1714; he was a second cousin of the Venetian Sparre brothers, rising to become French lieutenant general and field marshal, and later, after his return to Sweden, to Swedish general and field marshal.[48]

At the same time as Erik Sparre rose to the highest echelons of the Venetian army, another officer hailing from the Swedish realm (more exactly, from Estonia), Baron Bernhard Otto Rehbinder (1662–1742), rose first to lieutenant general of the Duchy of Savoy and later field marshal and commander-in-chief of the Kingdom of Sardinia. He also commanded a regiment of his own, the Reggimento Rehbinder, which he had raised in Württemberg.[49] Rehbinder's path to Northern Italy had begun in the Netherlands, from where, during the War of Spanish Succession (1701–1714), he had become involved in Italy via France. Erik Axelsson Sparre and Rehbinder must have known Erik Sparre and one can assume that some knowledge about his Venetian career would have spread to Sweden via them, although apparently never reaching Elgenstierna.

One of Erik Sparre's sons, Giovanni Gustavo Sparre, rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Venetian army. He died at the age of 60, leaving behind four teenage children, who were taken care of by their grandfather, who at his death left large outstanding debts.[50] The oldest daughter Elisabetta (Isabella) married well into the patrician Sorranzo family.[51] One of the boys, Carlo Sparre, received a company of his own, thanks to his well-known grandfather, but died as a major in 1782 in Zara at the age of only 38.[52] One of Carlo Sparre's sons,

47 For Peder Larsson Sparre, see Asker 2006; for the French de Sparre family, see Jullien de Courcelles 1827, 265–68; for *Royal Suédois*, see e.g. Beckman 1995.

48 Elgenstierna 1932, 412.

49 For Bernhard Otto Rehbinder, whose imposing grave monument has been preserved in the church of Spirito Santo in Turin, see e.g. Rehbinder 1907; Carutti 1909; Elgenstierna 1931, 205. Bernhard Otto Rehbinder left Sweden to wage war on the Dutch side against France in 1688, together with his younger brother Fabian Wilhelm Rehbinder. The latter rose to colonel in Holland during the 1720s.

50 See BMC, Codex Cigognia 2432, Fransesco Vendramin to Savio alla Scrittura, 25 ovember 1782; ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni Terra, b. 2193, 6 April 1754.

51 Schröder 1831, 282.

52 According to ASV, Savio alla Scrittura, b. 223, Piedelista 1745–1768, Stato del Reggimento Colonello Michiel Molari 15 February 1768/1769, Carlo Sparre

the adventurer and former lieutenant Vincenzo Sparre, joined the Dalmatian Carbonari and was arrested by Venetian-Austrian police while returning from Dalmatia to Venice in 1814.[53] In 1817, by decision of the Heraldic Committee set up by the Austrian authorities, he lost his right to use the title of baron as he could not put forward any proof of having the right to carry a noble title, thereby putting an end to the little-known Venetian branch of the Sparre family.[54]

The Schiller Brothers: Gaining from the Reduction

As we have seen, the reduction of 1680 caused large problems for many families of the old nobility. Von Königsmarck and the Sparre brothers were among those severely hit, something which encouraged them to leave Sweden and try their luck as military entrepreneurs. At the same time, the huge social changes introduced by the reduction offered opportunities for families of the bourgeoisie to rise to become ennobled. An interesting example is supplied by the brothers Johan and Magnus Schiller, whose climb in society was closely connected to their attempt to please Karl XI through work on the reduction. Their father, Magnus Schiller (1614–1671), had been professor eloquentiae at Upsala University, private secretary to Queen Kristina, and chief district judge; their mother was the daughter of the mayor of Stockholm.[55] Johan Schiller was apparently gifted, and made a career as chamberlain at the royal commission for the reduction of lands from the Swedish nobility. His career at the commission came to a sudden end towards the end of 1690 when he was accused of having cut out and destroyed

was born in 1744 in Verona. He started serving as captain in 1761 and was promoted to major in 1781, but died less than a year later (ASV, Savio alla Scrittura, b. 230, Piedelista 1780–1783, details for Reggimento Colonello Murari, 1 March 1781 (still captain); 1 September 1781 (already major); 1 March 1782 and 1 September 1782 (mentioned as deceased). See also BMC, Codex Cigognia 2432, Francesco Vendramin to Savio alla Scrittura, 25 November 1782, asking for the right of Carlo Sparre's company to be transferred to the older of his two underaged sons.

53 Ostoja 1970, 52, 84.

54 ASV, Senato, Commissione araldica, Atti, pezzo 248, Vincenzo Sparre to Imperiale Reggia Commmissione araldica sedante in Venezia, 17 May 1817.

55 Elgenstierna 1932, 16–17, adliga släkten Schillerfelt nr. 543.

one page of the royal registrature archive. Because of this he was condemned to three days' pillory, whipping, and expulsion from Sweden.[56]

Schiller had in the registrature archive found a decision taken by the Swedish Estates in 1527, according to which all land given to the Church after 1453 was to be withdrawn to the state. However, Gustav Vasa had reversed the decision in 1529 and the fiefs had thus been returned to their old owners. Destroying Gustav Vasa's reverse decision in the registrature archive made it look as if the crown still had a claim on this land. The crown would thereby have the right to reclaim 4200 estates, the gain of which was estimated at as much as a million Reichstaler in silver. Johan Schiller and his brother Magnus had apparently been raised to the nobility shortly before the discovery in the archive, on the grounds of documents put forward by themselves proving that they descended from a medieval noble family. However, they were still waiting to receive the patent of nobility (*adelsbrev*), a process which was frozen when Johan Schiller was accused of having falsified the documents in the registrature archive.[57]

Sven Leijonmarck, the secretary of the National Archives, had become well known for opposing demands from the royal commission for the reduction of lands that were based on false allegations.[58] He managed to prove that Schiller had destroyed Gustav Vasa's reverse decision, by finding a copy of it elsewhere in the archive. Schiller defended himself, maintaining that, contrary to Leijonmarck, who was known to speak for the nobility, he and worked for the best interests of the crown. According to Schiller, he had been pressured from above to carry out this action, but by whom remained unclear, although rumours mentioned two higher officials in the Chamber College

56 Fryxell 1852, 242–48; Schlegel and Klingspor 1875, 255–56. Fryxell gives a much more negative picture of Johan Schiller than Schlegel and Klingspor, stating that, as early as the beginning of his career, Schiller had forged records to gain advantage in various situations.

57 According to Schlegel and Klingspor 1875, 255–56, the decision to raise the brothers to the nobility had been taken early in October 1690, just before Johan Schiller revealed his find in the registrature. According to Rothlieb 1829, 157–58, the brothers had been raised to nobility in April 1690. The allegation of Fryxell 1852, 244, according to which Johan Schiller would have been promised a position in the House of Nobility as thanks for his find in the archive, is thus not correct.

58 Ylikangas 1967, 21–22; Jägerskiöld 1977–1979, 498.

(*kammarkollegiet*).[59] It was never proven whether Schiller acted alone or whether he had been incited by somebody else. However, when it was proved that he had destroyed the reverse decision in the registrature he had to be punished, no matter how favourable the case would have been for the crown.

Johan Schiller was first thrown in prison, from where his brother helped him to escape. However, he was caught anew and forced to stand in the pillory, after which he was expelled from Sweden. Karl XI had at the last minute pardoned him from whipping, in gratitude for which Schiller wrote a thanksgiving poem to him.[60] Even after the unveiling of the crime, the king seems to have remained benevolent towards the Schiller brothers. Magnus Schiller, who had tried to help his brother to flee, was not punished in any way but rather raised to the nobility in July 1692 under the name Palmstierna, based on the same documents concerning their descent to which the brothers had referred in 1690.[61] These documents have recently been proved to be forgeries.[62]

Johan Schiller first fled to France but later ended up in Northern Italy, now under the name Giovanni Ottone de Sturmfelt (Johan Otto Sturmfelt/Stormfelt), pretending to be of German nobility, which helped him to begin a military career. He served for the Venetian army in the Levant as a volunteer in 1692, taking part in the siege of Chania, after which he contemplated joining the army of the Duke of Savoy fighting the French. However, in March 1693 he offered his service for a second campaign for the Venetian Republic, wishing to receive the *stipendio* of a captain.[63] Subsequently, he was hired by the Duke of Parma and Piacenza, in whose service he had risen to lieutenant colonel by 1705, when he appears to have married a well-off German widow.[64] He finally became colonel and governor of the province Val Tidone and Castel San Giovanni, an area located 10–15 km to the west/

59 Fryxell 1852, 244–47.
60 Rothlieb 1829, 158; Fryxell 1852, 247–48.
61 Elgenstierna 1930, 641–42.
62 Gillingstam 1992–1994, 685.
63 ASV, Collegio, Suppliche commesse ai savi, b. 573, 7 March 1693. See also Hakkarainen 2017, 39–40.
64 RA, Stockholms domkapitel, protokoll, huvudserie SE/SSA/0148/AI/58 (1705), 54, Application by his brother Magnus Schiller for his sake, asking for a certificate attesting that Lieutenant Colonel Johan Otto de Sturmfeldt neither was, nor ever had been, married in Sweden.

south-west of Piacenza, a position in which he, according to his own words, was in charge of both the military and police of the province, in total amounting to 4000 men.[65]

Contrary to Erik Sparre, Johan Schiller, alias Sturmfelt, kept up good contacts with his family in Sweden, even being visited in Italy for seven months by his nephew Nils Palmstierna during the 1720s. On his way to Piacenza, Palmstierna stopped for a while in Turin as the guest of Bernhard Otto Rehbinder, commander-in-chief of the Sardinian army, whom he had clearly heard about before. Palmstierna never continued to Venice and thus we do not know whether he was aware of Erik Sparre.[66]

Gustaf Fredrik Lewenhaupt: Maltreated by the Crown

Gustaf Fredrik Lewenhaupt's father, Ludwig Wierich Lewenhaupt (1622–1668), was married to Countess Charlotte von Hohenlohe-Neuenstein und Gleichen. The family had previous strong connections to the German world, having owned estates there since the days of Gustaf Fredrik Lewenhaupt's great-grandfather Axel Lewenhaupt (1554–1613), whose first wife had been Sidonia von Daun, Countess of Falkenstein.[67] The Lewenhaupt family was hit hard by the reduction,

65 RA, Palmstiernska släktarkivet, E4995, Sturmfelt to his sister-in-law Brita Margareta Palmstierna, 15 July 1724. According to Fryxell 1852, 248, Schiller ended his days as major, which does not seem to fit with the fact that he was already a lieutenant colonel in 1705. According to Schiller 1909, 235, another tradition maintains that he ended his days as major general. Rothlieb 1829, 158, is more exact, giving his last grade as 'Sergeant-Major och Gubernator'. A *sergente maggiore* in 17th-century Italy would be equivalent to a major today, but there was also the rank of *sergente maggiore di battaglia*, which corresponded to brigadier. Erik Sparre, for instance, was *sergente maggiore di battaglia* and governor of Crema during the first years of the 18th century (Thürheim 1881, 93, 100). It is thus possible that Schiller could have been promoted to *sergente maggiore di battaglia* during the last years of his life.

66 For correspondence between Johan Schiller, alias Sturmfelt, and the Palmstierna family, see RA, Palmstiernska släktarkivet, E4993, E4995, and E4996. For Nils Palmstierna's visit to Italy in 1724, see his autobiography from 1760 (RA, Palmstiernska släktarkivet, E4995).

67 Broomé 1977–1979, 615–16.

when both the county of Raseborg in Finland and the baronship of Vinberg in Halland were reclaimed by the crown.[68]

Gustaf Fredrik Lewenhaupt had two brothers and five male cousins who all spent part of their early careers abroad, serving for the imperial army, different German principalities, the Netherlands, France, England, Poland, and Venice. Two of his cousins never returned home: Sten Casimir Lewenhaupt died in 1687 while serving Venice; and Carl Gustaf Lewenhaupt died in 1703 while in service for Saxony.[69] The best known of the eight cousins is perhaps Adam Ludwig Lewenhaupt, who, after having served in Bavaria and the Netherlands for 13 years, returned to Sweden and rose first to fame and later infamy under Karl XII.[70]

Gustaf Fredrik Lewenhaupt married his cousin Anna Catharina Lewenhaupt in 1686, without having received permission from Karl XI; they were therefore forced into exile. Marriages between cousins were prohibited in Sweden in 1678, but from 1680 were possible with royal permission.[71] Such marriages were quite common among the upper nobility: Gustaf Fredrik Lewenhaupt's brother Adam Ludwig, for instance, married the sister of Anna Catharina in 1690; however, aware of his brother's punishment, he did obtain permission from the king. In this perspective, the punishment inflicted on Gustaf Fredrik Lewenhaupt must have appeared unjust or at least heavily exaggerated.

The newly wed exiled young couple found refuge at the Lewenhaupt family estates in the Pfalz, where their first children were born.[72] The region was soon hit by the Nine Years' War (*Pfälzischer Erbfolgekrieg*), in which Lewenhaupt began his career as French *Rittmeister*. In 1690 we find him as lieutenant colonel in Carl Sparre's Brandenburg-Bayreuthian regiment.[73] Shortly afterwards, during the

68 See e.g. Gillingstam 1977–1979, 601.

69 The careers of the eight cousins can be followed in e.g. Elgenstierna 1928, 603–12. Sten Casimir Lewenhaupt was serving in one of Carl Sparre's Brandenburg-Bayreuthian regiments fighting for Venice when he died of illness (Forsén 2017, 70).

70 Artéus 1977–1979.

71 Clementsson 2014, 29.

72 Christian Ludvig Marius Lewenhaupt (1688–1692) was born in Bretzenheim and died in Venice; the second son, Carl Fredrik François Lewenhaupt, was in his turn born in Meissenheim in 1689 (Elgenstierna 1928, 611).

73 Tessin 1982, 24. We have not found any archival sources that verify this.

autumn of 1690, he began negotiations with his uncle, Count Wolfgang Julius of Hohenlohe-Neuenstein und Gleichen, to raise two regiments that the count wanted to 'rent' to Venice. Lewenhaupt was also supposed to function as colonel and brigadier of the regiments in the Levant, dividing the gains with the count. The agreement was finally signed in November 1690, but it took until the autumn of the following year before the last troops had been raised, a large part of whom were French prisoners of war.[74]

Lewenhaupt was followed in the field by his wife and two young children. His story resembles that of Erik Sparre. By the time he left Venice for the Levant, he already owed many people money, and during the war he continually spent more than he earned, partly because he desired to maintain a high standard of living for his family. He thus began to pocket the money meant for the regiments and soon rumours spread about him planning to sell them. The other officers complained to the Count of Hohenlohe-Neuenstein und Gleichen, who eventually filed a lawsuit against Lewenhaupt. According to documents, the Venetian Senate was already aware of the lawsuit in March 1695; it culminated in 1696.[75] Lewenhaupt fled, leaving the regiments behind him in the Levant. Karl XI had died in 1697, thus making it possible for the Lewenhaupt couple to return to Sweden. The new king, Karl XII, decided to protect Lewenhaupt against the Count of Hohenlohe-Neuenstein und Gleichen and against angry officers to whom he owed salary for the last years in the Levant; some of those officers followed Lewenhaupt to Germany and even to Sweden.[76]

74 For the treaty, see Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hohenlohe-Zentralarchiv Neuenstein (HZAN), Archiv Schillingfürst, Wilhelmsdorf I, Truppenwerbung für Venedig, Sf 35 Bü 255; for the march of the last contingent of troops to Venice and Lido, see Sf 35 Bü 266.

75 ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni Mar, b. 162, 3 March (fol. 48). For the lawsuit, see HZAN, Archiv Schillingfürst, Wilhelmsdorf I, Truppenwerbung für Venedig, Sf 35 Bü 276, Rechtsstreit zwischen dem Grafen Wolfgang Julius von Hohenlohe-Neuenstein und Gustav Fredrik von Löwenhaupt (1692–1695), 1696.

76 ASV, Collegio, suppliche commesse ai savi, b. 574, 4 July 1695, petition of Giovanni Tomaso Rottenhofer. Even more interesting is the petition of Lieutenant Colonel Ghintermayer from June 1700 (ASV, Collegio, suppliche commesse ai savi, b. 576). Ghintermayer had in vain tried to follow Lewenhaupt to Germany, but later returned to Venice, requiring the republic to reimburse him for

After his return, in 1701 Lewenhaupt was given a command as colonel of a cavalry regiment, with which he took part in the Battle of Helsingborg in 1710. After the battle, the Privy Council suggested that he should be promoted to major general, a decision which, however, was not confirmed by Karl XII, who apparently was not pleased with him. Eventually, in 1717, the king even deprived Lewenhaupt the rights to his regiment, accusing him of not having reported correctly as to how he had used the funds assigned to the regiment. When stepping down, Lewenhaupt took along the communion vessel of the regiment on the pretext that the crown actually owned him money. Ulrika Eleonora later reconstituted Lewenhaupt and appointed him lieutenant general in 1719. As a supporter of Ulrika Eleonora and Fredrik I, in 1720 Lewenhaupt tried to encourage the parliament to enlarge the royal rights. Two years later he was involved in the Stobée scandal, which was directed against Carl Fredrik, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp and a former claimant to the Swedish throne, but died before having to defend himself against the charges raised against him.[77]

The Lewenhaupt couple never left Sweden again, due to the lawsuit and the Great Northern War. Nevertheless, they maintained their contacts in Europe. Their oldest son, Carl Fredrik François, who had grown up in Frankfurt-am-Main, Venice, and Greece, inherited the rights to the lands of Falkenstein, Reitpoltzkirchen, and Bretzenheim in Germany. He received permission to leave Sweden in 1713, apparently living off his German estates until, during the 1730s, he sold the rights to the Duke of Lorraine, finally returning to Sweden in 1736. In 1742, he married Isabella Jakoba d'Andreoli from Milan in 1742, thereby in a way re-establishing contacts to Northern Italy.[78]

Conclusion

Early modern military entrepreneurship had a large influence on migration. During the late 1670s, Sweden developed from being a realm attracting foreign military entrepreneurs into a realm exporting aristocrats who wanted to gain from the business of war, a phenomenon

his losses. See also RA, Militaria, ansökningar och meritförteckningar M 1115, Johann Christian Mengering to Karl XII, 29 March 1701.

77 Gillingstam 1977–1979, 602.

78 Elgenstierna 1928, 611.

peaking during the last decades of the 17th century. The Swedish subjects enrolling in Venetian service during the Morean War can be seen as part of this wave of Swedish aristocrats engaged in military entrepreneurship who, during these decades, left their home in an attempt to build careers in a wide range of European countries, all the way from the German principalities, via Holland and France, to Venice and other Italian principalities.

Migration is typically dependent on both push and pull factors. The long peace that the Swedish realm enjoyed between 1679 and 1700, together with the new allotment system, made it difficult for young aristocrats to forge a military career. Dissatisfaction with the royal autocracy and the reduction of fiefs that had previously been granted to the nobility were two other push factors encouraging aristocrats to leave Sweden. The old land-owning nobility, which through their land holdings had enjoyed a certain independence against royal power, now became dependent on the crown, at the same time having difficulties in keeping up the standard of life to which they had become accustomed. The possibility of building a career abroad offered an alternative way forward. At the same time, emigration was supported by pull factors, such as existing transnational networks, especially among the upper nobility. There was also a strong demand for skilled officers on the European market, with the Venetians in particular continuously having approached the Swedish crown after the Thirty Years' War asking for military assistance.

The business of war offered the young men leaving the Swedish realm a chance to gain military experience and, if successful, even to earn well and to create a new future far away from Sweden. Some managed to achieve impressively high positions abroad. Meanwhile, the enormous changes brought about in Swedish society by the reduction of estates and the new military allotment system created possibilities for social mobility. Those who pleased the crown could rise fast and even compete with the old nobility. Where their ascent in society went wrong, as it did for Johan Schiller, they could always follow in the footsteps of the aristocrats offering their services on the pan-European military enterprise market. Little attention has been paid in Swedish national writing to those leaving their country during the late 17th century, something that has partly impaired our understanding of how

deeply connected Sweden was to the political and military developments on the European continent during the early modern period.

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PART III

Finances

CHAPTER 9

Financing the War in Livonia, 1617–1626

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Abstract

This study examines the financing of the war in Livonia from 1617 to 1626 between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden, an issue that has not been previously addressed in the literature. These years have marked significant developments in the struggle for control over this region. The research seeks to answer the following questions: Who supported the warring parties in the conflict? What forms did this support take? How significant was this contribution, both numerically and proportionally? What societal functions and roles did supporters assume within their respective countries, and to what extent did their public and private roles overlap? In my opinion, analysing the costs of the war in Livonia may provide a new perspective on the conflict.

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Introduction

The Italian condottiero Gian Giacomo Trivulzio (1440–1518) once said 'To carry on war, three things are necessary: money, money, and yet more money.'[1] The rulers and commanders were perfectly convinced of this during the war between the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden in Livonia in 1617–1626. It was one of the breakthrough periods during the conflict, lasting from 1600 to 1660. In the first phase of the war, the Polish–Lithuanian side achieved significant success on the battlefield despite limited available finances. A perfect example here is the Battle of Kircholm in 1605. In this battle, the elite Polish–Lithuanian army, composed of excellent cavalry, and fighting despite being funded only on the promise of remuneration afterwards, practically destroyed the Swedish army. Poles and Lithuanians, taught by experience, expected a repetition in 1617–1626: easy victories without significant financial investment. However, the former victors were unpleasantly surprised by another Swedish strategy. Gustav II Adolf and his commanders avoided battles and used field fortifications.[2]

This chapter showcases another important element that can better explain the Swedish success, an element that has not been addressed in previous research. In 1617, Sweden captured Pernau (Estonian Pärnu), its first lasting success in the war. Gustav II Adolf captured Riga four years later, the symbolic and financial key to Livonia. In 1626, the same ruler defeated the Lithuanian army in a major pitched battle for the first time, at Wallhof (Latvian Valle).[3] In examining this breakthrough period in the war, I will analyse the effectiveness and usefulness of private military support solutions. Who supported the warring parties in the conflict? What forms did this support take? How significant was this contribution, in terms of both numbers and percentages? What societal functions and roles did supporters assume in their countries, and what was the overlap between these people's public and private roles? To determine the extent of private individuals' contribution to financing the war, we must answer four further questions: how much money did both countries spend on the war in Livonia between 1617 and 1626? Which side spent more? Were there any breakthrough

1 Heinl 2014.
2 Frost 2000, 102–4; Balcerek 2021.
3 Frost 2000, 102; Balcerek 2024b.

moments in these expenses? And did increased spending translate into successes in the war?

When analysing the costs of the war in Livonia, I focus on three key issues. First, I present the expenses of both countries from 1617 to 1626. I then discuss additional sources of money, particularly loans from military personnel, those taking part in hostilities, government officials, private individuals, and even foreign countries. In the third section, I focus on the potential return on investment: success in the Livonian War. To answer the above questions, I first turned to available studies and published sources, particularly those written in the second half of the 20th century and afterwards. In 1968, Jan Wimmer presented an outline of the problem and the first estimated Polish–Lithuanian costs for individual campaigns.[4] His findings were the basis for further work on this issue. Despite the passage of time, some of the data provided by Wimmer is still valid, and I use it in what follows. In his next publication, Wimmer aimed to 'determine at least approximately the financial possibilities of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 17th century'.[5] In 1974, Axel Norberg's book *Polen i svensk politik 1617–1626* was published, providing the first estimate of the Swedish costs.[6] Despite the passage of time, Norberg's study is the only one concerning Sweden in this period and it is therefore crucial for my analysis.

Another breakthrough in this matter has been provided by the work of Anna Filipczak-Kocur, who has spent several decades researching the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth's treasury, investigating archives and libraries in Northern, Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Russia, and Sweden. Thanks to her efforts, we have an excellent base for the financing of the Polish and Lithuanian military efforts. In 1985, the book *Skarb koronny za Zygmunta III Wazy* was published.[7] A work on the Lithuanian treasury during the reign of Sigismund III and Władysław IV came out almost a decade later.[8] In 2006, the book Filipczak-Kocur published was *Skarbowość*

4 The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth had two separate treasuries and armies, for the crown (Poland) and Lithuania. See Wimmer 1968.
5 Wimmer 1969, 5.
6 Norberg 1974.
7 Filipczak-Kocur 1985.
8 Filipczak-Kocur 1994.

Rzeczypospolitej 1587–1648. Projekty-ustawy-realizacja, which combined and corrected the earlier works.[9] A corrected and updated version appeared in 2023.[10]

The work on the finances of both sides is ongoing. It is worth mentioning two articles by Przemysław Gawron. In the first one, 'Udział hetmanów litewskich w przygotowaniu kampanii wojennej na przykładzie zmagań ze Szwecją w roku 1625', the author presented the expenses of the Lithuanian *hetmans* (the highest military commanders) Leo Sapieha and Christopher II Radziwiłł in the campaign in Livonia.[11] In the second, he discussed the expenses of the Lithuanian *hetman* Jan Karl Chodkiewicz in an early period.[12]

The numerical data in the above-mentioned literature constitutes a good foundation for analysing the financing of the war in Livonia from 1617 to 1626. There are also important primary sources that contain accounts necessary for this stud. Some of them were published in 1865 by Julius Mankell.[13] Other equally crucial accounts were published in the edition of the writings of Axel Oxenstiernas, *Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brefvexling*.[14] In my study, I have also used sources from the Militieräkningar in the Krigsarkivet (Military Archives of Sweden) for 1617–1626, which have not yet been published.

Comparing the finances of both fighting sides in Livonia requires presentation. The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden used different monetary systems—the Polish (crown) and Lithuanian zloty and the Swedish daler—although both were silver-based. The purchasing power of these currencies differed in the capitals and the provinces. The price range within countries was extensive, and there was also a difference between the prices of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Swedish prices. Thus, averaging can lead to distortions of the results. Because of this, I decided to calculate the silver content in coins in both countries: this is a straightforward method that minimises the risk of distortions associated with averaging.

9 Filipczak-Kocur 2006.
10 Filipczak-Kocur 2023.
11 Gawron 2015.
12 Gawron 2019.
13 Mankell 1865.
14 Styffe 1888; Jönsson 2007.

At the time, the zloty was only a unit of calculation. According to the ordinance of 1580, it was divided into 30 groszes. One grosz weighed 1.9 g and contained 0.6821 g of pure silver. Thus, 1 zloty contained 20.463 g of pure metal. For 1617–1626, this value was subject to decline, owing to coin deterioration. In 1617–1618, 1 zloty contained only 15.66 g; in 1619–1620, 9.90 g; in 1621–1622, 9.27 g; and in 1623–1626, just 8.82 g.[15] These constant changes confused the market, as coins with the same denominator but different silver content were in circulation at the same time.

The Swedish daler used for military bills was not exactly the same as that used in everyday life.[16] The accounting dalers had a value of 4 marks. In 1604–1633, 1 mark contained 4.0503 g of silver, meaning that 1 daler contained 16.2012 g.[17] I have adopted these values in further estimates of war expenses. The dalers used for standard purchases, however, were subject to change: at the beginning of the war, they were divided into 4.5 marks; in 1629, they were divided into 14.5 marks.[18]

War in Livonia in 1617–1626

Three military campaigns took place in Livonia between 1617 and 1626. The first occurred in 1617–1618, as a result of the murder of representatives of the Courland-Semigallia nobility at the Landtag in Mitau (Latvian Jelgava) in 1615. The investigation accused Prince William, who managed the western part of the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia, of ordering the murder. At the Sejm (the Commonwealth's parliament) in 1616, the prince was deprived of power and sentenced to banishment, the only case in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth's history. His exile was taken advantage of by Wolmar Farensbach, the Governor of Courland, who asked Sweden for help. The monarchy of Gustav II Adolf was at this time struggling with the aftermath of the disastrous Kalmar War against Denmark–Norway (1611–1613), and the still ongoing Ingrian War (1609–1617) against Muscovy. Since Sweden was still heavily engaged, war-weary, and financially overextended (because of the large reparations being paid to Christian IV),

15 Żabiński 1981, 111–13.
16 Björklund and Schiavone 2021, 64; Björklund 2021, 26.
17 Edvinsson 2009a, 56, 59.
18 Edvinsson 2009a, 148–49, 192, 212–13; Edvinsson 2009b, 45, 56.

the Swedes did not want to get involved in an expensive new conflict in Livonia. However, resources were found thanks to a loan from the Dutch Republic. The borrowed money allowed Sweden to send over a small contingent, of 2600 soldiers. Thanks to the effect of surprise and the alliance with Wolmar Farensbach, the Swedish commander Nils Stiernsköld managed to capture Pernau, an important port on the Gulf of Riga. As it later turned out, this was Sweden's first permanent acquisition in the war with the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Lithuanian side tried to recover the losses, but their conflicts with Russia and the Ottoman Empire did not allow the effort to be concentrated in one place.[19]

The second campaign took place in 1621–1622. In 1621, Gustav II Adolf took advantage of the involvement of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in the war with the Ottoman Empire and did not extend the truce signed in 1618. That summer, his armies landed in Livonia and, after a siege of over a month, captured Riga, the region's largest and most prosperous city. This success was quickly monetised because the townspeople of Riga had to make a 'donation' to Gustav, which allowed him to repay the many loans taken out by Sweden to organise the campaign. Gustav's subsequent advances were blocked by the Lithuanian field *hetman* Christopher II Radziwiłł, who financed the war activities partly from his own pocket. Thanks to Radziwiłł's efforts, the Lithuanian army recovered some of the losses from 1621.[20]

The third campaign took place in 1625–1626. Sweden again received loans and resumed hostilities in Livonia. The troops of Gustav II Adolf managed to occupy almost all of Livonia north of the Daugava River, Semigallia, and a minor part of Lithuania. The actions of the Lithuanian side were hampered by a conflict among the highest commanders, each of whom acted separately. During this phase of the war, the Lithuanian grand *hetman* Leo Sapieha and the field *hetman* Christopher II Radziwiłł raised numerous armies with their own money. In January 1626, the frand *hetman*'s Lithuanian army was defeated in the Battle of Walhof at the end of the campaign. It was the first significant defeat of the Lithuanians since the beginning of the war, and marked a significant turning point.[21]

19 Balcerek 2012, 134–204; Balcerek 2024a, 855.
20 Balcerek 2008; Balcerek 2022.
21 Balcerek 2012, 301–19, 329–49.

Expenses

I will start with the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Based on the data collected by Wimmer and Filipczak-Kocur, the country spent 2,345,150 zlotys between 1617 and 1626, which converts to 39,350.818 kg of silver. This represented only 18 per cent of the total budget (56 per cent for Lithuania).[22] Most of this money was spent on pay. We do not have complete data, but in the case of the crown treasury's expenditure on the Livonian War in 1621–1623, the salary costs amounted to 100 per cent of the budget.[23] (The plan for the war with the Ottoman Empire in 1621 assumed as much as 96 per cent.[24]) Piotr Guzowski, Karol Łopatecki, and Radosław Poniat calculated that, during the War in Livonia in 1557–1570, the pay was 84 per cent.[25] Soldiers were expected to equip themselves with a horse and arms, and provide their own food. The state supported the cavalry only during the winter, with accommodation and food provided in kind, which often left no trace in the accounts.[26]

For comparison, based on the data from Mankell, Oxenstierna, and the study by Norberg, Sweden spent 7,683,479 dalers during this period, translating into 124,481.572 kg of silver.[27] Thus, the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth spent far less than Sweden, despite having more significant demographic and territorial potential. The reason may lie in the increased fiscal effort of the Scandinavian state, which had been observed since the reign of Gustav Vasa.[28] We see a significant difference in the approach to fiscal matters here. It was one of the foundations that allowed Sweden to gain an advantage over the Polish–Lithuanian state. In both cases, the states bore the costs of the salaries. In Sweden, the state also supplied weapons, equipment, and

22 Wimmer 1968, 42; Filipczak-Kocur 2023, 161, 164, 169, 172, 174, 176, 178, 368–69, 371, 374–77, 379.

23 Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie (Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw), Archiwum Skarbowe Koronne II (Crown Treasury Archive II), no. 42, fols. 198r–v, 232r–v.

24 Muzeum Narodowe w Krakowie. Biblioteka Czartoryskich (National Museum in Kraków, The Czartoryski Library), Ms 390/IV/Rkps, 49–50.

25 Guzowski, Łopatecki, and Poniat 2022, 112.

26 Wimmer 1968.

27 Mankell 1865, 31, 37–39, 41–42; Styffe 1888, 375–89, 398–401, 404–10; Norberg 1974, 45, 120, 133, 274.

28 Forssberg 2014, 170.




Figure 9.1: Expenditures of Lithuania (the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth) and Sweden on the war in Livonia, 1617–1626, in silver (kg). In the case of military campaigns, the highest calculations were used, as they were considered more realistic. For the years 1623–1624, the peace plans were accepted.

Sources: Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1617/1; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1624/23; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1624/24; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1624/25; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1625/3; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1625/5; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1625/7; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1625/25; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1625/26; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1625/30; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1626/21; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1626/47; Mankell 1865, 31, 37–39, 41–42; Styffe 1888, 375–89, 398–401, 404–10; Wimmer 1968, 42; Norberg 1974, 45, 120, 133, 274; Filipczak-Kocur 2023, 161, 164, 169, 172, 174, 176, 178, 368–69, 371, 374–77, 379.

food.[29] In the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, this had to be taken care of by the soldiers, who were mostly the ruler's subjects. The state and society thus shared the costs in the Commonwealth. Only during the winter did the state support the cavalry with lodging and food.

Figure 9.1 depicts the evolution of Sweden's spending advantage over the years. This advantage was already significant during the campaign in 1617 (3:1), 1618 (2:1), 1621 (2:1), and 1622 (3:1). In 1625, Sweden allocated 27 times more silver than the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. In 1626, Sweden turned its attention to Prussia,

29 See, for example, Krigsarkivet (Military Archives of Sweden), Militieräkningar 1537–1827, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1621/5; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1622/4; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1622/15; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1623/32; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1623/35; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1626/24.




Figure 9.2: Percentage of expenditures of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden on the war in Livonia, 1617–1626

Sources: Mankell 1865, 31, 37–39, 41–42; Styffe 1888, 375–89, 398–401, 404–10; Wimmer 1968, 42; Norberg 1974, 45, 120, 133, 274; Filipczak-Kocur 2023, 161, 164, 169, 172, 174, 176, 178, 368–69, 371, 374–77, 379.

dropping in its spending on Livonia. Nevertheless, the 5:1 advantage was sufficient to retain most occupied castles and towns in the region.

Figure 9.2 shows the percentage of expenditures of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden on the war in Livonia from 1617 to 1626. The difference between the leading players was significant and corresponded to the predominance of the Scandinavian monarchy. Lithuania's contribution is interesting, as it spent only slightly less proportionately on the war on the Daugava River than Sweden. However, Lithuanian financial resources were much smaller than Swedish ones, so the involvement of Lithuanians could not significantly influence the outcome of the conflict.

Additional Sources of Financing: Loans

The primary sources of financing for the war were taxes on cultivated land, customs duties, and other levies imposed on both sides of the Baltic Sea. However, these sources were insufficient to cover the growing

war expenses and operated with a delay.[30] As a result, the ruling circles of both countries had to seek additional funds elsewhere.

In theory, loans were the ideal source of quick and significant funds. Here, we can distinguish support from military personnel participating in hostilities, government officials, private individuals, and even foreign countries. In the case of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, the highest-ranking commanders—Lithuanian *hetmans*—granted loans (see Figures 9.3 and 9.4). Each *hetman* can be treated as a military entrepreneur. The king selected only wealthy aristocrats for this office so that they could hold office with dignity and financially support the treasury, giving it cheap and quick credit necessary for recruiting troops.[31] *Hetman* Radziwiłł lent the state 21,000 zlotys (34.97 kg of silver) for the campaign of 1617, which constituted as much as 30 per cent of the war budget (69,046 zlotys).[32] During the next campaign, in 1621–1622, Radziwiłł spent 46,843.33 zlotys (434.24 kg of silver) of his money, which constituted 4.69 per cent of the war budget in 1621–1623 (997,781 zlotys).[33] In 1625, the *hetman* allegedly lent 120,000–250,000 zlotys (1058.40–2205.00 kg) and used this money to pay between 3000 and 3600 soldiers.[34] In 1626 the Sejm awarded him only 114,687 zlotys (1011.54 kg of silver).[35] This means that his private contribution was equal to 61.46 per cent of state expenditure (186,594.5 zlotys). The unrecognised amount by the Sejm was 250,000 zlotys, representing a 134 per cent contribution to the budget. The difference between the total amount and the reimbursement, a total of 135,313 zlotys, became a non-refundable loan from the *hetman* to the state.

In 1625, the *hetman* Sapieha spent 136,594.33 zlotys (1204.76 kg). The state contributed only 49,493 zlotys, which made a total of 186,594.50 zlotys.[36] The *hetman*'s contribution was 73.2 per cent,

30 Generalstaben 1936, 49–56.

31 *Statut Wielkiego Xiestvva Litewskiego* 1619, 35; Gawron 2010, 136.

32 Filipczak-Kocur 2023, 371. In previous studies, the figure given was 21,405 zlotys (Filipczak-Kocur 1985, 119; Filipczak-Kocur 1994, 74).

33 Gawron 2019, 327.

34 Wisner 1970, 50, 58; Gawron 2015, 100.

35 Gawron 2015, 100; Filipczak-Kocur 2023, 379.

36 According to Anna Filipczak-Kocur,129,096 zlotys. Filipczak-Kocur 2006, 307; Czwołek 2012, 515; Gawron 2015, 92; Gawron 2019, 327; Filipczak-Kocur 2023, 379.



Figure 9.3: Military loans in silver (kg) for Sweden (black text on white background) and the Commonwealth (white text on black background)
Sources; Styffe 1888, 442–43, 450; Norberg 1974, 129–30, 148–49, 208–9, 229–31, 275; Czwołek 2012, 515; Gawron 2015, 92, 100; Gawron 2019, 327; Filipczak-Kocur 2023, 120, 371, 379.

almost three times greater than the state's. It means that the Lithuanian *hetmans* Radziwiłł and Sapieha each paid between two and three times more than the state. With this money, the *hetmans* recruited their private armies. Sapieha's army consisted of 4818 soldiers.[37] As we can see, without the financial support of both *hetmans*, the Lithuanian army would have been significantly smaller, and the success of the Swedish

37 Wisner 1970, 48.




Figure 9.4: Military loans as a percentage of the war budget for Sweden (black text on white background) and the Commonwealth (white text on black background)

Sources: Styffe 1888, 442–43, 450; Norberg 1974, 50, 121–22, 129–30, 148–49, 208–9, 229–31, 275; Czwołek 2012, 515; Gawron 2015, 92, 100; Gawron 2019, 327; Filipczak-Kocur 2023, 371, 120, 379.

military would have been greater.[38] During the earlier campaigns, the *hetmans* supported the state, but to a lesser extent. At the beginning of the conflict, the *grand hetman* of the crown Jan Zamoyski contributed 8 per cent of the entire budget for the war in 1600–1603, and the *grand hetman* of Lithuania Jan Karl Chodkiewicz lent about 6.86 per cent to the state in 1605–1609.[39]

38 Gawron 2015, 92.

39 Filipczak-Kocur 1985, 94–95; Filipczak-Kocur 2023, 120, 123–24, 353. According to Gawron, the *hetman* spent 55,004 zlotys in 1604–1608 (Gawron 2019, 325).

The highest-ranking military commanders in Sweden also supported the state financially (see Figures 9.3 and 9.4). In the autumn of 1621, when the royal treasury was short of money, Marshal Jacob De la Gardie and Colonel Jesper Mattson Krus credited some money to the crown. The following year, De la Gardie credited 22,000 dalers, or 356.43 kg of silver. It represented only 1.6 per cent of the war budget planned for 1622 (1,377,520 dalers). There were also smaller amounts. In 1625, Admiral Carl Carlsson Gyllenhielm and Colonel Nils Stiernsköld each lent 1000 dalers, only 0.04 per cent of the total (2,235,120 dalers). Field Marshal Herman Wrangel paid 3000 dalers from October 1625 to April 1626, constituting 0.16–0.32 per cent of the war budget for 1626 (9,50,744–1,879,000 dalers).[40] Such assistance also in earlier wars. In 1612–1613, during the conflict with Russia, which took place in the break between the struggles in Livonia, the highest commanders paid anywhere between several thousand and several dozen thousand dalers, constituting several per cent of the costs of the campaign.[41]

The above data show that Lithuanian commanders' financial contributions to the war were more significant than those of the Swedish commanders. Lower-ranking soldiers also supported the warring sides. In the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden, this involved service on credit, which was repaid upon the conflict's conclusion. In both cases, the rulers tried to settle the debts with land grants, noble titles, and official positions. Of course, these land grants, titles, and positions went to the officers, not the ordinary soldiers. When the crown could not pay the troops, it had to negotiate with commanding officers, who might pay for the soldiers from their own pockets.[42]

40 Norberg 1974, 129–30, 230–31.

41 Boëthius 1931, 634; Gillingstam 1971, 359; Björklund 2021, 36, 41, 44, 46. See also Chapter 7 in this volume.

42 Biblioteka PAN w Kórniku (Kórnik Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences), MS 7, 11, 15, 19, 23, 27, 31, 35, 39, 43, 59, 64, 67, 71, 75, 105, 113-19, 121, 137, 153, 157, 161, 180, 215, 227, 238, 255-56, 261, 283, 291, 293, 297, 301, 357, 382–83, 389, 441, 451, 463, 469, 499, 503, 507, 511, 515, 159, 523, 527, 531, 535, 539, 543–45, 547, 551; Ibid., MS 293, 7, 11, 15, 19, 23, 27, 31, 35, 39, 43, 59, 64–64, 67, 71, 75, 105, 113–19, 121, 137, 153, 157, 161, 180, 215, 227, 238, 255–56, 261, 283, 291, 297, 301. See also Muzeum Narodowe w Krakowie. Biblioteka Czartoryskich, Teki Naruszewicza (Naruszewicz's Files), vol. 99; Nilsson 1989, 10, 37, 45, 91–118; Björklund 2021, 21–85; Schiavone and Björklund 2023, 41–42.

In the Commonwealth, government officials also facilitated credit for the state. At the beginning of 1626, loans by the Grand Treasurer of Lithuania, Christopher Naruszewicz, amounted to 208,925 zlotys, or 1842.72 kg of silver. Loans to the Lithuanian treasury then amounted to 622,173.1 zlotys, meaning that Naruszewicz's share of the state debt was approximately 34 per cent (see Figures 9.1 and 9.2).[43] A similar situation held in Sweden, altough the officials' extent of support was lower than that of the Lithuanians (Figures 9.3 and 9.4). Gabriel Bengtsson Oxenstierna, the Governor General of Reval (Estonian Tallinn) and Swedish Estonia, privy councillor, and master of the ordnance, lent 6000 dalers, or 97.21 kg of silver, for the campaign of 1625. It represented just 0.27 per cent of the budget planned for that year (2,235,120 dalers).

The Swedish queen dowager, Kristina, donated 50,000 dalers, or 810.06 kg of silver, for the same war, 2.24 per cent of the war budget.[44]According to the statement of support for the crown for the 1625 campaign, the queen was to give 100,000 dalers, which amounted to 12 per cent of this subsidy (828,800 dalers).[45] By comparison, Prince Johan gave 11,750 dalers for the 1625 campaign (0.9 per cent of 1,350,576 dalers in donations and 0.5 per cent of 2,137,571 dalers in expenses).[46] In 1623, Kristina agreed to donate in the first instance 69,250 dalers (1121.93 kg of silver) for the war with the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth planned in 1624.[47] This was 12.88 per cent of the 537,613 dalers of donations. According to another calculation, the donation amounted to 131,000 dalers (9.7 per cent of 1,350,576 dalers of donations and 6.1 per cent of 2,137,571 dalers of planned costs).[48] Later, the conflict cost was increased, and Kristina's donation was proposed to increase to 171,750 dalers (2782.56 kg of silver).[49]

43 Filipczak-Kocur 2023, 379.
44 Norberg 1974, 229–30.
45 Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1625/30.
46 Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1625/26.
47 Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1624/23.
48 Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1625/26.
49 Norberg 1974, 208, 229–30. Various bills were located for the campaign in 1624, including 1,276,316 dalers and 2,598,815 dalers: Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1624/24.

There were further contributions to financing the war in Livonia. In 1617, the city of Riga lent the state 7000 zlotys for military purposes, constituting 10.14 per cent of the amount spent on the war in 1617–1618 (69,046 zlotys; see Figures 9.3 and 9.4).[50] The only more significant contribution by the city was in 1601, which amounted to 13.17 per cent.[51]

On the other side of the Baltic Sea, it was entrepreneurs rather than towns that supported the Swedish state (see Figures 9.3 and 9.4). In 1617, Louis De Geer lent gunpowder and fuses to the state to the value of 2424 dalers, constituting 1.21 per cent of the war budget (200,800 dalers). His support for the crown grew in later years: in 1621, it was 31,807 dalers (3.35 per cent of the war budget); in 1622, 80,557 dalers (5.85 per cent); and in 1625–1626, 6828 dalers (0.002 per cent).[52] In 1621, loans and material support for military purposes amounted to quantities between several thousand and several tens of thousands of dalers granted by several other entrepreneurs, which gave a total of 116,166 dalers (12.24 per cent share in the war budget). Mårten Wewitzer, Michel Günter, Peter Grönenberg, Petter Kruse, Lars Skytte, and others lent from a few thousand dalers to several tens of thousands. Similar help came from these people in subsequent years. For example, in October 1625, Mårten Werwitzer gave 39,750 dalers (59.91 per cent of 66,347 dalers).[53] According to another calculation, for the 1625 campaign, he gave 20,000 (2.41 per cent of 828,800 dalers).[54] This is a significant difference from the Polish–Lithuanian state, which did not receive such support from entrepreneurs.

The support from foreign countries is interesting (see Figures 9.3 and 9.4). In the case of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, no financial help was forthcoming from foreign countries. Permission was granted to recruit troops in the British Isles in 1621; this was related to help in defence against the Ottoman Empire. In the event,

50 Ziemlewska 2008, 158.
51 Filipczak-Kocur 2023, 120.
52 Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1617/17.
53 Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1626/47.
54 Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1625/30. See also Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1617/17; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1625/26; Norberg 1974, 50, 121–22, 148–49, 208–9, 229, 275.

these troops arrived too late and were sent to fight against Sweden in Livonia in 1622.[55]

In the case of Sweden, the Dutch Republic lent money to pay off the war ransom for Älvsborg, which allowed Sweden to attack Livonia in 1617.[56] In 1618, the Swedish crown was to receive 231,000 dalers (154,000 riksdalers), which constituted 41.8 per cent of all loans.[57] In comparison, the state's estimated income in 1615 or 1616 amounted to just 240,000 dalers (3888.29 kg of silver).[58] The financial contribution of the Dutch Republic allowed Sweden to have a strong bargaining position during the peace talks in 1618, helping Gustav II Adolf to retain Pernau.[59] The Hague also supported Stockholm in later years. In 1620, the Dutch loan amounted to 106,640 dalers, with external assistance amounting to 381,265 dalers and an estimated income of 667,665 dalers.[60] The Dutch contribution amounted to 27.94 per cent of the loans and 15.96 per cent of the budget. In addition to the Dutch Republic, the cities of Lübeck and Hamburg and merchants from those cities also provided support.[61] In 1617 and 1618, Sweden attempted to obtain financial support from King James I and VI of England and Scotland, but to no avail.[62]

Return on Investment

In 1616–1618, revenues to the Lithuanian treasury amounted to 548,886 zlotys, including 2666 zlotys from Livonia (41.75 kg of silver), constituting only 0.49 per cent of the budget (see Figures 9.5 and 9.6).[63] How much profit, financially, did Sweden get from owning Livonia and Estonia? It is a tricky question. For example, from 15 December 1623 to 1 August 1624, 242,012 dalers were spent on the garrisons in Livonia. Riga's share was 19,567 dalers (8 per cent) and Livonia's 25,445

55 Borowy 1949, 10–13; Ossoliński 1952, 97–107; Murdoch 2010, 53.
56 Ahnlund 1938, 213–15; Jönsson 2007, 243–44, 249, 262, 264, 268, 270, 272–73, 275, 281–82, 291, 294, 302, 305, 308.
57 Styffe 1888, 446–48.
58 Styffe 1888, 442–43.
59 Balcerek 2024a, 865–66.
60 Styffe 1888, 450.
61 Norberg 1974, 121, 208–9, 230.
62 Thyresson 1928, 134, 137; Norberg 1974, 57; Jönsson 2007, 83.
63 Tyla 1986, 80–81; Filipczak-Kocur 2023, 368.




Figure 9.5: Income derived from holding Livonia, Estonia, and Riga in silver (kg), by Sweden (black text on white background) and the Commonwealth (white text on black background)

Sources: Styffe 1888, 456; Liljedahl 1933, 100–11; Doroszenko 1966, 24, 34–35; Norberg 1974, 148, 231, 274; Doroshenko 1985, 20; Tyla 1986, 80–81; Ziemlewska 2008, 187; Filipczak-Kocur 2023, 368.

(10.5 per cent).[64] In 1625, the city also contributed 19,567 dalers, 2.2 per cent of the 875,160 dalers in additional profits.[65] According to another plan for 1625, Riga's share was 25,000 (22.18 per cent of 112,700 dalers from the Baltic provinces).[66] When planning the budget for the period from autumn 1625 to spring 1626, it was assumed that 60,554 dalers (1685.82 kg of silver) would be obtained: 20,000 from Estonia, 15,854 from Livonia, 13,700 from Riga, 10,000 from Reval, and 500 each from Narva and Pernau. Livonia's contribution represented 11.59 per cent of the 522,501 dalers in revenue.[67] If this money was collected, then this amount constituted 3.22 per cent of the budget for 1626 (1,879,000 dalers). We must remember that this territory's vast swathes were enfeoffed to the crown's creditors, servants, and noblemen. The

64 Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1624/16.
65 Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1625/27.
66 Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1626/47.
67 According to another plan, the Baltic provinces were to provide 116,800 dalers. Norberg 1974, 231, 274.




Figure 9.6: Income derived from holding Livonia, Estonia, and Riga in percentages, by Sweden (black text on white background) and the Commonwealth (white text on black background)
Sources: Styffe 1888, 456; Liljedahl 1933, 100–11; Doroszenko 1966, 24, 34–35; Norberg 1974, 148, 231, 274; Doroshenko 1985, 20; Tyla 1986, 80–81; Ziemlewska 2008, 187; Filipczak-Kocur 2023, 368.

crown would thus not receive all the revenue of conquered and controlled territory, yet its subjects might benefit collectively.

The largest city of Livonia was Riga. Its capture by Sweden in 1621 was a turning point in the entire conflict over the region. When Riga belonged to the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, the annual value of exports from the city between 1611 and 1620 was 24.5 million Riga marks (1 mark equalled 3.503 g of silver), averaging about 2.5 million marks per year (8757.5 kg of silver).[68] Of course, the city's trade was taxed. According to Vitaly Doroshenko, the Riga port tax in Polish–Lithuanian times was about 2 per cent, which gave an average of 50,000 Riga marks per year (175.15 kg of silver).[69] Of this, one third stayed in the city, and from 1603 half of it was spent on the defence

68 Doroszenko 1966, 24, 34–35.
69 Doroshenko 1985, 20.

of Riga during the Livonian War.[70] The average income from the city was thus approximately 87.58 kg of silver (see Figure 9.5). Of course, the amounts raised fluctuated significantly: in 1600, the entire tax collected in Riga amounted to as much as 185,784 Riga marks (65,080 kg of silver).[71] The average expenditure of the Lithuanian treasury on the war in Livonia between 1600 and 1611 amounted to 127,098.25 zlotys, or 2358.75 kg of silver (the median silver content in 1 zloty in the years 1600–1611 was 18.5585 g[72]). This means that half of the average amount from Riga port, 87.58 kg of silver, translated into a 7.79 per cent contribution to the Lithuanian military budget, which must have been significant for the region's defence against Sweden (see Figure 9.6).

When Gustav II Adolf captured Riga in 1621, the townspeople gave the Swedish king the equivalent of 313,339 dalers (7830.34 kg of silver).[73] This amount was almost 90 times greater than half of the Riga tax from the Polish–Lithuanian times, which had not changed in almost four decades, since the surrender of the city to the Polish king Stefan Batory in 1582.[74] We must remember, however, that the payment in 1621 was as much as 33 per cent of the costs incurred to control the city. Additionally, in the autumn of 1622, an agreement was reached according to which Riga was to transfer 24,000 dalers per year to Sweden, half in cash and the rest in grain.[75] This meant that the investment began to be returned to the new owner very quickly—and was recouped in just 11 years, by 1633.[76]

The income derived from owning Riga did not end with taxes. Money was also obtained through customs duties imposed on the trade of goods. According to the Sound Toll Registers Online (STRO), the electronic database of the complete Sound Toll Registers between 1497 and 1857, 1208 ships departed from Riga between 1600 and 1629. For comparison, only 403 ships departed from Stockholm, only

70 Ziemlewska 2008, 187.
71 Filipczak-Kocur 2023, 462.
72 Żabiński 1981, 105, 112–13.
73 Norberg 1974, 148.
74 Ziemlewska 2008, 69–88.
75 Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1624/16; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1624/24; Liljedahl 1933, 100–111.
76 Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1624/16; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1624/24; Balcerek 2024b, 136–37.

a third the number from Riga.[77] In 1617–1626, the ratio of Riga ships to Stockholm vessels was just 1.58:1, which can be explained by the war in Livonia.[78]

The city was one of the most important trading centres on the Baltic Sea, through which much money passed. It allowed Sweden greater access to loans necessary to wage wars.[79] Furthermore, Riga became enormously important for importing grain to the Swedish Empire. This was a strategic commodity that cannot be measured in money alone. For these reasons, Stockholm tried to secure Riga with a strong garrison. In 1622, there were almost 5000 soldiers in the city, costing 175,028 dalers annually (53 per cent was salary).[80] The garrison's payroll included over 6000 soldiers the following year, costing 126,672 dalers.[81] The maintenance costs gradually increased,[82] reaching 301,810 dalers in the period from 1 August 1624 to 1 June 1625.[83] The city was worth it. According to the list from autumn 1625, in Riga there was a garrison of 2,400, compared to 600 in Mitau, 600 in Nyemunde (Latvian Daugagriva), and just 100 in Stockholm, the largest garrison in Sweden.[84]

Conclusion

Swedish successes in the Livonian War have often been attributed to effective ongoing reforms of the Swedish army. While these were undoubtedly a significant contributing factor, this chapter has demonstrated that Sweden also enjoyed a considerable advantage regarding the fiscal resources at its disposal, which were of particular significance.

The Scandinavian state used a wide range of loans apart from taxes. They were provided by military personnel participating in combat, government officials, private individuals, and even friendly countries.

77 Sound Toll Registers Online (STRO), https://www.soundtoll.nl.
78 Compare: Ericsson 1928, 269; Jensch 1930, 88; Heckscher 1936, vol. 2, table V.7; Doroshenko 1985, 55; Harder-Gersdorff 1995, 561.
79 Wilson 2017, 222.
80 Oxenstierna 1888, 382–84.
81 Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0566/G I 1623/37.
82 Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1624/16; SE/KrA/0455/G I 1624/27.
83 Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1624/25.
84 Krigsarkivet, SE/KrA/0455/G I 1625/1.

The topic still requires study, but a preliminary review shows that Sweden led the way in the amount of money collected. An interesting difference was visible in the percentage of support contributed by Lithuanian commanders and officials. Their participation in the war in Livonia was extensive compared to their counterparts on the other side of the Baltic Sea. The best example is the contribution of the Lithuanian *hetmans* Leo Sapieha and Christopher II Radziwiłł to the campaign of 1625. They were each to spend between two and three times more money than the entire state. What is also interesting is the lack of loans from other countries to the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth for the war, with a large share of this type of support going to Sweden. An essential element in raising money for the war was the possession and use of captured areas. The example of Riga shows that Sweden could use its control over the town better than the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.

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CHAPTER 10

Financial Contributions and *Brandskatt* from the Period of the Polish–Swedish War, 1655–1660

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Abstract

During the early modern period, when the Swedes went to war outside their own territory, they transferred the responsibility for providing the army to the inhabitants of the occupied territories. This principle, whereby war was to 'feed itself', was based on the experience of the Thirty Years' War and was introduced to Germany by the armies of Gustav II Adolphus. This chapter aims to define the role of private agents in determining and collecting taxes, as well as their agency. Another issue to be addressed is how to determine the position of the *brandskatt* among the extraordinary war taxes imposed on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and how to compare it with the financial contributions imposed on Old Warsaw. The main sources for this chapter were contribution registers and *brandskatt* register.

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Introduction

Although the Thirty Years' War brought territorial gains to Sweden, the country's financial situation remained difficult. Upon ascending the throne in June 1654, Charles X Gustav began efforts to increase revenue for the treasury—which was all the more important due to plans for starting a new war with the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. As early as January 1655, the Riksdag adopted a draft resolution to abolish hereditary donations and to return to the crown those territories that were essential for the proper functioning of the central administration, which had been excluded from royal jurisdiction mainly during the reign of Queen Kristina.[1]

Despite the steps taken, returns to the central treasury did not increase enough for Charles X Gustav to finance the planned war with the Commonwealth. From the beginning of 1655, the need to rethink the country's key and recurring financial problems was discussed; among other things, it was postulated that the declaration of war on Poland should be withheld until the state's finances were stable and would allow it to freely finance the war effort.[2] At the same time, Magnus De la Gardie, Lord High Treasurer, convinced the members of the Swedish Riksdag that it was possible and advisable to wage war solely using extraordinary taxes and other means, including war contributions imposed.[3]

At the same time, the monarch—drawing on the experience of the Thirty Years' War and Hugo Grotius's assumptions of warfare in the face of 'higher necessity'—persuaded the Riksdag to agree to declare war on Poland; the mobilisation of troops began as early as the beginning of 1655. The king decided that the war would be financed in two ways: the initial action would be paid for by private loans contracted from representatives of Swedish magnate families and wealthy members of

1 By the end of Kristina's reign, approximately 63% of the land in Sweden and Finland was in the hands of the nobility. Regarding the process of carrying out the so-called reduction during the reign of Charles X Gustav, see, for example, Svedelius and Lemón 1849; Dahlgren 1964.

2 Svedelius and Lemón 1849; Dahlgren 1964.

3 Landberg 1968, 55–60; Landberg 1969, 12–14.

the nobility, while its further course would be covered by the collection of extraordinary taxes, namely contributions and *brandskatt*.[4]

The aim of this chapter is to determine the structure of extraordinary war taxes imposed on Warsaw by the Swedish army during the Second Northern War, and to define the role and involvement of private agents in determining and collecting these taxes. The primary sources upon which this article is based are the war tax (contributions) registers from 1655, held at the Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw (Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, AGAD), and another set of extraordinary tax registers, so-called *brandskatt*, of the same year from the collections of the National Archives of Sweden (Riksarkivet) in Stockholm. The 1656 register of contributions, which includes not only property owners but also their tenants, will also be used to supplement the source material. Complementary narrative sources have also been used, such as the Old Warsaw Files, which provide detailed and official information on the situation in the city after the Swedish army entered.[5]

Research on the contribution registers for the early modern era, and especially for the era of the Polish–Swedish wars, has not advanced far. Only a few studies have been written about the organisation of conscription or the concept of warfare, and they certainly do not exhaust the subject; some of them only inform about the existence of an additional type of tribute, *brandskatt*, but the subject requires in-depth research.[6] Due to the fact that the *brandkskatt* from 1655 is the only one available, the current study's timeframe and territorial scope have been limited. This limitation is connected to the region from which the *brandskatt* tax was levied—the analysis will focus solely on the

4 Talks were also held with the French ambassador about buying copper from Sweden, which would bring the country an additional source of revenue. See Landberg 1969, 14–16, 19–23.

5 Printed version in Berdecka *et al.* 1963a; AGAD, Akta Starej Warszawy (Old Town Files), no. 553, 1655; see also Wegner 1957.

6 In their work, both Fritz Redlich and John A. Lynn explained that *brandskatt* was an older type of tax than contributions, on top of which they stressed that it was also less efficient and difficult to fit into the system of war taxes that had been built up since the Thirty Years' War. See Redlich 1956; Redlich 1959; Lynn 1993. For more on the war tax system, see Landberg 1969; Ekholm 1970; Anusik 2009, 147; Radomski 2011, 159–60; Wagner 2013; Radziwonka 2015; Wilson 2017, 454, 471–72; Wagner 2020a; Wagner 2020b, 11–15; Wagner and Kowalski 2022.

area indicated in this tax, which covered the southern suburbs of Old Warsaw (Krakowskie Przedmieście and its environs). It is worth noting that this will be the first attempt at comparative analysis of source material for the southern suburban area based on war tax registers.

The Role of Private Agents and War Taxes Theory

As described by Grotius, the waging of war in the face of a 'higher necessity', such as the defence of borders or the king, granted the armed conflict the status of a just war. In practice, this allowed looting to be carried out in accordance with modern customary law.[7] This issue is also addressed in normative acts, such as the military articles which regulate the situations in which an army can engage in looting.[8] The legalisation of plundering was important, especially since Charles X Gustav, despite lacking financial resources, had decided to declare war on the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1655.

When news reached Warsaw on 21 July 1655 that the Swedish field marshal Arvid Wittenberg had crossed the border of the Commonwealth with his army, the problem was downplayed. The mood changed after the loss of Poznań (31 July 1655). Queen Louise Marie left the city at the beginning of August, when increasingly confusing news about the situation in the country was coming in. On 18 August, King John Kazimir also left the city, but before departing he appealed to the citizens of Warsaw 'to keep watch over the city for the sake of their own safety, and not for the sake of the enemy, but for the sake of some swaggering heap'.[9]

On 8 September, a meeting took place between the trumpeters sent to the gates of Warsaw by Charles X Gustav and representatives of the city magistrate, including the mayor and city councillors. The trumpeter Daniel Reger handed the mayor a letter from the Swedish

7 Grotius 1957, 104–230, 273–310. Various editions of Grotius's work *De iure belli ac pacis* are available. For the purposes of this article, the Polish edition was used.

8 For instance, AGAD, Gustavus Adolphus, 'Krijgs articlar som fordom then stormechtigste furste och herre, herr Gustaff Adolph, then andre och store, Sweriges, Göthes och Wendes konung, storfurste til Finland, hertig vthi Estland och Carelen, herre uthöfwer Ingermanland, etc. loffwärdigst i åminnelse, hafwer låtit göra och författa', Stockholm, 1621.

9 Wegner 1957, 23–24.

monarch demanding an answer 'on certain matters'; although it did not say directly that Charles Gustav demanded the surrender of Warsaw, this was obvious. The Warsaw scribe Franciszek Kazimierz Pruszowski noted in the city records that those assembled 'could not leap … and in humility decided to surrender'. What is more, representatives of the city went to the Swedish king, who was residing about 10 km from Old Warsaw; they confirmed to the king that the city would capitulate, but in such a way 'so that clergy and lay people remain healthy and retain [their] property, [as well as] the freedom to practise their religion and attend church services'. They also confirmed that the city lacked an army, and then to the king they 'laid down their lives and fortunes, though not from a sincere heart'.[10]

Contributions were financial or provisioning levies imposed by foreign armies on occupied urban and rural areas. The funds and goods thus obtained were allocated in their entirety to the needs of the army, and were therefore imposed repeatedly, depending on the needs of the occupying armies. As long as the Swedish army was on its own territory, the provision of goods for the army was carried out by the Swedish state and regulated by local norms; the situation changed when the army went to war. In order to prevent victualling problems, a General Commissariat was set up to supply the army with food, organise transport, collect contributions and tributes in cooperation with the civil and military authorities (according to the principle that 'war feeds itself'), and regulate pay. The planning of the supply service was based on the experience the Swedes had gained during the Thirty Years' War in Germany, and later refined during the stay of Charles X Gustav's army in Poland and Denmark. The guiding principle of Swedish intendantry was to exploit enemy territory as much as possible, but at the same time not to devastate it, because the Swedish army might return there in the future.[11]

Charles X Gustav remained in Warsaw for two days, and before leaving he named Benedict Gabrielsson Oxenstierna as governor of the city. Oxenstierna was helped by city officials, whom he left in office. This officials would organise the stay of the Swedish army, as well as facilitate the collection of contributions, because the municipal authorities knew their residents. However, the mayor and councillors

10 Wegner 1957, 33–34.
11 Wagner 2020b, 12–13; Bäckström 2023, 165–241.

were henceforth entirely dependent on their Swedish superiors. As one researcher of the history of Warsaw during the war with Sweden writes: 'The Swedes, leaving behind the former municipal authorities, often found allies in the patriciate of both Warsaw and Poznań or Kraków. The patriciate cooperated with the Swedes at first, thinking that in this way it would protect its own property from plunder or confiscation.'[12]

Aleksander Giza as mayor went down in history as someone who sought to win the favour of the Swedish troops, as he saw in this action the possibility of protecting the city from destruction. Thanks to his good relations with the Swedish army, he was able to intervene not only in matters concerning Warsaw but also in those relevant to the entire Commonwealth. In addition to the mayor, other members of the Old Warsaw patriciate tried to maintain good relations with the Swedish troops, as it was hoped that in this way they would protect their estates. However, the Swedes imposed tributes on the entire city, which all inhabitants had to pay. An extraordinary tax was soon imposed on the city and suburbs.[13]

Tax registers were prepared not only to maintain order in the collection of taxes but also to see who had paid the tax. They were drawn up by local authorities. In 1655, the Warsaw magistrate entrusted the preparation of a property tariff to Franciszek Kazimierz Pruszowski, a trustee and alderman's scribe. The distribution of the amount set by the Swedish army was left to Stanisław Falkiewicz and Augustyn Orlemus. It is worth noting that the scribe preparing the register received remuneration for this additional work, though it seems that the officials were doing their job out of obligation, despite receiving extra money for the work they put in.[14] At this stage of the research, however, no sources are known that clearly define the attitude of the writers or tax earners to the commissioned work.

The first occupation levy was imposed on the city immediately after the Swedish army entered Warsaw, in September 1655.[15] At that time, the city residents were obliged to pay a total of 240,000 zlotys. This

12 Wegner 1957, 42.
13 Wegner 1957, 40–42.
14 Wejnert 1856, 139–43. At the beginning of the 18th century, in the early years of the Great Northern War, the wage was 6 florins (a florin in practice meant a zloty and was also divided into 30 groshen).
15 Wejnert 1856; Berdecka *et al.* 1963b.

amount was divided between Old Warsaw with its suburbs (75,000 zlotys), New Town (7500 zlotys), and Leszno (4500 zlotys), as well as estates outside the city's jurisdiction (120,000 zlotys) and churches (33,000 zlotys).[16] Moreover, despite attempts by patricians and the wealthy nobility to protect their property, it was their properties (in the suburbs and *jurydykas*) that were obliged to pay the highest taxes. Since churches were exempted from paying the levy, their amount was distributed among the remaining areas. The highest levy per household was 1000 zlotys, while the lowest was 10 zlotys. At the time of the first levy, a barrel of Warsaw beer cost 90 groshen (3 zloty, as there were 30 groshen to 1 zloty), 1000 bricks cost 420 groshen, and the daily wage of an unskilled worker was 10–11 groshen.[17] When collecting the tax, the principle was adopted that the wealthy burghers were to pay a higher rate in order to compensate for possible losses resulting from non-payment of the tax by poorer residents of Old Warsaw. In the event that a taxpayer was unable to pay the tax, the city would advance the appropriate amount on their behalf, which was to be repaid in subsequent years. Some of the taxpayers could not pay the tax in cash, so the Swedish army agreed that the missing 30,000 zlotys should be paid in goods: for example, the apothecary Sebastian donated medicines worth 1710 zlotys, and Marcin Fukier, Julius Ginther, and other burghers donated linen. The last instalments of such 'loans' were repaid in the 1690s.[18]

The practice of imposing contributions by the Swedish army was in force not only in Warsaw but in every city occupied by the army of Charles X Gustav. After the capture of Kraków, the city was obliged to pay 300,000 zlotys—the taxpayers were to include the townspeople, Kraków Cathedral, the Academy, and the Jewish population. The higher tax amount was due to the fact that, at that time, Kraków had

16 Wejnert 1856, 170. Leszno was a *jurydyka* and was founded in 1648. A *jurydyka* was a kind of a small private city that belonged to a wealthy nobleman. According to the definition by Kulejewska-Topolska, a *jurydyka* is 'a settlement of an urban character, set up within a town wall or outside it, on grounds belonging to a town or other suburban owners, exempted from civic jurisdiction, with its own authorities and lawcourts, subject to the supreme authority of the landowner or king, but without municipal laws'. Kulejewska-Topolska 1969, 19.

17 See Adamczyk 1938, 27, 50, 61, 66, 85.

18 Wejnert 1856, 142–43; Wegner 1957, 44.

2.5 times more taxpayers than Warsaw. Additional financial charges were also imposed on monasteries. When, at the turn of 1655 and 1656, the Swedish army received just over half of the requested amount (160,000 zlotys), the remainder was spread out into monthly payments.[19] The situation was similar in Toruń, which was of great strategic importance in Royal Prussia. Its location on the Vistula River also meant that it could obtain funds from river trade, thus providing an additional source of income. As a result, the Swedish army hoped to collect 300,000 zlotys, but ultimately a compromise was reached with the local population and a tax of 60,000 zlotys was agreed.[20]

In preparing the contribution tariff, the wealth of the inhabitants was estimated. Contribution registers include around 800 taxpayers (owners and tenants), representing heads of families, so—due to Warsaw's limited space and the same method of determining city taxes—it was possible to estimate the financial capacity of individual heads of families. The municipal authorities were responsible for distributing the lump sum specified by the Swedish army among individual taxpayers. The taxpayer's wealth was taken into account, based on factors such as the legal status of the property (whether the taxpayer was an owner or a tenant), the type of building material (wooden or masonry structure), the property's location, and the number of tenants (in the case of owners).[21] In the simplest terms, this meant that a burgher who owned a tenement house by the Market Square paid a higher amount than a tenant in a wooden house in a poorer area within or outside the city walls. The wealthy townsmen paid a high tax, while the poorest residents paid a token fee or did not pay at all. It was also agreed that the collection of the contribution was to be supervised by one of the citizens, on behalf of the magistrate.[22] Since the tariffs were prepared by the Polish side, the contributions registers maintained a consistent format during both the Northern War of 1655–1660 and the Great Northern War 1700–1721. The same practice was also used in other Polish cities such as Kraków as Poznań. It was probably derived from a practice using the city's infrastructure at a time when the Swedish commissariat was developing the system. In these registers, after

19 Bieniarzówna and Małecki 1984, 373–76.
20 Cackowski *et al.* 1994, 156–57.
21 Wagner 2020b, 12.
22 Grauers 1976, 124–25; Wagner 2020b, 13.

recording the name of the street where a given taxpayer resided, a clerk would list the taxpayer's first name and surname, or just the surname. In some cases (60–70 per cent), he would also add another distinguishing feature, such as the taxpayer's occupation. The amount paid was recorded at the end. The registers also kept the sequence of the streets, following the order in which the tax collection register was compiled.[23]

The tax collector started collecting taxes from the buildings around the Old Town Market Square—the southern side (today's Zakrzewski side; Figure 10.1, no. 1), the western side (Kołłątaj; no. 2), the northern side (Dekert; no. 3), and the eastern side (Barss; no. 4). Next, he would proceed along Kanonicza (Jezuicka) Street and Św. Jana Street (with both sides listed separately; nos. 5–6), up to the Krakowska Gate (no. 7), along Św. Marcina Street (no. 8), Piekarska Street (no. 9), Piwna Street (no. 10), Dunaj (today's Szeroki Dunaj and Wąski Dunaj; nos. 11a and 11b), Nowomiejska Street (no. 12), and Krzywe Koło Street (nos. 13a and 13b). Having covered the area within the city walls, the tax collector would head to the suburbs, then move along Długa Street, Freta Street, Mostowa Street, and Rybitwia Street, up to the land of Father Jakub Zadzik.[24]

The next area was Krakowskie Przedmieście (starting from the Krakowska Gate to the area of the present-day church of the Nuns of the Visitation, then the other side from the church to Castle Square), including the area behind it (from Karowa Street to Bednarska Street, in the area of today's Adam Mickiewicz and Hoover Squares), as well as the space belonging to the Bernardine convent (later Mariensztat), Dziekańska Street (today Trebacka Street), Ossolińska Street, Przedmiejska Street, and Nowy Świat (a diversified area—from the church of the Nuns of the Visitation to Nowy Świat, including the buildings around the Kazimierzowski Palace, now Tamka Street and Kopernika Street, and Nowy Świat (all on the even-numbered side of the modern Krakowskie Przedmieście and Nowy Świat; see Figure 10.2)). The

23 Wagner 2020a, 562. There is, however, a noticeable difference in the way that the sums paid were recorded in relation to municipal taxes (e.g. *szos*—basic wealth tax paid by burghers in Old Poland to the state treasury). In this case, the payer had a page in the collection book assigned to his property, on which the collector added information about the payment of successive contributions in each year, whereas the contributions were based on the collection of tax from properties located on successive streets.

24 Wejnert 1856.




Figure 10.1: The route of tax collection within the walls of Old Warsaw
Map: Ania Światłowska and the author, based on the image published in Łoziński & Rottermund 1993, 113. Published with permission.

process continued to 'Krakowskie Przedmieście from Stara Zupna to Jazdów' (the odd-numbered side of Krakowskie Przedmieście from Królewska Street to the church of the Holy Cross and Nowy Świat), and finally listed the 'houses on Nalewki' (probably the later Karmelicka Street, Nowolipki Street, and Przejazd Street).[25] The order in which the streets were listed is characteristic of other cities as well. In each case, the process began in the most prestigious areas of the city, such as the market square, and then proceeded along the streets leading away from the market square, inhabited by the wealthy population. The route was then determined in a way that most effectively led the

25 See Wejnert 1856; Berdecka *et al.* 1963b.



Figure 10.2: Map of Warsaw from 1771
Source: The collections of the Print Room of the University Library in Warsaw. Image is in the public domain.

tax collector through the successive streets within the city walls and beyond, avoiding unnecessary backtracking.[26]

A unique supplement to the contributions was the collection of the *brandskatt*. The *brandskatt* for the suburbs of Old Warsaw found in the Stockholm Riksarkivet is titled 'Komput y Descriptia Dworow przy Mieście Starey Warszawie, okrom Nowego Miasta y Leszna, ktore osobny swoy dadzą Regestr, o co są praemoniti' (Inventory and description of the mansions in the Old Town of Warsaw, excluding the New Town and Leszno, which will give their own separate register, which they are asked to provide).[27] The idea behind it implied the inevitability of punishment in case of non-payment, which is why separate registers were prepared for different parts of the city: the title

26 Wagner 2020b, 113–14. A similar arrangement was used in collecting contributions during the Great Northern War: see Wagner 2020a, 561.

27 Riksarkivet, Preussiskaräkenskaper från Karl X Gustavs krig 1655–1660, Preussen 1655: I, Warschau—Räkenskap för brandskatt 1655, fols. 10r–12v.

of the register suggests that other lists were created, including New Warsaw and the *jurydyka* of Leszno. In principle, the *brandskatt* was collected only once, which is why the rates collected were much higher (from 50 to 6000 zlotys), resulting in a significantly higher total *brandskatt* collection. Even though far fewer taxpayers paid this tax, its collection more than doubled the amount of the 1655 contributions (3,985,500 groshen of *brandskatt* compared to 1,687,800 groshen of other tax contributions). The *brandskatt* register listed 106 properties, for which 76 owners were identified (they held land, church, central, court, and senatorial offices and thus belonged to the noble class, practically excluding burghers), while the financial contribution of the same year was paid by 894 burghers (barring the nobility and clergy, who were excluded from municipal jurisdiction).[28]

War Taxes: Swedish Practice

Krakowskie Przedmieście, also known as Czerskie or Bernardyńskie, served as a communication route leading southwards. Moreover, the line comprising Krakowskie Przedmieście, Nowy Świat, and Ujazdowskie Avenue naturally connected the royal castle with the other royal residences—such as Villa Regia (Kazimierzowski Palace) and Ujazdowski Castle. The development of Krakowskie Przedmieście in the mid-17th century was diverse. The initially sparse wooden buildings gradually began to be replaced and complemented by noble estates, such as those of Aleksander Koniecpolski, Grand Warrant Officer of the Crown in the years 1641–1656, and Michał Kazimierz Radziwiłł, Grand *Incisor* of Lithuania from 1653.[29] The designation of Warsaw as a venue of the General Sejm (the parliament) in 1569 and the Election Sejm in 1572 (whose task was to elect the king by the entirety of the nobility), and especially the transfer of the royal residence to the local castle (a process which lasted from the burning down of a wing of Kraków Castle in 1595 until 1611/1612) resulted in a systematic influx of wealthy nobility and magnates into the suburbs of Old Warsaw. They purchased plots of land here and built their residences, which led

28 Wagner and Kowalski 2022, 139–149; Wagner and Kowalski 2023.

29 Przyboś 1967–1968; Lulewicz and Rachuba 1994, 60. On suburban development, see Putkowska 2016.

Table 10.1: Amount of *brandskatt* tax paid by individual property types in the suburbs of Old Warsaw in 1655

Type of property	Number	Amount (groshen)	% of the total amount of brandskatt	Average charge per property of a particular type (groshen)
manor house	80	3,711,000	93.11	46,387.50
mansion	21	186,000	4.67	8857.14
tenement building	2	78,000	1.96	39,000.00
other	3	10,500	0.26	3500.00
total	106	3,985,500	100.00	

Source: Based on Riksarkivet, Warschau—Räkenskap för brandskatt 1655, fols. 10r–12v.

to increased construction activity, as well as diversification and intermingling of bourgeois and aristocratic building development.[30]

Among the 106 taxpayers listed in the *brandskatt* register, there were 80 manor houses, 21 mansions, 2 tenement buildings, 1 house, 1 granary, and 1 manor (Table 10.1). The two tenements belonged to 'Ms Lubelska', namely to Maria Joanna Petinger a Petting et Persing, widow of Stefan Dobrogost Grzybowski, the Castellan of Lublin (1633–1644); and the 'Tenement house of the late Mr Hutyni', property of Philip Huttini/Uttini —a scribe in the Royal Court Chancellery, the Greater Crown Chancellery scribe (from 1650), and doctor of both laws—who died in 1653. These individuals thus belonged to the nobility, demonstrating that the rule of tenement ownership only by burghers ceased to apply outside the city walls.

The owners of manors, the dominant form of housing, paid 93 per cent of the total amount of tax specified in this register. This group primarily included individuals holding central, court, or land offices, but also noted were those who served at the court, such as a royal washerwoman and a coachman. The selection of such taxpayers was likely due to the necessity of collecting a large amount of tax within

30 On the special status of Warsaw in the 17th century, see Bogucka 1993; Bogucka 1996; Bogucka 2008.

a short period of time. Therefore, as in the case of contributions, an additional burden was imposed on wealthy individuals, which was also connected to the desire to protect the properties of central and court officials from destruction or looting.

The situation is completely different in the case of financial contributions. Given that the taxpayers were townspeople and those under municipal jurisdiction, the register includes poor residents of the suburbs. The highest tax amount in 1655 was 250 zlotys (7500 groshen), while within the city walls it was 2000 zlotys (60,000 groshen), and the lowest tax paid was 10 groshen (in Old Warsaw, 15 groshen). In addition, 155 people were recorded as not paying any tax; they account for almost half of those recorded in the suburbs (49 per cent) and 21 per cent of the total number of taxpayers listed in the entire 1655 contribution register.[31]

Of the 316 properties recorded in this area (Table 10.2), houses dominate (244, or 77.2 per cent of the building development in the area), complemented by 15 cottages (4.7 per cent). Other types of buildings are also noted, including gardens and empty yards (13 in total, accounting for 4 per cent), as well as individual stables, the Holy Cross Hospital, a farm, and tenement buildings. The register also includes mentions of 19 manor houses and 11 mansions, as well as one palace, which was undoubtedly the Villa Regia—together they made up 9.8 per cent of the buildings. More importantly, their owners did not pay financial contributions.[32]

Discussing the social structure is difficult, as one must rely almost exclusively on the information contained in the tax registers. The poor residents of the suburbs are rarely mentioned in other sources that would allow a reconstruction of their microhistories or establishment of their further life stories. Moreover, they inhabited areas outside the city and belonged to a poor section of the community, which makes it impossible to find information about their activities in other sources, such as wills or city records. In the aforementioned tax sources, they

31 The total number of payers in the register for the collection of contributions in 1655 was 736 people (in the area of the Kraków suburb it was 316 payers). In 1656 it had already risen to 909 property owners and tenants, while the Kraków suburb and its surroundings yielded 278 people.

32 Author's own research, based on Riksarkivet, Preussiskaräkenskaper file 1655–1660, Preussen 1655: I, Warschau—Räkenskap för brandskatt 1655, fols. 10r–12v.

Table 10.2: Amount of financial contributions paid by particular property types in the suburbs of Old Warsaw in 1655 and 1656

Type of property	Year	Number of properties	Amount paid (groshen)	% of the total amount of contribution	Average payment (groshen)
house	1655	244	4,680	0.277	19.20
	1656	240	13,448	0.382	56.03
small house/ cottage	1655	12	10	0.001	0.83
	1656	15	687	0.020	45.80
tenement building	1655	2	175	0.010	87.50
	1656	2	350	0.010	175.00
garden	1655	4	0	0.000	0.00
	1656	4	0	0.000	0.00
empty yard	1655	13	125	0.007	9.60
	1656	9	340	0.010	37.80
others	1655	41	0	0.000	0.00
	1656	8	550	0.016	78.60
total	1655	316	4,990	0.296	
	1656	278	15,375	0.437	

Source: Based on Wejnert 1856.

Table 10.3: Occupations of payers of financial contributions in 1655

Occupation	Number	Amount paid (groshen)	% of the total amount of contribution
craftsmen	43	640	0.038
merchants	1	0	0.000
services	37	470	0.028
clergy	24	125	0.007
clerks	16	0	0.000
women	26	500	0.030
others	2	20	0.001
total	149	1755	0.104

Source: Based on Wejnert 1856.

are usually listed by name. Less than half of this group (49 per cent) have the additional distinguishing feature of their occupation. Nevertheless, based on this information, one can attempt to reconstruct the occupational structure of the area, bearing in mind the imperfections of the source material.

The most numerous group in the suburban area were craftsmen (Table 10.3). This category included the typical professions such as locksmiths (five people), blacksmiths (four), tailors (three), bakers and carpenters (one of each). Another prominent group consisted of individuals in occupations that would be classified as services, such as stablemen, stewards, and gardeners. The group of 'clerks' includes individual listings in the real estate registry belonging to, for example, the Lithuanian field *hetman*, the Grand Standard-Bearer of the Crown, or the king himself. Representatives of this group did not pay financial contributions in 1655, as these were mostly intended for burghers, but they were obliged to pay the *brandskatt*. As many as 29 individuals listed in the financial contributions register were included on the list of *brandskatt* payers, which perfectly complements the image of the occupational and social structure of this part of the city. In the 'other' group, two descendants of previous owners were recorded, without indicating their surnames or occupation. This is characteristic of the early modern era, when the names of owners were used to describe/name the property for easier identification.

A separate category consists of women. Their socio-professional structure is certainly the most diverse, but it can only be partially reconstructed. Let us start with women classified according to their status as widows. They appear most frequently in this list—17 of them were included, constituting 65 per cent of all women indicated in the contribution, living in the suburbs (and at the same time 5.4 per cent of all suburban taxpayers).[33] The remaining women were referred to by the names of their professions, as in other early modern towns—for example, two bakers, a saddle maker, a gardener, a silversmith, a barber surgeon, and a coachwoman were recorded. Women were also described using terms limited to convents (e.g. Bernardine nun, or by nationality (e.g. a Frenchwoman). It is important to remember that the tax registers, of both kinds, included only heads of families and were therefore dominated by men. However, women were noted in cases of

33 Karpiński 1990, 82–83.

temporary absence of men (for example, participation in a war or a trade journey) or permanent absence (widowhood). Another case of this type was a woman running a one-person household, which was more characteristic of large cities.[34]

Conclusion

To sum up, following an analysis of the registers of financial contributions from the period 1655–1656 for the area outside the walls of Old Warsaw and covering the area south of the walls of Old Warsaw and the Royal Castle (including Krakowskie Przedmieście, Nowy Świat, and the future area of the Mariensztat *jurydyka*), it has emerged that they provide an excellent complement to the 1655 *brandskatt* register. The first source covers taxpayers of the war tax from the townspeople and those belonging to the poor, while the second source includes the wealthiest individuals associated with the royal court and/or from the nobility. To date, no detailed study of this area has been carried out in terms of the wealth of its inhabitants, as indicated by the amount of war taxes paid. In this case, it was possible because the method of imposing contributions was based on the inclusion of all burgher taxpayers in a general, lump-sum tax amount, which necessitated a census of all individuals residing in the specified area.

The sources show attempts to arrange the relationship of individuals from the city authorities with the Swedish army, especially with the governor of Warsaw. The aim of these efforts was to secure the city, as well as the property of the inhabitants. However, despite the attempts, taxes were levied on all the city's inhabitants (and *brandskatt* was additionally levied on the nobility and those connected with the royal court or holding central offices), and the concessionary tariff resulting from the established private relationships was not noted.

During the occupation, the role of the municipal authorities, who remained in position after the Swedish army took over the city, was important. The same procedure was followed in various Polish cities (such as Poznań and Kraków), and it appears that this may have been

34 Cezary Kuklo noted: 'There seems to be a functional type of city, influencing the attractiveness of a given centre, offering the possibility of finding work also for larger female groups, better wages, facilities, and for some of them a more attractive life.' Kuklo 1998, 54.

an activity that was more generally applied in occupied territories, outside Sweden. Leaving the local authorities subordinate to the Swedish governor facilitated the management of the area and, above all, the distribution and collection of war taxes. Meanwhile, the municipal authorities tried to maintain good relations with the Swedish troops to protect the city from plunder or destruction. At this stage of the research, however, it is not possible to determine the attitude of the private agents—such as the tax collectors or the scribes preparing the tax registers—to the occupying forces, or how much of this was bureaucratic work that commanded an additional wage and how much was consent or acquiescence to change.

Both sources add to the state of knowledge of the socio-occupational structure of this hitherto unexplored territory. They illustrate the huge wealth inequalities in the area, thus revealing the processes of this area's transformation—in terms of both construction (increased building activity after the king's residence was moved to Old Warsaw) and society (central and court offices in *brandskatt* alongside impoverished suburban craftsmen). To be sure, these sources do not exhaust the subject, but they do open up additional fields for research—and in conjunction with the sources and studies devoted to architectural development, they make it possible to supplement this area of knowledge as well.

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CHAPTER 11

The Financial Infrastructure of Warfare

Merchant Bankers, Bills of Exchange, and the Exchange Bank in 18th-Century Sweden

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Abstract

The objective of this study is to demonstrate the reciprocal relationship between merchant bankers active on the European financial markets and the Exchange Bank in the Bank of Sweden in the mid-eighteenth century. It is done by studying accounts held with the Exchange Bank and the drawing, acceptance and depositing of bills of exchange by merchants and brokers. In contrast to what is claimed by previous research, the results demonstrate that the Exchange Bank was frequently used by both merchants and state representatives, and that it played an important role in the financial infrastructure of early modern Sweden.

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Introduction

In the early modern period, states did not have the capacity to equip and supply their military forces through their own bodies and institutions. Instead, they had to cooperate with entrepreneurs and markets. This fact also applied to their financial needs. In order to raise credit and to transfer money to locations where it needed to be spent, early modern states were heavily dependent on merchant bankers. However, states also had the capability to upgrade existing institutions, or to create new ones, to facilitate their collaboration with markets and to improve their financial capacity.

The objective of this short study is to demonstrate the reciprocal relationship between merchant bankers active on the European financial markets and the Exchange Bank in Sweden in the mid-18th century. This relationship provided the Swedish state with a financial infrastructure that not all contemporary states possessed. The amplitude of this part of the financial market was crucial, as was easy access to its continental counterparts. If the market were liquid, with merchants and bankers frequently issuing and accepting transnational bills of exchange and clearing them through the Exchange Bank, the Swedish state could readily tap into short-term credits and transfer large sums for the benefit of the military. On the other hand, if there were little activity on this financial market, the Swedish state would find it more difficult to raise credit and, especially, to transfer resources to its armed forces.

Such issues are notoriously difficult to investigate. With a few isolated exceptions, no private merchant's books of account have been preserved, and the historian is mostly consigned to consulting the ledgers of the Bank of Sweden, where merchants kept accounts. This vast body of material has, surprisingly enough, never before been the subject of scholarly research. Here, the number of accounts will be assessed for a sustained period of time, and a few individual accounts will be further scrutinised over roughly the same period. In order to further explore the depth of the financial market, some rarely preserved bills of exchange, from the time of the Seven Years' War, will be examined. Finally, some transactions conducted by government agencies, also from the time of the Seven Years' War, will be considered. Thus, this brief study does not claim to cover this extensive field of research in its entirety. Rather, it is a preliminary attempt to engage with an area

where very little prior research has been conducted—at least not in the Swedish context. Accordingly, the object of investigation is the financial system itself, and only to a limited extent the actual operations.

Financial Infrastructure and Warfare

Wars have the capacity to change societies. Not least, because they tend to alter economic conditions. In the early modern period, warring states were economic engines. Through taxation, resources were concentrated and circulated back into the economy, mainly through military procurements and wages to officers, soldiers, and sailors. In this way, the flow of resources from the poorer sections of society to the richer ones was intensified, as government contractors profited from deliveries, and military officers received generous payments or other forms of compensation for their services.[1] From the time of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) and Great Northern War (1700–1721), credit became the primary source of finance for war expenditure, while taxation tended to be used as collateral and to service loans.[2]

As states waged war, commodities flowed from producers and subcontractors to contractors, and onwards to the armies and navies. Payments flowed in the opposite direction. However, these flows were not confined to the territories of the states that had raised them, as government contractors were active on transnational markets. Payments were even less confined within political borders. By the time of the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), most, but certainly not all, payments were cleared in financial centres such as Amsterdam, Hamburg, and London.[3]

Bills of Exchange and Banks

The fact the most payments could be cleared at a distance, and that money could be transferred between the major cities in Europe and even to some parts of the Americas and Asia, was due to the development

1 Lindegren 1985; Glete 2002, esp. 52–66; Alfani and Di Tullio 2019.
2 Dickson 1967; Dickson and Sperling 1970; Velde 2008; Rowlands 2012; Brandon 2018; Ericsson and Winton 2020.
3 Neal 1990; Denzel 2010; Brandon 2018.

of the bill of exchange. Such bills constituted a way to capitalise on the trust and creditworthiness that existed between two merchant bankers. One of them, the Drawer of the bill, was approached by another person, the Remitter, who needed to make a payment in another location. The Drawer then issued an order, the actual bill, to a business contact, the Acceptor, situated where the payment was to be made, to pay a specific amount in a certain currency to another person, the Possessor, after a stipulated time had passed.[4] The price paid by the Remitter was higher than the sum denoted on the bill itself. It could vary significantly, based on currency exchange rates, an allowance for the risks involved, and including premiums for both Drawer and Acceptor. But, crucially, the price depended on the availability of bills: that is, to what extent potential Drawers and Acceptors were willing to offer their services.[5]

Possessors of bills of exchange could sell them on, in which case the name of the new Possessor was noted on the back of the bill. The initial Possessor then became jointly responsible for the clearing of the bill, and such serial endorsement improved reliability. The drawing of a bill of exchange left the Drawer with a debt to the Acceptor, which was most easily settled by the Acceptor drawing a corresponding bill back on the initial Drawer. In reality, this was not so common. Instead, merchant bankers formed increasingly complex networks, in which they held accounts with each other. Accrued debts were cleared by a variety of bills of exchange and, to a much lesser extent, by deliveries of commodities. The rapid turnover of ever new bills of exchange meant that individual accounts with merchant bankers were not balanced at all times, as continuous trade and transactions were expected to even out in the long run. Thus, trade and payments were genuinely multilateral, and merchants did not necessarily abide by the political logic of states and their borders.[6]

When a Remitter had purchased a bill of exchange from a Drawer, he obviously had to send it to a Possessor. Sometimes, the Remitter would ask for and be granted copies of the bill, due to unsecure postal services, which were sent separately. Such copies were usually labelled

4 Neal 1990; Carlos and Neal 2011; Quinn and Roberds 2023, 28–33.
5 Rowlands 2015, 84–115.
6 Heckscher 1950; Samuelsson 1954, 173–89; Neal 1990, 141–65; Denzel 2010, xlii–lvii; Carlos and Neal 2011; Rowlands 2015, 186–89.

Secondary or Tertiary bills (etc.), depending on the number of copies issued. The Remitter would also typically send a letter to the Acceptor, alerting him that he had drawn a bill on him. When a bill of exchange was finally settled, it would normally be destroyed.[7]

Bills of exchange constituted a major part of the circulating liquidity in early modern Europe. They made it possible to transfer resources on a large scale without costly and insecure transport of bullion or hoards of coins. There was, however, another form of liquidity that became increasingly important during the 18th century, and that was funds kept in bank accounts. Notably, there was a link between 'bank money' or 'ledger money' and bills of exchange, as transfers between bank accounts became a routine way of clearing bills. Public banks originated around the Mediterranean in late medieval times, in urban and commercial centres such as Genoa, Venice, Lyon, and Seville. By the 17th century, the centre of gravity of international trade had shifted towards Northern Europe and the Atlantic, and first Antwerp and then Amsterdam emerged as hubs of European commerce. Concurrently, the Bank of Amsterdam developed into a dominant financial institution.[8] Early banks had the privileged capacity to create legal tender, in the form of funds on accounts (ledger money) or circulating deposit receipts. Such claims were backed by a variety of assets. That fact was important. However, for the stability of the money thus created and the longevity of the bank, the support of the local merchant community was of even greater significance.[9]

The Bank of Amsterdam was founded as an exchange bank (often called by its Dutch name, the *Wisselbank*), with the explicit purpose of establishing rates and bringing order to the confusing multitude of coins and currencies that merchants had to handle. In doing so, the florin (or guilder) was established as the benchmark currency, and it primarily existed as a unit of account and as ledger money in the Bank. It proved to be very stable, and in the 18th century it was traded at a premium, usually around 4 per cent, to specie currencies. Already in the initial charter of 1609, it was stated that all larger bills of exchange drawn on Amsterdam merchant bankers must be cleared through the Bank. This statute ensured that traders opened accounts,

7 Samuelsson 1954, 173–89.
8 Roberds and Velde 2014.
9 Roberds and Velde 2014, 2.

and guaranteed a huge turnover. The monopoly was short-lived but, nevertheless, most bills continued to be cleared through transfers between bank accounts. In addition, deposits made with coins, and in the 18th century even bullion, were accepted. The *Wisselbank* never issued money in the form of notes, but receipts on the deposits could be circulated. By the 18th century, the demand for paying specie on demand for deposits had dried up, and the practice was abandoned. The Bank ledgers now constituted pure fiat money.[10]

In contrast, London merchant bankers had in the 17th century created extensive private networks in which bills of exchange were cleared. The Bank of England was not established until 1695, from which point it complemented the services provided by the merchant bankers. During the 18th century there was a close relationship between London and Amsterdam, with capital flowing easily between them, and there was a multitude of crossholdings of financial assets. Amsterdam remained a financial centre long after its position as a centre for trade in commodities had been lost, but in the latter part of the 18th century it was surpassed by London.[11]

In the 17th century, Hamburg emerged as the leading entrepôt for trade in Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea region. The Bank of Hamburg was founded in 1619, modelled on the Bank of Amsterdam, but it was from the beginning divided into two parts: an exchange bank and a lending bank. Private interest could borrow against collateral, but the bulk of the credits were extended to the municipal treasury. Like its counterpart in Amsterdam, the exchange bank proved successful in clearing bills. It also established a stable form of ledger money. The 'marks banco' or 'Hamburger banco' became an important currency in which bills of exchange were drawn, and it circulated at a premium over specie coins.

The Seven Years' War and the Crisis of 1763

Large-scale warfare could erect barriers to trade and prove disruptive to the financial system. But, essentially, warring states created huge demands for commodities required for campaigning on land and at

10 Dillen (1934) 1964, 79–123; Roberds and Velde 2014, 33–37; Quinn and Roberds 2023, 7–14, 21–26.

11 Neal and Quinn 2001; Carlos and Neal 2011; Brandon 2018.

sea. Times of war saw vast new credit being raised and channelled through the financial system. Moreover, as warfare escalated and came to be fought between alliances, all the major states of Europe tended to increase their spending at the same time. Thus, the major European wars of the 18th century, of which the Seven Years' War was prominent, did not so much impede the financial system as overstretch it.[12]

In the Seven Years' War, Amsterdam and Hamburg remained neutral (but obviously not London). This meant that both sides in the conflict had access to merchant bankers located in the two financial centres, along with their banking facilities, and that government payments and, in particular, large subsidiaries could be channelled through them. Most banking houses did not take sides, but some acted as agents for the warring states. Perhaps the largest of the merchant bankers in Amsterdam, Adrian and Thomas Hope, traded with both Britain and France during the war, while raising and channelling huge credits for the benefit of Britain in particular.[13] One of the richest and most influential patrons of the Bank of Hamburg, Philipp Heinrich von Stenglin, served as an agent for the emperor in Vienna and secured him large credit.[14]

In the same way as wartime demand drove up prices, increased the money supply, and boosted the financial system, the peace treaties in 1762 and 1763 meant that military demand dwindled, prices dropped, liquidity was retracted, and the financial system was starved. In 1763, there was a major financial crisis, triggered by the bankruptcy of the Amsterdam merchant bankers the Neufville brothers. Symptomatically, they had been involved in a project of buying up grain left behind by the Russian army in Poland, both as traders and as financiers of their partners. As the price of grain in Berlin collapsed, the Neufvilles fell into a solvency crisis from which they never recovered. The bankruptcy sent waves through Europe and the crisis hit Hamburg and Berlin especially hard, with numerous merchant houses going out of business.[15] Stockholm was also heavily exposed. But here, the real economic consequences were obscured by the fierce political struggles

12 Buist 1974, 10–13.
13 Buist 1974, 12.
14 Sieveking (1934) 1964, 136–46; Roberds and Velde 2014, 43–46.
15 Schnabel and Shin 2004; Quinn and Roberds 2015.

that were triggered by the lack of military progress, and ensuing accusations of financial mismanagement.[16]

Bills of Exchange in Sweden

There has been no previous research on financial operations using bills of exchange in Sweden. But the fact that the Swedish crown and its commissioners made extensive use of such bills in the early part of the 17th century, when paying for war expenditure, is well documented. These transactions were typically conducted in Germany, with the crown remitting bills by a network of well-connected German merchants.[17] Moreover, it appears that the practice of drawing, paying, and selling bills of exchange domestically was well established when it was regulated by a royal ordinance in 1671. The ordinance regulated how payments should be made, and did so painstakingly, with plentiful examples. Its twentieth paragraph assumed, in passing, that payments were frequently cleared through the recently opened bank.[18]

In older Swedish historiography, the importance of bills of exchange has generally been underrated. Arthur Montgomery, writing in 1921 about the 18th century in the authoritative survey of the Bank of Sweden, simply claimed that no bills of exchange were drawn on Sweden, and that Swedish importers had to buy bills from Swedish exporters to settle their debts.[19] Kurt Samuelsson, writing in the 1950s, was well aware of the importance of bills of exchange in the 18th century. He emphasised that Swedish exporters typically received short-term credit from their supplier, who then passed it on, by drawing or selling bills of exchange to major merchant bankers in Amsterdam and Hamburg. In a similar way, Swedish exporters would typically have been paid by drawing bills of exchange on the same groups of merchant

16 Roberts 1986, 217–21.

17 See, e.g. Ekholm 1971, 201–20; Björklund and Schiavone 2021, 72, 78.

18 *Årstrycket*, Kongl. Mayst: Växel-Rätt och Stadga / Uppå Nästförledne Riksdaag aff Samplige Rykzens Ständer Wedertagen, Stockholm, 1671. The ordinance uses the word 'bank'. Thus it is not explicitly stated that this refers to the Exchange Bank, but clearing through the Loan Bank would not have been an option.

19 Montgomery 1920, 14–15.

bankers.[20] This would have been the standard procedures for most trade in Europe at the time. Samuelsson also noted Montgomery's claim. Although he recognised that bills of exchange were drawn on Swedish merchant bankers, he tended to agree with Montgomery in general, claiming that it would have been an uncommon practice.[21]

In a rare instance, in the archives of the firm Carlos & Claes Grill, a number of bills of exchange for the years 1752 and 1761 have been preserved. The bills from the latter date will be explored here. The firm was founded by the brothers Abraham and Carlos Grill to take advantage of the business opportunities generated by the Great Northern War. Importantly, the Grills had close family ties to merchant bankers in the Dutch Republic, allowing them excellent access to the credit market. As merchants, they specialised in the most lucrative branch of the Swedish economy, the export of iron, and, in the 1720s, their firm emerged as the leading merchant house in Stockholm. At the death of Abraham in 1725, he was succeeded by his son Claes, and under the latter's leadership the firm prospered. They were also proprietors of ironworks, among them Söderfors anchor-works. They owned ships and a shipyard in Stockholm and had interests in other manufactures of maritime equipment.

The wealth and success of Claes Grill led him to take positions in public institutions: he became a deputy of the Association of Ironmasters, of the Bank of Sweden, and of the Swedish Board of Commerce. In those capacities, he also possessed political influence. In time, banking became more significant than trade for the Grills, and their business flourished. They mediated large credits, granted loans, and cleared international bills of exchange.[22] Not all the bills of exchange passing through the hands of Carlos & Claes Grill in 1761 have been preserved, but the ones that the firm accepted and paid off were. These payments are presented in Table 11.1.

20 Samuelsson 1951, 124–97; Samuelsson 1955; Lindblad 1982, 54–61. Samuelsson claims that Swedish traders, especially iron exporters, thus used borrowed foreign capital, in the form of bills of exchange, to conduct their business, without realising that this was the standard way of settling nearly all international trade.

21 Samuelsson 1955, 178.

22 Hildebrand and Högberg 1967–1969; Högberg 1967–1969; Müller 1998, 62–68; Müller 2002b, 277–79, 283–86.

Table 11.1: Bills of exchange redeemed by Carlos & Claes Grill in 1761

Drawn in	Number of bills of exchange	Drawer	Amount (dkm)
Stralsund	22	Joachim Ulrich Giese	271,848
Stralsund	3	Others	11,021
Amsterdam	7	Anthoni & Johannes Grill	15,533
Vienna	7	Count Bark	40,739
Fridricia	3	A. de Kaiser	900
Lübeck	1	Arnold Jürgen Widderich	506
Nantes	1	Carlos & Claes Grill	7500
Total	**44**		**348,047**

Source: Riksarkivet, Uppsala, Handelshuset Carlos & Claes Grill 1749–1839, Övriga handlingar, 1761. All amounts have been converted to dkm (*daler kopparmynt*). There were 3 dkm to 1 dsm (*daler silvermynt*). For transnational exchange rates, see Denzel 2010, 344.

The most obvious observation drawn from Table 11.1 is that there are not many bills of exchange drawn on one of the leading merchant houses in Sweden in 1761. But there were of course other merchant houses accepting bills in that year. However, the amounts are quite substantial. As a comparison, the annual pay of a captain in the infantry, a gentleman, was 600 dkm, while his superior, the colonel and commander of a regiment, was paid 5100 dkm in nominal terms.[23]

By far the most active Drawer on the Grills was Joachim Ulrich Giese, in both the number of bills and the sums involved. Giese was not only a wealthy merchant and factory owner working out of Stralsund, but he was also one of the main commissioners of the Swedish state, as banker, creditor, and supplier to the Swedish army operating in Pomerania. In addition, he was the organiser and proprietor of the recently established Pomeranian mint, which provided the Swedish military forces with local currency.[24] It is therefore a reasonable

23 Thisner 2014, 56.
24 Marsson 1928, 11–26.

assumption that most, but not necessarily all, of the transactions that he executed were on behalf of the Swedish military.

Some of the bills are noteworthy. On 8 June, Giese drew 15,296 dkm on the Grills to be paid to Baron von Lantinghausen, the former commander-in-chief of the Swedish army in Pomerania. It is an informed guess that this sum was a reimbursement for Lantinghausen's expenses as commander, as he frequently had to call on his personal credit in order to supply his forces.[25] Giese could have drawn this sum in his capacity as government contractor, but he could also have been acting as an intermediary, forwarding funds that he had received, or was himself advancing, from the Swedish state. A similar transaction was executed on 3 September, when Giese drew 18,000 dkm on the Grills for the benefit of 'Baron Hamilton', also a former commander of the army in Germany, and possibly for the same reason. The largest sums were drawn on 27 October, when Giese drew seven bills of 36,000 and 18,000 dkm, with a combined value of 180,000 dkm, on behalf of the holder of the bill (Herrn Einhaber).[26] On 27 January, he also drew a large sum (2506 rixdollar banco, or 15,111 dkm), for the benefit of the 'Kongl. Ober Krigs Commissariat'—that is, the Pomeranian Field Commissariat, a newly established institution with the purpose of coordinating supplies to the army in Pomerania.[27] This time, Giese drew on the Grills in order to transfer funds to be used for the sustenance of the army. With all probability, the same applies to a bill of 9767 dkm that was drawn for the benefit of *Feltsecretaire* Olof Tisell. So it is clear that the Swedish state, through their commissioner Giese, used the Grills' banking business to transfer funds by bills of exchange from the keeping of the field army to be cleared in Stockholm.

The 44 bills of exchange that the Grills reimbursed are not the only ones preserved from 1761. They also handled 149 Secondary bills of exchange. These were presumably preserved to avoid confusion with the Primary ones, and to assure that they were not reimbursed twice. Obviously, most bills of exchange were not duplicated, and the ones dealt with here would have been a minor part of the bills handled by the Grills that year. That said, the number of Secondary bills is

25 Säve 1915, 66, 256–57, 282.

26 The bill were drawn in dsm. For clarity they have been converted to dkm at a rate of 1:3.

27 See Chapter 12 in this volume.

Table 11.2: Locations where bills of exchange handled by the Grills were issued and reimbursed

Issued	Number of bills	Reimbursed	Number of bills
Stockholm	105	Amsterdam	77
Gothenburg	15	Hamburg	50
St Petersburg	15	London	8
Cadix	3	Amsterdam (The Hague)	7
Riga	3	Paris	3
Frankfurt	2	Frankfurt	1
Stralsund	2	Stralsund	1
Strasburg	2	Stockholm	1
Bristol	1	Copenhagen	1
Nantes	1		
Sum	**149**		**149**

Source: Riksarkivet, Uppsala, Handelshuset Carlos & Claes Grill 1749–1839, Övriga handlingar, 1761.

informative, as it indicates that the part of the Grills' banking business that involved accepting bills drawn on them in Stockholm was not their main business.

The Secondary bills provide a good indication, but not an exhaustive one, of where the Grills' business associates resided, and thus of the geographic scope of their network. Table 11.2 demonstrates that most transactions were cleared in Amsterdam or Hamburg. Only eight of them were reimbursed in London.[28] A different picture emerges when we turn to questions of where the bills of exchange were originally issued. Here, Stockholm is by far the most frequent location, with Gothenburg and St Petersburg as the only others of any significance. It should be noticed that the Grills did not draw all these bills, even though they drew the highest number, 13, of them. The same number

28 Müller 2002b, 283–86.

was drawn by Jean Lefebure, and 12 by Finley, Jennings & Co. Among the other Drawers were a selection of the most prominent Swedish merchant houses: Nettelblad & Söhne, Koschell & Conradi, Charles & William Tottie, and Hebbe & Söhne & Comp. One merchant house located in Gothenburg was also frequently represented: Abraham Grill & Soon, whose senior partner was the brother of Claes and Anthoni.[29]

The Grills were the beneficiaries of many of these Secondary bills of exchange. On 48 of them they were explicitly the Possessors. The funds thus transferred would have ended up in their accounts held with their business associates in Amsterdam or Hamburg, or they could have sold them on for specie. Another 30 Secondary bills had Johan Sahlberg as the Possessor. His name occurs frequently in the correspondence of the Grills. In all probability, Sahlberg was a broker whose services were employed by the Grills, and he was likely handling funds on their behalf. As he received payments both in Amsterdam and Hamburg, Sahlberg would have held accounts with merchant bankers in both financial centres. Another recipient of funds, in the shape of seven bills of exchange, was 'Count Osterman', namely Ivan Osterman, the Russian ambassador in Stockholm. The bills with Osterman as Possessor were all drawn in St Petersburg to be paid in Amsterdam.

As indicated, the Acceptors of the bills which Grills dealt with were some of most prominent merchant bankers in Europe. Table 11.3 constitutes a brief line-up of those who accepted more than three of the Secondary bills in this selection.

Finally, there are a number of Secondary bills in this selection for which the Grills were neither Drawer nor Possessor. Typically, they had bought them on the market, and their names and signatures, or those of Johan Sahlberg's, are written on the reverse. For Possessors of bills of exchange drawn on merchant bankers in Hamburg or Amsterdam, selling them to the Grills would have offered a convenient way of liquidating their claims in Stockholm.

The market for bills of exchange was essential for early modern states and their capacity to transfer funds for military undertakings. But states were also actively trying to influence or manipulate markets. Obviously, legislation would have been one way to achieve results. Transforming existing institutions or government bodies or creating new ones could also serve this purpose. Such an ambition was the

29 Müller 2002b, 280.

Table 11.3: Merchant bankers accepting Secondary bills of exchange handled by Carlos & Claes Grill in 1761

Merchant bankers	Location	Number of bills of exchange
Gebroeders de Neufville	Amsterdam	10
Peter Boui & Sohn	Hamburg	10
George Clifford & Sons	Amsterdam	8
Hetling & Com	Hamburg	7
Tobias Boas	Amsterdam (The Hague)	7
Anthoni & Johannes Grill	Amsterdam	5
Baron von Stenglin	Hamburg	5
Caspar David Müller	Hamburg	5
Pat & Rob Machy	London	5
Thomas & Adrian Hope	Amsterdam	5
Raym & Theod de Smeth	Amsterdam	4
Jean & Carl Hasselgreen	Amsterdam	3
Peter His & Sohn	Hamburg	3
Pye, Rich & Wilkieson	Amsterdam	3

Source: Riksarkivet, Uppsala, Handelshuset Carlos & Claes Grill 1749–1839, Övriga handlingar, 1761.

establishment of the Exchange Office (*Växelkontoret*) in Sweden. At the Riksdag (the Swedish Parliament) of 1746–1747, there were complaints that bills of exchange had become excessively expensive, which was said to have a negative impact on trade, and by extension on government revenues. A consortium of leading merchants was organised, who agreed to use their networks of business contacts to buy bills of exchange at lower cost, and then offer them to the Swedish market. To that end they were provided with a capital of 300,000 rixdollars annually (about 1,800,000 dkm), funded by the Swedish state's subsidies from France, access to interest-free credit with the Bank of Sweden, and the right to handle the crown's own export of copper. It appears that the Exchange Office was initially able to live up to this agreement,

presumably more as the result of favourable economic circumstance than jobbing[30] in bills of exchange.

In 1756, a new group of merchants replaced the original ones but, owing to involvement in a major European war and the continuous release of paper money, exchange rates soured. In 1758, the contract returned to the original members, but still the rates could not be brought down. In the first half of 1761, the Exchange Office was closed.[31] After the war, a new regime came to power in the Riksdag. The merchant bankers of the Exchange Office were closely associated with the previous regime and were made scapegoats for the post-war financial crisis. They were accused of mismanaging government funds and manipulating the exchange rates to further their own interests. They were sentenced to heavy fines and in some case imprisonment; among them was Claes Grill.[32]

The Exchange Bank in Sweden

The Bank of Sweden (*Riksens Ständers Bank*, later *Riksbanken*) was founded in 1668, with the Bank of Hamburg and the Bank of Amsterdam as the immediate models. Here is not the place to give an account of its development, but it is important to note that there were two sections of the Riksbank: the Loan Bank and the Exchange Bank. The former accepted deposits and offered loans against collateral. Because the interest was set by law, the bank could not adjust to fluctuations on the credit market by raising or lowering rates. Instead, it had to resort to refusing deposits or loans, and even declining withdrawals, which meant that it was alternately closing and reopening. The Loan Bank was crucial to the Swedish infrastructure of warfare, as it granted large credits to the state—especially so in the 18th century, when it covered skyrocketing expenses by printing paper money that was not fully backed by deposits or bullion. Inflation ensued, starting in the 1740s and peaking during the Seven Years' War.[33] Without such credit, it would have been very difficult to pursue the opportunistic politics of war in 1741–1743 and 1757–1762.

30 Short-term or speculative dealing.
31 Montgomery 1920, 19–36; Müller 2002a, 129–37.
32 Müller 2002a, 140–47.
33 Fregert 2018, 95–103; Pihl 2023.

However, this is not the whole story. In the charter of 1668, the first 43 paragraphs and the majority of the regulations were directed at the running of the Exchange Bank.[34] Nevertheless, the bank has largely been ignored by research; when it *is* mentioned, it is usually to stress that it was a disappointment. Deposits in the Exchange Bank were not interest-bearing, but depositors would be given a receipt that could be circulated (prohibition against this practice was not enforced). In an overview of the Riksbank, the economic historian Klas Fregert commented that 'using the chequing facility' was impractical and time-consuming, which is why there were few depositors and only small funds were placed.[35] These conclusions are drawn from the difference between the annual balances of the Loan Bank and the Exchange Bank, with the latter being much lower. But annual balances are a poor measure of the efficacy of an exchange bank. Annual turnover is a better gauge, as account holders would use an exchange bank to transfer funds but not to store value, as it paid no interest. A brief look in the ledgers at the actual accounts reveals that not only were they a 'chequing facility' but very substantial funds were also transferred between accounts. In fact, the Exchange Bank has all the appearance of a major clearing house. Recent authors have failed to realise this, because they rely on the five-volume history of the Riksbank, marking its 250th anniversary, published between 1918 and 1931.[36] Neither its authors, active around a hundred years ago, nor their modern counterparts, have consulted the ledgers of the Exchange Bank. For the same reason, the conclusion is drawn for the time after the 1720s that 'The exchange bank continued, now mainly used by government authorities and public charities.'[37] It is true that it continued but, unlike the Loan Bank, it remained open throughout the political and financial turmoil of the 18th century. Moreover, while government agencies and public charities did use the Exchange Bank, they were far from alone.

To make a crude estimate of how attractive it was to hold an account with the Exchange Bank in the mid-1700s, the number of accounts have

34 *Årstrycket*, Sweriges Rijkes Ständers Beslut och Förordning om Banken i Stockholm, Stockholm, 22 September 1668.

35 Brisman 1918, 131–37; Fregert 2014, 360 (quotation). Fregert almost the same wording in a later work: 2018, 97.

36 Brisman 1918, 131–43; Hallendorff 1919; Wetterberg 2009; Fregert 2014; Fregert 2018.

37 Fregert 2018, 100.

Table 11.4: Number of accounts in Exchange Bank, 1737–1771, odd years

Year	Number of private accounts	Number of public or collective accounts	Total number of accounts
1737	700	157	857
1739	669	164	833
1741	552	182	734
1743	671	226	897
1745	513	265	778
1747	454	273	727
1749	438	227	665
1751	438	281	719
1753	327	242	569
1755	410	276	686
1757	353	260	613
1759	328	247	575
1761	353	298	651
1763	271	228	499
1765	242	255	497
1767	289	278	567
1769	261	230	491
1771	287	280	567

Source: Riksarkivet, Sveriges Riksbank, Växelbanken, Räkenskaper Huvudböcker, 1737–1763, vol. 3317–3533.

been counted for every other year between 1737 and 1771 (Table 11.4). A breakdown has been made between accounts held by a private name and accounts held by public institutions or collective funds. In the former category, two groups of names are immediately recognisable: those of the high nobility and those of prominent merchants. Commercial company names have also been placed in this group. The second category is more complex. Here we find government agencies—

the central and regional administration, and tax collecting or juridical bodies—but also funds held by parish churches or guilds.

Three tendencies are evident from Table 11.4. There is a clear decline in the total number of accounts, from 857 in 1737 to 567 in 1771. There is an increase in the number of public or collectively held accounts, from 157 in 1737 to 280 in 1771. The most obvious tendency, however, is the decline in the number of accounts held by private persons or companies, from 700 in 1737 to 287 in 1771. But even after this dramatic fall, there were still more privately held accounts than public or collectively held ones. A general impression is that there were fewer noble names in the ledgers in the 1760s than in the 1730s. But that is probably not enough to explain the decline. It could be that there was a kind of professionalisation occurring throughout the period. Account holders with little activity seem to have left, while more public institutions opened accounts, and the activity on many such accounts increased. It could also be that the Exchange Bank experienced increased competition from merchant bankers, such as the Grills in Stockholm, who could provide many of the same services, or even from bankers located in foreign financial centres.

A brief comparison of the numbers of accounts in the Swedish Exchange Bank with those in its counterparts in Hamburg and Amsterdam provides a rough estimate of its importance. Heinrich Sieveking, writing in the 1930s, mentions in passing that there were around 700 accounts with the Hamburg Bank in the 1760s, which was a turbulent time, and that it increased to between 800 and 900 in the 1790s.[38] The *Wisselbank* was a larger establishment, the number of account holders fluctuating between 2000 and 3000, in the period 1720–1780, with the highest number reached being 2918 in 1721.[39] When these numbers are compared to those in Table 11.4, it should be noted that in Hamburg and Amsterdam only merchants who were registered burghers could open accounts. The size of the cities was of course crucial to sustain a large merchant community. The population of Hamburg was about 75,000 in 1750; this was comparable in size to Stockholm, which had a population of around 63,000 in the same year. Amsterdam was much more populous with around 240,000 inhabitants in 1760.[40] Obviously,

38 Sieveking (1934) 1964, 141.
39 Dillen (1934) 1964, 107.
40 Nusteling 1985, 240; Lilja 1996, 119.

Hamburg, and especially Amsterdam, would have been more prosperous, with larger trade volumes, than Stockholm. Still, the number of account holders with the Swedish Exchange Bank demonstrates that this was not an insignificant institution.

With the correlation between various types of account holders established, the activity, or the turnover, can be exemplified. To demonstrate that it could be very high indeed, the busiest account of the 1730s has been chosen. The official town broker Matthias Lafransen kept an account with the Exchange Bank for only nine years, and why it was terminated is unclear. Table 11.5 shows the number of transactions and the turnover in his account. His dealings with forms of legal tender other than *daler kopparmynt* have been omitted. In the years 1731 to 1733, he also deposited and withdrew silver coins in units of *riksdaler*, *daler carolin*, and *daler courant*. Their amounts and values, however, were completely overshadowed by the *daler kopparmynt* transactions. The credit column in Lafransen's account simply denotes the proceeds as 'various' (*diverse*), so their origin and form cannot be established. But the fact that his account turned over around 2 million dkm in four consecutive years in the mid-1730s indicates that it could not possibly have all been in coins. He could have deposited numerous banknotes, as the Riksbank was issuing such legal tender in increasing volumes. But it is more than likely that the bulk of the amounts on both the revenue and expenditure side originated from the clearing of bills of exchange. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that Lafransen was a major dealer in such assets. Indeed, in a discussion at the Board of Commerce (a major government agency), on Lafrensen's demise in 1757, his influence on the market was mentioned. A hope was expressed that the exchange rates—that is, the prices on bills of exchange—might stabilise, now that his dominance in the market was gone.[41]

A prominent feature in Table 11.5 is the frequency of activity in Lafransen's account. In the four years with the largest turnover, he made between 2000 and 2500 transactions annually, As an official broker, he was prohibited from conducting trade on his own, but among his functions was to mediate financial transactions, among them bills of exchange, as regulated in an ordinance from 1720.[42] The intensive

41 Riksarkivet, Täby, Kommerskollegium, Protokoll, 25 April 1758.
42 *Årstrycket*, Kongl. Mat:ts Mäkle-Ordning, Stockholm, 6 July 1720.

Table 11.5: Matthias Lafrensen's account with the Exchange Bank, 1730–1738

Year	Number of debits	Number of credits	Debit (dkm)	Credit (dkm)	Balance (dkm)
1730	0	0	0	1200	0
1731	804	219	523,367	525,461	1200
1732	963	264	912,667	915,746	3294
1733	1711	277	2,025,943	2,026,891	6373
1734	2135	320	2,073,264	2,099,342	7322
1735	2228	419	2,352,418	2,331,972	33,400
1736	1564	364	1,849,772	1,844,230	12,954
1737	253	74	264,170	258,699	5542
1738	0	0	0	0	70

Source: Riksarkivet, Riksbanken, Växelbanken, Räkenskaper, Huvudböcker 1730–1738, vol. 3289–3326.

activities and large amounts passing through his account were thus on behalf of his clients.

If Lafransen was not trading with his own money, there were others who did. Major merchant houses such as Jean H. Lefebure, Pettersen & Bedoir, Gustav Kierman, and Koshell & Conradi kept accounts that were very active over long periods of time. The firm with the largest turnover found in the ledgers was Jennings, Finley & Co., whose account channelled more than 4,870,000 dkm in 1764.[43] Others that could have been expected to make extensive use of the services provided by the Exchange Bank only did so infrequently. Prominent among these were Carlos & Claes Grill, Christian Hebbe, Wittfoth & König, and Anders & Thomas Plomgren. One of the trading houses that dealt with the Exchange Bank regularly over a long period was that of Baltazar Nettelblad. He was primarily active as an importer of

43 Riksarkivet, Sveriges Riksbank, Växelbanken, Räkenskaper, Huvudböcker, 1764, vol. 3495–3500.

grain but he was also a shipowner.[44] His account with the Exchange Bank is presented in Table 11.6.

Table 11.6: Baltazar Nettelblad's account with the Exchange Bank, 1730–1765

Year	Number of debits	Number of credits	Debit (dkm)	Credit (dkm)	Balance (dkm)
1730	190	48	156,663	155,772	1488
1731	264	48	215,859	216,340	597
1732	235	41	213,954	214,441	1078
1733	355	41	230,590	231,751	1565
1734	375	46	246,162	245,439	2726
1735	362	41	278,470	280,066	2003
1736	366	45	332,399	329,436	3599
1737	435	45	327,047	326,854	636
1738	568	43	421,396	423,069	443
1739	477	33	502,594	502,594	2116
1740	404	26	489,363	487,830	5228
1741	520	34	562,915	570,082	3695
1742	541	28	688,468	684,794	10,862
1743	464	24	674,269	672,060	7188
1744	598	24	823,826	833,575	4979
1745	468	26	870,728	874,680	8931
1746	424	30	651,827	645,782	2886
1747	315	24	819,393	829,681	13,174
1748	492	40	1,360,670	1,357,816	10,320
1749	308	29	925,833	924,810	9297
1750	305	29	1,023,739	1,014,442	9679
1751	278	28	968,010	964,098	5767
1752	306	33	854,798	860,081	11,050

44 Samuelsson 1951, 209–10.

Year	Number of debits	Number of credits	Debit (dkm)	Credit (dkm)	Balance (dkm)
1753	250	28	953,149	955,125	13,026
1754	345	45	1,251,175	1,267,820	29,671
1755	283	39	1,791,946	1,772,377	10,102
1756	256	36	1,763,127	1,779,384	26,359
1757	154	27	1,475,225	1,448,866	3856
1758	160	30	1,324,729	1,329,450	8577
1759	173	19	896,600	890,222	2199
1760	109	23	1,035,531	1,043,981	10,649
1761	139	29	917,513	925,454	18,590
1762	134	32	1,030,573	1,016,392	4,409
1763	43	15	410,372	407,464	1,501
1764	79	23	695,603	694,590	488
1765	52	18	302,564	302,581	505

Source: Riksarkivet, Sveriges Riksbank, Växelbanken, Räkenskaper Huvudböcker, 1730–1765, vols. 3289–3502.

The transactions on the credit side of Nettelblad's account were much less frequent and involved larger sums than those on the debit side and they are simply labelled 'various' (*diverse*). The debit transactions are of three types. About half of them were transfers to other named account holders. It is not unlikely that many of those involved the clearing of bills of exchange. The other two types were either funds that were remitted to the cashier (in which case Nettelblad would have withdrawn the sum in exchange for specie or received a receipt that could be circulated) or they were transfers to his account with the Loan Bank (in which case he would have received interest along with a receipt that could be circulated).[45]

Just as in Lafransen's case, the balances kept at the end of each year are a small fraction of the turnover. Nettelblad's business with the Exchange Bank peaked in the late 1730s and the 1740s, when he

45 Brisman 1918, 131–37, 143–46.

regularly conducted 400–500 transactions a year. A quantity of the increased amounts passing through his account from the late 1740s until the end of the Severn Years' War was undoubtedly due to inflation.[46] Nevertheless, it is unquestionable that Nettelblad provides an example of a leading merchant house that made extensive use of the Exchange Bank, and that the funds turned over were very substantial. In 1763, there was a generational shift, coinciding with a slowing down of business on Nettelblad's account, as the name changed to 'Baltazar Nettelblad & Söhne'. It is therefore difficult to assess if the slump of 1763 was due to the major crisis that erupted that year. It is, however, hard to imagine that this particular firm would have been unaffected.

Transactions in the Seven Years' War

Turning, finally, to the transactions conducted by the Swedish state during the Seven Years' War, the main ledger of the Procurement Office (Utredningskommissionen) provides a suitable overview. This body was constituted in 1757 as a central government agency, staffed by prominent merchants, senior civil servants, and military officers. Its purpose was to channel and keep track of all military expenditure during the war. It bought commodities in bulk from consortia of Swedish merchants and had them shipped to the army operating in Pomerania. The Procurement Office transferred resources to the Field Commissariat, so that the latter could acquire supplies locally. It also procured bills of exchange from a variety of merchants and bankers, but most notably from the aforementioned Exchange Office.[47] In the main ledgers, the total cost of the Swedish participation in the war is given as around 55 million dsm (165,000,000 dkm).[48] This sum, however, does not include all expenses, as recruitment, equipment, and some maintenance and transport of the army was paid locally in Sweden as part of the ordinary taxation. The examples below are taken from the accounts with the Procurement Office with the highest turnovers.

46 Montgomery 1920, 8–13; Fregert 2018, 100–102.

47 Compare British transactions in financing the War of the Spanish Succession, as studied by Brandon 2018.

48 Riksarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1757, Huvudbok 1757–1764, vol. 37a, Capitalräkning.

The Procurement Office paid the consortia of government contractors through a variety of means. The merchants Isac Classon & Wittfoth delivered victuals at the crown's storehouses in Stralsund—mainly grain, but also large quantities of beef. In the years 1759 to 1762, they granted the crown credits, as they were accumulating funds on a special account (*Reverse conto*). But the crown also transferred large sums from the Exchequer (Räntekammaren) to their account with the Exchange Bank. All in all, their dealings with the Procurement Office amounted to 701,072 dsm (2,103,216 dkm)[49]

Another consortium, Isac Classon & Hebbe & Co., arranged and carried out the transport of several regiments in 1757 and 1758 from Stockholm to Stralsund. In addition, they billed the crown for shipping victuals to Stralsund. For some of their claims, Classon & Hebbe were assigned revenues directly from the regional treasury on the island of Gotland. They were also paid a smaller sum, in this context, of 12,155 dsm (36,445 dkm) by 'the merchant Grill'. It is unclear which of the Grills this post refers to. A large proportion of the payments was settled through the provision of the Exchequer, but in what form the payments were made is not specified. The dealings of Classon & Hebbe with the Procurement Office amounted to a total of 245,704 dsm (737,112 dkm).[50]

Thus, the Procurement Office could reimburse wholesale contractors like Classon, Wittfoth, and Hebbe in a variety of ways, one of which was the transfer of funds within the Exchange Bank. Crucially, they in turn would have had to pay their subcontractors in an appropriate medium, which brings us to the dealings of the Procurement Office in bills of exchange. To this end, the services of the Exchange Office was called upon and very large sums were turned over. From August 1758 to October 1762, the Exchange Office channelled 14,207,135 dsm (42,621,405 dkm) in bills of exchange through their account with the Procurement Office.[51] At the same time, the Procurement Office bought bills of exchange from merchants active outside the Exchange

49 Riksarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1757, Huvudbok 1757–1764, vol. 37a, Classon and Wittfoth's account.

50 Riksarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1757, Huvudbok 1757–1764, vol. 37a, Classon and Hebbe's account.

51 Riksarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1757, Huvudbok 1757–1764, vol. 37a, Wexell Contoiret's account.

Office. The company of Wittfoth & König mediated bills of exchange for the substantial amount of 1,948,622 dsm (5,845,866 dkm).[52]

Of all the transactions in the ledgers of the Procurement Office, the transfer of the subsidies paid by France were the largest, and they were handled by the Exchange Office.[53] From the notes and explanations that accompanies the posts and sums registered in the account, it is possible to deduce how these transactions were organised. First, the Swedish authorities, Chancellor von Höpken and the envoy Schefer in Paris, are mentioned, granted that the subsidies, denominated in *livres*, were deposited for the benefit of the Exchange Office with Parisian merchant bankers, among them the firms Frontmartel, La Borde, and Touton et Baur. Second, members of the Exchange Office used these funds to buy bills of exchange drawn on Hamburg, where the firm Pierre His & Son was frequently used. Alternatively, they could draw such bills themselves. Third, these bills were sent to the Pomeranian Field Commissariat, or on a few occasions to the commander Lantinghausen. These transactions involved very substantial amounts. Several million *livres* were exchanged for bills denominated in even sums of 100,000 or 50,000 Hamburger Banco. Interestingly, there were also many bills denominated in Pomeranian courant, in equally high and even numbers. This indicates that the Hamburger Banco bills were used to pay for commodities purchased on international markets, while the bills in Pomeranian courant were intended to be used locally. In either case, they were explicitly designated for the needs and sustenance of the army.[54]

Conclusion

In the middle of the 18th century, the Swedish state had a well-functioning financial infrastructure at its disposal. The basis consisted of merchant houses that were integrated into wider European networks of bankers who would draw, accept, and trade with bills of exchange.

52 Riksarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1757, Huvudbok 1757–1764, vol. 37a, Wittfoth and König's account.

53 This complex process deserves a more comprehensive study than that provided here.

54 Riksarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1757, Huvudbok 1757–1764, vol. 37a, Wexell Contoiret's account.

Just like their counterparts in Hamburg and Amsterdam, Swedish merchants had access to an Exchange Bank, where bills of exchange could be easily cleared and funds transferred between accounts held by both state agencies and private traders. The state also had the capacity to create new institutions, and to make merchant bankers and government contractors part of its day-to-day operations, as in the cases of both the Exchange Office and the Procurement Office.

This financial infrastructure was immediately mobilised in wartime. Funds were constantly finding their way through networks of accounts held by merchant bankers in a variety of locations. Merchants and contractors were regularly paid, in acceptable forms of legal tender and currencies. The contrast to the preceding century is unmistakable. In the 18th century, contractors did not—at least not as a rule—accumulate huge floating claims of vague sizes and values, which could be compensated for by land donations governed by uncertain conditions and duration, or by issuing patents of nobility, which was the common practice in the preceding century.[55] The system was certainly far from perfect, but the establishment of a functioning financial infrastructure increased state capacity. By harnessing markets, campaigning in theatres of war with limited local resources was made feasible, as commodities demanded by the military could be brought in from afar, in bulk, and, more often than not, on time.

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55 For an overview of Swedish war finance in the 17th century, see e.g. Landberg 1971; Nilsson 1990.

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CHAPTER 12

Swedish Logistics and Finance in the Seven Years' War, 1757–1762

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Abstract

This chapter examines how the Swedish army's procurement system functioned during its deployment in Europe in the Seven Years' War (1757–62), focusing on operations in Pomerania and Brandenburg. It concentrates on supply activities at the ground level of war and analyses these alongside Sweden's domestic and foreign trade. The chapter discusses the roles played by local entrepreneurs in Germany as well as by the Swedish government in managing strategic resource pipelines and mobilising capital for tactical missions. By highlighting the depth and longevity of Sweden's supply operations, it challenges previous scholarship that has characterised its supply system as utterly inadequate, while in reality Sweden sustained a demanding expeditionary campaign for five years. The failure of this campaign, it argues, stemmed not from logistical shortcomings but from the complex and adverse conditions of campaigning in Pomerania as well as from the friction in its command structures. The chapter concludes that, by augmenting the army's financial infrastructure and resource support

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with private input, Sweden displayed considerable resilience amid a turbulent economic period.

Introduction

The Seven Years' War started in 1756 as a conflict between France and Britain and grew into a worldwide confrontation in the Americas, Europe, and Asia. Its northernmost theatre in the Old World was the small province of Pomerania, which, although ill-fitted for campaigning, saw five years of incursions by the Franco-Austrian ally Sweden from Western Pomerania (Vorpommern) into Prussia's Eastern Pomerania (Hinterpommern) in an effort to divert the resources of the latter from other theatres. Constrained in scope and duration, Swedish campaigns are absent from this war's scholarly synopses. While the historiography is sparse, the Swedish example deserves attention for showing its resilient support of expeditionary forces in an adverse landscape despite a precarious economy.

A common conclusion across all existing literature that focuses on Sweden's performance in the Seven Years' War is that it sustained a strategic failure for not harnessing critical support to break into Prussia and turn the tables in the war.[1] This criticism is usually followed by an ostensible compliment for using this all-consuming confrontation as an organising principle in its internal and external policies to escape a domestic politico-economic turmoil. This argument conflates the army's performance with political debates, creating a deeper gap in understanding of its dynamics and outcomes.[2] Judging the supply capabilities by the volume of allocated resources, historians fail to appreciate that the application of these resources was context-specific and dependent upon sets of circumstances that escape their attention: particularly the commercial supplement of Sweden's logistics and the ways in which entrepreneurs and private actors contributed to the armed forces.

1 The three most recent studies are Böhme 1989, 211; Winton 2012, 27; Åselius 2012, 162.

2 For example, Roberts 1986, 21. F. A. J. Szabo (2008, 224) misinterprets Sweden's 1758 campaign, alleging insufficient supply despite the Pomeranian storage facilities being at capacity. The campaign failed due to logistical failures in freight transport.

Previous studies have focused primarily on the quantity and source of resources raised by Sweden rather than their application. In recent years, this omission has been addressed by the contractor state approach. Focusing particularly on French, British, and Spanish military supply systems, this contractor state literature has demonstrated that state reliance on private actors and commercial specialists played a pivotal role in sustaining military expeditions.[3] For instance, Rafael Torres Sánchez has showed how the French army, despite its centralised structure, depended heavily on private contractors and military entrepreneurs to supply logistics and weaponry to the frontline, underscoring the complexity of resource management beyond simple state administration.[4] Similarly, Aaron Graham's study of the British army demonstrates that private financial networks were instrumental in securing loans to allow Britain to project military power far beyond its domestic capacity.[5] These examples suggest that the Swedish army's performance, when judged solely by resource volume, also overlooks the nuanced ways in which private commerce shaped the military capabilities. My chapter argues that understanding military effectiveness requires an appreciation of resource mobilisation, distribution, and application within specific campaign contexts.

My research into the entire set of correspondence about Sweden's state procurement for the duration of its involvement in the Seven Years' War proposes a revision of the traditional literature.[6] I evaluate the effectiveness of supply support in each of Sweden's campaigns and assess the state's ability to achieve the operational objectives with the resources leveraged on the inter-Baltic and local markets. I argue that Sweden had an apt procurement system, though not free from friction and insufficiencies, whereby its agencies could safeguard their needs from the general disarray, hostility, and deficiency that was so common to any long-term overseas deployment. It is true that Sweden could not simply buy an easy victory—neither could a contemporary financial powerhouse such as the City of London—but it persistently

3 Rowlands 2002; Conway 2006.
4 Torres Sánchez 2016.
5 Aaron 2015.
6 Krigsarkivet (Military Archives of Sweden, KrA), Krigshandlingar, Pommerska kriget 1757–1762; KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757.

threw jabs at Berlin. Not only did Sweden continually endanger Prussia's northern flank, but it created opportunities for its allies and demonstrated versatility in dynamically switching from deep defence strategies to offensive missions on a limited and exhausted territory.

Sweden's Strategy

Sweden entered the Seven Years' War in September 1757 and fought until May 1762. The war on the French side presented Sweden with an illusory opportunity for fast, inexpensive gains. Sweden was driven by its security strategy to counter the Russian advance along the southern Baltic coast.[7] It also hoped to regain control over Stettin customs and the Oder trade, lost to Prussia after the Treaty of Stockholm of 11 January 1720. According to this agreement, Sweden was entitled to collect toll duties on the freight shipping through Wolgast, until the Prussians constructed their own Swinemünde Canal in 1745, so bypassing Swedish customs.[8]

After deliberations, the Swedish secret committee (*sekreta utskottet*)—the Riksdag's representative body with extended authority over the state's financial and banking systems—advised the government to explore the possibilities of aligning its policies with those of the combatants.[9] As the state's economy continued to decline and internal political confrontation sharpened, the ministers became increasingly supportive of the opportunity to join the war, seeing it as a solution to in-country issues.[10] In consequence, Sweden's diplomatic missions abroad engaged with the Franco-Austrian alliance, while the June 1757 royal decree put the Pomeranian garrisons on high alert and announced mobilisation for a deployment in Germany. Swedish soldiers crossed the Prussian border on 13 September without a formal declaration of war.

The deceptive promise of an easy victory subscribed Sweden to an exhaustive confrontation in the hostile terrain of North-Western Pomerania. The contemporaneous commentaries and later scholarly

7 Trulsson 1947, 203–4.
8 Holmberg 1941, 133–5.
9 Hallendorf 1919, 251: 'med Råds råde lämpa utvägarne derhän, at rikets anseende, förkofran och—om möjeligt vore—tillväxt derigenom kunde erhålls'.
10 Trulsson 1947, 209; Winton 2012, 30.

works acknowledge the difficulty of manoeuvring an army in this landscape.[11] This part of Pomerania offered a good defensive position, but removed the offensive potential that Sweden possessed in Stettin. It presented a plateau with agricultural zones divided by marshes and dense forests, restricting the movement of large army formations. It was surrounded by water: the Baltic in the north, the Peene in the south, the Trebel in the west, and the Stettin Lagoon in the east. Despite its seemingly convenient location in the middle of waterways, Pomerania is portrayed in the war reports as an area with restricted access to marine transport through Stralsund due to severe weather and winds that lasted most of the year.

The major surrounding rivers were not deep but consistently wide, especially the Peene, which separated Swedish Pomerania from Prussia. The Peene had a few crossing sites, all of which belonged to the Prussians after the Great Northern War (1700–1721). The rivers limited the freedom of soldiers' movement from and into Prussia, but would freeze in winter, creating ice corridors for light cavalry to enter. Another difficulty for the army's movement was generated by the muddy roads and high humidity, which destroyed the wooden baggage wagon wheels and accelerated the loss of provisions to rot.[12] This presented situations demanding a combination of long-range freight distribution with locally arranged purchases, while Pomerania and Ückermark were turned into a wasteland by the armies. Neighbouring Mecklenburg was destroyed to the point that its inhabitants sought food across the sea in Sweden.[13]

To successfully sustain campaigns in this challenging landscape, several conditions needed to be met: there had to be uninterrupted communication with Baltic ports to receive overseas food and coin; control of the Peene crossing sites, including Peenemünde, was necessary for transportation along or across the river; and a robust defensive manoeuvre was required at Stralsund to counter Prussian flanking

11 Säve 1915, 67.

12 KrA, Krigshandlingar, Pommerska kriget 1757–1762, vol. 21, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 14 November 1757; KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 30a, Sparre to Utredningskommissionen, 18 April 1761.

13 Klinckowström, 1872, 29, 45, 185; KrA, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 27a, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 31 August 1759; vol. 30a, Sparre to Utredningskommissionen, 1 October 1761.

hooks from Mecklenburg–Schwerin. Additionally, to advance further into Ückermark, the Ücker River needed to be kept secure for logistical distribution; sabotage raids by the 3000-strong Stettin garrison had to be contained; and the pace and depth of the southward marches had to be coordinated with missions to Mecklenburg and Wollin, as well as with allies' actions on other fronts. Further attacks into Brandenburg or Altmark, towards Berlin, were even more complex. All these difficulties associated with activities in Pomerania demanded substantial outlay, making Sweden's prospects of significant gains in Prussia unlikely.

Similarly to other Swedish deployments abroad, the political leadership underplayed the dangers of the new war. The council of the realm (Riksrådet) presented the conflict as a fast and limited commitment, aimed at capturing territories across the Peene to contribute to the anti-Prussian alliance. Additionally, the council's political intrusions into military affairs restrained the campaigns, reducing the initiative and overall effectiveness of the commanders. Stockholm's interventions frustrated the generals, who suffered setbacks due to the political involvement in their planning. Lieutenant General Gustav David Hamilton recalled later how the council 'drew the Empire into a conflict that it could neither properly sustain nor feed with bread, and then recklessly intervened in the war planning when the army could not advance in the way that they had hoped in their wishful thinking'.[14]

The army officers were reliant on wishful thinking too. They based their expectations of campaigning in Germany on the misleading examples of other European nations who fought at their own battlefronts under different conditions, as well as on the legacy of operations launched from Stettin with more favourable terrain parameters. For example, the officers of the Preparations Commission (Förberedningskommission), created in Pomerania in the summer of 1757 to oversee the military infrastructure, concluded:

> The economy here cannot be compared to Finland or Ukraine, or other suchlike places where Sweden had fought before; bread is baked abundantly and undeniably can be acquired by the army in the majority of

14 Nikula, 1960, 284.

> German cities, which had been proven recently and many times before in this small province.[15]

Based on this assumption, the procurement authorities were misled into believing that the market on the continent was more vibrant and that logistical mishaps could be averted with local assistance. This calculation was clearly way off: the availability of food on the civilian market did not automatically translate into easy acquisition. As will be shown, Pomerania was emptied by the raiding parties while its inhabitants sold their stocks to the highest bidders from among the continental combatants, who all maintained agents on this same market of Northern Germany.

Administration and Logistics

To supply the Pomeranian army, Sweden mounted a robust multilayered administrative system, overseen by Stockholm ministers in the same way as were the commanders. The cornerstone of this system was the Procurement Commission (Utredningskommission)—yet another executive committee, established in June 1757 by the council. The commission emerged as a managing taskforce for strategic logistics, reporting directly to the king, Adolf Frederik, who famously had little to no political weight and yielded the reins of control to the council. To reach the tactical and operational levels of the logistical infrastructure, the commission relied on subordinate institutions, mainly on the Pomeranian Field Commissariat General (Överkrigskommissariat i Pommern) in Stralsund and the branch of Stockholm's Exchange Office (Växelkontor) in Hamburg.

The Procurement Commission operated with money from the so-called armaments fund (*utredningsfond*), which was separated from the ordinary and extraordinary state budgets in order not to affect the balance of finances. It was supervised by the Agency for Public

15 KrA, Krigshandlingar, Pommerska kriget 1757–1762, vol. 21, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 6 September 1757: 'jag håller thet förewara at hushållning grep, at i detta Landet, som ei Kan liknas med Finland eller andra mindre handlande Länder, som Ukraine och flere orter, hwarest de sichsta Swenska Krigen blifwit förde bespisa Armen med bröd, hwilket overdersägeligen tjänst i de mästa städer i Tyskland, och hwaraf man til dato haft prof i denna lilla Provincen'.

Management (Statskontoret) and supplied with money from the royal Exchequer (Räntekammare).[16] Its main assignment was the upkeep of the army, the navy, and military infrastructure in a broader sense. The main priority, however, was maintenance of the ground forces in Pomerania. Expenses in the field were managed by the commissariat, which received 55 per cent of all state war expenditure, making it the primary consumer of the commission's resources.[17]

Figure 12.1 presents data from the Procurement Commission's main ledger. It accounts for the dates when the bills of exchange were issued, but not when they were actually received by the commissariat. In other words, the delay in the transfers meant that the reality was not the same as reflected in the accounting book. It is evident that there was a consistent one-year lag between field expenditure and the commission's disbursements. The 1757 data shows how severely underresourced the commissariat was at the beginning of the war. Geographically, this chart is focused on remitting that happened between Stockholm, Hamburg, and Stralsund, while the units were operating elsewhere. As a result of the lack of consistent accounts, we can only assume how little money had reached the army units from the actual army chest, refilled from the commissariat's budget.

The commissariat was created in July 1757 and consisted of nine clerks and its leader, the commissioner general (*generalkrigskommissar*). There were three men who held this post during the conflict: Lieutenant General Jacob Albrecht von Lantingshausen (1757–1759), Colonel Carl von Otter (1759–1760), and Lieutenant Colonel Carl Sparre (1760–1762). The commissariat's primary function was coordination of various entities that supported the army: the Procurement Commission, the high command of the army and navy, the provincial government chairmen in Sweden (*landshövdingar*), the Swedish government of Pomerania, and the local German government assembly.[18] To control the field logistics, the commissariat relied on the field office (*fältkontor*) operating the war chest, and on the War Directorate

16 Åmark 1961, 187.

17 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 37, Capital Räkning.

18 Riksarkivet (National Archives of Sweden), Militaria, Krigshistoriska samlingen, vol. 1623, Adolf Frederik to Ungern-Sternberg, 18 July 1757.




Figure 12.1: Total spending of the Procurement Commission and income for the Commissariat.
Source: KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 37, Capital Räkning.

(Krigsdirektorium) overseeing the army quartering, discipline, contributions, and other operational aspects.[19]

To further complicate this system, the link between Swedish and Pomeranian finances was provided through a relay transfer network, network, in which bills of exchange were moved via a chain of designated stations in Europe.[20] During the early deployment stages, such stations were provided privately by the commissariat's leadership. In November 1757, this responsibility was delegated to Stockholm's Exchange Office branch in Hamburg.[21] This office was initially directed by a wealthy German merchant, Henrich König, who had strong trade ties to Stockholm. The office became a vital component of Sweden's economic effort on the continent, supporting financial transactions for the army. It also provided the main hub for processing the voluminous

19 Riksarkivet, Militaria, Krigshistoriska samlingen, vol. 1644, Strödda Handlingar, Krigsdirektorium i Pommern, 1 October 1757, Instruction; Blumfeldt 1954, 4.
20 Sjöstrand 1908, 168.
21 Säve 1915, 56. See also Chapter 11 in this volume.

French subsidies flowing from Paris to Pomerania (*c*. 12,000,000 silver daler (dsm) in total).[22]

My research demonstrates that this system's implementation had serious limitations. The main constraint was that all the above-mentioned departments, commercial enterprises, and political groups had their own priorities and were embedded in different networks dictated by their potentially lucrative interests. Such divergence had evidently impacted their performance, restricting the campaign's effectiveness, reach, and longevity. Likewise, an extended institutional system cultivated confusion and unaccountability, whereby each party escaped responsibility by blaming the others for their own shortcomings. Lack of full control came at the cost of exposure to corruption, imprinting its incompetencies on army operations, but it also granted insurance against one of the parties taking over the entire army's supply.

On the surface the Procurement Commission existed to oversee war-related acquisitions and reduce the confusion of Stockholm's political bodies by managing all logistics enquiries, while the commissariat aimed to apply the acquired assets on the ground. In practice, these two organs were mired in controversy from the first day of the war. The opening strike in the autumn of 1757 had immediately revealed this problem, and—with its failure—Sweden's inability to ensure a sustained support of expeditions. Most importantly, it disproved the chances of achieving the core objective: gaining and keeping a foothold in Prussian Pomerania.[23] The commanding officers had quickly realised that the objective to operate across the Peene was simply unrealistic. They attempted to avoid responsibility for the imminent setback by filing discharge requests. This tendency caused unprecedently high turnover in the high command during the opening year, making the strategic leadership dependent upon the resolutions of their subordinate officers. Among the latter, Major General Albrecht von Lantingshausen stood out as a particularly able figure, combining combat competencies with practical knowledge of military administration.

Lantingshausen came from the Livonian military nobility who had served Sweden for generations. He started as a young soldier in

22 Riksarkivet, Statskontoret, Statskontoret kammarkontoret strödda handlingar och räkenskaper för bl. a. regementen 1683–1876, inflytna subsidier, 1727–1789, Kronan Frankrike för Sverige accorderade Subsidier.

23 Sulicki 1867, 80.

the Carolean army in Norway, and then fought for various German princes in the wars of the Polish and Austrian Succession (1733–1735 and 1740–1748 respectively). His service to the European overlords ended in his appointment as a ceremonial representative of Zweibrücken, in which capacity he returned to Stockholm. Back in Sweden, his expertise was rewarded with an offer to hold authority over reconstruction of the Finnish defence installations in the late 1740s, which he later exchanged for the post of commandant in Gothenburg, which in turn led him to the Stockholm government.[24] A rare set of skills and powerful contacts granted Lantingshausen a seat in the War Preparations Commission of 1757 and made him the only fit candidate to lead the Pomeranian commissariat.

Holding authority over the commissariat did not stop Lantingshausen from commanding soldiers on the frontline. If anything, this experience gave him the opportunity to test and adapt the supply chains that he created. After encountering difficulties during the initial march to Prussia, he warned the Procurement Commission that the army could not depend on the rear food stockpiles if they were unreliably distributed to the units.[25] His concerns were emblematic of other officers' criticism, directed at the central administration, of building a poor logistical connection between the coastal magazines and the army, which prevented the troops from conducting 'swift and audacious manoeuvres as Stockholm had anticipated'.[26] Eyewitnesses pointed out a seemingly stable circulation of wagons near Stralsund, while in reality the Swedish baggage train could not reach beyond well-secured provinces where the garrison units were tightly quartered to protect and assist the transportation. What appeared to be active logistics near Stralsund were, in fact, enacted by no more than 35 per cent of all wagons, the rest being in disrepair.[27]

The Procurement Commission responded to Lantingshausen's criticism by putting the blame for this debacle on the commissariat. The

24 Malmström 1889, 274; Jägerskiöld 2024.

25 KrA, Krigshandlingar, Pommerska kriget 1757–1762, vol. 21, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 4 October 1757: 'armen, som står uti fiendes land, hwaräst inga Magaziner äro uprättande, under desse haftige rörelser icke kan nyttja deras Magaziner som de hfwa backom sig'.

26 Malmström 1899, 298: 'kunde icke utföra sådana snabba och djerfva företag, som man i Stockholm af densamma fordrade'.

27 Malmström 1899, 300.

commission evaded the questions about the disconnect between the Baltic stockpiles and the field army by recentring the conversation on Lantingshausen and why he had not stored more in the rear to feed the army of invasion.[28] However, the commission was informed in August to early September that the army would face shortages in the field. The commission had acted on this intelligence and had prepared for the scenario where the central deliveries failed.[29] Moreover, it explored the viability of decentralisation through handing coin to the soldiers for private purchases instead of burdening core logistical centres.[30] Eventually the commission rejected this solution and reported to the agency of public management that decentralised procurement would impede their ability to control the distribution, granting the commissariat an unreasonably high stake in contracting—a stake that could be misused.[31]

As the campaign of autumn 1757 resulted in a debacle and the inefficiency of Swedish logistics became apparent, the commission revisited this dispute. They were more cooperative this time, yielding a greater autonomy to the commissariat to sustain the army through cash compensation for private purchases of essential foods and forage from local sutlers. This decision had little effect, as the soaring demand had doubled the prices of basic necessities, while certain products, such as wheat, had vanished from Pomerania.[32] Need for money outpaced its availability for the army, spiking inflation and rendering the decentralisation efforts futile.

The divide between the commission and the commissariat becomes clearer through the contract vetting procedure. The commissariat had to identify a supply contractor and submit their quote to the commission, detailing the contract's parameters. This estimate, after being included in the commission's meeting agenda, would be reviewed

28 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 1, fol. 1799, 19 September 1757.

29 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 1, fols. 1539–40, 6 September 1757.

30 KrA, Krigshandlingar, vol. 43, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 8 October 1757.

31 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 1, fol. 1957, 19 October 1757.

32 KrA, Krigshandlingar, vol. 21, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 27 September 1757.

against the other offers from the commission's own suppliers. Notably, the commissariat was forbidden to send agents into the territories of the Swedish Empire until 1760 (and then only to Skåne), limiting their market to the southern Baltic coast and encouraging contraband.[33] If the offer was accepted, the payable amount would be approved by the public management agency, whereafter the commissariat would receive a letter of credit (*kreditiv*) confirming the state's commitment to providing funds up to a set limit. The commissariat would then confirm the deal with the merchant and issue a bill of exchange guaranteeing a future relay payment from Sweden's discretionary fund in Hamburg.[34]

Early on, Lantingshausen pointed out that this bureaucratic routine ignored the contingent war factors and pivoted around the commission's own interests.[35] The commission took a defensive stance, accusing him of wastefulness and blaming the commissariat for shortcomings in the first Prussian campaign; it capitalised on this image of the commissariat as a sinkhole of state funds to justify its stringent control of resources.[36] This allowed the commission to request expenditure estimates in advance of the campaigns, despite the army's operational uncertainties. The commission's members acknowledged the obstacles this posed, but prioritised their own convenience over the army's needs: 'When the army marches into the foreign and unknown land its movements and routes become unpredictable and mixed under the circumstances, but even less predictable and mixed is the nature of supply [acquisitions], required to maintain the army.'[37]

This system was mismatched with the dynamics of the war theatre. Lantingshausen criticised it for being too rigid, saying that it was impossible to make plans or strategise without having certainty about incoming support:

33 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 30a, Sparre to Utredningskommissionen, 12 March 1761.

34 Malmström, 1899, 360.

35 KrA, Krigshandlingar, vol. 43, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 15 July 1758.

36 Darbel 1929, 11.

37 KrA, Krigshandlingar, vol. 73, Utredningskommissionen to Lantingshausen, 31 March 1758: 'När armeen kommer at gå in uti främmande och mera okändte orter, och då armeens rörerlser och förtagande kan blifwa owis och olika den ena tiden emot den andra, mera owist och osäkert, måste blifwa, at förut kunna säga, till hwad del armeen på det ena eller andra sättet skall underhållas.'

> It always takes too long [for money to arrive]; [money] arrives when it is no longer needed or when the prices have grown higher than anticipated; logistics depend on the army's current position and movement which are circumstantial and unclear; none of them is permanent, especially when the army is in the enemy land, subjected to the fast shifts and turns of the moment, when it is surrounded by the enemy light troops.[38]

Frequent delays in payment to the contractors by the commission reduced the expected profit of the former. This was caused by inflation and the cost of long debt servicing, making agreements unviable for the sellers and their own supplier networks. This deficiency provoked complaints by the army leadership that eventually caught the king's attention.[39] Despite the pressure from different layers of power, the commission remained steadfast, insisting to the entire political elite that they had met their responsibilities, attributing all failures to the commissariat.[40] Influenced by the Stockholm ministers, who were closely linked with the commission's members, the king ruled in the commission's favour. Lantingshausen's allegations were discarded, and he was instructed to 'lead without complaints'.[41]

The locally arranged acquisitions demanded immediate cash outlay, accomplished through the establishment of a discretionary fund in Pomerania that held money for circumstantial disbursements.[42] Under the debt burden of local lenders, Lantingshausen improvised this structure by leveraging private real estate in Pomerania valued at approximately 100,000 dsm as mortgage security. Once the loans were negotiated, he issued assignats on security of these loans to cover

38 KrA, Krigshandlingar, vol. 43, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 29 September 1758: 'hwilken alltid kommer så långsamt, at mer än requirerat blifwit då redan är upgångit och anticiperat … hwilket för en armee som går i Fiendens Land är alt för owist at wälja, så länge den ey står på fast fot, utan är underkastad för ändringar och ställningar och marcher, samt på alla sidor är omgifwen af Fiendens lätta troupper'.

39 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 22, Adolf Frederik to Utredningskommissionen, 10 October 1758.

40 Riksarkivet, Militaria, Krigshistoriska samlingen, vol. 1627, Utredningskommissionen to Hamilton, 10 October 1758.

41 Malmström 1889, 293–97.

42 KrA, Krigshandlingar, vol. 21, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 12 November 1757.

the army's most urgent expenses. His trade with assignats must have brought too high a risk and too little profit; he submitted three resignation letters, citing the strain of pawning private assets for professional duties as his motivation. All of his letters were dismissed because of his indispensable role in the procurement system.[43]

Financial Operations

Particularly active financial links connected Lantingshausen with the merchant Joachim Ulrich Giese, who hailed from a Rostock merchant family. His career in the trade houses led to Stralsund, where his wealth opened doors to the local establishment. Giese's contacts with the Swedish government were through the German minister Adolf Friedrich von Olthoff, who had strong ties to Stockholm. Olthoff's father served as a legal counsel and advisor in Sweden, and Olthoff himself spent his youth assisting his father and socialising in the capital court with resourceful peers who eventually installed him as an officer in the Swedish War Directorate during the Pomeranian deployment. At the beginning of the war, Sweden sought to establish a minting press in Stralsund and Olthoff introduced Giese as a potential investor to Lantingshausen. Although the project did not materialise until three years later, Giese became instrumental in extending liquidity from Hamburg to the field army through his merchant connections in Lübeck, Rostock, Schwerin, and Wismar, charging a modest cost for every transaction.[44]

Giese's financial support began as a private arrangement between him and Lantingshausen as early as July 1757—a time when Sweden's procurement system was not fully set up.[45] By late October, according to Giese's calculations, Lantingshausen owed him 165,000 dsm, mostly spent on preparations for the first campaign.[46] However, the combined public and private efforts to support Sweden's expedition proved insufficient. The scarcity of food due to transport issues forced a retreat, opening the way for the Prussians to counterattack and blockade

43 Malmström 1889, 285, 295.
44 Marsson 1928. See also Chapter 11 in this volume.
45 Blumfeldt 1954, 2.
46 KrA, Krigshandlingar, vol. 21, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 22 October 1757.

Stralsund. Notably, the food continued to flow to the sea ports during the blockade. It was delivered by the commission in such quantities that when Stralsund was relieved, the Swedish coastal depots were filled to capacity and Lantingshausen had concerns about the excessive volume rotting in the warm weather.[47] To avoid wastage, the field authorities were forced to sell overdue slimy meat from the commission to the poor peasants.[48]

The loss of continental pastures in the winter and spring endangered fodder supply, while its prices had soared locally. An eyewitness suggests that certain officers 'shot their horses dead before entering Stralsund to grant them relief during the prolonged blockade'.[49] To avoid starvation of the horses, soldiers used unsuitable sorts of dry rye to feed them, which caused an epidemic of glanders.[50] The further loss of draught animals, occurring when Sweden was already grappling with transportation issues in the field, made logistics for the 1758 campaign particularly challenging. One commentary stated that supply wagons could not travel more than five miles from the key Stralsund depot where food was kept.[51]

Even with the reported logistical hardships, the army managed to reach the surroundings of Berlin. Their raiding parties had a more impressive reach, operating on the western side of the Elbe. This effort ended unfavourably, however: after advancing to the Havel, Lieutenant General Hamilton halted and presented Stockholm with the choice of committing the army to a movement beyond the Prignitz line, where it could not be reached by either money or food deliveries.[52] During the long wait for the letter exchange with Stockholm, Hamilton released

47 KrA, Krigshandlingar, vol. 43, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 15 and 17 July 1758.

48 KrA, Krigshandlingar, vol. 43, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 8 October 1758.

49 KrA, Krigshandlingar, vol. 43, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 2 November 1758: 'straxt wid armeens inryckande i Stralsund för bettre utkomst skutit deras Hästar för häfwandet på thet under en långwarig bloquade'.

50 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 30a, Sparre to Utredningskommissionen, 13 March 1761.

51 KrA, Krigshandlingar, vol. 43, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 8 December 1758.

52 KrA, Krigshandlingar, vol. 43, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 13 September 1758.

the soldiers for small supply raids and lost the capability to continue the concentrated attack.[53]

Lantingshausen pointed out that the delayed payments for tactical application were caused by the commission's preference for contracts with Baltic distributors, who sold goods at prices twice as high as those offered to the Prussians.[54] These major distributors also unloaded the deliveries in the unreachable Pomeranian warehouses. To avoid accountability for its inefficiency, the Procurement Commission had again twisted the dispute into a conversation about the commissariat's alleged mismanagement of debt in Germany.[55] It claimed that the commissariat failed to distinguish between debts that could be temporarily postponed and those requiring immediate repayment; in addition, it contended that the commissioners' priorities were selective, not based on urgency but on lucrative motives. The growing divide between the two agencies was exacerbated by the fact that the commissariat had not submitted a single financial report to the central authorities until the final year of the conflict, when Stockholm expanded its audit office in Stralsund fivefold.[56] But even when detailed accounts arrived in the capital, the commission's members had reportedly made efforts to downplay them, seeking to deceive the council and portray the commissariat in a negative light.[57]

In 1759 Lantingshausen was reappointed commander-in-chief and replaced as commissioner general by Colonel Carl von Otter: old and compliant, Otter was expected not to overhaul the system when Lantingshausen was at the front. As early as January, the authorities began preparing for the new campaign. There was a noted increase in the prices of basic foods such as corn, quadrupling since the same time the previous year.[58] Borrowing for the previous acquisitions had left the field budget in a precarious state, and the unpaid debts overlapped

53 KrA, Krigshandlingar, vol. 43, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 7 September 1758.

54 KrA, Krigshandlingar, vol. 43, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 12 November 1758.

55 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 2, fol. 1370, 5 December 1758.

56 Blumfeldt 1954.

57 Darbel 1929, 16.

58 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 27a, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 14 January 1759.

with a new wave of contracts. The commissariat was depleted, and the local sellers were burdened by a backlog of payments for the former orders, making them reluctant to enter new agreements.[59] The cost of soldiers' upkeep was exaggerated by new demand to restock the magazines before redeployment and was expected to stay high until the next summer's harvest.

To avoid panic and chaotic borrowing by the commissariat, the commission sternly cautioned it about the limitations on what it could expect financially.[60] Another constraint on the war finance was the reduced availability of cash in the Hamburg market and Sweden's limited naval transport capability in the southern Baltic.[61] As an alternative to naval deliveries, the commissariat had again offered the commission to establish a minting press in Stralsund to produce a debased currency to buy out Sweden's debts and regulate the prices. This offer was acknowledged in Stockholm but with the reservation that the guarantee fund for Pomeranian coin should be in Hamburg, as opposed to the commissariat's proposition of backing Pomeranian coin from Sweden's budget directly.[62] The council nonetheless refrained from coin debasement due to concerns about uncontrolled inflation and its effect on the local German community. As a result, the commission restricted the commissariat's intervention in local finance to prohibiting foreign currencies in Pomerania, and it intended to issue obligations against future French subsidy revenue.[63]

The crucially anticipated subsidies had slowed down after France's defeats at Breton and Quebec of 1758–1759.[64] The commissariat was left without a breathing space to pay off the previous years' agreements with debt issued against the subsidy income, as the latter security rapidly became unpopular on the financial market. Stockholm,

59 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 27a, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 27 February 1759; Säve, 1915, 350.

60 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 2, fols. 3876–77, 3888.

61 Sjöstrand 1908, 160.

62 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 3, fol. 126, 5 February 1758.

63 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 3, fols. 273, 329; Marsson 1930, 110–16.

64 Sulicki 1867, 203.

inadvertently constraining the army's logistics, pressured the commissariat for significant operational outputs to revive the allies' aid, in order to gain more subsidies and improve its payment capacity.[65] To bypass the enforced funding constraints, Lantingshausen was commanded to immerse the commissariat in a higher debt.[66] Consequently, the local sellers noticed Sweden's growing deficit, lost trust, and started to actively smuggle goods past the enforced cordons into the neighbouring German provinces.[67] Even Sweden's own officers, who supplied grain from their estates through the army contracts system, participated in this illicit trade. For example, Hamilton and Major Fredrik Ulrik Putbus withdrew their offers from the Stockholm commission because of their concerns about the payment.[68]

To Sweden's disappointment, French subsidies ceased after France's defeat in the Quiberon Bay battle of 20 November 1759.[69] The army's demand for cash at the same time surpassed any single available revenue stream and Sweden's suppliers witnessed its collapsing economy. The primary pressure was not from the liabilities for the large inter-Baltic contracts, but from compounded smaller agreements in Pomerania that needed resolution before starting a new wave of deals for the 1760 campaign. Each creditor needed compensation to accept new contracts, requiring Sweden to carefully navigate its way out of this crisis. The foremost challenge became replacing the subsidies, calling for a structural reconsideration of Sweden's approach to the army's finance.

The Procurement Commission explored various solutions. These included, for example, supporting Giese's fund from Stockholm's budget—a proposal that had been suggested before as a part of the so-called 'connection fund' project.[70] Another solution was to sponsor the

65 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 27a, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 10 February 1759.

66 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 11, Utredningskommissionen to KMt, 31 October 1759.

67 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 27a, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 19 November 1759.

68 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 27a, Carl von Otter to Utredningskommissionen, 9 April and 8 May 1759.

69 Klinckowström 1872, 163, 188–89.

70 Riksarkivet, Kammarkollegiets ämnesamlingar, Likvidationer, serie 95–96, vol. 35, Giese.

Hamburg Exchange Office from Stockholm for further remitting into Pomerania, but this was dismissed as 'completely impractical'.[71] Alternatively, the entire expenditure could be taken into the commission's hands.[72] The commission's membership, hotly refusing any intrusion in its finance, argued for the last option. The timing was opportune: the commissariat had been exhausted after three years of slow finance support; all previous campaigns had been repelled, discouraging France from continuing to pay subsidies; and the field agencies were expected to face heavy scrutiny at the 1760 Riksdag assembly by the returned veterans. These arguments, together with a promise to grant the chancellor of the realm, Anders Johan von Höpken, control over the commission's multi-million funding allocation, convinced the council to embrace the idea of substituting subsidies with bank loans and making the commission their main manager.[73]

Rearrangement of finance threatened the commissariat's own credit system as well as risking the capital of the commissariat's creditors who depended on the Exchange Office's subsidies pipeline. A new debate was ignited between the two competing bodies. Commissioner Otter contended that, given the Hamburg Exchange Office's insolvency, it would be more sensible to finance Giese with bills of exchange drawn directly against the Stockholm bank securities instead of Sweden's collateralised debt obligations.[74] In the meantime, the commission insisted on returning Giese's loans with Sweden's debt and only upon receiving his liquidation requests for the expired bills of exchange. This was simply a means of moving the debt deadlines ahead, inflicting losses on Giese; he was forced to wait for his bills' expiry, since no one on the continent wished to buy Sweden's debt under current conditions.[75] Otter emphasised Giese's value as the fastest credit source for day-to-day operations:

71 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 4, fol. 191, 28 March 1759.

72 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 11, Utredningskommissionen to KMt, 22 November 1759.

73 Malmström 1899–1900, 4:371, 5:33.

74 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 29a, Carl von Otter to Utredningskommissionen, 1 January and 14 March 1760.

75 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 4, fol. 185, 28 March 1759.

> The resource of subsidies would seem to be somewhat significant, but when compared to the advances made by director Giese and to the borrowed capital and to the army's debt, they are not sufficient; subsidies are, nevertheless, the means by which the army's immediate needs can be satisfied to an extent.[76]

This argument held little weight in Stockholm. Partly to curb local inflation and meet the commissariat's demand for liquidity, and partly to take advantage of the declining price of Sweden's debt, the commission was set on flooding Pomerania with banknotes (*banko transport sedlar*), with a fixed exchange rate defined in Stockholm. These banknotes were intended for subsequent sale in Sweden.[77] To back this operation, the commission granted Giese and his business partner Olthoff a concession to establish a minting press in Stralsund on 1 June 1760. The minting press aimed to provide inexpensive coinage for payments to the note holders. The profits from fluctuating exchange rates and coin debasement generated additional revenue for the commissariat, while Giese profited from supplying silver for re-minting.[78]

The armaments fund's expansion with bank loans had significantly accelerated inflation. The army, for whom the debased coin was intended, could hardly utilise it, as prices rose again and petty contractors refused to accept either the Pomeranian *courant* or Swedish banknotes.[79] It took a lot to find credit for local acquisitions, but it took more to find contractors willing to accept the new payment methods. And just as in 1758, instead of coming up with a comprehensive approach considering various economic policies and their impacts, the commission used these hardships as a pretext to tighten its control over logistics. Hence, it bought so much supply from the Baltic that it had to expropriate sheds and barns from the inhabitants in the

76 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 29a, Carl von Otter to Utredningskommissionen, 16 April 1760: 'Then resource af subsidie medel skulle synas wara något betydande, men då de förskåtter Directeuren Giese giort och uplånte Capitaler samt Armeens skulder theremot jämnföres äro the icke uträckne. Emedlertid är thet likwäl et medel, hwarigenom armeens för handen warande behof til någon del kunna ståpas.'

77 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 4, fols. 190–92.

78 Marsson 1928, 121–3.

79 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 29a, Sparre to Utredningskommissionen, 28 July 1760.

surroundings of Stralsund to support the magazine infrastructure.[80] At the same time, wagons and draught animals could not be found in the needed quantities and food lay rotting in coastal warehouses. The local sutlers, rather than concluding deals with the agencies, sold goods privately to the army officers and overcharged them.[81] Subsequently, soldiers' and officers' wages inflated in relation to the local prices, much to their dissatisfaction, leading to unrest with the civilians over food and essentials.[82]

On orders from Stockholm, the Swedish government of Pomerania enforced numerous regulations compelling the locals to provide food consignments at a lower cost than the market rate. These regulations promised future fixed compensations, to be paid in the Pomeranian *courant*. The coerced products were supplied to the army at a subsidised rate but, exacerbating the situation, instead of distributing these products to their units, the officers appropriated and resold them back to the starving locals.[83] Commissioners voiced concern that the high prices were not necessarily due to inflation but rather created by speculation, and called for an even stricter intervention by the Pomeranian government.[84] Adding to the existing friction, the Swedish government of Pomerania took a stance at odds to the field agencies, protesting against the inflation and proliferation of debased currency.[85] The commissioners themselves took advantage of the crisis by offering the locals their services through exchanging the debased currency for better silver coin, directly competing with Stockholm's plans.[86]

80 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 29a, Sparre to Utredningskommissionen, 14 July 1760.
81 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 29a, Sparre to Utredningskommissionen, 6 December 1760.
82 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 29a, Sparre to Utredningskommissionen, 12 August 1760.
83 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 30a, Sparre to Utredningskommissionen, 3 February 1761.
84 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 29a, Sparre to Utredningskommissionen, 27 September 1760.
85 Malmström 1899–1900, 4:371; Säve 1915, 112–16.
86 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 30a, Sparre to Utredningskommissionen, 27 June 1761, fol. 848.

Lantingshausen approached the situation by drawing wisdom from his similarly under-resourced past campaigns.[87] He mortgaged his private property again to conclude a series of loans with Giese, army officers, and local German magnates.[88] The remainder of the funds were provided by the Stockholm Central Bank.[89] The assets mobilised for the new expedition were managed by Carl Sparre, who replaced Commissioner General Otter. Sparre had built a military career in the volunteer corps of other continental powers and served in the regimental command of the Swedish units in Finland and Pomerania. He was connected with Lantingshausen through a close friend and relative of the latter, Axel von Fersen.[90] Sparre began his service in the commissariat during a challenging time, but was aware of the difficulty posed by poor support from Stockholm.[91] Fortuitously for Sparre, the heavy duty of mobilising funds was undertaken by Lantingshausen before his accession. Yet, an even heavier task of repaying these debts lay ahead.

The deliveries against previously negotiated agreements with the majority of local suppliers were set to stop in March 1761, prompting the need for substantial external aid if Sweden wished to stay in the war.[92] Giese was reportedly unable to assist because the commission had indefinitely postponed his payments.[93] The decline of European financial markets in 1761, fuelled by overall wartime inflation, caught Giese unprepared to pay clearing claims to his own bankrupting creditors in Amsterdam and Hamburg.[94] Sparre reported that, in order to stay operational, the commissariat needed to keep Giese afloat. The Procurement Commission, however, suspecting that Giese would not reinvest the returned debts in Sweden, defaulted on him and forbid any

87 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 27a, Lantingshausen to Utredningskommissionen, 3 March 1759, fol. 696.
88 Malmström 1899–1900, 4:309; Säve 1915, 351.
89 Säve 1915, 256.
90 Darbel 1929, 3–7.
91 Darbel 1929, 11.
92 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 30a, Sparre to Utredningskommissionen, 28 February 1761.
93 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 5, fols. 257, 337, 16 March and 13 April 1760.
94 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 30a, Sparre to Utredningskommissionen, 21 May 1761.

disbursements to the merchant.[95] Thus, Giese's crediting was curtailed. The commission resorted to minting a larger amount of cheap coin in Pomerania to replenish the commissariat's stocks.

This cheap coin was neither accepted elsewhere in Germany nor valued locally, whereas Sparre was encouraged by the commission's senior members to purchase banknotes with debased currency to improve his liquidity.[96] Notably, facing difficulties with the new coin, Sparre asked: 'when our promises are not kept with smaller amounts, how can we induce the inhabitants to credit larger sums?'[97] At this stage, many supply businesses had quit their trade with the commissariat. Lantingshausen himself was approached three times by the commission's members with loan requests for purchase of transport wagons, all of which he cautiously rejected.[98] The unenviable task of leading a campaign under these circumstances was assigned to Major General Augustin Ehrensvärd, an army visionary with an excellent career record but little hands-on experience of staging large manoeuvres. This opinion was expressed by Sparre, bringing him into sharp conflict with the general and creating another gap in the army's support.[99]

Sparre's concerns about Ehrensvärd were soon validated: the general managed to negotiate a financial supplement from the Stockholm council, but it was delivered through the same method as in 1757—shaping the offensive around the limits of centralised logistics.[100] Purchases of food consignments in Pomerania and Mecklenburg were impossible without cash and the slow distribution through the Baltic was increasingly expensive and unreliable.[101] Ehrensvärd's strategy was back to what it had been before Lantingshausen's adaptations: built around rigid communication lines leading to the concentrated vanguard in Prussia and reliant on Sweden's allies, primarily the Russians.

95 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 5, fol. 450, 28 May 1760.

96 Marsson 1928, 132.

97 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 30a, 13 March 1761, Sparre to Utredningskommissionen: 'när ord och löfften icke hålles i mindre summor, huru kunde man då förmå inwånarne på Rygen, att lämna Credit på störra summa.'

98 Malmström 1899–1900, 5:131.

99 Säve 1915, 507.

100 Malmström 1899–1900, 5:121; Säve 1915, 442–47.

101 KrA, Utredningskommissioner, Utredningskommissionen 1757, vol. 30a, Sparre to Utredningskommissionen, 31 July 1761.

Although Ehrensvärd had expanded the cavalry count to support his logistical method, when the army crossed the Peene in mid-August, Sweden's inability to transport food further halted the advance at Taschenberg, near the campaign's starting point.[102] The remaining part of Sweden's war effort was limited to short and disorganised cavalry raids that lasted until a separate peace treaty in May. Sweden could not generate power for a new thrust. Its part in the Seven Years' War was over.

Conclusion

Sweden emerged from the war undefeated, avoiding imposition of harsh terms by Prussia. However, its involvement did not achieve any lasting advantage to balance the sacrifices. What was truly impressive was the country's stamina. This chapter has demonstrated the complexity of sustaining military operations that not only face the risks apparent to any war but contend with and adapt to the insufficiencies, bureaucracy, and incompetencies that affect an army's ability to fight. Sweden did not achieve its strategic ambition to occupy the territories across the Peene or to assist the French advance and thereby secure a more stable subsidy inflow or post-war prizes. Arguably, it inadvertently aided the Russians in gaining control of Eastern Prussia—a counterproductive outcome at odds with its political course. But the Swedish army held together with the help of private solutions when public supply was lacking, and vice versa. In fact, it attained occasional tactical gains in the direction of Berlin, Stettin, and Wollin, impeding Prussian troop movements to other theatres.

In every passing year Sweden's resource base declined, while older debt arrangements overlapped with new ones, revealing newer deficiencies. Swedish warfare became dependent on France's aid to fuel the military acquisitions and to create a liquidity buffer upholding the contracts approved by Stockholm. A critical juncture in Sweden's warfare was the cessation of these subsidies, coupled with the bankruptcy of its main continental creditor, Joachim Ulrich Giese, resulting in challenges to find adequate substitutes to replace these credit sources. The new system relied on central bank loans and was increasingly managed by the Stockholm cabinet ministers and logisticians. It reduced

102 Malmström 1899–1900, 5:143.

the army's ability to operate autonomously with the help of local commerce, thereby limiting the scope of operations.

Amid the overall exhaustion of the Pomeranian market, Sweden required a combination of the commissariat's and commission's efforts, which was achieved not through their cooperation but through competition over the resource flows. In the established system, the strategic procurement and tactical agencies focused on their commercial objectives and prioritised them above the achievement of operational tasks, resulting in sharper discord and tighter financial commitments. But Sweden's acquisitions continued through overlap of public and private roles in pursuit of sustaining the relentless momentum of war. This seemingly disordered contest within the administration granted situational advantages to the involved agencies through decentralised finances and acquisitions. It also ensured the autonomy of each organ from the interventions of the others, proving to be the source of resilience of the Swedish warfare.

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Epilogue

The Study of the Baltic Business of War, Now and in the Future[1]

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The Business of War in the Early Modern Baltic Sea Region, 1530–1765 combines two approaches to the past: economic history (including business and financial history) and the history of war. On their own, both economics and warfare are complex matters, and each topic has been studied for its relation to state formation.[2] The early modern Baltic Sea region was central both in trade—on all geographical levels—and in warfare, the latter mostly at the regional or European level. Yet, the challenges of waging war and supplying for war at the same time have hitherto been understudied, and this present volume has endeavoured to fill in these research gaps.

1 The research for this chapter has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 787504).

2 Among many others, Brewer 1989; Tilly 1992; Rogers 1995; Pomeranz 2000; Adams 2005.

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The many wars discussed in the chapters of this book—the Nordic Seven Years' War, the Thirty Years' War, the British Civil War, the Anglo-Dutch Wars, several wars between Sweden and Russia, and between Sweden and Poland–Lithuania, the Livonian Wars, the Great Northern War, the (global) Seven Years' War, and even the Ottoman–Venetian Wars—show the ubiquity of Baltic powers in European warfare, as well as of warfare within the region. While this fact has been studied at national level, and especially for the conflicts under the label of Northern Wars,[3] the importance of wars usually not considered part of the Northern Wars needs to be studied more, as the chapters by Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, Adam Grimshaw, Patrik Winton, Björn Forsén and Mika Hakkarainen, Peter Ericsson, and Oleksandr Turchyn have shown. The perspective of looking at the business of war on the regional level of the Baltic brings into focus the interplay between various wars, usually considered independently from each other.

This volume has used an actor-centric approach to discuss the entanglement of these different wars with the complex economic and financial frameworks which make for the business of war. The actors analysed in these pages have ranged from military commanders, merchants, producers, financiers, specialised contractors, diplomats, and state agents to rulers, governments, and nobles. Studying them has demonstrated how deeply transnational the act of supplying and organising for war was, both on the level of these individual actors and on the level of organisations and governments. An analysis of the early modern Baltic business of war will be comparable to other European regions, which also functioned on overlapping levels of local, regional, and transnational networks, connected via land and sea. These networks interacted with each other and, as such, Baltic networks supplying for war were connected to other European regions too, whether as part of a European labour market for officers, cavalry, or infantry (discussed here by Sebastian Schiavone and by Forsén and Hakkarainen, but also touched upon by Grosjean and Murdoch and by Jaakko Björklund), or as part of logistical and production chains of war materials (here discussed by Grosjean and Murdoch, and by Adam Grimshaw, Mika Mickelsson, and Winton). However, the case studies presented here also show the importance of various contexts to how

3 Oakley 1992; Frost 2000.

Baltic powers prepared for war. Political, legal, economic, geographic, military, and administrative frameworks, some of them specific to the Baltic region, all impacted the conduct of the business of war, and all offer categories for future research to compare the Baltic with other European or global regions.

The Baltic region was connected by water, and its ports and coastal cities formed a network independently from kingdoms and other polities. This network enabled trade, with both military and civil goods, and both within and outside the Baltic Sea. It also connected military entrepreneurs with recruitment grounds, producers of war materials, merchants, and political actors on all levels. Traces of these connections between ports are found all over the Baltic (and beyond, in cities such as Hamburg, Amsterdam, or Aberdeen), in customs books and harbour accounts. As widespread as the Baltic trading connections were, so widespread today are traces of it in sources all over the Baltic, Northern Europe, and beyond. It is possible for historians to follow these traces and at least partly reconstruct the trading networks of the Baltic businesses of war. However, as the chapters in this book have shown, the variety of available source material, the limits of each of these source genres, and the gaps in source tradition constitute an ongoing problem. A fantastic start in combining these various source traditions are the three volumes by Lennart Bes, Edda Frankot, and Hanno Brand, *Baltic Connections* (2007), but more needs to be done in terms of identifying, curating, and digitising sources related to the Baltic business of war.[4]

As this book shows, the variety of actors involved in early modern warfare demands an open approach to heuristic, in particular the choice of sources and source genres. The authors of the various chapters have cross-referenced sources—some of them already digitised or edited, and some newly researched archival materials—to uncover the complexity of each case study. Letters, reports of all kinds, information on shipments such as the Sound Toll Registers Online (STRO), ship arrivals, customs accounts from various ports, regiment rolls, tax lists,

4 Bes, Frankot, and Brand 2007. Currently, the project 'Quantifying Illicit and Licit Trade in the Early Modern World' (QuILT), funded by the University of Helsinki, also attempts to combine several of these sources to shed more light on the maritime trade connections, starting with a study focused on the Baltic ports.

account books, and political proceedings have been among the used sources. In particular, letters are essential to understanding the actors within the business of war and to unravelling their networks, as several of the chapters have shown. This constitutes a challenge since letters are scattered widely, often in local or even private archives; many have not survived; and, of course, all are highly subjective and limited in scope. Grimshaw's study of the activities of the Swedish diplomat Johan Barkman in England shows that following traces of such actors is time-consuming, but it can yield unexpected results and shine new light into international relations and the conduct of wars due to the entanglement between private and public matters (Chapter 3). Letters and cross-referencing of sources offer new insights and reveal unexpected connections within networks. In addition to such letters, biographical databases such as the Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical Database (SSNE) are needed in this research to provide further information. As the business of war was so highly dependent on individual agency; on actors from, surrounding, and outside state governments; and on the networks between interested and invested actors, the use these databases is needed to fully understand events and motivation.

The Baltic business of war was, as the chapters in this book have demonstrated, highly dependent on non-government actors throughout the early modern period. Nonetheless, characteristics of the entanglement between governments and suppliers of materiel, soldiers, and finances give insights into Baltic state formation. The commerce of materiel, finances, and troops for armies and navies was an important part of the early modern economy. In addition, the two and a half centuries between the end of the Kalmar Union (1523) and the end of the Seven Years' War (1763) were marked by the changing of the conduct of war itself. Wars were now conducted with larger units; troops were often employed for longer and more continuous campaigns; and they were equipped with expensive new technologies requiring new drills and enabling a wider part of the population to engage with war, either as soldiers, as providers of war materials, or in a growing number of roles within the baggage trains and the various early modern warfaring societies.[5] These changes forced rulers to take a different approach to organising warfare and to mobilising military resources. Private or

5 E.g. Hall 1997; Tallett and Trim 2010; Sandberg 2016.

semi-private actors as well as more open markets were a possibility for buying or hiring whatever was necessary, with actors such as merchants and military entrepreneurs quickly proving their ability to fulfil the governments' demands. In the early modern period, these actors therefore gained political influence in new ways, supported by their economic activities that proved necessary for the new patterns of warfare. What have been most influential for understanding this from the actors' perspective and in a European context have been discussions on the fiscal-military state and the contractor state.[6] The economic agency of early modern rulers, and the limitations in their acting on transnational and even global markets are, however, still an open question which requires further study.[7]

This volume has focused in its three parts on men, money, and materiel, but, at the same time, several chapters have discussed the overlap of these essential parts of warfare. The importance of planning the supply of armies with war materials—in particular, a wide range of weapons—has been shown by Grosjean and Murdoch's chapter covering the case of the Scottish Covenanter army preparing to fight against King Charles I of England, Scotland, and Ireland (Chapter 1). Their work draws attention to the relevance of established connections between military commanders and merchants but also highlights the various roles that early modern army commanders fulfilled. Political and military roles were entangled with the high social and economic status of these actors, a theme also discussed by Björklund (Chapter 7) in his study of Jacob De la Gardie, and by Forsén and Hakkarainen (Chapter 8) for the Swedish nobles joining the Morean War (1684–1699). Their political functions within their respective native realms, resulting from their noble status, landownership, or family influence, kept them connected to their nations, even when fighting outside their own jurisdiction and for different powers; furthermore, these made them aware of the need to prepare for war years in advance.

Supplying wars was in large part organised by non-state actors, and it was, at least on the side of merchants and producers, just part of wider business practices. Following the traces of army leaders, as Schiavone, Björklund, and Grosjean and Murdoch have done, is one

6 Torres Sánchez 2007; Bannerman 2008; Harding and Ferri 2012; Graham and Walsh 2016.

7 Cremer and Jendorff 2022.

way to uncover the hitherto understudied Baltic- and European-wide networks of military supply. As discussed by Grimshaw in his chapter on the later 17th-century Anglo-Swedish commercial relations, semi-private diplomats, envoys, and agents from Sweden in Britain, identifying their networks, and cross-referencing mentioned trades with the STRO or Stockholm's custom accounts and diplomatic reports, reveals not only existing networks but also the problems of smuggling or concealing materiel when shipping across borders and through hostile waters, as was especially the case for anything coming to or leaving Sweden and having to pass the Danish-controlled Øresund. This is specific to the Baltic geography, and to the extraordinary control that Denmark had over the only navigable strait into the Baltic Sea (and out of it). However, letters and other sources are needed to identify shipments between England and Sweden which were re-routed through Hamburg or Amsterdam, making them nearly unidentifiable in STRO or custom accounts as part of the Anglo-Swedish trade, as Grimshaw has shown.

In the early modern period, governments did not have a monopoly on the means of war. They were one among many ordering or buying war materials from private suppliers, who were not necessarily from their own jurisdiction. Louis De Geer from Liège in the Low Countries was such an example of an entrepreneur acting across several territories. Moreover, even though he was the royal supplier for Sweden, he was not confined to this role, as he also traded widely across Northern Europe and had an extensive personal and business network. Mickelsson's chapter highlights the importance of not only tracing individual actors and their various roles within the business of war, but also including actors' family and wider networks, without which military supply would simply not have worked (Chapter 2). The role of non-state or private actors in these industrial endeavours cannot be overestimated.[8] As especially the history of the state monopoly on copper and iron in Sweden has shown, new technologies, initiatives and willingness for investments, and transnational connections were essential to grow such trade, and were mostly provided by non-state actors. Analysing which industries were characteristic and essential in providing for war is another approach to understand the local and regional contributions to the wider European system.

8 Odén 1960; Evans and Rydén 2007.

Private actors within the business of war mostly answered to states' demand for materiel, soldiers, or finances. The interactions between private actors and state officials, however, are not yet well explored. As Winton in his chapter (Chapter 4) on the unsuccessful Swedish war with Russia of 1741–1743 discusses, mutual trust needed to be established between state and merchants, a theme also important in Schiavone's chapter. Merchants were continuously acting across borders, and the few merchants in direct contact with the Swedish Procurement Office were each representative for their much larger international networks. Cities such as Stockholm in the Baltic, and Hamburg or London outside it, became more and more the spaces where such international networks were able to interact, as shown later in the book by Ericsson's chapter.[9] Moreover, as Winton's analysis of food procurement for this comparatively small campaign of 1741–1743 shows, such merchant networks were entangled with other networks of trade and finance, and none of them would have been able to fulfil the complete demand for the Swedish campaign in Finland, owing to specialisation of trade. From the perspective of economic history, supplying for war—with its different logic compared to market developments—shows the complexity of either state actors trying to operate in a mostly private market economy, or private actors trying to navigate state and political requirements, emphasising the higher efficiency of a mixture of private and public actors within this business.

The second part of this book turns the focus on the human resources necessary for waging war. Often forgotten in discussions about troops are the people involved in intelligence and security, and the people providing governments with information and access to the markets on which to hire troops. Martin Neuding Skoog discusses the role of various agents working for the Swedish king Gustav I in the late 1530s and 1540s, but also conceptualises information as a commodity within the wider business of war (Chapter 5). Intelligence about available troops, mobilisations, and troop movements was essential for polities in precarious political positions as the newly established Kingdom of Sweden was, but such intelligence was also, as Neuding Skoog highlights, subjective and fraught with unverified information and knowledge. This draws attention once again to the second or even third level in early modern governments: men (and sometimes women) in royal service,

9 See also Wilson and Klerk 2022.

and their role as provider of information, a topic also touched upon by Grimshaw's case studies and in Mariusz Balcerek's chapter. However, the case of Sweden also highlights the importance of considering the individual decision-makers, as Gustav I was an unusually mistrustful ruler, and it shows the problem of separating truth from rumours, and of determining in which direction a mobilised army might go. Gustav countered this high uncertainty by spreading out his network, relying on office-holders within and outside the Swedish realm, as well as on mobile agents and letters.

This book shows that researchers need to look at military personnel on several scales. Schiavone's analysis of the Scottish cavalry squadron under William Cahun during the beginning of the Northern Wars period (1560s) points out the opportunities but also the difficulties in such relationships across borders (Chapter 6). Trust as a basis for such political and military relationships was as important here as it was in Gustav I's network of intelligence. Schiavone is able to show these changing trust relationships between Cahun and Erik XIV, and between Cahun and Johan III, again emphasising the need to understand the personal relationships between state actors, even monarchs, and military leaders on all levels, a common theme throughout the book. There is more to be done to follow these individuals over time, as seen, for example, in the case of Pontus De la Gardie, discussed by Schiavone for his role in the Northern Seven Years' War, and his son Jacob De la Gardie, discussed by Björklund. Having both chapters is indeed helpful to show the change over time, and the increase in administrative developments, enabling Jacob to build on the work of his father. Björklund's chapter reveals the financial and administrative practices of Jacob De la Gardie's military entrepreneurship in the Ingrian War of 1609–1617, with a focus on the building of his own lifeguard regiment. While Schiavone addresses the uncertainty of Pontus De la Gardie's career, as well as the reduced role of the Swedish government in this, Björklund's article shows the changing situation, with the establishment of a system in which foreigners were integrated in war organisation. His analysis of financial movements indicates the interaction between private coffers and military treasuries, confirming the fluidity between them, and the challenges in identifying private and public funds in early modern warfare (or polities, for that matter). The interdependence of military performance and economic or financial

developments will need more comparative analysis to understand to the fullest both it and its role within wider political decisions.

While the role of privatised military units and entrepreneurs has been well discussed since Fritz Redlich's *The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force* (1964–1965), more recent research on the entanglement of private and public matters, in particular in financial and economic terms, requires more investigation.[10] The business of warfare, thought to be public business, and more and more revealed to be privately or mixed public–privately financed, is an important contribution to the more general discussions of premodern political economy. Understanding these wider connections requires going beyond individual polities, to consider the European (and sometimes also global) 'transnational labour market'.[11] Forsén and Hakkarainen therefore turn their attention to Swedish military personnel serving in Venice during the Morean War (1684–1699), bringing light to the Baltic business of war interacting with wider European contexts, but also to the role of the domestic policy in Sweden of the 1680 *reduktion* (confiscation of land by the crown, largely to the detriment of the nobility), which influenced Swedish subjects to participate in this transnational military labour market, and turned Sweden from an import area of military personnel to an export region of the same. The patterns and motivations behind the migration of transnational actors within the business of war—Louis De Geer, the De la Gardies, and Cahun being just a few of the many—are another fruitful research field, connecting the requirements of the complexity of warfare with general demographics and social European history.

The impact of economic and financial aspects on military performance also need closer study. As Balcerek in his chapter on the early 17th-century war in Livonia (Sweden vs Poland–Lithuania) discusses, state financial capacity was essential in securing military resources (Chapter 9). Furthermore, establishing dominion over cities such as Riga was important not only for geo-strategic reasons, but even more so to secure access to the trade and wealth of their inhabitants. Sweden in the conflict with Poland–Lithuania was more successful in acquiring a wider spread of revenues, and in mobilising resources needed for military performance and, ultimately, for the successful waging of war.

10 Redlich 1964–1965.
11 See Chapter 8 in this volume.

These wars between Sweden and Poland–Lithuania, also discussed by Katarzyna Wagner (Chapter 10), connect the Baltic sphere with the conflicts in Central Europe, and their contextualisation within wider European developments needs more discussion. In particular, the interaction between the land-based wars of Poland–Lithuania and the very maritime character of Baltic warfare seems still to be a challenge to conceptualise. One approach to this, as Wagner discusses for the Polish–Swedish War of 1655–1660 and Balcerek for the early 17th century, might be to follow the money, inevitably entangled with war efforts. War, unlike economic activities during peacetime, allows for looting, forced loans, and taxes, as well as what amounts to protection money, as extraordinary income outside normal economic behaviour. The *brandskatt* tax of Warsaw was one such example, helping to connect the military side of war with social and especially urban history, thus showing the impact that war had on everyday life.

As Björklund and Balcerek discuss for the early 17th century, Ericsson also confirms for the 18th century: the entanglement between state financial capacity and private (or semi-private) entrepreneurship (Chapter 11). His study, however, brings this into a more established European and global market, and connects it to the general ongoing institutionalisation within these markets. It remained nonetheless the task of the Swedish crown to access private enterprise to enhance state military business. As the economic organisation of polities changed—for example, by relying more on credit than on extraordinary taxes or contributions such as Warsaw's *brandskatt* for war finances, military entrepreneurs like the De la Gardies became less involved with the financial side of warfare, which was then taken over by merchant bankers, war becoming just one business among many. Much as the military entrepreneurs had been, these merchant bankers were active in transnational markets, making financial hubs such as Amsterdam, Hamburg, or London central for governments to access money. Furthermore, the established widespread use of financial instruments such as bills of exchange and the growing importance of financial markets and exchange banks made this possible, as Ericsson explains in his chapter. Within the Swedish realm, Stockholm was a financial centre, interacting with Hamburg, Amsterdam, and other European hubs, and enabling the Swedish crown to participate not only in the Baltic business of war but also in the European and global scale of it.

Turchyn's chapter on Swedish finances during the Seven Years' War brings this discussion to the operational and local level (Chapter 12). Investigations that complement each other, as Ericsson's and Turchyn's studies do, seem to be essential for getting a grip on the complex relationship between the private sphere and the state, and between the actors on various levels, and for understanding the local, regional, and transnational contexts of early modern warfare. I omit the level of national contexts deliberately, as more and more research has shown that the business of war (and many other businesses) has always had an element that transcends national jurisdiction. That is not to say that national domestic policies and contexts cannot influence warfare and in turn be influenced by it, but they are always only one aspect of the whole. Moreover, as Turchyn shows, the influence of governmental actors in the economic and financial side of warfare can prove to be a disadvantage, where they lack the networks, capital, and flexibility of established private actors.

Given the transnational aspects of trade, economy, finances, and business intermingling with logistics, military campaigns, and warfare, as well as recovery from war or preparing for war in times of no active conflicts (rare as they were in the early modern Baltic), future research into the Baltic business of war needs to follow these various threads of men, money, and materiel out of the Baltic. While comparative history, such as comparisons with the organisation of the business of war within the Atlantic or Mediterranean powers, has its value, the increasingly transnational character of military entrepreneurs, bankers, providers of war materials, and other involved actors demands a larger scale of analysis, rather than looking at regional histories in their own bubbles. Furthermore, research to understand the supply of war has to address the widespread role of private agents within it. As such, historians need to utilise a wide variety of sources. Going from production to distribution and finally to demand and consumption, such sources include account books of producers and merchants, customs registers such as the ones for the Sound Toll, letters between everyone involved, ship lists and harbour registers, account books, and bills from state offices. And these sources need to be utilised not just from the national archives of Baltic powers but from all over Europe and even the world.

Today, accessing these sources and allowing studies on a scale which mirrors the activities of early modern Baltic actors is possible due to the increase of digitisation projects. Making economic, financial, and

military data available in databases, and not just as images of archival documents, is essential to untangle the complexity which each of the chapters in this volume has discussed for a very limited time period. However, digitisation and databases are just the first step; international cooperation to make these datasets compatible is required as well.

Looking at the Baltic business of war over the roughly 250-year period between the increase of armies in the 16th century to the (maybe short-term) nationalisation of warfare since the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars highlights the increase of standardisation and attempted state control, though this has always fluctuated, with a large part not standardised and reliant on non-state actors. In addition to change over time, the business of war within the wider Baltic region encompasses different geographies. In particular, the Baltic Sea as connection, but also with its own challenges of food supply, weather, navigation, piracy, and smuggling needs to be considered, and results from maritime history are especially promising to consider.[12] Moreover, campaigns by Baltic powers were usually overseas—even when they were in the same jurisdiction. Sweden, despite being at war for most of the period, hardly ever fought on home territory. Even with examples such as the Swedish–Russian War of 1741–1743, which was, indeed, fought in large part on Swedish territory in Finland, because Finland was separated from mainland Sweden by the Gulf of Bothnia, the problem of overseas supply remained.

This volume has mostly studied the Baltic business of war from the perspective of the history of war. As such, questions of how important the business of war was for European and global business in general are still open. The confidence and ease with which military entrepreneurs acted within these transnational markets demands more analysis, and perhaps also a reconsideration of the economic agency and activities of political and social elites, as especially the chapter by Forsén and Hakkarainen has shown.[13]

Understanding the early modern Baltic business of war will increase our knowledge of Baltic trade and economy as well as of early modern European warfare. However, as this volume has demonstrated, more research at the local, regional, and transnational level is needed, which requires the utilisation of source materials from Baltic archives as well

12 E.g. Glete 2000; Glete 2010.
13 Cremer and Jendorff 2022.

as those beyond the Baltic. Based on such research, questions of the impact and role of warfare within the economy of polities, or of the economic agency of various ranks, or even of the interdependence of economy, finances, military performance, and political decision-making might be answered in future research.

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